

THIS FILE IS MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE DECLASSIFICATION EFFORTS AND RESEARCH OF:

THE BLACK VAULT

THE BLACK VAULT IS THE LARGEST ONLINE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT / GOVERNMENT RECORD CLEARING HOUSE IN THE WORLD. THE RESEARCH EFFORTS HERE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS THROUGHOUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AND ALL CAN BE DOWNLOADED BY VISITING:

[HTTP://WWW.BLACKVAULT.COM](http://www.blackvault.com)

YOU ARE ENCOURAGED TO FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO YOUR FRIENDS, BUT PLEASE KEEP THIS IDENTIFYING IMAGE AT THE TOP OF THE .PDF SO OTHERS CAN DOWNLOAD MORE!

I O Report

**Chronological Record of Events for
Article 23 Proceedings**

Chronological Record of Events for Article 32 Investigation

2003

- 17 July Received appointment letter, CID investigation packet, and charge sheets from [REDACTED] attorney for the prosecution
- 18 July Sent e-mail notification to trial counsel suggesting 28 July as hearing date
- Sent e-mail to [REDACTED] to draft an official notification letter for accused
- Sent e-mail to 530th MP Battalion notifying them of tentative hearing date and requesting coordination of facilities at Camp Bucca, IZ
- E-mail notification re-sent to [REDACTED]
- 19 July E-mail notification re-sent to [REDACTED]
- 21 July Received e-mail from [REDACTED] on behalf of other defense counsel, requesting delay until 5 September, reply asking for each counsel's calendar through 5 September
- Remaining counsels respond with trial calendars through 5 September
- 22 July Forward defense counsels calendars to [REDACTED] asking for input for an alternate date
- [REDACTED] replies back suggesting 25 August as hearing date
- Investigating Officer selects 27 August for hearing, allowing 2 days travel and 2 days consultation for defense
- 23 July Notification letters for accused prepared and handed to [REDACTED] Executive Officer, 530th MP Battalion, for delivery to accused
- E-mails sent to defense counsels with notification letters attached for their respective clients
- E-mail attachment received from [REDACTED] requesting hearing delay until 27 August
- 24 July E-mail attachment received from [REDACTED] requesting hearing delay until 27 August
- Sent memorandum to Commander, 800th MP Brigade, advising on status of Article 32 investigation
- 27 July E-mail attachment received from [REDACTED] requesting hearing delay until 27 August

- 28 July E-mail received from [REDACTED] requesting hearing delay until 27 August
Sent request for hearing extension date to Commander, 800th MP Brigade
- 31 July [REDACTED] legal advisor, receives Article 32 acknowledgement from [REDACTED]
- 4 August Forwarded request to Commander, 800th MP Brigade, for assignment of Public Affairs Officer to the Article 32 investigation
Receive notice from [REDACTED] that two of the defense counsels, [REDACTED] have requested change of venue from Camp Bucca to Camp Arifjan, due to their perceived inability to adjust to the area's climate in time for the trial
- 5 August Request report from [REDACTED] on progress with arrangements at Bucca, he responds that tents are available, but that air conditioning and power are critical issues that he is having problems with and that humidity is affecting all aspects of life there
Send e-mail to [REDACTED] asking for input based on [REDACTED] report
- 6 August Spoke with [REDACTED] of 724th MP Battalion regarding KBR force provider package for Bucca. Communicate with [REDACTED] to ask KBR for timeline. Package does not look as if it will support needs for hearing. 171st ASG unable to support requirements, either
- 7 August Spoke with 226th ASG representatives. They indicate that if hearing needs to move in part to Arifjan, they can support it with Warehouse #7. Also speak with KBR representatives on ability to provide temporary power generation and AC units for hearing at Bucca. They are checking to see if they can support the requirements
Received e-mail from [REDACTED] regarding expression of concern from [REDACTED] about conditions at Bucca. Both have asked that hearing be bifurcated with any necessary interviews taking place at Camp Bucca and remainder of hearing in Kuwait
- 8 August Spoke with [REDACTED] on telephone regarding conditions at Bucca. She expresses her concern about holding hearing there, due to weather conditions. I explained that we were working to try and make conditions there more conducive to the hearing, but that if we couldn't accomplish it, we would look at holding the hearing at, or at least a portion of it, at Camp Arifjan, KU
On or about 8 August, spoke with [REDACTED], S-3, 226th ASG, regarding availability of space for hearing and rooms at Arifjan. He said he believed he could accomplish it and be able to house both the hearing and sleep facilities in Warehouse #7, if necessary
- 9 August Sent out e-mail to all parties asking for resolution on issues concerning receipt/acknowledgements of hearing from [REDACTED] late witness and evidence lists from defense counsels, PAO/recorder/interpreter support from 800th, KBR support at Camp Bucca

[REDACTED] replies to query and has been in court 6-7 August. Said he plans on visiting Camp Bucca 12-14 August to check on site preparation and issues with PAO/interpreter/recorder support

[REDACTED] sends e-mail informing me that a [REDACTED] ACO, can authorize tents at Camp Bucca

10 August Receive Article 32 Witness and Discovery Request from [REDACTED] on behalf of her client, [REDACTED]

In a series of e-mails with [REDACTED] he informs me that there is as of yet, no word or progress from KBR other than beginning the force provider package for the camp as a whole

11 August Receive Article 32 Witness and Discovery Request from [REDACTED] on behalf of her client, [REDACTED]

Make contact with [REDACTED] ACO, who expresses cooperation to help with site arrangements at Camp Bucca

Sent message to [REDACTED] at Camp Bucca on general layout of the hearing area and requirements for the housing of the participants

12 August [REDACTED] forwards Letter of Technical Direction to [REDACTED] authorizing erection of four tents and climate control VIA ECU's and power generation at Camp Bucca in support of Article 32 hearing

14 August Forwarded Article 32 Witness and Discovery Requests to [REDACTED]

15 August Receive report from [REDACTED] on his trip to Camp Bucca 12-14 August

Received message from [REDACTED] that he has not yet determined his witness list Also advised that he would have [REDACTED] respond by e-mail, acknowledging Art 32 proceedings

Received message from [REDACTED] that she wishes representation at the Article 32 hearing from [REDACTED] forwarded to [REDACTED] responded to [REDACTED] and advised to forward witness/discovery list as soon as possible

[REDACTED] confirms reporter for hearing, advises that he is checking on PAO support

16 August Send e-mail advising all counsel that Article 32 proceedings will be held at Camp Bucca, in total Also advised that EPWs would be heard in one block Spoke briefly to PAO and media coverage Advised counsel that we would hold meeting on Tuesday, 26 Aug, at 0900, at Camp Bucca, to discuss issues before the hearing commences

- 17 August [REDACTED] advises that her client [REDACTED] is aware of Art 32 proceedings and also that her witness list will be similar to CPT Ausprung
- 18 August Sent official notice to [REDACTED] that I am officially ordering witnesses and evidence previously requested by [REDACTED] to be present at hearing, requests had been forwarded to him on 14 August
- Send message to all counsel asking for input about having EPWs testify last in the proceedings, to allow mission essential personnel to go first and return to their units as quickly as possible
- Received replies from [REDACTED] that they had no objections to EPWs testifying last, [REDACTED] stated that she might need to re-call witnesses based on EPW testimony
- 19 August Forwarded [REDACTED] witness and discovery request to [REDACTED] (request was sent late on 18 August)
- Asked [REDACTED] for review of requested evidence for classified material, in case brigade commander wishes to issue a protective order
- 20 August [REDACTED] replies that to-date he has not been able to determine whether evidence material contains classified information, but is waiting on [REDACTED] of 800th MP Bde to supply requested information
- Received several communications regarding media presence at hearing and on Camp Bucca. Expressed my wish that media be limited to 2-3 representatives in the hearing tent due to its limited size. Also, that during presentation of testimony and evidence from EPWs, or when classified information is presented, that the tent will be cleared of all media
- 23 August Witness and discovery list received from [REDACTED]. Forwarded to [REDACTED] with order to produce witnesses and material
- 25 August Legal Advisor and I depart for Camp Bucca, IZ. Arrive approx 1100 Hrs. Notify all counsel of meeting on Tuesday at 0900 Hrs to discuss trial procedure. Defense counsel and accused arrive with government counsels
- 26 August Meet with all trial counsels and discuss trial procedures and witness list. Government informs that all several US witnesses are on leave or have been rotated out of theater. Requests further time to identify, with [REDACTED] those EPW witnesses that will be available. Decide to meet again at 1500 to go over EPW witness list. Additionally,
- Defense requests verbatim transcript of proceedings and I approve, due to questionable presence of EPWs at a later time and potential of availability of US witnesses
 - Legal advise will be with all counsel present and re-stated for the record
 - Will request that appointing authority transmit copies of report to counsel
- At 1500 meeting, it has been determined that all EPW witnesses requested by the government and eight EPW witnesses requested by the defense are available, with potentially four more EPWs available, as well

- 27 August Hearing opened at 0800 Hrs, on schedule All accused, defense counsels, and government counsels are present. Government presents six witnesses [REDACTED] Defense presents three witnesses [REDACTED] Hearing recessed at 1900 Hrs, at defense request, to review witnesses from 320th MP Battalion and 314th MP Company
- 28 August Hearing re-opened at 0800 Hrs Government presents one witness [REDACTED] Defense presents three witnesses [REDACTED] Hearing stops at approximately 1030 Hrs, at defense request, in order for them to prepare for CID special agent and EPW testimony
- Approx 1900 Hrs, defense counsels request an additional delay until 1300 Hrs, 29 August, in order to further examine EPW testimony and also due to delay in seeing EPW witnesses that afternoon
- 29 August Hearing re-opens at 1300 Hrs. Defense presents [REDACTED] government presents EPWs [REDACTED] Government re-presents [REDACTED] presents CID Special [REDACTED] Defense presents CID Special Agent [REDACTED] Government presents [REDACTED] Hearing is recessed from Camp Bucca to Camp Doha, KU, for three witnesses returning from leave [REDACTED] and for government to pursue contact with witnesses rotated out of theater [REDACTED] MD
- 30 August All parties move to Kuwait, pending notification of arrival of three witnesses returning from leave Recognition of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for arrangements at Camp Bucca
- 1 September At Camp Doha, heard testimony of [REDACTED] both just returning from leave Also made contact with SA [REDACTED] by telephone and heard his testimony
- 2 September Heard testimony of SPC [REDACTED] at Camp Doha. Government requests additional charges of adultery and obstruction of justice against SGT [REDACTED] Decision made not to allow additional charges due to late request. Hearing closed Government advises that verbatim transcript will take 3-4 weeks to produce
- 7 September Government requests re-consideration of earlier decision not to allow additional charges against SGT [REDACTED] CPT [REDACTED] counsel for SGT [REDACTED] unable to immediately respond due to trial in the US

- 13 September ██████████ responds to government request
- 17 September ██████████ advises IO on government request and defense position
- 18 September Responded to request affirming earlier decision not to allow charges
- 22 September Receive two copies verbatim transcript from CFLCC OSJA
- 23 September Article 32 investigation report forwarded to BG Karpinski

INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT
(Of Charges Under Article 32, UCMJ and R.C.M. 405, Manual for Courts-Martial)

1a FROM (Name of Investigating Officer Last First MI) [REDACTED]	b GRADE O-5/LTC	c ORGANIZATION 220TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE APO AE 09366	d DATE OF REPORT
2a TO (Name of Officer who directed the investigation Last First MI) KARPINSKI, JANIS L	b TITLE BRIGADE COMMANDER	c ORGANIZATION 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE APO AE 09366	
3a NAME OF ACCUSED (Last First, MI) EDMONDSON, SHAWNA L	b GRADE E-5	c SSN [REDACTED]	d ORGANIZATION 320TH MILITARY POLICE BN
			e DATE OF CHARGES

(Check appropriate answer)		YES	N
4	IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 32 UCMJ AND R.C.M. 405, MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL, I HAVE INVESTIGATED THE CHARGES APPENDED HERETO (Exhibit 1)	X	
5	THE ACCUSED WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL (If not see 9 below)	X	
6	COUNSEL WHO REPRESENTED THE ACCUSED WAS QUALIFIED UNDER R.C.M. 405(d)(2) 5D2(d)	X	

7a NAME OF DEFENSE COUNSEL (Last First MI) [REDACTED]	b GRADE O-3/CPT	8a NAME OF ASSISTANT DEFENSE COUNSEL (If any) NA	b GRADE
c ORGANIZATION (If appropriate) US ARMY TRIAL DEFENSE SERVICE REGION VIII, SCWEINFURT BRANCH OFFICE		c ORGANIZATION (If appropriate) NA	
d ADDRESS (If appropriate) APO AE 09226		d ADDRESS (If appropriate) NA	

9 (To be signed by accused if accused waives counsel. If accused does not sign, investigating officer will explain in detail in Item 2.)

a PLACE	b DATE
---------	--------

I HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF MY RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED IN THIS INVESTIGATION BY COUNSEL, INCLUDING MY RIGHT TO CIVILIAN OR MILITARY COUNSEL OF MY CHOICE IF REASONABLY AVAILABLE. I WAIVE MY RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS INVESTIGATION.

c SIGNATURE OF ACCUSED

10	AT THE BEGINNING OF THE INVESTIGATION I INFORMED THE ACCUSED OF (Check appropriate answer)	YES	N
a	THE CHARGE(S) UNDER INVESTIGATION	X	
b	THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSER	X	
c	THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 31	X	
d	THE PURPOSE OF THE INVESTIGATION	X	
e	THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE	X	
f	THE WITNESSES AND OTHER EVIDENCE KNOWN TO ME WHICH I EXPECTED TO PRESENT	X	
g	THE RIGHT TO CROSS EXAMINE WITNESSES	X	
h	THE RIGHT TO HAVE AVAILABLE WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED	X	
i	THE RIGHT TO PRESENT ANYTHING IN DEFENSE, EXTENUATION OR MITIGATION	X	
j	THE RIGHT TO MAKE A SWORN OR UNSWORN STATEMENT ORALLY OR IN WRITING	X	
11a	THE ACCUSED AND ACCUSED'S COUNSEL WERE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE (If the accused or counsel were absent during any part of the presentation of evidence, complete b below.)	X	

11b STATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND DESCRIBE THE PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED IN THE ABSENCE OF ACCUSED OR COUNSEL.

NOTE: If additional space is required for any item, enter the additional material in Item 21 on a separate sheet. Identify such material with the proper numerical and, if appropriate, lettered heading (Example: 7c). Securely attach any additional sheets to the form and add a note in the appropriate item of this form. "See additional sheet."

1.2b. THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES TESTIFIED UNDER OATH (Check appropriate answer)				
NAME (Last, First, MI)	GRADE (If any)	ORGANIZATION/ADDRESS (Whichever is appropriate)	YES	NO
[REDACTED]	E-6/SSG	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	E-5/SGT	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	E 5/SGT	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320th MP BATTALION	X	
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320th MP BATTALION	X	
b THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TESTIMONY OF THESE WITNESSES HAS BEEN REDUCED TO WRITING AND IS ATTACHED			X	
13a THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS DOCUMENTS OR MATTERS WERE CONSIDERED THE ACCUSED WAS PERMITTED TO EXAMINE EACH				
DESCRIPTION OF ITEM		LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (If not attached)		
#1 SWORN STATEMENT, [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03		OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU		
#2 AIR SA [REDACTED] IEM, 14 MAY 03		OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU		
#3 SWORN STATEMENT, SPC [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03		OSJA CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU		
#4 SWORN STATEMENT, SGT [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03		OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU		
#5 SWORN STATEMENT, SPC [REDACTED]		OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU		
#6 EPW MANIFEST, 744th MP BATTALION DTD 12 MAY 03		OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU		
ACH ITEM CONSIDERED OR A COPY OR RECITAL OF THE SUBSTANCE OR NATURE THEREOF, IS ATTACHED			X	
THERE ARE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED WAS NOT MENTALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OFFENSE(S) OR NOT COMPETENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEFENSE. (See R C M 909, 916(h))				X
15 THE DEFENSE DID REQUEST OBJECTIONS TO BE NOTED IN THIS REPORT (If Yes specify in Item 2) below ,			X	
16 ALL ESSENTIAL WITNESSES WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT OF TRIAL.			X	
17 THE CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS ARE IN PROPER FORM			X	
18 REASONABLE GROUNDS EXIST TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE OFFENSE(S) ALLEGED			X	
19 I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY GROUNDS WHICH WOULD DISQUALIFY ME FROM ACTING AS INVESTIGATING OFFICER (See R C M 405(d)(1))			X	
20 I RECOMMEND				
a TRIAL BY <input type="checkbox"/> SUMMARY <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GENERAL COURT MARTIAL				
b <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Item 2) below				
21 REMARKS (include as necessary explanation for any delays in the investigation and explanation for any "no" answers above)				
SEE ATTACHED CONTINUATION SHEET				
22a TYPED NAME OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER		b GRADE	c ORGANIZATION	
[REDACTED]		0-5/LTC	220th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE APO AE 09366	
d SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER			e DATE	
[REDACTED]				

CONTINUATION SHEET, DD FORM 457, INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

Item 12a, Witnesses

[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	744 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-7/SFC	744 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-5/SGT	744 th MO BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-6/SSG	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	0-4/MAJ	800 th MP BRIGADE	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	223 rd MP COMPANY	YES
By Telephonic Interview			
[REDACTED]	SA		YES

CONTINUATION SHEET, DD FORM 457, INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

Item 13a, Witnesses

#7 SWORN STATEMENT, [REDACTED] DTD 15 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#8 SWORN STATEMENT, [REDACTED] DTD 16 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#9 AIR, [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#10 SWORN STATEMENT, [REDACTED] DTD 15 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#11 SWORN STATEMENT, [REDACTED] DTD 16 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#12 SECOND SWORN STATEMENT, [REDACTED] DTD 15 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES

CONTINUATION SHEET, DD FORM 457, INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

SGT [REDACTED]

Item 21, Remarks

- 1 Twelve pieces of evidence were submitted during the hearing. The evidence presented and examined consisted of sworn statements or Agent's Investigation Reports taken or written by CID Special Agents. A manifest from the 744th Military Police Battalion, dated 12 May 03, was also submitted during the hearing. In some cases, witnesses referred to their statements or reports to re-fresh their recollection of events under question. Thirty-one separate witnesses were heard. The witnesses were credible, although defense counsels attempted to refute the testimony of certain witnesses and highlight that previous testimony or statements were contradictory to the recorded testimony during this hearing. Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence presented, I am able to make a recommendation with regard to further action involving the accused soldier.
- 2 With regard to SGT [REDACTED] make the following recommendations to the charges and specifications alleged against him:
 - a Charge I Violation of Article 92, Dereliction of Duty: I find that a preponderance of the evidence exists to validate the specification alleged against her. Clearly, SGT Edmondson had certain duties that might to safeguard EPWs, she knew of these duties by virtue of her position, grade, and previous experience, and that, according to the testimony of [REDACTED] she was willfully derelict in the performance of those duties.
 - b Charge II Violation of Article 93, Cruelty and Maltreatment: I find that a preponderance of the evidence exists to validate the specification alleged against her. The testimony of [REDACTED] indicate that her actions were cruel and maltreated EPW [REDACTED].
 - c Charge III Violation of Article 128, Assault: I find that a preponderance of the evidence exists to validate the specification alleged against her. The testimony of the witnesses identified previously all indicate that SGT [REDACTED] inflicted bodily harm on EPW [REDACTED] and that her use of force was unlawful.
 - d During the course of the hearing, testimony from SPC [REDACTED] prompted counsel for the government to request that the investigation be broadened to include violations of Article 81, Conspiracy, and Article 134, Obstruction of

Justice, against all four of the accused. I granted that request over the objection of all defense counsels. Aside from the testimony of SPC [REDACTED] I do not feel that further, sufficient evidence was presented to validate these charges. I, therefore, cannot report that a preponderance of the evidence suggests that these charges are true.

e. I recommend that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

3 Delays in proceedings

- a. IO proposed original date of 28 July 03 for hearing. Defense counsels requested delay to 5 September 03 due to schedule conflicts. IO set date of 27 August 03 after consulting all counsels. Defense counsels acknowledged that the time would not count against the speedy trial requirement of the government.
- b. 28 August 03. Defense counsels requested additional time to prepare for EPW witnesses and CID Special Agent testimony. IO granted recess until 290800 August 03. At approx. 2000 Hrs, defense counsels requested further delay due to problems accessing EPW witnesses. IO granted further delay until 291300 August 03.
- c. 29 August 03. Hearing recessed until arrival of additional witnesses on leave. Re-convene at Camp Doha, KU.
- d. 1 September 03. Hearing recessed until 021300 September 03 for additional witness. Further delayed until 021430 Sep 03 at request of defense counsels for additional time to interview witness.

4 Defense and Government Objections

- a. Defense. Defense counsels objected to introduction of sworn statement of SSG [REDACTED] in addition to his sworn testimony at the hearing. SSG [REDACTED] did not refer to his report during his testimony. IO sustained objection LAW RCM 405(4)(g)(B), allowing introduction of sworn statements over defense objection when the witness is not available.
- b. Government. Government counsel objected to defense line of questioning, asking whether certain witnesses had been advised of their rights under Article 31, or were being investigated, or had been charged with violation of Article 32, UCMJ, Dereliction of Duty. IO allowed defense counsels to ask this question due to its relevance based on the testimony of the witnesses.

CONTINUATION SHEET, DD FORM 457, INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

Item 13a, Witnesses

#7 SWORN STATEMENT, SSG [REDACTED] DTD 15 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#8 SWORN STATEMENT, MSG [REDACTED] DTD 16 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#9 AIR, SA [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#10 SWORN STATEMENT, SPC [REDACTED] DTD 15 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#11 SWORN STATEMENT, SSG [REDACTED] DTD 16 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#12 SECOND SWORN STATEMENT, SPC [REDACTED] DTD 15 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES

CONTINUATION SHEET, DD FORM 457, INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

SSG Scott A McKenzie, [REDACTED]

Item 21, Remarks

- 1 Twelve pieces of evidence were submitted during the hearing. The evidence presented and examined consisted of sworn statements or Agent's Investigation Reports taken or written by CID Special Agents. A manifest from the 744th Military Police Battalion, dated 12 May 03, was also submitted during the hearing. In some cases, witnesses referred to their statements or reports to re-fresh their recollection of events under question. Thirty-one separate witnesses were heard. The witnesses were credible, although defense counsels attempted to refute the testimony of certain witnesses and highlight that previous testimony or statements were contradictory to the recorded testimony during this hearing. Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence presented, I am able to make a recommendation with regard to further action involving the accused soldier.
- 2 With regard to SSG McKenzie, I make the following recommendations to the charges and specifications alleged against him:
 - a. Charge I Violation of Article 92, Dereliction of Duty: I find that a preponderance of the evidence exists to validate the specification alleged against him. By virtue of his position, experience and rank, SSG [REDACTED] had a certain duty to safeguard EPWs and was aware of those duties. The testimony of SSG [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED] and SPC [REDACTED] indicate that he was willfully derelict in the performance of those duties.
 - b. Charge II Violation of Article 93, Cruelty and Maltreatment: I find that a preponderance of the evidence exists to validate Specifications 2, 3 and 5 alleged against him. Evidence was not presented to sufficiently validate Specifications 1 and 4 alleged against him. SGT Nilsson's testimony confirms EPW [REDACTED] account of being dragged across the ground by his armpits (Specification 2). SGT [REDACTED] and SPC [REDACTED] both testified to his mistreatment of EPW [REDACTED] (Specification 3). The testimony of SSG [REDACTED] and SGT [REDACTED] indicate his mistreatment of EPW [REDACTED]. Other than the testimony of the EPWs themselves, I did not find corroborating testimony to substantiate the mistreatment of EPWs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

- c Charge III Violation of Article 107, False Official Statements: I find that a preponderance of the evidence exists to validate the specification alleged against him. The testimony of the previous witnesses indicates that SSG McKenzie's sworn statement of 16 May was false in that he denied the mistreatment of any EPWs and that he evidently knew such denial to be false at the time, and that his intent was to deceive investigators as to the true events of 12 May.
- d Charge IV Violation of Article 128, Assault: I find that a preponderance of the evidence exists to validate Specifications 1, 2, and 5 alleged against him. Evidence was not presented to sufficiently validate Specifications 3 and 4 alleged against him. The testimony of SGT [REDACTED] confirms EPW [REDACTED] account of being dragged by his armpits across the ground. SGT [REDACTED] and SPC [REDACTED] testified as to EPW [REDACTED] abuse. SSG [REDACTED] and SGT [REDACTED] testified as to his abuse of EPW [REDACTED]. Other than the testimony of the EPWs themselves, I did not find corroborating testimony to substantiate the assault of EPWs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].
- e During the course of the hearing, testimony from SPC [REDACTED] prompted counsel for the government to request that the investigation be broadened to include violations of Article 81, Conspiracy, and Article 134, Obstruction of Justice, against all four of the accused. I granted that request over the objection of all defense counsels. Aside from the testimony of SPC [REDACTED] I do not feel that further, sufficient evidence was presented to validate these charges. I, therefore, cannot report that a preponderance of the evidence suggests that these charges are true.
- f I recommend that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

3 Delays in proceedings

- a IO proposed original date of 28 July 03 for hearing. Defense counsels requested delay to 5 September 03 due to schedule conflicts. IO set date of 27 August 03 after consulting all counsels. Defense counsels acknowledged that the time would not count against the speedy trial requirement of the government.
- b 28 August 03 Defense counsels requested additional time to prepare for EPW witnesses and CID Special Agent testimony. IO granted recess until 290800.

August 03. At approx. 2000 Hrs, defense counsels requested further delay due to problems accessing EPW witnesses. IO granted further delay until 291300 August 03

- c 29 August 03 Hearing recessed until arrival of additional witnesses on leave Re-convene at Camp Doha, KU
- d 1 September 03 Hearing recessed until 021300 September 03 for additional witness Further delayed until 021430 Sep 03 at request of defense counsels for additional time to interview witness

4 Defense and Government Objections

- a Defense Defense counsels objected to introduction of sworn statement of SSG [REDACTED] in addition to his sworn testimony at the hearing. SSG [REDACTED] did not refer to his report during his testimony. IO sustained objection LAW RCM 405(4)(g)(B), allowing introduction of sworn statements over defense objection when the witness is not available
- b Government Government counsel objected to defense line of questioning, asking whether certain witnesses had been advised of their rights under Article 31, or were being investigated, or had been charged with violation of Article 32, UCMJ, Dereliction of Duty IO allowed defense counsels to ask this question due to its relevance based on the testimony of the witnesses
- c Defense Government counsel requested to broaden the scope of the investigation to include violations of Article 81, UCMJ, 80, Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice, and Article 134, UCMJ, Obstruction of Justice, against all four of the accused, based on testimony of SPC [REDACTED] Based on her testimony, IO allowed government to broaden the scope of the investigation to include these two charges
- d Defense Defense counsels perceived an allegation of impropriety in line of questioning by government counsel and asked that hearing area be cleared to further discuss the matter IO cleared the courtroom of all spectators, including the media I was advised by the PAO representation of a potential violation of the Freedom of Information Act in doing so, since the hearing was declared open My legal advisor also suggested that other spectators carried the same weight as the media Both were allowed back in, although the government counsel assured all parties that no such implied accusation was intended against any defense counsel and withdrew any further line of questioning along these lines

e Defense defense counsels objected to line of questioning by the government of SA [REDACTED] regarding a previous investigation by [REDACTED] of MSG [REDACTED] as irrelevant to the proceedings at hand. Government did not argue probative v prejudiced value of the questioning I sustained the objection and disallowed the questioning

f Defense after the testimony of the final witness, SPC [REDACTED] government counsel asked that the scope of the investigation be broadened to include violation of Article 134, Adultery and Obstruction of Justice Government withdrew its request for the adultery charge I did not allow the inclusion of this charge due to inadequate notice to the defense to prepare for the additional charges

5 While EPW witnesses have agreed to be available for further testimony, their release might make it difficult to reach them once they have returned home.

6 During the course of this hearing, testimony from SSG [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED] [REDACTED] SGT [REDACTED] SPC [REDACTED], and SPC [REDACTED] indicated that while the alleged incidents were occurring, they did not actively attempt to intervene as it was their responsibility to do as soldiers, and in the case of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as non-commissioned officers and leaders Beyond SSG [REDACTED] verbal attempts to stop the abuse of these EPWs, nothing else seems to have been done SGT [REDACTED] testimony that he turned away because he could not bear to watch this treatment is especially disturbing I recommend that you consider appropriate action with regard to these soldiers and their evident failure to act to protect the enemy prisoners of war in their charge or stop the mistreatment to which they have testified, under oath

INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

(Of Charges Under Article 32, UCMJ and R.C.M. 405, Manual for Courts-Martial)

1a FROM (Name of Investigating Officer Last, First MI) [REDACTED]	b GRADE O-5/LTC	c ORGANIZATION 220TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE APO AE 09366	d DATE OF REPORT
2a TO (Name of Officer who directed the investigation Last, First MI) KARPINSKI, JANIS L	b TITLE BRIGADE COMMANDER	c ORGANIZATION 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE APO AE 09366	
3a NAME OF ACCUSED (Last, First MI) MCKENZIE, SCOTT A	b GRADE E-6	c SSN [REDACTED]	d ORGANIZATION 320TH MILITARY POLICE BN

(Check appropriate answer)

4 IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 32 UCMJ AND R.C.M. 405 MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL, I HAVE INVESTIGATED THE CHARGES APPENDED HERETO (Exhibit 1);	YES	X	N
5 THE ACCUSED WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL (If not, see 6 below)	YES	X	N
6 COUNSEL WHO REPRESENTED THE ACCUSED WAS QUALIFIED UNDER R.C.M. 405(d)(2), 502(d)	YES	X	N

7a NAME OF DEFENSE COUNSEL (Last, First MI) [REDACTED]	b GRADE O-3/CPT	8a NAME OF ASSISTANT DEFENSE COUNSEL (If any) NA	b GRADE
c ORGANIZATION (If appropriate) US ARMY TRIAL DEFENSE SERVICE REGION VIII, VICENZA FIELD OFFICE		c ORGANIZATION (If appropriate) NA	
d ADDRESS (If appropriate) APO AE 09630		d ADDRESS (If appropriate) NA	

8 (To be signed by accused if accused waives counsel. If accused does not sign, investigating officer will explain in detail in item 21.)

a PLACE	b DATE
I HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF MY RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED IN THIS INVESTIGATION BY COUNSEL, INCLUDING MY RIGHT TO CIVILIAN OR MILITARY COUNSEL OF MY CHOICE IF REASONABLY AVAILABLE. I WAIVE MY RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS INVESTIGATION.	

c SIGNATURE OF ACCUSED

10 AT THE BEGINNING OF THE INVESTIGATION I INFORMED THE ACCUSED OF (Check appropriate answer)		YES	N
a	THE CHARGE(S) UNDER INVESTIGATION	X	
b	THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED	X	
c	THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 31	X	
d	THE PURPOSE OF THE INVESTIGATION	X	
e	THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE	X	
f	THE WITNESSES AND OTHER EVIDENCE KNOWN TO ME WHICH I EXPECTED TO PRESENT	X	
g	THE RIGHT TO CROSS EXAMINE WITNESSES	X	
h	THE RIGHT TO HAVE AVAILABLE WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED	X	
i	THE RIGHT TO PRESENT ANYTHING IN DEFENSE, EXTENUATION OR MITIGATION	X	
j	THE RIGHT TO MAKE A SWORN OR UNSWORN STATEMENT ORALLY OR IN WRITING	X	

11a THE ACCUSED AND ACCUSED'S COUNSEL WERE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE (If the accused or counsel were absent during any part of the presentation of evidence, complete b below)

b STATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND DESCRIBE THE PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED IN THE ABSENCE OF ACCUSED OR COUNSEL

NOTE: If additional space is required for any item, enter the additional material in item 21 or on a separate sheet. Identify such material with the proper numerical and, if appropriate, lettered heading (Example: "7c.") Securely attach any additional sheets to the form and add a note in the appropriate item of the form. "See additional sheet."

12a THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES TESTIFIED UNDER OATH (Check appropriate answer)				
NAME (Last First MI)	GRADE (if any)	ORGANIZATION/ADDRESS (Whichever is appropriate)	YES	NO
[REDACTED]	E-6/SSG	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	E-5/SGT	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	E-5/SGT	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320th MP BATTALION	X	
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320th MP BATTALION	X	
b THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TESTIMONY OF THESE WITNESSES HAS BEEN REDUCED TO WRITING AND IS ATTACHED			X	
13a THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS DOCUMENTS OR MATTERS WERE CONSIDERED THE ACCUSED WAS PERMITTED TO EXAMINE EACH				
DESCRIPTION OF ITEM		LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (if not attached)		
#1 SWORN STATEMENT, SGT [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03	[REDACTED]	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X	
#2 AIR, SA [REDACTED] IEM, 14 MAY 03	[REDACTED]	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X	
#3 SWORN STATEMENT, SPC [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03	[REDACTED]	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X	
#4 SWORN STATEMENT, SGT [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03	[REDACTED]	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X	
#5 SWORN STATEMENT, SPC [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X	
#6 EPW MANIFEST 744th MP BN, DTD 12 MAY 03	[REDACTED]	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X	
IF ITEM CONSIDERED OR A COPY OR RECITAL OF THE SUBSTANCE OR NATURE THEREOF, IS ATTACHED			X	
THERE ARE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED WAS NOT MENTALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OFFENSE(S) OR NOT COMPETENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEFENSE. (See R.C.M. 909 916(k))				X
15 THE DEFENSE DID REQUEST OBJECTIONS TO BE NOTED IN THIS REPORT (If Yes specify in Item 21 below)			X	
16 ALL ESSENTIAL WITNESSES WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT OF TRIA			X	
17 THE CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS ARE IN PROPER FORM			X	
18 REASONABLE GROUNDS EXIST TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE OFFENSE(S) ALLEGED			X	
19 I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY GROUNDS WHICH WOULD DISQUALIFY ME FROM ACTING AS INVESTIGATING OFFICER. (See R.C.M. 405(d))			X	
20 I RECOMMEND:				
a TRIA: b <input type="checkbox"/> SUMMARY <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL				
c <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Item 21 below)				
21 REMARKS (include as necessary explanation for any delays in the investigation and explanation for any "no" answers above)				
SEE ATTACHED CONTINUATION SHEET				
a TYPED NAME OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER		b GRADE	c ORGANIZATION	
[REDACTED]		O-5/LTC	220th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE APO AE 09366	
c SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER			d DATE	
[REDACTED]				

CONTINUATION SHEET, DD FORM 457, INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

Item 12a, Witnesses

[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	744 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-7/SFC	744 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-5/SGT	744 th MO BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-6/SSG	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	O-4/MAJ	800 th MP BRIGADE	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	223 rd MP COMPANY	YES
By Telephonic Interview			
[REDACTED]	SA		YES

- c Defense: Government counsel requested to broaden the scope of the investigation to include violations of Article 81, UCMJ, 80, Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice, and Article 134, UCMJ, Obstruction of Justice, against all four of the accused, based on testimony of SPC [REDACTED]. Based on her testimony, IO allowed government to broaden the scope of the investigation to include these two charges
- d Defense Defense counsels perceived an allegation of impropriety in line of questioning by government counsel and asked that hearing area be cleared to further discuss the matter IO cleared the courtroom of all spectators, including the media I was advised by the PAO representation of a potential violation of the Freedom of Information Act in doing so, since the hearing was declared open My legal advisor also suggested that other spectators carried the same weight as the media Both were allowed back in, although the government counsel assured all parties that no such implied accusation was intended against any defense counsel and withdrew any further line of questioning along these lines
- e Defense defense counsels objected to line of questioning by the government of SA [REDACTED] regarding a previous investigation by [REDACTED] of MSG [REDACTED] as irrelevant to the proceedings at hand Government did not argue probative v prejudiced value of the questioning I sustained the objection and disallowed the questioning
- f Defense after the testimony of the final witness, SPC [REDACTED], government counsel asked that the scope of the investigation be broadened to include violation of Article 134, Adultery and Obstruction of Justice Government withdrew its request for the adultery charge I did not allow the inclusion of this charge due to inadequate notice to the defense to prepare for the additional charges
- g On 7 September, MAJ [REDACTED] representing the government, asked again, by e-mail attachment, that I re-consider my decision not to include the charges of adultery and obstruction of justice against SGT [REDACTED] outlined in para 4 f above CPT [REDACTED] representing SGT [REDACTED] replied on 13 September after returning from another case in the United States On 17 September, I consulted with MAJ [REDACTED] my legal advisor Summarizing his counsel, I responded to the government's request by e-mail on 18 September, affirming my earlier decision not to consider the additional charges due to the late notice given

by the government and, in the case of the adultery charge, that it was outside the scope of the hearing

- 5 While EPW witnesses have agreed to be available for further testimony, their release might make it difficult to reach them once they have returned home
- 6 During the course of this hearing, testimony from SSG [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED], SPC [REDACTED], and SPC [REDACTED] indicated that while the alleged incidents were occurring, they did not actively attempt to intervene as it was their responsibility to do as soldiers, and in the case of [REDACTED] as non-commissioned officers and leaders. Beyond SSG [REDACTED] verbal attempts to stop the abuse of these EPWs, nothing else seems to have been done. SGT [REDACTED] testimony that he turned away because he could not bear to watch this treatment is especially disturbing. I recommend that you consider appropriate action with regard to these soldiers and their evident failure to act to protect the enemy prisoners of war in their charge or stop the mistreatment to which they have testified, under oath

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U S Army Trial Defense Service
Vicenza Field Office
APO AE 09630

AESE-JAD

25 July 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR LTC [REDACTED] Article 32 (b) Investigating Officer

SUBJECT Defense Request for Delay Article 32 Investigation

1 - The defense requests a delay in the Article 32(b) Investigation scheduled for 28 July 2003 until 27 August 2003. The bases for the defense delay request are as follows:

a. The defense received notice of the Article 32(b) Investigation on 18 July while TDY for a contested court-martial. As of that date, defense counsel had yet to receive the charge sheet or the CID report pertaining to this case. The date set for the Article 32 hearing was 28 July 2003. Defense counsel was in a contested court-martial until the evening of 24 July 2003 and is scheduled to take leave in conjunction with TDY to begin on 28 July 2003. Given the timing of the notice, approved leave and logistical problems with getting back to Italy, drawing equipment and scheduling a flight, defense counsel requests a delay in the Article 32(b) Investigation.

b. More importantly, defense counsel will not be prepared to go forward on 28 July 2003. I have yet to receive and review the packet. This is an extremely serious case, which will take extensive preparation prior to the Article 32(b) Investigation. Defense cannot provide SSG McKenzie with effective assistance without some time to prepare for the hearing.

2. I am the POC for this memorandum and can be reached via phone at DSN 314-634-7043 or via e-mail at amy.fitzgibbons@setaf.army.mil. I will be back in Vicenza on 6 August 2003.

[REDACTED]
CPT, JA
Senior Defense Counsel

INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

(Of Charges Under Article 32, UCMJ and R.C.M. 405, Manual for Courts-Martial)

1a FROM (Name of Investigating Officer Last, First MI) [REDACTED]	b GRADE O-5/LTC	c ORGANIZATION 220th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE APO AE 09366	1c DATE OF REPORT
2a TO (Name of Officer who directed the investigation Last, First MI) KARPINSKI, JANIS L	b TITLE BRIGADE COMMANDER	c ORGANIZATION 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE	
3a NAME OF ACCUSED (Last, First MI) CANJAR, TIMOTHY F	b GRADE O-4/SPC	c SSH [REDACTED]	d ORGANIZATION 320th MP BATTALION e DATE OF CHARGES 14 JULY 03

(Check appropriate answer)

	YES	N	
4 IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 32, UCMJ, AND R.C.M. 405, MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL, I HAVE INVESTIGATED THE CHARGES APPENDED HERETO (Exhibit 1)	X		
5 THE ACCUSED WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL (If not, see 9 below)	X		
6 COUNSEL WHO REPRESENTED THE ACCUSED WAS QUALIFIED UNDER R.C.M. 405(d)(2), 502(d)	X		
7a NAME OF DEFENSE COUNSEL (Last, First MI) [REDACTED]	b GRADE O-4/MAJ	8a NAME OF ASSISTANT DEFENSE COUNSEL (If any) NA	b GRADE
c ORGANIZATION (If appropriate) US ARMY TRIAL DEFENSE SERVICE BAMBERG FIELD OFFICE, REGION VIII		c ORGANIZATION (If appropriate) NA	
d ADDRESS (If appropriate) APO AE 09139		d ADDRESS (If appropriate) NA	

9 *(To be signed by accused if accused waives counsel. If accused does not sign, investigating officer will explain in detail in item 2.)*

a PLACE	b DATE
---------	--------

I HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF MY RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED IN THIS INVESTIGATION BY COUNSEL, INCLUDING MY RIGHT TO CIVILIAN OR MILITARY COUNSEL OF MY CHOICE IF REASONABLY AVAILABLE. I WAIVE MY RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS INVESTIGATION.

c SIGNATURE OF ACCUSED

	YES	N
10a AT THE BEGINNING OF THE INVESTIGATION I INFORMED THE ACCUSED OF <i>(Check appropriate answer)</i>		
a THE CHARGE(S) UNDER INVESTIGATION	X	
b THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSER	X	
c THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 31	X	
d THE PURPOSE OF THE INVESTIGATION	X	
e THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE	X	
f THE WITNESSES AND OTHER EVIDENCE KNOWN TO ME WHICH I EXPECTED TO PRESENT	X	
g THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES	X	
h THE RIGHT TO HAVE AVAILABLE WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED	X	
i THE RIGHT TO PRESENT ANYTHING IN DEFENSE, EXTENUATION OR MITIGATION	X	
j THE RIGHT TO MAKE A SWORN OR UNSWORN STATEMENT ORALLY OR IN WRITING	X	
11a THE ACCUSED AND ACCUSED'S COUNSEL WERE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE <i>(If the accused or counsel were absent during any part of the presentation of evidence, complete b below.)</i>	X	

b STATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND DESCRIBE THE PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED IN THE ABSENCE OF ACCUSED OR COUNSEL

NOTE: If additional space is required for any item, enter the additional material in item 21 or on a separate sheet. Identify such material with the proper numerical and, if appropriate, lettered heading (Example: "7c"). Securely attach any additional sheets to the form and add a note in the appropriate item of the form. "See additional sheet."

12a THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES TESTIFIED UNDER OATH (Check appropriate answer)				
NAME (Last, First MI)	GRADE (if any)	ORGANIZATION/ADDRESS (Whichever is appropriate)	YES	NO
[REDACTED]	E-6/SSG	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	E-5/SGT	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	SPC/E-4	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	SGT/E-5	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320th MP BATTALION	X	
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320th MP BATTALION	X	
b THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TESTIMONY OF THESE WITNESSES HAS BEEN REDUCED TO WRITING AND IS ATTACHED			X	
13a THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS, DOCUMENTS, OR MATTERS WERE CONSIDERED. THE ACCUSED WAS PERMITTED TO EXAMINE EACH:				
DESCRIPTION OF ITEM		LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (if not attached)		
#1 SWORN STATEMENT, SGT [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X		
#2 AIR SA [REDACTED] IEM, 14 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X		
#3 SWORN STATEMENT, SPC [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X		
#4 SWORN STATEMENT, SGT [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X		
#5 SWORN STATEMENT, SPC [REDACTED]	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X		
#6 EPW MANIFEST 744th MP BN, DTD 12 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X		
14 WHICH ITEM CONSIDERED OR A COPY OR RECITAL OF THE SUBSTANCE OR NATURE THEREOF, IS ATTACHED			X	
15 THERE ARE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED WAS NOT MENTALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OFFENSE(S) OR NOT COMPETENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEFENSE (See R.C.M. 909.916(k)).				X
16 THE DEFENSE DID REQUEST OBJECTIONS TO BE NOTED IN THIS REPORT (If Yes specify in Item 21 below)			X	
17 ALL ESSENTIAL WITNESSES WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT OF TRIAL			X	
18 THE CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS ARE IN PROPER FORM			X	
19 REASONABLE GROUNDS EXIST TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE OFFENSE(S) ALLEGED			X	
20 I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY GROUNDS WHICH WOULD DISQUALIFY ME FROM ACTING AS INVESTIGATING OFFICER (See R.C.M. 405(d)(1)).			X	
2c I RECOMMEND				
e TRIAL BY <input type="checkbox"/> SUMMARY <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL				
f <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Item 21 below)				
21 REMARKS (Include, as necessary, explanation for any delays in the investigation, and explanation for any "no" answers above.)				
SEE ATTACHED CONTINUATION SHEET				
22 TYPED NAME OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER		23 GRADE	24 ORGANIZATION	
[REDACTED]		O 5/LTC	220th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE APO AE 09366	
25 SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER			26 DATE	
[REDACTED]			23 September 2003	

CONTINUATION SHEET, DD FORM 457, INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

Item 12a. Witnesses

[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	744 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-7/SFC	744 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-5/SGT	744 th MO BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-6/SSG	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	O-4/MAJ	800 th MP BRIGADE	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	223 rd MP COMPANY	YES

By Telephonic Interview

[REDACTED]	SA		YES
------------	----	--	-----

CONTINUATION SHEET, DD FORM 457, INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

Item 13a, Witnesses

#7 SWORN STATEMENT, SSG [REDACTED] DTD 15 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#8 SWORN STATEMENT, MSG [REDACTED] DTD 16 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#9 AIR, SA [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#10 SWORN STATEMENT, SPC [REDACTED] DTD 15 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#11 SWORN STATEMENT, SSG [REDACTED] DTD 16 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#12 SECOND SWORN STATEMENT, SPC [REDACTED] DTD 15 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES

CONTINUATION SHEET, DD FORM 457, INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

SPC Timothy F Canjar, [REDACTED]

Item 21, Remarks

- 1 Twelve pieces of evidence were submitted during the hearing. The evidence presented and examined consisted of sworn statements or Agent's Investigation Reports taken or written by CID Special Agents. A manifest from the 744th Military Police Battalion, dated 12 May 03, was also submitted during the hearing. In some cases, witnesses referred to their statements or reports to re-fresh their recollection of events under question. Thirty-one separate witnesses were heard. The witnesses were credible, although defense counsels attempted to refute the testimony of certain witnesses and highlight that previous testimony or statements were contradictory to the recorded testimony during this hearing. Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence presented, I am able to make a recommendation with regard to further action involving the accused soldier.
- 2 With regard to SPC Canjar, I make the following recommendations to the charges and specifications alleged against him.
 - a Charge I: Violation of Article 92, Dereliction of Duty: I find that a preponderance of the evidence exists to validate the specification alleged against him. Testimony from SGT [REDACTED] and SPC [REDACTED] and EPW witnesses, clearly indicate that SPC [REDACTED] had certain duties on the night in question, that he knew or reasonably should have known of those duties, and that he was derelict of those duties.
 - b Charge II: Violation of Article 93, Cruelty and Maltreatment. I find that a preponderance of the evidence exists to validate Specifications 2 and 3 alleged against him. Evidence was not presented to sufficiently validate Specifications 1 and 4 alleged against him. The testimony of SGT [REDACTED] and SPC [REDACTED] indicate SPC [REDACTED] participation in the cruelty and maltreatment of EPW [REDACTED]. The testimony of SGT [REDACTED] and SSG [REDACTED] indicate his participation in the cruelty and maltreatment of EPW [REDACTED]. I felt that insufficient evidence existed to confirm his participation in the alleged cruelty and maltreatment of EPW [REDACTED]. Specification 4 was not specific with regard to the identify of the EPW. There was insufficient evidence to suggest he participated in the cruelty or mistreatment of any such unidentified EPW. Clearly EPWs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

any such unidentified EPW. Clearly EPWs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were subject to SPC [REDACTED] orders and his actions were cruel and represented maltreatment of both individuals

c Charge III Violation of Article 107, False Official Statements I find that a preponderance of the evidence exists to validate the specification alleged against him based on the testimony of witnesses already identified SPC [REDACTED] signed two sworn statements indicating justifiable use of force against EPWs that evening The testimony of witnesses, specifically SSG [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED], and SPC [REDACTED] indicate that his statements were false, that he knew them to be false at the time of making them, and that his statements were intended to deceive the investigators

d Charge IV Violation of Article 128, Assault. I find that a preponderance of the evidence exists to validate Specifications 1 and 4 alleged against him Evidence was not presented to sufficiently validate Specifications 2 and 3 alleged against him Again, based on the testimony of SSG [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED] and SPC [REDACTED] SPC [REDACTED] did bodily harm to these EPWs and the bodily harm was done with unlawful force

e During the course of the hearing, testimony from SPC [REDACTED] prompted counsel for the government to request that the investigation be broadened to include violations of Article 81, Conspiracy, and Article 134, Obstruction of Justice, against all four of the accused I granted that request over the objection of all defense counsels Aside from the testimony of SPC [REDACTED] I do not feel that further, sufficient evidence was presented to validate these charges

f I recommend that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

3 Delays in proceedings

a IO proposed original date of 28 July 03 for hearing Defense counsels requested delay to 5 September 03 due to schedule conflicts IO set date of 27 August 03 after consulting all counsels Defense counsels acknowledged that the time would not count against the speedy trial requirement of the government

b 28 August 03 Defense counsels requested additional time to prepare for EPW witnesses and CID Special Agent testimony. IO granted recess until 290800

problems accessing EPW witnesses. IO granted further delay until 291300 August 03

- c 29 August 03 Hearing recessed until arrival of additional witnesses on leave Re-convene at Camp Doha, KU
- d 1 September 03 Hearing recessed until 021300 September 03 for additional witness Further delayed until 021430 Sep 03 at request of defense counsels for additional time to interview witness.

4 Defense and Government Objections

- a Defense Defense counsels objected to introduction of sworn statement of SSG [REDACTED] in addition to his sworn testimony at the hearing SSG [REDACTED] did not refer to his report during his testimony. IO sustained objection LAW RCM 405(4)(g)(B), allowing introduction of sworn statements over defense objection when the witness is not available
- b Government Government counsel objected to defense line of questioning, asking whether certain witnesses had been advised of their rights under Article 31, or were being investigated, or had been charged with violation of Article 32, UCMJ, Dereliction of Duty IO allowed defense counsels to ask this question due to its relevance based on the testimony of the witnesses
- c Defense Government counsel requested to broaden the scope of the investigation to include violations of Article 81, UCMJ, 80, Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice, and Article 134, UCMJ, Obstruction of Justice, against all four of the accused, based on testimony of SPC [REDACTED]. Based on her testimony, IO allowed government to broaden the scope of the investigation to include these two charges
- d Defense Defense counsels perceived an allegation of impropriety in line of questioning by government counsel and asked that hearing area be cleared to further discuss the matter IO cleared the courtroom of all spectators, including the media I was advised by the PAO representation of a potential violation of the Freedom of Information Act in doing so, since the hearing was declared open My legal advisor also suggested that other spectators carried the same weight as the media Both were allowed back in, although the government counsel assured all parties that no such implied accusation was intended against any defense counsel and withdrew any further line of questioning along these lines

e Defense: defense counsels objected to line of questioning by the government of SA [REDACTED] regarding a previous investigation by [REDACTED] of MSG [REDACTED] as irrelevant to the proceedings at hand. Government did not argue probative value or prejudicial value of the questioning. I sustained the objection and disallowed the questioning.

f Defense after the testimony of the final witness, SPC [REDACTED] government counsel asked that the scope of the investigation be broadened to include violation of Article 134, Adultery and Article 128, Obstruction of Justice. Government withdrew its request for the adultery charge. I did not allow the inclusion of this charge due to inadequate notice to the defense to prepare for the additional charges.

5 While EPW witnesses have agreed to be available for further testimony, their release might make it difficult to reach them once they have returned home.

6 During the course of this hearing, testimony from SSG [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED], SPC [REDACTED] and SPC [REDACTED] indicated that while the alleged incidents were occurring, they did not actively attempt to intervene as it was their responsibility to do as soldiers, and in the case of [REDACTED] as non-commissioned officers and leaders. Beyond SSG [REDACTED] verbal attempts to stop the abuse of these EPWs, nothing else seems to have been done. SGT [REDACTED] testimony that he turned away because he could not bear to watch this treatment is especially disturbing. I recommend that you consider appropriate action with regard to these soldiers and their evident failure to act to protect the enemy prisoners of war in their charge or stop the mistreatment to which they have testified, under oath.

INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

(Of Charges Under Article 32, UCMJ and R.C.M. 405, Manual for Courts-Martial)

1a FROM <i>(Name of Investigating Officer Last, First, MI)</i> [REDACTED]	b GRADE O 5/LTC	c ORGANIZATION 220TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE APO AE 09366	1c DATE OF REPORT
2a TO <i>(Name of Officer who directed the investigation Last First MI)</i> KARPINSKI, JANIS L	b TITLE BRIGADE COMMANDER	c ORGANIZATION 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE APO AE 09366	
3a NAME OF ACCUSED <i>(Last, First MI)</i> GIRMAN, LISA M	b GRADE E-8	c SSN [REDACTED]	d ORGANIZATION 320TH MILITARY POLICE BN 1e DATE OF CHARGES 13 JUL 03

(Check appropriate answer)

4 IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 32 UCMJ AND R.C.M. 405 MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL I HAVE INVESTIGATED THE CHARGES APPENDED HERETO (Exhibit 1)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5 THE ACCUSED WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL (If not see 9 below)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6 COUNSEL WHO REPRESENTED THE ACCUSED WAS QUALIFIED UNDER R.C.M. 405(d)(2) 502(d)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

7a NAME OF DEFENSE COUNSEL <i>(Last, First MI)</i> [REDACTED]	b GRADE O-3/CPT	8a NAME OF ASSISTANT DEFENSE COUNSEL <i>(If any)</i> NA	b GRADE NA
c ORGANIZATION <i>(If appropriate)</i> US ARMY TRIAL DEFENSE SERVICE WURZBURG FIELD OFFICE, REGION VIII		c ORGANIZATION <i>(If appropriate)</i> NA	
d ADDRESS <i>(If appropriate)</i> APO AE 09036		d ADDRESS <i>(If appropriate)</i> NA	

8 *(To be signed by accused if accused waives counsel. If accused does not sign, investigating officer will explain in detail in item 21.)*

a PLACE	b DATE
I HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF MY RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED IN THIS INVESTIGATION BY COUNSEL, INCLUDING MY RIGHT TO CIVILIAN OR MILITARY COUNSEL OF MY CHOICE IF REASONABLY AVAILABLE. I WAIVE MY RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS INVESTIGATION.	

c SIGNATURE OF ACCUSED

10 a AT THE BEGINNING OF THE INVESTIGATION I INFORMED THE ACCUSED OF: <i>(Check appropriate answer)</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
a THE CHARGE(S) UNDER INVESTIGATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSEE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 31	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d THE PURPOSE OF THE INVESTIGATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f THE WITNESSES AND OTHER EVIDENCE KNOWN TO ME WHICH I EXPECTED TO PRESENT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g THE RIGHT TO CROSS EXAMINE WITNESSES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
h THE RIGHT TO HAVE AVAILABLE WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
i THE RIGHT TO PRESENT ANYTHING IN DEFENSE, EXTENUATION OR MITIGATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
j THE RIGHT TO MAKE A SWORN OR UNSWORN STATEMENT ORALLY OR IN WRITING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11a THE ACCUSED AND ACCUSED'S COUNSEL WERE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE <i>(If the accused or counsel were absent during any part of the presentation of evidence, complete b below.)</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

b STATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND DESCRIBE THE PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED IN THE ABSENCE OF ACCUSED OR COUNSEL:

NOTE: If additional space is required for any item, enter the additional material in item 21 or on a separate sheet. Identify such material with the proper numerical and, if appropriate, lettered heading (Example: 7c). Securely attach any additional sheets to the form and add a note to the appropriate item of the form: "See additional sheet."

12a THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES TESTIFIED UNDER OATH (Check appropriate answer)				
NAME (Last, First, MI)	GRADE (if any)	ORGANIZATION/ADDRESS (Whichever is appropriate)	YES	NO
[REDACTED]	E-6/SSG	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	E-5/SGT	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	E-5/SGT	223rd MP COMPANY	X	
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320th MP BATTALION	X	
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320th MP BATTALION	X	
e THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TESTIMONY OF THESE WITNESSES HAS BEEN REDUCED TO WRITING AND IS ATTACHED			X	
13a THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS, DOCUMENTS, OR MATTERS WERE CONSIDERED, THE ACCUSED WAS PERMITTED TO EXAMINE EACH				
DESCRIPTION OF ITEM		LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (if not attached)		
#1 SWORN STATEMENT, SGT [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X		
#2 AIR SA [REDACTED] IEM. 14 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X		
#3 SWORN STATEMENT, SPC [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X		
#4 SWORN STATEMENT, SGT [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X		
#5 SWORN STATEMENT SPC [REDACTED]	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X		
#6 EPW MANIFEST 244th MP BN, DTD 12 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, Camp Doha, KU	X		
e EACH ITEM CONSIDERED, OR A COPY OR RECITAL OF THE SUBSTANCE OR NATURE THEREOF, IS ATTACHED			X	
f THERE ARE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED WAS NOT MENTALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OFFENSE(S) OR NOT COMPETENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEFENSE (See R.C.M. 909 916(r))				X
15 THE DEFENSE DID REQUEST OBJECTIONS TO BE NOTED IN THIS REPORT (If Yes specify in item 21 below)			X	
16 ALL ESSENTIAL WITNESSES WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT OF TRIAL			X	
17 THE CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS ARE IN PROPER FORM			X	
18 REASONABLE GROUNDS EXIST TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE OFFENSE(S) ALLEGED			X	
19 I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY GROUNDS WHICH WOULD DISQUALIFY ME FROM ACTING AS INVESTIGATING OFFICER (See R.C.M. 405(d)(1))			X	
20 RECOMMENDATION				
a TRIAL BY: <input type="checkbox"/> SUMMARY <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GENERAL COURT MARTIAL				
b <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in item 21 below)				
21 REMARKS (Include, as necessary, explanation for any delays in the investigation and explanation for any "no" answers above)				
SEE ATTACHED CONTINUATION SHEET				
a TYPED NAME OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER		b GRADE	c ORGANIZATION	
[REDACTED]		O-5/LTC	220th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE APO AE 09366	
d SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER			e DATE	
[REDACTED]				

CONTINUATION SHEET, DD FORM 457, INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

Item 12a, Witnesses

[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	744 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-7/SFC	744 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-5/SGT	744 th MO BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-6/SSG	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	314 th MP COMPANY	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	EPW	CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	SA	CID, CAMP BUCCA, IZ	YES
[REDACTED]	O-4/MAJ	800 th MP BRIGADE	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	320 th MP BATTALION	YES
[REDACTED]	E-4/SPC	223 rd MP COMPANY	YES
By Telephonic Interview			
[REDACTED]	SA		YES

CONTINUATION SHEET, DD FORM 457, INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

Item 13a, Witnesses

#7 SWORN STATEMENT, SSG [REDACTED] DTD 15 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#8 SWORN STATEMENT, MSG [REDACTED] DTD 16 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#9 AIR, SA [REDACTED] DTD 14 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#10 SWORN STATEMENT, SPO [REDACTED] DTD 15 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#11 SWORN STATEMENT, SSC [REDACTED] DTD 16 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES
#12 SECOND SWORN STATEMENT, SPO [REDACTED] DTD 15 MAY 03	OSJA, CFLCC, CAMP DOHA, KU	YES

CONTINUATION SHEET, DD FORM 457, INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

MSG Lisa M. Girman, [REDACTED]

Item 21, Remarks

- 1 Twelve pieces of evidence were submitted during the hearing. The evidence presented and examined consisted of sworn statements or Agent's Investigation Reports taken or written by CID Special Agents. A manifest from the 744th Military Police Battalion, dated 12 May 03, was also submitted during the hearing. In some cases, witnesses referred to their statements or reports to re-fresh their recollection of events under question. Thirty-one separate witnesses were heard. The witnesses were credible, although defense counsels attempted to refute the testimony of certain witnesses and highlight that previous testimony or statements were contradictory to the recorded testimony during this hearing. Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence presented, I am able to make a recommendation with regard to further action involving the accused soldier.
- 2 With regard to MSG Lisa M. Girman, I make the following recommendations to the charges and specifications alleged against her:
 - a Charge I Violation of Article 92, Dereliction of Duty. I find that a preponderance of the evidence exists to validate both specifications alleged against her. MSG Girman's position, her previous experience, and her senior non-commissioned officer rank are clearly indicative that she had certain duties that night and that she knew of those duties. The testimony of SSG [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED], and SPC [REDACTED] all indicate that she was willfully derelict in the performance of those duties, to include her responsibilities to safeguard EPWs herself and to ensure that her soldiers also safeguarded EPWs.
 - b Charge II Violation of Article 93, Cruelty and Maltreatment. I find that a preponderance of the evidence exists to validate specifications 1 and 2 alleged against her, but that evidence was not presented to sufficiently validate specification 3 alleged against her. The testimony of SGT [REDACTED] and SPC [REDACTED] indicate MSG [REDACTED] participation in the cruel mistreatment of EPW [REDACTED]. The testimony of SSG [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED], and SPC [REDACTED] indicate her cruel mistreatment of EPW [REDACTED]. I did not find that sufficient evidence existed to confirm the specification alleged against her regarding EPW [REDACTED].

- c Charge III: Violation of Article 107, False Official Statements: I find that a preponderance of the evidence exists to validate the specification alleged against her. Based on the testimony of the witnesses previously indicated, MSG Girman's sworn statement of 16 May appears to be false in that she denies the mistreatment and assault of any of the EPWs, that she evidently knew the statement to be false, and that her statement was intended to deceive investigators as to her true actions.
- d Charge IV Violation of Article 128, Assault: I find that a preponderance of the evidence exists to validate specifications 1 and 2, but that evidence was not presented to sufficiently validate specification 3 alleged against her. The testimony of SSG [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED], SGT [REDACTED], and SPC [REDACTED] all indicate that MSG Girman did bodily harm to EPWs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and that the harm was done with unlawful force. Again, I did not find that sufficient evidence existed to confirm the specification alleged against her regarding EPW [REDACTED].
- e Charge V Violation of Article 134. I find that the evidence presented was insufficient to validate the specification against her. The testimony of SPC [REDACTED] indicates that while MSG Girman's inquiry of him, both about his need for an attorney and his actual knowledge of the events of 12 May, was suspicious, it does not meet the criteria to validate this charge.
- f During the course of the hearing, testimony from SPC [REDACTED] prompted counsel for the government to request that the investigation be broadened to include violations of Article 81, Conspiracy, and Article 134, Obstruction of Justice, against all four of the accused. I granted that request over the objection of all defense counsels. Aside from the testimony of SPC [REDACTED], I do not feel that further, sufficient evidence was presented to validate these charges. I, therefore, cannot report that a preponderance of the evidence suggests that these charges are true.
- g I recommend that you proceed with a general court martial, charging the accused with Violation of Article 92, both specifications, Violation of Article 93, Specifications 1 and 2, Violation of Article 107 and its specification, and Violation of Article 128, Specifications 1 and 2.

3 Delays in proceedings

- a IO proposed original date of 28 July 03 for hearing. Defense counsels requested delay to 5 September 03 due to schedule conflicts. IO set date of 27 August 03.

after consulting all counsels. Defense counsels acknowledged that the time would not count against the speedy trial requirement of the government.

- b. 28 August 03 Defense counsels requested additional time to prepare for EPW witnesses and CID Special Agent testimony IO granted recess until 290800 August 03 At approx 2000 Hrs, defense counsels requested further delay due to problems accessing EPW witnesses IO granted further delay until 291300 August 03
- c. 29 August 03 Hearing recessed until arrival of additional witnesses on leave Re-convene at Camp Doha, KU
- d. 1 September 03 Hearing recessed until 021300 September 03 for additional witness. Further delayed until 021430 Sep 03 at request of defense counsels for additional time to interview witness

4 Defense and Government Objections

- a. Defense Defense counsels objected to introduction of sworn statement of SSG [REDACTED] in addition to his sworn testimony at the hearing. SSG [REDACTED] did not refer to his report during his testimony. IO sustained objection IAW RCM 405(4)(g)(B), allowing introduction of sworn statements over defense objection when the witness is not available
- b. Government Government counsel objected to defense line of questioning, asking whether certain witnesses had been advised of their rights under Article 31, or were being investigated, or had been charged with violation of Article 32, UCMJ, Dereliction of Duty IO allowed defense counsels to ask this question due to its relevance based on the testimony of the witnesses
- c. Defense Government counsel requested to broaden the scope of the investigation to include violations of Article 81, UCMJ, 80, Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice, and Article 134, UCMJ, Obstruction of Justice, against all four of the accused, based on testimony of SPC [REDACTED] Based on her testimony, IO allowed government to broaden the scope of the investigation to include these two charges
- d. Defense Defense counsels perceived an allegation of impropriety in line of questioning by government counsel and asked that hearing area be cleared to further discuss the matter IO cleared the courtroom of all spectators, including the media I was advised by the PAO representation of a potential violation of the Freedom of Information Act in doing so, since the hearing was declared open My

legal advisor also suggested that other spectators carried the same weight as the media. Both were allowed back in, although the government counsel assured all parties that no such implied accusation was intended against any defense counsel and withdrew any further line of questioning along these lines.

e. Defense defense counsels objected to line of questioning by the government of SA [REDACTED] regarding a previous investigation by [REDACTED] of MSG Girman as irrelevant to the proceedings at hand. Government did not argue probative or prejudicial value of the questioning. I sustained the objection and disallowed the questioning.

f. Defense after the testimony of the final witness, SPC [REDACTED] government counsel asked that the scope of the investigation be broadened to include violation of Article 134, Adultery and Obstruction of Justice. Government withdrew its request for the adultery charge. I did not allow the inclusion of this charge due to inadequate notice to the defense to prepare for the additional charges.

5. While EPW witnesses have agreed to be available for further testimony, their release might make it difficult to reach them once they have returned home.

6. During the course of this hearing, testimony from SSG Stephen [REDACTED] SGT [REDACTED] SGT [REDACTED] SPC [REDACTED] and SPC [REDACTED] indicated that while the alleged incidents were occurring, they did not actively attempt to intervene as it was their responsibility to do as soldiers, and in the case of [REDACTED] as non-commissioned officers and leaders. Beyond SSG [REDACTED] verbal attempts to stop the abuse of these EPWs, nothing else seems to have been done. SGT [REDACTED] testimony that he turned away because he could not bear to watch this treatment is especially disturbing. I recommend that you consider appropriate action with regard to these soldiers and their evident failure to act to protect the enemy prisoners of war in their charge or stop the mistreatment to which they have testified, under oath.

Army Regulation 381-10

Military Intelligence

US Army Intelligence Activities

**Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC
1 July 1984**

Unclassified

AR 381-10

SUMMARY of CHANGE

AR 381-10

US Army Intelligence Activities

RESERVED

FOREWORD

This DoD regulation sets forth procedures governing the activities of DoD intelligence components that affect United States persons. It implements DoD Directive 5240.1, and replaces the November 30, 1979 version of DoD Regulation 5240.1-R. It is applicable to all DoD intelligence components.

Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," stipulates that certain activities of intelligence components that affect US persons be governed by procedures issued by the agency head and approved by the Attorney General. Specifically, procedures 1 through 10, as well as appendix A, herein, require approval by the Attorney General. Procedures 11 through 15, while not requiring approval by the Attorney General, contain further guidance to DoD Components in implementing Executive Order 12333 as well as Executive Order 12334, "President's Intelligence Oversight Board."

Accordingly, by this memorandum, these procedures are approved for use within the Department of Defense. Heads of DoD components shall issue such implementing instructions as may be necessary for the conduct of authorized functions in a manner consistent with the procedures set forth herein.

This regulation is effective immediately.

(Signed) 10/4/82
William French Smith
Attorney General of the
United States

Signed 12/7/82
Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense

Military Intelligence

US Army Intelligence Activities

By Order of the Secretary of the Army.

JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official.

ROBERT M. JOYCE
Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

History

Summary This regulation, which sets forth policies and procedures governing the conduct of intelligence activities by Department of the Army intelligence components has been revised. This revision implements DoD Directive 5240.1 and DoD 5240.1-R which implement Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities. It includes all of DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons,"

dated December 1982, and added implementing supplementing instructions where required. These additions are set in boldface type.

Applicability

1 This regulation applies to the following:
a All Army intelligence components, as that term is defined in appendix A, paragraph 8.

b Other military personnel and civilian employees of the Department of the Army when they engage in intelligence activities as that term is defined in appendix A, paragraphs 8 and 13.

c Members of the Army National Guard and US Army Reserve when they are performing Federal duties or engaging in activities directly related to a Federal duty or mission.
2 Army intelligence components are explicitly excluded from the provisions of AR 380-13.

3 This regulation is not applicable to activities covered under Presidential Directive/National Security Council-9.

Proponent and exception authority
Not applicable.

Impact on the New Manning System

This regulation does not contain information that affects the New Manning System.

Army management control process.
Not applicable.

Supplementation Supplementation of this regulation is prohibited unless prior approval is obtained from HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310.

Interim changes Interim changes to this regulation are not official unless they are authenticated by The Adjutant General. Users will destroy interim changes on their expiration dates unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

Suggested Improvements. The proponent agency of this regulation is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310.

Distribution Distribution: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-9A requirements for AR, Military Intelligence Active Army, B, ARNG and USAR, C.

Contents (Listed by paragraph and page number)

Part 1

PROCEDURE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS, page 1
APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE • A, page 1
PURPOSE • B, page 1
INTERPRETATION • C, page 1
EXCEPTIONS TO POLICY • D, page 1
AMENDMENT • E, page 1
REQUESTS FOR APPROVAL • F, page 1
GENERAL PROHIBITIONS • G, page 1

Part 2

PROCEDURES 2 COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS, page 1
APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE • A, page 1
EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS • B, page 1
TYPES OF INFORMATION THAT MAY BE COLLECTED ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS • C, page 2
GENERAL CRITERIA GOVERNING THE MEANS USED TO COLLECT INFORMATION ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS • D, page 2

SPECIAL LIMITATION ON THE COLLECTION OF FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES • E, page 3

Part 3

PROCEDURES 3 RETENTION OF INFORMATION ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS, page 3
APPLICABILITY • A, page 3
EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS • B, page 3
CRITERIA FOR RETENTION • C, page 3
ACCESS AND RETENTION • D, page 3
CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE INFORMATION • E, page 3
INDEXING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE INFORMATION • F, page 4

Part 4

PROCEDURE 4 DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS, page 4
APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE • A, page 4
CRITERIA FOR DISSEMINATION • B, page 4
OTHER DISSEMINATION • C, page 4

*This regulation supersedes AR 381-10, 15 February 1982.

Contents—Continued

Part 5

PROCEDURE 5. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, page 4

Part 1

APPLICABILITY • A, page 4

GENERAL RULES • B, page 5

CONSENSUAL ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE • C, page 5

Part 2

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED

STATES FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES, page 5

APPLICABILITY • A, page 5

EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS • B, page 6

PROCEDURES • C, page 6

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN EMERGENCY SITUATION

• D, page 6

OFFICIALS AUTHORIZED TO REQUEST AND APPROVE

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED

STATES • E, page 6

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-US PERSONS • F,

page 7

Part 3

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, page 7

APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE • A, page 7

EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS • B, page 7

PROCEDURES • C, page 8

Part 4

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES,

page 8

APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE • A, page 8

EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS • B, page 8

PROCEDURES • C, page 8

Part 5

DEVELOPING, TESTING, AND CALIBRATION OF

ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT, page 8

APPLICABILITY • A, page 8

PROCEDURES • B, page 8

Part 6

TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE OPERATIONS AND USE

OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND

SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT, page 9

APPLICABILITY • A, page 9

PROCEDURES • B, page 9

Part 7

CONDUCT OF VULNERABILITY AND HEARABILITY

SURVEYS, page 9

APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE • A, page 9

EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS • B, page 9

PROCEDURES • C, page 9

Part 6

PROCEDURE 6 CONCEALED MONITORING, page 10

APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE • A, page 10

EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS • B, page 10

PROCEDURES • C, page 10

Part 7

PROCEDURE 7 PHYSICAL SEARCHES, page 10

APPLICABILITY • A, page 10

EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS • B, page 11

PROCEDURES • C, page 11

Part 8

PROCEDURE 8 SEARCHES AND EXAMINATION OF MAIL,

page 12

APPLICABILITY • A, page 12

EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS • B, page 12

PROCEDURES • C, page 12

Part 9

PROCEDURE 9. PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE, page 12

APPLICABILITY • A, page 12

EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINING TERMS • B, page 12

PROCEDURES • C, page 12

Part 10

PROCEDURE 10 UNDISCLOSED PARTICIPATION IN
ORGANIZATIONS, page 13

APPLICABILITY • A, page 13

EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS • B, page 13

PROCEDURES FOR UNDISCLOSED PARTICIPATION • C,

page 13

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT • D, page 14

Part 11

PROCEDURE 11. CONTRACTING FOR GOODS AND
SERVICES, page 14

APPLICABILITY • A, page 14

PROCEDURES • B, page 14

EFFECTS OF NON-COMPLIANCE • C, page 15

Part 12

PROCEDURE 12 PROVISIONS OF ASSISTANT TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES, page 15

APPLICABILITY • A, page 15

PROCEDURES • B, page 15

Part 13

PROCEDURE 13 EXPERIMENTATION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES, page 15

APPLICABILITY • A, page 15

EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS • B, page 15

PROCEDURES • C, page 15

Part 14

PROCEDURE 14. EMPLOYEE CONDUCT, page 15

APPLICABILITY • A, page 15

PROCEDURES • B, page 15

Part 15

PROCEDURE 15 IDENTIFYING, INVESTIGATING, AND
REPORTING QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES, page 16

APPLICABILITY • A, page 16

EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS • B, page 16

PROCEDURES • C, page 16

Appendix A Definitions, page 18

Appendix B Extract from "The Agreement between the Deputy
Secretary of Defense and Attorney General, April 5, 1979",
page 19

Appendix C References to Army Implementation of DoD 5240
I-R, page 20

Appendix D Part II, Executive Order 12333, page 21

Part 1 PROCEDURE 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

A. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

1 These procedures apply only to "DoD intelligence components," and other DA components performing "intelligence activities," as defined in Appendix A. Procedures 2 through 4 provide the sole authority by which such components may collect, retain and disseminate information concerning United States persons. Procedures 5 through 10 set forth applicable guidance with respect to the use of certain collection techniques to obtain information for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes. Authority to employ such techniques shall be limited to that necessary to perform functions assigned to the DoD intelligence component concerned. Information may be gathered by intelligence components using techniques described in procedures 5 through 10 for other than foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (CI) purposes. However, such collection must comply with the following: be based on a proper function assigned to the intelligence component, employ the least intrusive lawful investigative techniques reasonable available, and comply with the appropriate provisions of this regulation. Procedures 11 through 15 govern other aspects of DoD intelligence activities, including the oversight of such activities.

2 The function of DoD intelligence components not specifically addressed herein shall be carried out in accordance with applicable policy and procedure.

3 These procedures do not apply to law enforcement activities, including civil disturbance activities, that may be undertaken by DoD intelligence components. Involvement by an Army intelligence component in civil disturbance activities is governed by the Department of the Army (DA) Civil Disturbance Plan (Garden Plot) dated 3 August 1978. When an investigation or inquiry undertaken pursuant to these procedures establishes reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, the DoD intelligence component concerned shall refer the matter to the appropriate law enforcement agency in accordance with procedures 12 and 15, or, if the DoD intelligence component is otherwise authorized to conduct law enforcement activities, shall continue such investigation under appropriate law enforcement procedures. If evidence surfaces during the course of an investigation by an Army intelligence component that provides reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and which under AR 195-2 also may be under the investigative jurisdiction of the US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC), details of the investigation will be provided to the USACIDC under AR 381-20.

4 DoD intelligence components shall not request any person or entity to undertake any activity forbidden by Executive Order 12333, reference (a), or this regulation.

B. PURPOSE

The purpose of these procedures is to enable DoD intelligence components to carry out effectively their authorized functions while ensuring their activities that affect United States persons are carried out in a manner that protects the constitutional rights and privacy of such persons. This regulation is intended to complement other intelligence regulatory policy; it does not establish independent authority for intelligence activities. Therefore, activities and investigations described elsewhere, such as AR 381-12, AR 381-20, and Director of Central Intelligence Directives, must be conducted in accordance with these procedures. For example, in determining whether an intelligence component may conduct an investigation that involves a US person, the component should first determine whether it has the mission and authority to conduct the type of investigation involved. That determination is made utilizing applicable regulations, Director of Central Intelligence Directives, Defense Intelligence Agency guidance, and so forth. Once that determination is made, and the component can establish its authority to conduct the investigation involved, this regulation, particularly Procedure 2, should be used to determine whether particular items of information about US persons may be collected during the conduct of the otherwise authorized investigation. Intelligence components should be

aware that number of concepts and terms commonly used within the intelligence community have unique definitions in this regulation. For example, activities commonly considered part of a "CI investigation" (AR 381-20, appendix) may be considered "personnel security" matters under this regulation. (See app A, secs 19 and 20)

C. INTERPRETATION

1 These procedures shall be interpreted in accordance with their stated purpose.

2 All defined terms appear in appendix A. Additional terms, not otherwise defined, are explained in the text of each procedure, as appropriate.

3 All question of interpretation shall be referred to the legal office responsible for advising the DoD intelligence component concerned. Intelligence component commanders will seek legal advice from their supporting judge advocates. When questions cannot be resolved locally, they will be forwarded through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310, for coordination with the Office of The Judge Advocate General. Questions that cannot be resolved in this manual shall be referred to the General Counsel of the Military Department concerned, or, as appropriate, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense for resolution.

D. EXCEPTIONS TO POLICY

Requests for exception to the policies and procedures established herein shall be made in writing to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), who shall obtain the written approval of the Secretary of Defense and, if required, the Attorney General for any such exceptions. Request for exceptions to policy will be forwarded through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310.

E. AMENDMENT

Request for amendment of these procedures shall be made to the Deputy under the Secretary of Defense (Policy), who shall obtain the written approval of the Secretary of Defense, and, if required, the Attorney General, for any such amendment.

F. REQUESTS FOR APPROVAL

Requests to conduct any activity authorized by this regulation that requires HQDA or higher level approval (such as the Secretary of the Army or the US Attorney General) will be submitted through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310. Complete justification must accompany each request.

G. GENERAL PROHIBITIONS

DA components will not conduct or provide support for the conduct of special activities, unless such actions have been approved by the President and directed by the Secretary of Defense. Exceptions will be in time of war declared by the Congress or during a period covered by a report from the President and directed by the Secretary of Defense. Under no circumstances will a DA employee engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.

Part 2 PROCEDURES 2. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS

A. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This procedure specifies the kinds of information about United States persons that may be collected by DoD intelligence components and sets forth general criteria governing the means used to collect such information. Additional limitations are imposed in Procedures 5 through 10 on the use of specific collection techniques. Nothing in this procedure will be interpreted as authorizing the collection of any information relating to a US person solely because of lawful advocacy of measures opposed to Government policy.

B. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS

1 *Collection* Information shall be considered as "collected" only when it has been received for use by an employee of a DoD

intelligence component in the course of his official duties For information to be "received for use" and therefore "collected" by an Army intelligence component, an employee must take some affirmative action that demonstrates an intent to use or retain the information received (such as production of a report, filing of an investigative summary, or electronic storage of received data) Establishment of "unofficial files" and the like may not be used to avoid the application of this procedure Thus, information volunteered to a DoD intelligence component by a cooperating source would be "collected" under this procedure when an employee of such component officially accepts, in some manner, such information for use within that component Data acquired by electronic means is "collected" only when it has been processed into intelligible form Information held, or forwarded to a supervisory authority, solely for the purpose of making a determination about the collectability of that information under this procedure (and not otherwise disseminated within the component) is not "collected"

2 Cooperating sources means person or organizations that knowingly and voluntarily provide information to DoD intelligence components, or access to information, at the request of such components or on their own initiative Cooperating sources must be either informed or otherwise have knowledge that they are dealing with a DoD intelligence component These include government agencies, law enforcement authorities, credit agencies, academic institutions, employers, and foreign governments

3 Domestic activities refers to activities that take place within the United States that do not involve a significant connection with a foreign power, organization, or person

4 Overt means refers to methods of collection whereby the source of the information being collected is advised, or is otherwise aware, that he is providing such information to the Department of Defense or a component thereof

C TYPES OF INFORMATION THAT MAY BE COLLECTED ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS

Information that identifies a United States person may be collected by a DoD intelligence component only if it is necessary to the conduct of a function assigned the collecting component, and only if it falls within one of the following categories Note Terms used in this part are defined in appendix A and may differ substantially from traditional Army usage

1 *Information obtained with consent* Information may be collected about a United States person who consents to such collection

2 *Publicly available information* Information may be collected about a United States person if it is publicly available

3 *Foreign intelligence* Subject to the special limitations contained in section E, below, information may be collected about a United States person if the information constitutes foreign intelligence, provided the intentional collection of foreign intelligence about United States persons shall be limited to persons who are

(a) Individuals reasonably believed to be officers or employees, or otherwise acting for or on behalf, of a foreign power

(b) An organization reasonably believed to be owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a foreign power,

(c) Persons or organizations reasonably believed to be engaged or about to engage, in international terrorist or international narcotics activities (See AR 190-52).

(d) Persons who are reasonably believed to be prisoners of war, missing in action, or are the targets, the hostages, or victims of international terrorist organizations, or

(e) Corporations or other commercial organizations believed to have some relationship with foreign powers, organizations or persons

4 *Counterintelligence* Information may be collected about a United States person if the information constitutes counterintelligence, provided the intentional collection of counterintelligence about United States persons must be limited to

(a) Person who are reasonably believed to be engaged in, or about to engage in, intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign

power, or international terrorist activities (See AR 190-52, AR 381-12, and AR 381-20)

(b) Persons in contact with persons described in paragraph C 4 a, above, for the purpose of identifying such persons and assessing their relationship with persons described in paragraph C 4 a, above

5 *Potential sources of assistant to intelligence activities* Information may be collected about United States person reasonably believed to be potential sources of intelligence, or potential sources of assistant to intelligence activities, for the purpose of assessing their suitability and credibility This category does not include investigations undertaken for personnel security purposes (See subsection 8)

6 *Protection of intelligence sources and methods* Information may be collected about a United States person who has access to, had access to, or is otherwise in possession of, information which reveals foreign intelligence and counterintelligence sources or methods, when collection is reasonably believed necessary to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of such information, provided that within the United States, intentional collection of such information shall be limited to persons who are

(a) Present and former DoD employees,

(b) Present or former employees of a present or former DoD contractor, and

(c) Applicants for employment at DoD or at a contractor of DoD

7 *Physical security* Information may be collected about the United States person who is reasonably believed to threaten the physical security of DoD employees, installations, operations or official visitors Information may also be collected in the course of a lawful physical security investigation (See AR 381-12, AR 381-20, AR 190-1, and AR 190-52)

8 *Personnel security* Information may be collected on a United States person that arises out of a lawful personnel security investigation This includes information concerning relatives and associates of the subject of the investigation, if required by the scope of the investigation and the information has a bearing on the matter being investigated or the security determination being made (See AR 604-5, AR 381-12, AR 381-20, and AR 190-52)

9 *Communications security* Information may be collected about a United States person that arises out of a lawful communications security investigation (See AR 380-53)

10 *Narcotics* Information may be collected about a United States person who is reasonably believed to be engaged in international narcotics activities

11 *Threats to safety* Information may be collected about a United States person when the information is needed to protect the safety of any person or organization, including those who are targets, victims or hostages of international terrorist organizations (See AR 190-52)

12 *Overhead reconnaissance* Information may be collected for overhead reconnaissance not directed at specific United States persons

13 *Administrative purposes* Information may be collected about a United States person that is necessary for administrative purposes

D. GENERAL CRITERIA GOVERNING THE MEANS USED TO COLLECT INFORMATION ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS

1 *Means of collection* DoD intelligence components are authorized to collect information about United States persons by any lawful means, provided that all such collection activities shall be carried out in accordance with E O 12333, (reference (a)), and this Regulation, as appropriate

2 *Least intrusive means* The collection of information about United States persons shall be accomplished by the least intrusive means In general, this means-

(a) To the extent feasible, such information shall be collected from publicly available information or with the consent of the person concerned,

(b) If collection from these sources is not feasible or sufficient, such information may be collected from cooperating sources,

(c) If collection from cooperating sources is not feasible or sufficient, such information may be collected, as appropriate, using other lawful investigative techniques that do not require a judicial warrant or the approval of the Attorney General, then

(d) If collection through use of these techniques is not feasible or sufficient, approval for use of investigative techniques that do require a judicial warrant or the approval of the Attorney General may be sought

3 Requests to engage in collection techniques which require HQDA or higher level approval will be submitted through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310. Full justification as required in the relevant procedures will be included

E. SPECIAL LIMITATION ON THE COLLECTION OF FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Within the United States, foreign intelligence concerning United States persons may be collected only by overt means unless all the following conditions are met

1 The foreign intelligence sought is significant and collection is not undertaken for the purpose of acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of any United States person,

2 Such foreign intelligence cannot be reasonably obtained by overt means,

3 The collection of such foreign intelligence has been coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and

4 The use of other than overt means has been approved in writing by the head of the DoD intelligence components concerned, or his single designee, as being consistent with these procedures. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, HQDA, and the Commanding General, US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), are the heads of the Army intelligence components for this purpose. Information copies of approval by the Commanding General, INSCOM, will be provided to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310. They will reflect appropriate coordination with the supporting judge advocate. A copy of any approval made pursuant to this section shall be provided the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). All submissions to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) will be forwarded to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310.

Part 3 PROCEDURES 3. RETENTION OF INFORMATION ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS

A. APPLICABILITY

This procedure governs the kinds of information about United States persons that may knowingly be retained by a DoD intelligence component without the consent of the person whom the information concerns. It does not apply when the information in question is retained solely for administrative purpose or is required by law to be maintained.

B. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS

The terms "retention," as used in this procedure, refers only to the maintenance of information about United States persons which can be retrieved by reference to the person's name or other identifying data.

C. CRITERIA FOR RETENTION

1 *Retention of information collected under Procedure 2* Information about United States persons may be retained if it was collected pursuant to Procedure 2.

2 *Retention of information acquired incidentally* Information about United States persons collected incidentally to authorize collection may be retained if

(a) Such information could have been collected intentionally under Procedure 2,

(b) Such information is necessary to understand or access foreign intelligence or counterintelligence,

(c) The information is foreign intelligence or counterintelligence

collected from electronic surveillance conducted in compliance with this Regulation, or

(d) Such information is incidental to authorized collection and may indicate involvement in activities that may violate federal, state, local, or foreign law.

3 *Retention of information relating to functions of other DoD Components or non-DoD Agencies* Information about United States persons that pertains solely to the functions of other DoD Components or agencies outside the Department of Defense shall be retained only as necessary to transmit or deliver scheduled information to the appropriate recipients.

4 *Temporary retention* Information about United States persons may be retained temporarily, for a period not to exceed 90 days, solely for the purpose of determining whether that information may be permanently retained under these procedures.

5 *Retention of other information* Information about United States persons other than that covered by subsection C 1 through 4, above, shall be retained only for purposes of reporting such collection for oversight purposes and for any subsequent proceedings that may be necessary.

D. ACCESS AND RETENTION

1 *Controls on access to retained information* Access within a DoD intelligence component to information about United States persons retained pursuant to this procedure shall be limited to those with a need to know.

2 *Duration of retention* Disposition of information about United States persons retained in the files of DoD intelligence components will comply with the disposition schedules approved by the Archivist of the United States for the files or records in which the information is retained. Information about US persons retained in the files of DA intelligence components will be reviewed. This review will insure the following: that its continued retention serves the purpose for which it was collected and stored, and that it is necessary to the conduct of authorized functions of DA intelligence components or other Government agencies. This review will be conducted in conjunction with the annual review of files under AR 340-2 or AR 340-18-1, as appropriate. Review of files in the Intelligence Records Repository (IRR) will be under AR 381-45 and AR 340-18-5. Final disposition of such information will comply with disposition schedules approved by the Archivist of the United States for the files or records in which the information is stored. (An example is the AR 340-18 series.)

3 *Information acquired prior to effective date* Information acquired prior to the effective date of this procedure may be retained by DoD intelligence components without being screened for compliance with this procedure or Executive Order 12333 (reference (a)), so long as retention was in compliance with applicable law and previous executive orders.

E. CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE INFORMATION

1 *Review* All electronic surveillance information acquired through Army intelligence operations or received from cooperating (liaison) sources will be reviewed expeditiously after receipt. This review will assure that the contents are relevant to the purpose of the electronic surveillance coverage. All irrelevant or unnecessary information will be destroyed. Information about US persons may be collected, retained, or disseminated only if authorized under procedures 2, 3, or 4.

2 *Access controls* Access to electronic surveillance information will be controlled by the commander of the element that is the custodian of the information. Procedures will be established to assure that access to electronic surveillance information is limited to those with a need-to-know.

3 *Annotation* Each message, document, report, or file of any type that contains electronic surveillance information which identifies any person or organization by name will be clearly and conspicuously marked with the following annotation: "Contents include

electronic surveillance information Handle in accordance with AR 381-10"

F. INDEXING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE INFORMATION

1 *General* In order to be responsive to motions for discovery under section 3504 title 18, United States Code (18 USC 3504), indices will be maintained of all electronic surveillance information which is used, retained, or disseminated by Army intelligence components and which contain references to an identifiable US or non-US person. A person is identifiable if sufficient information is available to the component to determine the last name of the person and to distinguish that person from others who may have the same name. A person generally will be considered distinguishable that person from others with the same name when the information required by one or more of subsections 3b-e and g is known. Electronic surveillance information that is destroyed without being used, retained, or disseminated need not be indexed.

2 *Indexing office* Headquarters, INSCOM, will maintain an index of all electronic surveillance information obtained by Army intelligence elements worldwide, under provisions of this regulation.

3 *Content* The indices will contain the following information to the extent known:

- (a) Name and sex of each identifiable person whose communications were intercepted
- (b) Language in which the conversation occurred
- (c) Telephone numbers, radio frequencies, or radio telephone call signs involved in the interception
- (d) Address of the premises at which the surveillance was conducted
- (e) Title or number of investigative file
- (f) Element maintaining the case file
- (g) Date or dates of the interception

4 *Retrieval* Information maintained in the indices must be retrievable by the following:

- (a) Name of the subject of the case
- (b) Name of each identifiable person overheard, provided that person's conversation was used, retained, or disseminated. Retrieval through additional criteria may be imposed on a case-by-case basis by the approving authority.

5 *Notifying the indexer* Promptly after screening of electronic surveillance information (secretary F 1) an electrical message containing the information required by section F 3 will be sent to HQ INSCOM, Fort Meade, MD//IACSF-IRC//, subject Electronic Surveillance Indexing Material.

6 *Procedure for forwarding backup material* Copies of all indexed electronic surveillance information must be sent to HQ INSCOM to serve as backup for the index. When this information is contained in an investigative file, it will be sent after the file is closed or the investigation is completed. Information not part of an investigative file will be sent as soon as practicable. Backup material sent to the indexing office will include the following:

- (a) Be clearly marked as electronic surveillance information
- (b) Refer to the message or messages that transmitted the indexing information
- (c) Contain all the electronic surveillance information that was used, retained, or disseminated
- (d) Contain a record of all dissemination's of the information outside the DoD

(e) Carry a certification by the forwarding office (to include name, grade and title) that the contents meet the retention criteria of this regulation. If the contents include US person information.

7 *Index security controls* Indexing offices will devise procedures to safeguard and control access to the indices and backup material.

Part 4 PROCEDURE 4. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS

A APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This procedure governs the kinds of information about United States persons that may be disseminated, without their consent, outside the DoD intelligence component that collected and retained the information. It does not apply to information collected solely for administrative purposes, or disseminated pursuant to law, or pursuant to a court order that otherwise imposes controls upon such dissemination.

B CRITERIA FOR DISSEMINATION

Except as provided in section C, below, information about United States persons that identifies those persons may be disseminated without the consent of those persons only under the following conditions:

1 The information was collected or retained or both under Procedures 2 and 3,

2 The recipient is reasonably believed to have a need to receive such information for the performance of a lawful governmental function, and is one of the following:

- (a) An employee of the Department of Defense, or an employee of a contractor of the Department of Defense, and has a need for such information in the course of his or her official duties,
- (b) A law enforcement entity of federal, state, or local government, and the information may indicate involvement in activities which may violate laws which the recipient is responsible to enforce,

(c) An agency within the intelligence community, provided that within the intelligence community, information other than information derived from signals intelligence, may be disseminated to each appropriate agency for the purpose of allowing the recipient agency to determine whether the information is relevant to its responsibilities without such a determination being required of the disseminating DoD intelligence component,

(d) An agency of the federal government authorized to receive such information in their performance of a lawful governmental function, or

(e) A foreign government, and dissemination is undertaken pursuant to an agreement or other understanding with such government.

C OTHER DISSEMINATION

Any dissemination that does not conform to the conditions set forth in section B, above, must be approved by the legal office responsible for advising the DoD Component concerned after consultation with the Department of Justice and General Counsel of the Department of Defense. Such approval shall be based on a determination that the proposed dissemination complies with applicable laws, executive orders, and regulations. Requests will be forwarded through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310.

Part 5 PROCEDURE 5. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Part 1 ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE UNITED STATES FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

A APPLICABILITY

This part of Procedure 5 implements the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 USC 1801, et seq, reference b) and applies to electronic surveillance, as defined in the Act, conducted by DoD intelligence components within the United States to collect "foreign intelligence information," as defined in that Act. This part applies to all nonconsensual electronic surveillance conducted within the United States, whether directed against a US or non-US

person Policy and procedures governing all consensual electronic surveillance are found at section C of this part

B. GENERAL RULES

1 Electronic surveillance pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act A DoD intelligence component may conduct electronic surveillance within the United States for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes only pursuant to an order issued by a judge of the court appointed pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (reference (b)), or pursuant to a certification of the Attorney General issued under the authority of section 102(a) of the Act

2 Authority to request electronic surveillance Authority to approve the submission of applications or requests for electronic surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (reference (b)) shall be limited to the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretary or Under Secretary of a Military Department, and the Director of the National Security Agency Applications for court orders will be made through the Attorney General after prior clearance by the General Counsel, DoD Requests for Attorney General certification shall be made only after prior clearance by the General Counsel, DoD

(a) Requests by Army intelligence components for authority to conduct electronic surveillance pursuant to this part will be submitted through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310 Requests will include the information required by section C of part 2 of procedure 5, they will be submitted as soon in the planning stage as possible

(b) Policy governing control and indexing of electronic surveillance information is contained in sections E and F, procedure 3

3 Electronic surveillance in emergency situations

(a) A DoD intelligence component may conduct electronic surveillance within the United States in emergency situations under an approval from the Attorney General in accordance with section 105(e) of reference (b)

(b) The head of any DoD intelligence component may request that the DoD General Counsel seek such authority directly from the Attorney General in an emergency, if it is not feasible to submit such request through an official designated in subsection B 2. above, provided the appropriate official concerned shall be advised of such requests as soon as possible thereafter

(c) Requests by Army intelligence components for emergency authority to conduct electronic surveillance pursuant to this part will be submitted through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC) WASH DC 20310

C. CONSENSUAL ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

1 *Applicability* This section governs consensual electronic surveillance conducted by Army intelligence components, under the following whether directed against US or non-US persons, and whether occurring within or outside the United States

2 *Explanation of undefined terms* Consensual electronic surveillance occurs when electronic surveillance is conducted after consent for the interception is given by one or more, but fewer than all, of the parties to the communication

3 Case approval authority

(a) Consensual electronic surveillance conducted within the United States or directed against US persons will be approved in advance by the Secretary or Under Secretary of the Army, or the Army General Counsel Requests for approval will be forwarded through command channels HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310, they will contain the information required in section C 4 b

(b) Consensual electronic surveillance directed against non-US persons aboard may be approved by those officials identified in procedure 5, part 2, section F 1 This authority may be delegated, in writing, to field supervisors

4 Case approval standards

(a) Consensual electronic surveillance may be conducted for any lawful function assigned the Army intelligence component

(b) Requests for consensual electronic surveillance conducted

within the United States or directed against a US person abroad will provide the following

(1) Description of the facts and circumstances requiring the intended interception, the means by which it would be conducted, the place at which it would be conducted, and its expected duration

(2) Names of all persons whose conversations are expected to be intercepted, and their roles in the incident being investigated Except in extraordinary situations, written consent forms will be executed by all individuals consenting to the electronic surveillance In extraordinary situations, the request for surveillance will contain an explanation of why written consent could not be obtained

(3) Statement that in the judgment of the person making the request, the interception is warranted in the interest of a lawful function assigned the Army intelligence component The function will be identified

(c) All electronic surveillance information used, retained, or disseminated, that pertains to an identifiable US or non-US person, must be controlled and indexed pursuant to procedure 3, sections E and F

5 Consensual electronic surveillance in emergency situations Notwithstanding section C 3 a, an Army intelligence component may conduct consensual electronic surveillance within the United States or directed against a US person outside the United States in emergency situations, under the following limitations

(a) A general court-martial convening authority may authorize consensual electronic surveillance He may do so only when securing the prior approval of person described in section C 3 a is not practical because of the reasons listed below

(1) Time required would cause failure or delay in obtaining valuable intelligence information, or

(2) A person's life or physical safety is reasonably believed to be in immediate danger, or

(3) Physical security of a defense installation or Government property is reasonably believed to be in immediate danger

(b) Such officials will notify HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310, within 24 hours of any such surveillance, the reason for authorizing such surveillance on an emergency basis, and the expected results

(c) Consensual electronic surveillance authorized pursuant to this section may not continue longer than the time required for a decision by the persons designated in section C 3 a

Part 2 ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

A APPLICABILITY

This part of Procedure 5 applies to electronic surveillance, as defined in Appendix A, for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes directed against United States person who are outside the United States, and who, under the circumstances, have a reasonable expectation of privacy (Electronic surveillance directed against a US person abroad also may be performed pursuant to this part of procedure 5 for any other lawful function assigned an Army intelligence component) It is intended to be applied in conjunction with the regulation of electronic surveillance "within the United States" under Part 1 and the regulation of "signals intelligence activities" under Part 3, so that the intentional interception for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes of all wire or radio communications of persons within the United States and against United States persons abroad where such persons enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy is covered by one of the three parts In addition, this part governs the use of electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance devices for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes against a United States person abroad in circumstances where such person has a reasonable expectation of privacy This part does not apply to the electronic surveillance of communications of other than United States person abroad or to the interception of the communications of United States persons abroad that do not constitute electronic surveillance (Policy governing electronic surveillance of non-US persons conducted outside the United States is contained in

sections F and G, below Policy governing control and indexing of electronic surveillance information is contained in procedure 3, sections E and F Policy governing all consensual electronic surveillance is found at procedure 5, section C, part 1

B. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS

1 Electronic surveillance is "directed against a United States person" when the surveillance is intentionally targeted against or designed to intercept the communications of that person Electronic surveillance directed against person who are not United States persons that results in the incidental acquisition of the communications of a United States person does not thereby become electronic surveillance directed against a United States person However, use, retention or dissemination of inadvertently intercepted US person communications is governed by section G 4

2 Electronic surveillance is "outside the United States" if the person against whom the electronic surveillance is directed is physically outside the United States, regardless of the location at which surveillance is conducted For example, the interception of communications that originate and terminate outside the United States can be conducted from within the United States and still fall under this part rather than Part 1

C PROCEDURES

Except as provided in section D, below, DoD intelligence components may conduct electronic surveillance against a United States person who is outside the United States for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes only if the surveillance is approved by the Attorney General Request for approval will be forwarded to the Attorney General by an official designated in section E 1, below Each request shall include

1 An identification or description of the target If applicable, include the address, telephone number, room number, whether inside or outside a building, and whether on public or private property

2 A statement of the facts supporting a finding that

(a) There is probable cause to believe the target of the electronic surveillance is one of the following

(1) A person who, for or on behalf of a foreign power, is engaged in clandestine intelligence activities (including covert activities intended to affect the political or governmental process), sabotage, or international terrorist activities, or activities in preparation for international terrorist activities, or who conspires with, or knowingly aids and abets a person engaging in such activities,

(2) A person who is an officer or employee of a foreign power,

(3) A person unlawfully acting for, or pursuant to the direction of, a foreign power The mere fact that a person's activities may benefit or further the aims of a foreign power is not enough to bring that person under this subsection, absent evidence that the person is taking direction from, or acting in knowing concert with, the foreign power,

(4) A corporation or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a foreign power, or

(5) A person in contact with, or acting in collaboration with, an intelligence or security service of a foreign power for the purpose of providing access to information or material classified by the United States to which such person has access

(b) The electronic surveillance is necessary to obtain significant foreign intelligence or counterintelligence

(c) The significant foreign intelligence or counterintelligence expected to be obtained from the electronic surveillance could not reasonably be contained by other less intrusive collection techniques

3 A description of the significant foreign intelligence or counterintelligence expected to be obtained from the electronic surveillance

4 A description of the means by which the electronic surveillance will be effected Describe the equipment to be used, method of transmission, recording device, and method of installation

5 If physical trespass is required to effect the surveillance, a

statement of facts supporting a finding that the means involve the least amount of intrusion that will accomplish the objective

6 A statement of period of time, not to exceed 90 days, for which the eligibility surveillance is required

7 A description of the expected dissemination of the product of the surveillance, including a description of the procedures that will govern the retention and dissemination of communications or concerning United States persons other than those targeted, acquired incidental to such surveillance

8 A description of any less intrusive procedures that have been tried and failed, why they may fail again, or why they are too dangerous to attempt

9 If the request is for an extension of a previous authorization, describe results thus far obtained from the interception, or give a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain results

10 Indicate that the request has been coordinated with the appropriate staff or command judge advocate

11 If known, indicate whether previous requests have been made for electronic surveillance on any of the same persons, facilities, or places to be surveyed State whether such requests were approved or disapproved

D ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN EMERGENCY SITUATION

Notwithstanding section C, above, a DoD intelligence component may conduct surveillance directed at a United States person who is outside the United States in emergency situations under the following limitations

1 Officials designated in section E, below, may authorize electronic surveillance directed at a United States person outside the United States in emergency situations, when securing the prior approval of the Attorney General is not practical because

(a) The time required would cause failure or delay in obtaining significant foreign intelligence or counterintelligence and such failure or delay would result in substantial harm to the national security,

(b) A person's life or physical safety is reasonably believed to be in immediate danger, or

(c) The physical security of a defense installation or government property is reasonably believed to be in immediate danger

2 Except for actions taken under subsection D 1 b, above, any official authorizing such emergency surveillance shall find that one of the criteria contained in subsection C 2 a, above, is met Such officials shall notify the DoD General Counsel promptly of any such surveillance, the reason for authorizing such surveillance on an emergency basis, and the expected results

3 The Attorney General shall be notified by the General Counsel, DoD, as soon as possible of the surveillance, the circumstances surrounding its authorization, and the results thereof, and such other information as may be required to authorize continuation of such surveillance

4 Electronic surveillance authorized pursuant to this section may not continue longer than the time required for a decision by the Attorney General and in no event longer than 72 hours

E OFFICIALS AUTHORIZED TO REQUEST AND APPROVE ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

1 The following officials may request approval of electronic surveillance of US persons outside the United States under section C, above, and approved emergency surveillance under section D, above,

(a) The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense

(b) The Secretaries and Under Secretaries of the Military Departments

(c) The Director and Deputy Director of the National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service

2 Authorization for emergency electronic surveillance under section D, may also be granted by

(a) Any general or flag officer at the overseas location in question, having responsibility for either the subject of their surveillance, or responsibility for the protection of persons, installations, or property that is endangered (Before an Army general officer is an overseas location authorizes and emergency electronic surveillance, he or she must coordinate with the major Army command (MACOM) senior intelligence officer (SIO) and supporting judge advocate on appropriateness and applicable policy regarding the proposed surveillance. When an Army general officer at an overseas location authorizes an emergency electronic surveillance, the MACOM SIO will provide details to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310, by the most expeditious means available), or

(b) The Deputy Director for Operations, National Security Agency

F ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-US PERSONS

This section prescribes the sole authority by which Army intelligence components may engage in non-consensual electronic surveillance of non-US persons outside the United States. Electronic surveillance of non-US persons within the United States is governed by part 1 of procedure 5. Consensual electronic surveillance is governed by section C of part 1 of procedure 5.

1 *Case approval authority.* Authorities listed below may approve electronic surveillance under this section that is conducted by Army intelligence components or requested directly or indirectly by those components:

(a) The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), HQDA

(b) Commanding General, INSCOM

(c) Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe, and Seventh Army (CINCUSAREUR)

(d) *Commanding General Eighth United States Army (EUSA)*

The officials at (a) through (d) above may delegate authority to their deputies, chiefs of staff, or ranking intelligence staff officers; they in turn may delegate their authority to the responsible military intelligence group commanders. No further delegation is authorized. All delegation of authority will be in writing. Requests for approval will be forwarded through command channels; they will contain the information required in section 2 (a) through (i). Approval will be granted only after coordination with the approving authority's supporting judge advocate. Information copies of approvals will be provided to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310.

2 *Case approval standards.* Non-consensual electronic surveillance of non-US persons abroad may be conducted for any lawful functions assigned the Army intelligence component. Each request to conduct electronic surveillance pursuant to this section will comply with the following:

(a) Provide facts sufficient to support a determination by the approval authority that a reasonable belief exists that the surveillance will gather valuable intelligence information.

(b) Describe nature and content of conversations expected to be intercepted.

(c) Identify the investigative unit that will conduct the surveillance.

(d) Identify any US persons whose communications could reasonably be expected to be intercepted. Identify any people who have consented to the surveillance.

(e) Describe the equipment to be used and the method of installation.

(f) State the location of the proposed surveillance. If applicable include the address and means of access. If physical trespass is required, detail the method of entry.

(g) Estimate the expected duration of the surveillance.

(h) If the request is for an extension of a previous authorization, describe the results thus far obtained, or provide an explanation of the failure to obtain results.

(i) Indicate that the request has been coordinated with the appropriate judge advocate and the date of the coordination.

3 *Case approval periods.* Initial approvals of cases directed against non-US persons may be granted for a period up to 90 days.

Renewal requests for non-US person cases involving specific individuals may be approved for a period up to 90 days. Renewal requests for cases involving foreign intelligence or counterintelligence of a continuing and long-term interest may be approved for a period up to 1 year. All renewal requests will be submitted in the same manner as the original request; they will be reviewed under the same criteria.

4 *Inadvertent interception of US person conversations.* If a US person communication is inadvertently intercepted during electronic surveillance directed against a non-US person, the following will apply:

(a) Approval of the Secretary or Under Secretary of the Army must be obtained before the information is used, retained or disseminated. Requests for approval should be sent through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310.

(b) In emergency situations such request may be approved by the Army General Officer, after coordination with his or her senior intelligence officer. A report of emergency approvals will be expeditiously provided to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310. The report will include an explanation of the nature of the emergency situation.

(c) Electronic surveillance information approved for use, retention, or dissemination under this subsection must be controlled and indexed pursuant to sections E and F, procedure 3.

(d) Approval of the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Army is not required if the contents of the inadvertent interception are destroyed and are not used, retained, or disseminated.

Part 3 SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

A APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

1 This procedure governs the conduct by the United States Signals Intelligence System of signals intelligence activities that involves the collection, retention, and dissemination of foreign communications and military tactical communications. Such activities may incidentally involve the collection of information concerning United States persons without their consent, or may involve communications originated or intended for receipt in the United States, without the consent of a party thereto.

2 This part of Procedure 5 shall be supplemented by a classified Annex promulgated by the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, which shall also be approved by the Attorney General. That regulation shall provide that signals intelligence activities which constitute electronic surveillance as defined in Parts 1 and 2 of this procedure, will be authorized in accordance with those parts. Any information collected incidentally about United States persons shall be subjected to minimization procedures approved by the Attorney General.

B EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS

1 Communications concerning a United States person are those in which the United States person is identified in the communication. A United States person is identified when the person's name, unique title, address or other personal identifier is revealed in the communication in the context of activities conducted by that person. A reference to a product by brand name or manufacturer's name or the use of a name in a descriptive sense, as, for example, "Monroe Doctrine," is not an identification of a United States person.

2 Interception means the acquisition by the United States Signals Intelligence system through electronic means of a nonpublic communication to which it is not an intended party, and the processing of the contents of that communication into an intelligible form but not including the display of signals on visual display devices intended to permit the examination of the technical characteristics of the signals without reference to the information content carried by the signals.

3 Military tactical communications means United States and allied military exercise communications within the United States and

abroad necessary for the production of simulated foreign intelligence and counterintelligence or to permit an analysis of communication security

4 **United States person** For purpose of signals intelligence activities only, the following guidelines will apply in determining whether a person is a United States person

(a) A person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as a United States person unless the nature of the person's communications or other available information concerning the person give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is not a United States citizen or permanent resident alien

(b) A person known to be currently outside the United States, or whose location is not known, will not be treated as a United States person unless the nature of the person's communications or other available information concerning the person give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a United States citizen or permanent resident alien

(c) A person known to be an alien admitted for permanent residence may be assumed to have lost status as a United States person if the person leaves the United States and it is known that the person is not in compliance with the administrative formalities provided by law that enable such persons to reenter the United States without regard to the provisions of law that would otherwise restrict an alien's entry into the United States. The failure to follow the statutory procedures provides a reasonable basis to conclude that such alien has abandoned any intention of maintaining status as a permanent resident alien

(d) An unincorporated association whose headquarters are located outside the United States may be presumed not to be a United States person unless the collecting agency has information indicating that a substantial number of members are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence

5 **United States Signals Intelligence System** means the unified organization for signals intelligence activities under the direction of the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, comprised of the National Security Agency, the Central Security Service, the components of the military services authorized to conduct signals intelligence and such other entities (other than the Federal Bureau of Investigation) as are authorized by the National Security Council or the Secretary of Defense to conduct signals intelligence. FBI activities are governed by procedures promulgated by the Attorney General

C. PROCEDURES

1 **Foreign communications** The United States Signals Intelligence System may collect, process, retain, and disseminate foreign communications that are also communications of or concerning United States persons, but only in accordance with the classified annex to this procedure

2 **Military tactical communications** The United States Signals Intelligence System may collect, process, retain, and disseminate military tactical communications that are also communications of or concerning United States persons but only in accordance with the classified annex to this procedure

(a) **Collection** Collection efforts will be conducted in the same manner as in the case of signals intelligence for foreign intelligence purposes and must be designed in such a manner as to avoid to the extent feasible the intercept of communications not related to military exercise

(b) **Retention and processing** Military tactical communications may be retained and processed without deletion of references to United States persons who are participants in, or are otherwise mentioned in exercise-related communications, provided that the communications of United States persons not participating in the exercise that are inadvertently intercepted during the exercise shall be destroyed as soon as feasible

(c) **Dissemination** Dissemination of military tactical communications and exercise reports or information files derived from such

communications shall be limited to those authorities and persons participating in or conducting review and critiques of such exercise

Part 4 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES

A APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This part of Procedure 5 applies to the use of electronic equipment to determine the existence and capability of electronic surveillance equipment being used by persons not authorized to conduct electronic surveillance. It implements section 105(f)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, (reference b))

B. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS

The term technical surveillance countermeasures refers to activities authorized pursuant to DoD Directive 5200.29, (reference (c)), and, as used in the procedure, refers to the use of electronic surveillance equipment, or electronic or mechanical devices, solely for determining the existence and capability of electronic surveillance equipment being used by persons not authorized to conduct electronic surveillance, or for determining the susceptibility of electronic equipment to unlawful electronic surveillance

C. PROCEDURES

A DoD intelligence component may use technical surveillance countermeasures that involve the incidental acquisition of the nonpublic communications of United States persons without their consent, provided

1 The use of such countermeasures has been authorized or consented to by the official in charge of the facility, organization, or installation where the countermeasures are to be undertaken,

2 The use of such countermeasures is limited in extent and duration to that necessary to determine the existence and capability of such equipment, and

3 Access to the content of communications acquired during the use of countermeasures is limited to person involved directly in conducting such measures, and any content acquired is destroyed as soon as practical or upon completion of the particular use. However, if the content is acquired within the United States, only information which is necessary to protect against unauthorized electronic surveillance, or to enforce Chapter 119 of title 18, United States Code (reference (d)) and Section 605 of the Communication Act of 1934 (reference (e)), may be retained and disseminated to appropriate law enforcement authorities. A record of the types of communications and information subject to acquisition by the illegal electronic surveillance equipment may be retained

4 Use, retention, or dissemination of US person information acquired pursuant to this part must be approved by the Secretary or Under Secretary of the Army. Requests should be submitted to HQDA dm, WASH DC 20310. In emergency situations such request may be approved by any Army general officer, after consultation with his or her senior intelligence officer and supporting judge advocate. A report will contain an explanation of the nature of the emergency situation

Part 5 DEVELOPING, TESTING, AND CALIBRATION OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT

A APPLICABILITY

This part of Procedure 5 applies to developing, testing, and calibrating electronic equipment that can intercept or process communications and non-communications signals. It also includes research and development that needs electronic communications as a signal source

B PROCEDURES

1 **Signal Authorized for Use**

(a) The following may be used without restrictions

(1) Laboratory-generated signals

(2) Communications signals with the consent of the communicator

(3) Communications in the commercial or public service broadcast bands

(4) Communications transmitted between terminals located outside of the United States not used by any known United States person

(b) Communications subject to lawful electronic surveillance under the provisions of Parts 1, 2, or 3 of this procedure may be used subject to the minimization procedures applicable to such surveillance

(c) Any of the following may be used subject to the restrictions of subsection B 2, below

(1) Communications over official government communications circuits with consent from an appropriate official of the controlling agency

(2) Communications in citizens and amateur-radio bands

(d) Other signals may be used only where it is determined that it is not practical to use the signals described above and it is not reasonable to obtain the consent of persons incidentally subjected to the surveillance. The restrictions of subsection B 2, below will apply in such cases. The Attorney General must approve use of signals pursuant to this subsection for the purpose of development, testing, or calibration when the period of use exceeds 90 days. When Attorney General approval is required, the DoD intelligence component shall submit a test proposal to the General Counsel, DoD, or the NSA General Counsel for transmission to the Attorney General for approval. The test proposal shall state the requirement for a period beyond 90 days, the nature of the activity, the organization that will conduct the activity, and the proposed disposition of any signals or communications acquired during the activity. Requests will be submitted through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310

2 *Restrictions* For signals described in subsection B 1 c and d, above, the following restrictions apply

(a) The surveillance shall be limited in scope and duration to that necessary for the purpose referred to in section A above

(b) No particular United States person shall be targeted intentionally without consent

(c) The content of any communication shall

(1) Be retained only when actually needed for the purposes referred to in section A above

(2) Be disseminated only to persons conducting the activity, and

(3) Be destroyed immediately upon completion of the activity

(d) The technical parameters of a communication (such as frequency, modulation, bearing, signal strength, and time of activity) may be retained and used for the purposes outlined in section A, above, or for collection avoidance purposes. Such parameters may be disseminated to other DoD intelligence components and other entities authorized to conduct electronic surveillance or related development, testing, and calibration of electronic equipment provided such dissemination and use are limited to the purposes outlined in section A, or collection avoidance purposes. No content of any communication may be retained or used other than as provided in subsection B 2 c, above

Part 6

TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE OPERATIONS AND USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT

A APPLICABILITY

This part of Procedure 5 applies to the training of personnel by DoD intelligence components in the operations and use of electronic communications and surveillance equipment. It does not apply to the interception of communications with the consent of one of the parties to the communication or to the training of intelligence personnel by nonintelligence components

B. PROCEDURES

1 *Training guidance* The training of personnel by DoD intelligence components in the operation and use of electronic communications and surveillance equipment shall include guidance concerning the requirements and restrictions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (reference (b)), and E O 12333 (reference (a)), with respect to the unauthorized acquisition and use of the content of communications of United States persons

2 *Training Limitations*

(a) Except as permitted by subsection B 2 b and c, below, the use of electronic communications and surveillance equipment for training purposes is permitted subject to the following limitations

(1) To the maximum extent practical, use of such equipment for training purposes shall be directed against communications which are subject to lawful electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes under Parts 1, 2, and 3 of this procedure

(2) The contents of private communication of nonconsenting United States persons may not be acquired aurally unless the person is an authorized target of electronic surveillance

(3) The electronic surveillance will be limited in extent and duration to that necessary to train personnel in the use of the equipment

(b) Public broadcasts, distress signals, or official United States Government communications may be monitored, provided that when government agency communications are monitored, the consent of an appropriate official is obtained

(c) Minimal acquisition of information is permitted as required for calibration purposes

3 *Retention and dissemination* Information collected during training that involves communications described in subsection B 2 a (1), above, shall be retained and disseminated in accordance with minimization procedures applicable to that electronic surveillance. Information collected during training that does not involve communications described in subsection B 2 a (1), above, or that is acquired inadvertently, shall be destroyed as soon as practical or upon completion of the training and may not be disseminated for any purpose. This subsection does not apply to distress signals

Part 7

CONDUCT OF VULNERABILITY AND HEARABILITY SURVEYS

A APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This part of Procedure 5 applies to the conduct of vulnerability surveys and hearability surveys by DoD intelligence components. Army implementation is contained in AR 380-53

B EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS

1 The term vulnerability survey refers to the acquisition of radio frequency propagation and its subsequent analysis to determine empirically the vulnerability of the transmission media to interception by g intelligence services

2 The term hearability survey refers to monitoring radio communications to determine whether a particular radio signal can be received at one or more locations and, if reception is possible, to determine the quality of reception over time

C PROCEDURES

1 *Conduct of vulnerability surveys* Nonconsensual surveys may be conducted to determine the potential vulnerability to intelligence services of a foreign power of transmission facilities of communications common carriers, other private commercial entities, and entities of the federal government, subject to the following limitations

(a) No vulnerability survey may be conducted without the prior written approval of the Director, National Security Agency, or his designee

(b) No transmission may be acquired aurally

(c) No content of any transmission may be acquired by any means

(d) No transmission may be recorded

(e) No report or log may identify any United States person or

entity to the extent of identifying transmission facilities that are vulnerable to surveillance by foreign powers. If the identities of the users of such facilities are not identical with the identities of the owners of the facilities, the identity of such users may be obtained but not from the content of the transmissions themselves, and may be disseminated. Logs may be disseminated only if required to verify results contained in reports.

2 *Conduct of hearability surveys* The Director, National Security Agency may conduct, or may authorize the conduct by other agencies, of hearability surveys of telecommunications that are transmitted in the United States.

(a) *Collection* Where practicable, consent will be secured from the owner or user of the facility against which the hearability survey is to be conducted prior to the commencement of the survey.

(b) *Processing and Storage* Information collection during a hearability survey must be processed and stored as follows:

(1) The content of communications may not be recorded or included in any report.

(2) No microwave transmission may be demultiplexed or demodulated for any purpose.

(3) No report or log may identify any person or entity except to the extent of identifying the transmission facility that can be intercepted from the intercept site. If the identities of the users of such facilities are not identical with the identities of the owners of the facilities, and their identities are relevant to the purpose for which the hearability survey has been conducted, the identity of such users may be obtained provided such identities may not be obtained from the contents of the transmission themselves.

(a) *Dissemination* Reports may be disseminated only within the United States Government. Logs may not be disseminated unless required to verify results contained in reports.

Part 6 PROCEDURE 6 CONCEALED MONITORING

A APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

1 This procedure applies to concealed monitoring only for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes conducted by a DoD intelligence component within the United States or directed against a United States person who is outside the United States where the subject of such monitoring does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as explained in section B, below, and no warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes.

2 Concealed monitoring in the United States for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes where the subject of such monitoring (whether or not a US person) has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes shall be treated as "electronic surveillance within the United States" under Part 1 of Procedure 5, and processed pursuant to that procedure.

3 Concealed monitoring for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes of a United States person abroad where the subject of such monitoring has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes shall be treated as "electronic surveillance outside the United States" under Part 2 of Procedure 5, and processed pursuant to that procedure.

4 Concealed monitoring for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes when the monitoring is a signals intelligence activity shall be conducted pursuant to Part 3 of Procedure 5.

5 Concealed monitoring for foreign intelligence and CI purposes of a non-US person abroad who has a reasonable expectation of privacy will be treated as electronic surveillance of a non-US person outside the United States. This is governed by section F of part 2 of procedure 5.

B EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS

1 Concealed monitoring means targeting by electronic, optical, or mechanical devices a particular person or a group of persons without their consent in a surreptitious and continuous manner.

Monitoring is surreptitious when it is targeted in a manner designed to keep the subject of the monitoring unaware of it. Monitoring is continuous if it is conducted without interruption for a substantial period of time. Beacons ("beepers") and transponders generally are considered methods of concealed monitoring under the following conditions: when affixed in a public place (for example, placing the device on the underside of a vehicle on a public area), and where no warrant would be required in a criminal law context. Concealed monitoring by "beacons" authorized under this procedure must terminate when the target of the monitoring acquires an expectation of privacy. An example would be the vehicle entering private property not visible from a public place.

2 Monitoring is within the United States if the monitoring device, or the target of the monitoring, is located within the United States.

3 Whether concealed monitoring is to occur where the subject has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a determination which depends upon the circumstances of a particular case, and shall be made only after consultation with the legal officer responsible for advising the DoD intelligence component concerned. Reasonable expectation of privacy is the extent to which a reasonable person in the particular circumstances involved is entitled to believe his or her actions are not subject to monitoring by electronic, optical, or mechanical devices. For example, there are ordinarily reasonable expectations of privacy in work spaces if a person's actions and papers are not subject to ready observation by others under normal working conditions. Conversely, a person walking out of his or her residence into a public street ordinarily would not have a reasonable expectation that he or she is not being observed or even photographed, however, such a person ordinarily would have an expectation of privacy within his or her residence.

C PROCEDURES

1 *Limitations on use of concealed monitoring* Use of concealed monitoring under circumstances when the subject of such monitoring has no reasonable expectation of privacy is subject to the following limitations:

(a) Within the United States, a DoD intelligence component may conduct concealed monitoring only on an installation and facility owned or leased by DoD, or otherwise in the course of an investigation conducted pursuant to the Agreement Between the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, reference (g) (See App B).

(b) Outside the United States, such monitoring may be conducted on installation and facilities owned or leased by the Department of Defense. Monitoring outside such facilities shall be conducted after coordination with appropriate host country officials, if such coordination is required by the governing Status of Forces Agreement, and with the Central Intelligence Agency.

2 *Required Determination* Concealed monitoring conducted under subsection C 1, requires approval by an official designated in subsection C 3, below, based on a determination that such monitoring is necessary to the conduct of assigned foreign intelligence or counterintelligence functions, and does not constitute electronic surveillance under Parts 1 or 2 of Procedure 5.

3 Officials authorized to approve concealed monitoring. Officials authorized to approve concealed monitoring under this procedure include the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director, National Security Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army, the Director, Naval Intelligence, the Director of Intelligence, US Marine Corps, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force, the Commanding General, Army Intelligence and Security Command, the Director, Naval Investigative Service, and the Commanding Officer, Air Force Office of Special Investigations.

(a) Requests for approval of concealed monitoring will be coordinated with the legal advisor to the approving authority.

(b) Information copies of approvals by the Commanding General, INSCOM, will be provided to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310.

Part 7 PROCEDURE 7 PHYSICAL SEARCHES

A. APPLICABILITY

This procedure applies to unconsented physical searches of any person or property within the United States and to physical searches of the person or property of a United States person outside the United States by DoD intelligence components for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. Physical searches also may be performed pursuant to this procedure for any other lawful function assigned an Army intelligence component. DoD intelligence components may provide assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement authorities in accordance with Procedure 12 Part C 4 of this procedure also governs physical searches on non-US persons abroad.

B EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS

Physical search means any intrusion upon a person or a person's property or possessions to obtain items of property or information. The term does not include examination of areas that are in plain view and visible to the unaided eye if no physical trespass is undertaken, and does not include examinations of abandoned property left in a public place. The term also does not include any intrusion authorized as necessary to accomplish lawful electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to Parts 1 and 2 of Procedure 5.

C PROCEDURES

1 Unconsented physical searches within the United States

(a) *Searches of active duty military personnel for counterintelligence purposes.* The counterintelligence elements of the Military Departments are authorized to conduct unconsented physical searches in the United States for counterintelligence purposes of the person or property of active duty military personnel, when authorized by a military judge, or a military commander empowered to approve physical searches for law enforcement purposes pursuant to rule 315(d) of the Manual for Courts Martial, Executive Order 12198 (reference (h)), based upon a finding of probable cause to believe such persons are acting as agents of foreign powers. For purposes of this section, the term "agent of a foreign power" refers to an individual who meets the critical set forth in subsection C 2 b (2), below.

(b) *Other unconsented physical searches.* Except as permitted by section A, above, DoD intelligence components may not conduct unconsented physical searches of person and property within the United States for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. DoD intelligence components may, however, request the FBI to conduct such searches. All such requests shall be in writing, shall contain the information required in section C 2 b (1) through (6), below, and be approved by an official designated in section C 2 c, below. A copy of each such request shall be furnished the General Counsel, DoD.

2 Unconsented physical searches outside the United States

(a) *Searches of active duty military personnel for counterintelligence purposes.* The counterintelligence elements of the Military Departments may conduct unconsented physical searches of the person or property of active duty military personnel outside the United States for counterintelligence purposes when authorized by a military judge, or a military commander empowered to approve physical searches for law enforcement purposes pursuant to rule 315(d) of the Manual for Courts Martial, Executive Order 12198, (reference (h)), based upon a finding of probable cause to believe such persons are acting as agents of foreign powers. For purposes of this section, the term "agent of a foreign power" refers to an individual who meets the critical set forth in subsection C 2 b (2), below.

(b) *Other unconsented physical searches.* DoD intelligence components may conduct other unconsented physical searches for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes of the person or property of United States persons outside the United States only pursuant to the approval of the Attorney General. Requests for such

approval will be forwarded by a senior official designated in subsection C 2 c, below, to the Attorney General and shall include:

(1) An identification of the person or description of the property to be searched.

(2) A statement of facts supporting a finding that there is probable cause to believe the subject of the search is:

(a) A person who, for or on behalf of a foreign power, is engaged in clandestine intelligence activities (including covert activities intended to affect the political or governmental process), sabotage, or international terrorist activities, activities in preparation for international terrorist activities, or who conspires with, or knowingly aids and abets a person engaging in such activities.

(b) A person who is an officer or employee of a foreign power.

(c) A person unlawfully acting for, or pursuant to the direction of, a foreign power. The mere fact that a person's activities may benefit or further the aims of a foreign power does not justify an unconsented physical search without evidence that the person is taking direction from, or acting in knowing concert with, the foreign power.

(d) A corporation or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a foreign power, or

(e) A person in contact with, or acting in collaboration with, an intelligence or security service of a foreign power for the purpose of providing access to information or material classified by the United States to which such person has access.

(3) A statement of facts supports a finding that the search is necessary to obtain significant foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.

(4) A statement of facts supporting a finding that the significant foreign intelligence or counterintelligence expected to be obtained could not be obtained by less intrusive means.

(5) A description of the significant foreign intelligence or counterintelligence expected to be obtained from the search.

(6) A description of the extent of the search and a statement of facts supporting a finding that the search will involve the least amount of physical intrusion that will accomplish the objective sought.

(7) A description of the expected dissemination of the product of the search, including a description of the procedures that will govern the retention and dissemination of information about United States persons acquired incidental to the search.

(c) Request for approval of unconsented physical searches under subsection C 2 b must be made by:

(1) The Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense,

(2) The Secretary or the Under Secretary of a Military Department,

(3) The Director, National Security Agency,

(4) The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

3 Requests for authority to conduct unconsented physical searches within the United States or of US persons abroad:

(a) Information copies of approvals for physical searches authorized pursuant to sections C 1 a or C 2 a will be provided to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310.

(b) Requests submitted by an Army intelligence component under sections C 1 b or C 2 b will be submitted through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310.

4 Unconsented physical searches of non-US persons abroad

(a) Unconsented physical searches of non-US persons outside the United States may be performed for any lawful function assigned the Army intelligence component.

(b) Unconsented physical searches of non-US persons outside the United States may be approved by the following officials:

(1) ACSI, HQDA

(2) Commanding General, INSCOM

(3) CINCUSAREUR

(4) *Commanding General, EUSA.* The officials at (1) through (4) above may delegate authority to their deputies, chiefs of staff, or ranking intelligence staff officers, they in turn may delegate their authority to the responsible military intelligence group commanders, who may further delegate this authority to military intelligence battalion commanders or their equivalent. No further delegation is

authorized. All delegations must be in writing. Request for approval will be forwarded through command channels, approvals will be granted only after coordination with the approving authority's supporting judge advocate. Information copies of all approvals will be provided to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310.

Part 8 PROCEDURE 8. SEARCHES AND EXAMINATION OF MAIL

A. APPLICABILITY

This procedure applies to the opening of mail in United States postal channels, and the use of mail covers with respect to such mail, for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes. (Additionally, mail opening and mail covers may be performed pursuant to this procedure for any other lawful function assigned an Army intelligence component.) It also applies to the opening of mail to or from United States persons where such activity is conducted outside the United States and such mail is not in United States postal channels.

B. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS

1 Mail within the United States postal channels includes

(a) Mail while in transit within, among, and between the United States, its territories and possessions (including mail of foreign origin which is passed by a foreign postal administration to the United States Postal Service is forwarding to a foreign post administration under a postal treaty or convention, and mail temporarily in the hands of the United States Customs Service or the Department of Agriculture), Army-Air Force (APO) and Navy (FPO) post offices, and mail for delivery to the United Nations, NY, and

(b) International mail en route to an addressee in the United States or its possessions after passage to United States Postal Service from a foreign postal administration or en route to an addressee aboard before passage to a foreign postal administration.

(c) As a rule, mail shall be considered in such postal channels until the moment it is delivered manually in the United States to the specific addressee named on the envelope, or his authorized agent.

2 To examine mail means to employ a mail cover with respect to such mail.

3 Mail cover means the process by which a record is made of any data appearing on the outside cover of any class of mail matter as permitted by law, other than that necessary for the delivery of mail or administration of the postal service.

C. PROCEDURES

1 Searches of mail within United States postal channels

(a) Applicable postal regulations do not permit DoD intelligence components to detain or open first class mail within United States postal channels for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes, or to request such action by the US Postal Service. Searches of first class mail in US postal channels may be authorized for law enforcement purposes under procedures established in DoD 4525 6-M, chapter 8, volume 1.

(b) DoD intelligence components may request appropriate US postal authorities to inspect, or authorized the inspection, of the contents of second, third or fourth class mail in United States postal channels, for such purposes, in accordance with applicable postage regulations. Such components may also request appropriate US postal authorities to detain, or permit the detention of, mail that may become subject to search under this section, in accordance with applicable postal regulations. Request for approval under this subsection will be coordinated with the legal advisor to the approving authority. Information copies of request submitted to postal authorities by the Commanding General, INSCOM will be provided to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310.

2 Searches of mail outside United States postal channels

(a) DoD intelligence components are authorized to open mail to or from the United States person that is found outside United States

postal channels only pursuant to the approval of the Attorney General. Requests for such approval shall be treated as a request for an unconsented physical search under subsection C 2 b of Procedure 7. Army intelligence components will submit such requests through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), was

(b) Heads of DoD intelligence components may authorize the opening of mail outside US postal channels when both the sender and intended recipient are other than United States persons if such searches are otherwise lawful and consistent with any Status of Forces Agreement that may be in effect. Searches of mail pursuant to this subsection may be conducted for any lawful function assigned an Army intelligence component. Searches of mail outside US postal channels may be approved by the following officials:

(1) ACSI, HQDA

(2) Commanding General, INSCOM

(3) CINCUSAREUR

(4) *Commanding General, EUSA*. The officials at (1) through (4) above may delegate authority to their deputies, chiefs of staff, or ranking intelligence staff officers. They in turn may delegate their authority to responsible mil intelligence group commanders, these commanders may further delegate this authority to military intelligence battalion commanders, or equivalent. No further delegation is authorized. Delegation of authority must be in writing. Requests for approval will be forwarded through command channels. Approvals will be granted only after coordination with the approving authority's supporting judge advocate. Information copies of all approvals will be provided to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310.

1 Mail Covers

(a) DoD intelligence components may request US postal authorities to examine mail in US postal channels, for counterintelligence purposes, in accordance with applicable postal regulations. Applicable regulations include AR 65-75, the US Postal Service Domestic Mail Manual, and DoD 4525 6-M.

(b) DoD intelligence components may also request mail covers with respect to mail to or from a United States person that is outside US postal channels, or mail covers on non-US persons outside US postal channels in accordance with appropriate law and procedure of the host government, and any Status of Forces Agreement that may be in effect.

(c) Requests for mail covers pursuant to this section may be approved by the same authorities and procedures described in section C 2 b.

Part 9 PROCEDURE 9. PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE

A. APPLICABILITY

This procedure applies only to the physical surveillance of United States persons by DoD intelligence components for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes. Additionally, physical surveillance may be performed pursuant to this procedure for any other lawful function assigned an Army intelligence component. This procedure does not apply to physical surveillance conducted as part of a training exercise where the subjects are participants in the exercise. This procedure also governs physical surveillance of non-US persons.

B. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINING TERMS

The terms physical surveillance means a systematic and deliberate observation of a person by any means on a continuing basis, or the acquisition of a nonpublic communication by a person not a party thereto or visibly present thereat through any means not involved electronic surveillance.

C. PROCEDURES

1 Critical for physical surveillance in the United States. Within the United States, DoD intelligence components may conduct unconsented physical surveillance's for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes against United States persons who are present or former employees of the intelligence components concerned, present or former contractors of such components or their

present or former employees, applicants for such employment or contracting, or military persons employed by a nonintelligence element of a Military Service. Any physical surveillance within the United States that occurs outside a DoD installation shall be coordinated with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies as may be appropriate. Army intelligence components additionally may conduct physical surveillance of persons in contact with the above subjects, but only to the extent necessary to identify that person. Physical surveillance for identification purposes may be approved by a field supervisor.

2. Critical for physical surveillance outside the United States. Outside the United States, DoD intelligence components may conduct unconsented physical surveillance of United States persons in one of the categories identified in subsection C 1, above. In addition, such components may conduct physical surveillance of other United States persons in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence or counterintelligence investigation, provided (a) such surveillance is consistent with the laws and policy of the host government and does not violate any Status of Forces Agreement that may be in effect, and (b) that physical surveillance of the United States person abroad to collect foreign intelligence may be authorized only to obtain significant information that cannot be obtained by other means. Army intelligence components additionally may conduct physical surveillance of persons in contact with the above subjects, but only to the extent necessary to identify that person. Physical surveillance for identification purposes may be approved by a field supervisor.

3. Required approvals for physical surveillance.

(a) Persons within DoD investigative jurisdiction. Physical surveillance within the United States of US persons or which involve United States persons within DoD investigative jurisdiction overseas may be approved by the head of the DoD intelligence component concerned or by designated senior officials of such components in accordance with this procedure. Persons within DoD investigative jurisdiction are defined in "The agreement Between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Attorney General, April 5, 1979," at appendix B. Requests for physical surveillance pursuant to this section may be approved by the following officials:

- (1) ACSI, HQDA
- (2) Commanding General, INSCOM
- (3) CINCUSAREUR

(4) *Commanding General EUSA*. The officials at (1) through (4) above may delegate authority, in writing, to their deputies, chiefs of staff, or ranking intelligence staff officers. No further delegation is authorized. Requests for approval will be forwarded through command channels, approval will be granted only after coordination with the approving authority's supporting judge advocate. Information copies of all approvals will be provided to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310.

(b) Persons outside DoD investigative jurisdiction. Outside the United States, physical surveillance of United States persons who are not within the investigative jurisdiction of the DoD intelligence component concerned will be forwarded through appropriate channels to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) for approval. Requests for approval of physical surveillance pursuant to this section will be forwarded through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310. Such requests shall indicate coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency.

4. Physical surveillance of Non-US Persons.

(a) Physical surveillance of non-US persons may be conducted for any lawful function assigned the Army intelligence component.

(b) Physical surveillance of non-US persons within the United States may be approved by the ACSI, DA, the Commanding General, INSCOM, or their written designees. It must be conducted in conformity with jurisdictional limitations imposed by "The Agreement Between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Attorney General, April 5, 1979" at appendix B.

(c) Officials identified in section C 3 a may approve physical

surveillance of non-US persons abroad. This authority may be delegated down to field supervisors. All delegations must be in writing.

Part 10 PROCEDURE 10. UNDISCLOSED PARTICIPATION IN ORGANIZATIONS

A. APPLICABILITY

This procedure applies to participation by employees of DoD intelligence components in any organization within the United States, or any organization outside the United States that constitutes a United States person, when such participation is on behalf of any entity of the intelligence community. These procedures do not apply to participation in organizations for solely personal purposes.

B. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS

1. Domestic activities refers to activities that take place within the United States that do not involve a significant connection with a foreign power, organization or person.

2. The term organization includes corporations and other commercial organizations, academic institutions, clubs, professional societies, associations, and any other group whose existence is formalized in some manner or otherwise functions on a continuing basis.

3. An organization within the United States means all organizations physically located within the geographical boundaries of the United States whether or not they constitute a United States person. Thus, a branch, subsidiary, or office of an organization with the United States, which is physically located outside the United States, is not considered as an organization within the United States.

4. Participation refers to an action undertaken within the structure or framework of the organization involved. Such actions include serving as a representative or agent of the organization, acquiring membership, attending meetings not open to the public, including social functions for the organization as a whole, carrying out the work or functions of the organization, and contributing funds to the organization other than in payment for goods or services. Actions taken outside the organizational framework, however, do not constitute participation. Thus, attendance at meeting or social gatherings which involve organization members but are not functions or activities of the organization itself does not constitute participation.

5. Participation is on behalf of an agency within the intelligence community when an employee is asked or requested to take action within an organization for the benefit of such agency. Such employee may already be a member of the organization or may be asked to join. Actions undertaken for the benefit of an intelligence agency include collecting information, identifying potential sources or contracts, or establishing and maintaining cover. If a cooperating source furnishes information to an intelligence agency which he or she obtained by participation within an organization but was not given prior to direction or tasking by the intelligence agency to collect such information, then such participation was not on behalf of such agency.

6. Participation is solely for personal purposes, if undertaken at the initiative and expense of the employee for the employee's benefit.

C. PROCEDURES FOR UNDISCLOSED PARTICIPATION

Except as permitted herein, employees of DoD intelligence components may participate on behalf of such components in organizations within the United States, or in organizations outside the United States that constitute United States persons, only if their affiliation with the intelligence component concerned is disclosed to an appropriate official of the organization in accordance with section D, above. Participation without such disclosure is permitted only if it is consistent with the limitations set forth in subsection C 1, below, and has been approved in accordance with subsection C 2, below.

1. Limitations on undisclosed participation.

(a) *Lawful Purpose*. No undisclosed participation shall be permitted under this procedure unless it is essential to achieving a lawful

foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose within the assigned mission of the collecting DoD intelligence component

(b) *Limitations on use of undisclosed participation for foreign intelligence purposes within the United States* Undisclosed participation may be authorized within the United States for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence from or about a United States person, nor to collect information necessary to assess us persons as potential sources of assistant to foreign intelligence activities This does not preclude the collection of information about such persons, volunteered by cooperating sources participating in organizations to which such persons belong, however, if otherwise permitted by Procedure 2

(c) *Duration of Participation* Authorization to participate under subsection C 2 a and b shall be limited to the period covered by such participation which shall be no longer than 12 months Participation which lasts longer than 12 months shall be reapproved by the appropriate official on an annual basis in accordance with this procedure

(d) *Participation for the purpose of influencing the activities of the organization or its members* No participation under this procedure shall be authorized for the purpose of influencing the activities of the organization in question, or its members, unless such participation is undertaken on behalf of the FBI in the course of a lawful investigation, or the organization concerned is composed primarily of individuals who are not United States persons and is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power Any DoD intelligence component that desires to undertake participation for such purpose shall forward its request to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) setting forth the relevant facts justifying such participation and explaining the nature of its contemplated activity Such participation may be approved by the DUSD(P) with the concurrence of the General Counsel, DoD Request for approval such participation by Army intelligence elements will be submitted through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310

2 Required approvals

(a) Undisclosed participation that may be approved within a DoD intelligence component Undisclosed participation on behalf of a DoD intelligence component may be authorized within such component under the following circumstances

(1) Participation in meetings open to the public For purposes of this section, a seminar or conference sponsored by a professional organization that is open to persons of a particular profession whether or not they are members of the organization itself or have received a special invitation, shall be considered a meeting open to the public

(2) Participation in organizations that permits other persons acknowledged to the organization to be employees of the United States Government to participate

(3) participation in educational professional organizations for the purpose of enhancing the professional skills, knowledge, or capabilities of employees

(4) Participation in seminars, forums, conferences, exhibitions, trade fairs, workshops, symposiums, and similar types of meetings, sponsored by organizations in which the employee is a member, has been invited to participate, or when the sponsoring organization does not require disclosure of the participant's employment affiliations, for the purpose of collecting significant foreign intelligence that is generally made available to participants at such meetings, and does not involve the domestic activities of the organization or its members

(5) Request to engage in undisclosed participation pursuant to this subsection may be approved by the ACSI, HQDA, Commanding General, INSCOM, Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSI), USAREUR, the G-2, EUSA, or their written designees All requests will receive prior legal review by the supporting judge advocate Information copies of approvals will be forwarded to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310

(b) Participation that may be approved by senior intelligence officials Undisclosed participation may be authorized by either the

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army, the Commanding General, U S Army Intelligence and Security Command, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Director of Intelligence, U S Marine Corps, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force, the Director, Naval Investigation Service, the Commanding Officer, Air Force Office of Special Investigations or their single designees, for the following purposes

(1) To collect significant foreign intelligence outside the United States, or from or about other than United States persons within the United States, provided no information involving the domestic activities of the organization or its members may be collected

(2) For counterintelligence purposes, at the written request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(3) To collect significant counterintelligence about other than United States persons, or about United States persons who are within the investigative jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, provided any such participation that occurs within the United States shall be coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(4) To collect information necessary to identify and assess other than United States persons as potential sources of assistant for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities

(5) To collect information necessary to identify United States persons as potential sources of assistant to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities

(6) To develop or maintain cover necessary for the security of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities

(7) Outside the United States, to assess United States persons as potential sources of assistant to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities

(8) Requests to engage in undisclosed participation pursuant to this section must be approved by the ACSI, HQDA, or the Commanding General, INSCOM All request will receive prior legal review by the Office of The Judge Advocate General, HQDA, or the Staff Judge Advocate, INSCOM, respectively Information copies of all approvals by the Commanding General, INSCOM, will be provided to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310

D DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT

1 Disclosure of the intelligence affiliation of an employee of a DoD intelligence component shall be made to an executive officer of the organization in question, or to an official in charge of membership, attendance or the records of the organization concerned Disclosure under this subsection is not required if undisclosed participation is permissible and authorized by this procedure

2 Disclosure may be made by the DoD intelligence component involved, an authorized DoD official, or by another component of the Intelligence Community that is otherwise authorized to take such action on behalf of the DoD intelligence component concerned

Part 11 PROCEDURE 11. CONTRACTING FOR GOODS AND SERVICES

A APPLICABILITY

This procedure applies to contracting or other arrangements with United States persons for the procurement of goods and services by DoD intelligence components within the United States and with contractors abroad who are US persons This procedure does not apply to contracting with government entities, or to the enrollment of individual students in academic institutions The latter situation is governed by Procedure 10

B PROCEDURES

1 *Contracts with academic institutions* DoD intelligence components may enter into a contract for goods or services with an academic institution only if prior to the making of the contract, the intelligence component has disclosed to appropriate officials of the academic institution the fact of sponsorship by a DoD intelligence component

2 *Contracts with commercial organizations, private institutions and individuals* Contracting by or for a DoD intelligence component with commercial organizations, private institutions, or private individuals within the United States may be done without revealing the sponsorship of the intelligence component if

(a) The contract is for published material available to the general public or for routine goods or services necessary for the support of approved activities, such as credit cards, car rentals, travel, lodging, meals, rental of office space or apartments, and other items incident to approved activities, or

(b) There is a written determination by the Secretary or the Under Secretary of a Military Department, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) that the sponsorship of a DoD intelligence component must be concealed to protect the activities of the DoD intelligence component concerned. Requests by Army intelligence elements for authority to conceal such sponsorship will be submitted through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310

C EFFECTS OF NON-COMPLIANCE

No contract shall be void or voidable for failure to comply with this procedure

Part 12 PROCEDURE 12 PROVISIONS OF ASSISTANT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES

A APPLICABILITY

This procedure applies to the provision of assistant by DoD intelligence components to law enforcement authorities. It incorporates the specific limitations on such assistant contained in EO 12333, (reference (a)), together with the general limitations and approval requirements of DoD Directive 5525 5, (reference (i)) (See AR 500-51)

B PROCEDURES

1 *Cooperation with law enforcement authorities* Consistent with the limitations contained in DoD Directive 5525 5, (reference (i)) and subsection B 2, below, DoD intelligence components are authorized to cooperate with law enforcement authorities for the purpose of

(a) Investigating or preventing clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, international narcotics activities, or international terrorist activities,

(b) Protecting DoD employees, information, property and facilities, and

(c) Preventing, detecting or investigating other violations of law

2 *Types of permissible assistant* DoD intelligence components may provide the following types of assistant to law enforcement authorities

(a) Incidentally-acquired information reasonably believed to indicate a violation of federal law shall be provided in accordance with the procedures adopted pursuant to section 17(a) of EO 12333 (reference (a)) Policy governing reporting and use of information concerning Federal crimes is found at procedure 15, section C 4

(b) Incidentally-acquired information reasonable believed to indicate a violation of state, local or foreign law may be provided in accordance with procedures adopted by the heads of DoD components,

(c) Specialized equipment and facilities may be provided to federal law enforcement authorities, and, where lives are endangered, to state and local law enforcement authorities, provided such assistant is consistent with, and has been approved by an official authorized pursuant to , enclosure 3 of DoD Directive 5525 5, (reference (i)), and

(d) Personnel who are employees of DoD intelligence components may be assigned to assist federal law enforcement authorities, and when lives are endangered, state and local law enforcement

authorities; provided such use is consistent with, and has been approved by an official authorized pursuant to, enclosure 4 of DoD Directive 5525 5, (reference (i)) Such official shall ensure that the General Counsel of the providing DoD component concurs in such use

(e) Assistant may be rendered to law enforcement agencies and security services of foreign governments or international organizations in accordance with established policy and applicable Status of Forces Agreements, provided, that DoD intelligence components may not request or participate in activities of such agencies undertaken against United States persons that would not be permitted such components under these procedures

Part 13 PROCEDURE 13. EXPERIMENTATION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

A APPLICABILITY

This procedure applies to experimentation on human subjects if such experimentation is conducted by or on behalf of a DoD intelligence component. This procedure does not apply to experimentation on animal subjects

B EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS

1 Experimentation in this context means any research or testing activity involving human subjects that may expose such subjects to the possibility of permanent or temporary injury (including physical or psychological damage and damage to the reputation of such persons) beyond the risks of injury to which such subjects are ordinarily exposed in their daily lives

2 Experimentation is conducted on behalf of a DoD intelligence component if it is conducted under contract to that component or to another DoD component for the benefit of the intelligence component or at the request of such a component regardless of any existence of a contractual relationship

3 Human subjects in this context includes any person whether or not such person is a United States person

C PROCEDURES

1 Experimentation on human subjects conducted by or on behalf of a DoD intelligence component may be undertaken only with the informed consent of the subject, and in accordance with guidelines issued by the Department of Health and Human Services, setting out conditions that safeguard the welfare of such subjects

2 DoD intelligence components may not engage in or contract for experimentation on human subjects without approval of the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary or Under Secretary of a Military Department, as appropriate. Request for such approval submitted by Army intelligence components will be addressed through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310

Part 14 PROCEDURE 14 EMPLOYEE CONDUCT

A APPLICABILITY

This procedure sets forth the responsibilities of employees of DoD intelligence components to conduct themselves in accordance with this Regulation and other applicable policy. It also provides that DoD intelligence components shall ensure, as appropriate, that these policies and guidelines are made known to their employees

B PROCEDURES

1 *Employee responsibilities* Employees shall conduct intelligence activities only pursuant to, and in accordance with, Executive Order 12333 (reference (a)) and this Regulation. In conducting such activities, employees shall not exceed the authorities granted the employing DoD intelligence components by law, Executive Order, including EO 12333 (reference (a)), and applicable DoD directives

2 *Familiarity with restrictions*

(a) Each DoD intelligence component shall familiarize its personnel with the provisions of Executive Order 12333, (reference (a)), this Regulation, and any instructions implementing this Regulation which apply to the operations and activities of such component. At a minimum, such familiarization shall contain

(1) Applicable portions of Procedures 1 through 4

(2) A summary of other procedures that pertain to collection techniques which are, or may be, employed by the DoD intelligence component concerned, and

(3) A statement of individual employee reporting responsibility under Procedure 15

(b) The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) (ATSD (IO)), and each Inspector General responsible for a DoD intelligence component shall ensure, as part of their inspections, that procedures are in effect which achieve the objectives set forth in paragraph B 2 a, above

3 *Responsibilities of the heads of DoD components* The heads of DoD Comps that constitute, or contain, DoD intelligence components (The Secretary of the Army) shall

(a) Ensure that all proposals for intelligence activities which may be unlawful, in whole or in part, or may be contrary to applicable Executive Branch or DoD policy are referred to the General Counsel responsible for such component

(b) Ensure that no adverse action is taken against any employee because the employee reports activities pursuant to Procedure 15

(c) Impose such sanctions as may be appropriate upon any employee who violates the provisions of this Regulation or any instruction promulgated thereunder

(d) In any case involving serious or continuing breaches of security by either DoD or non-DoD employees, recommend to the Secretary of Defense appropriate investigative actions

(e) Ensure that the General Counsel and Inspector General with responsibility for the component (The Army General Counsel and the DA Inspector General), as well as the General Counsel, DoD, and the ATSD (IO), (and the intelligence oversight officer, office of the ACSI, HQDA) have access to all information concerning the intelligence activities of that component necessary to perform their oversight responsibilities

(f) Ensure that employees cooperate fully with the Intelligence Oversight Board and its representatives

Part 15

PROCEDURE 15 IDENTIFYING, INVESTIGATING, AND REPORTING QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES

A APPLICABILITY

This procedure provides for the identification, investigation, and reporting of questionable intelligence activities

B EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS

1 The term "questionable activity," as used herein, refers to any conduct that constitutes, or is related to, an intelligence activity that may violate the law, any Executive Order or Presidential directive including E O 12333, reference (a)), or applicable DoD policy including this Regulation

2 The terms "General Counsel" and "Inspector General" as used herein, refer, unless otherwise specified, to any General Counsel or Inspector General with responsibility for one or more DoD intelligence components. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "Inspector General" shall also include the ATSD (IO). For the purposes of this procedure the terms refer to the Army General Counsel and the DA Inspector General

C PROCEDURES

1 Identification

(a) Each employee shall report any questionable activities to the General Counsel or Inspector General for the DoD intelligence component concerned, or to the DoD General Counsel or the ATSD (IO)

(1) Questionable activities will be reported by electrical message

through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310, as soon as possible (but in any event not later than five days of discovery). Reports will include the following

a Description of the nature of the questionable activity

b Date, time, and location of occurrence

c Individual or unit responsible for the questionable activity

d Summary of the incident to include references to particular portions of this regulation

e Status of the investigation of the incident

(2) Employees are encouraged to submit such reports through command channels, however, if the employee desires, reports of questionable activity may be sent directly to the following: The ACSI, HQDA, the Office of The Inspector General, HQDA, or the Office of the Army General Counsel, WASH DC 20310

(b) Inspectors General, as part of their inspection of DoD intelligence components, and General Counsels, as part of their oversight responsibilities shall seek to determine if such components are involved in any questionable activities. If such activities have been or are being undertaken, the matter shall be investigated under subsection C 2 below. If such activities have been undertaken but were not reported, the Inspector General shall also ascertain the reason for such failure and recommend appropriate corrective action

(c) Inspectors General, as part of their oversight responsibilities, shall, as appropriate, ascertain whether any organization, staffs, or offices within their respective jurisdiction but not otherwise specifically identified as DoD intelligence components, are being used for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes to which Part 2 of E O 12333, (reference (a)), applies, and, if so, shall ensure that activities of such components are in compliance with this Regulation and applicable DoD policy

(d) Inspectors General, as part of their inspection of DoD intelligence components, shall ensure that procedures exist within such components for the reporting of questionable activities, and that employees of such components are aware of their responsibilities to report such activities

2 Investigation

(a) Each report of a questionable activity shall be investigated to the extent necessary to determine the facts and assess whether the activity is legal and is consistent with applicable policy

(1) Initial investigation will be conducted in an expeditious manner by the command which reported the questionable activity

(2) Within 30 days of the initial report, the command will forward a final report through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310 for submission to the DA Inspector General and the Army General Counsel. The report will be reviewed by the supporting judge advocate, it will include the following

a Results of the investigation

b Disciplinary or corrective action taken or contemplated

(3) If the investigation cannot be completed within 30 days from the date of the initial report, a status report will be submitted, the report will provide the reasons for the delay and an estimated date of completion. Status reports will be forwarded every 30 days until the investigation is completed. Except in extraordinary circumstances, investigations will be completed and a final report sent within 60 days from the date of the original report

(4) Pursuant to AR 335-15, paragraph 7-2r, the above reports are exempt from the requirement for a Requirements Control Symbol

(b) When appropriate, questionable activities reported to a General Counsel shall be referred to the corresponding Inspector General for investigation, and if reported to the Inspector General, shall be referred to the corresponding General Counsel to determine whether the activity is legal and consistent with applicable policy. Reports made to the DoD General Counsel or the ATSD (IO) may be referred, after consultation between these officials, to the appropriate Inspector General and General Counsel for investigation and evaluation

(c) Investigations shall be conducted expeditiously. The officials

responsible for these investigations may, in accordance with established procedures, obtain assistance from within the component concerned, or from other DoD components, when necessary, to complete such investigations in a timely manner

(d) To complete such investigations, General Counsels and Inspectors General shall have access to all relevant information regardless of classification or compartmentation

3 Reports

(a) Each Counsel and Inspector General shall report immediately to General Counsel, DoD, and the ASTD questionable activities of a serious nature

(b) Each General Counsel and Inspector General shall submit to the ATSD (IO) a quarterly report describing those activities that come to their attention during the quarter reasonably believed to be illegal or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential directive, or applicable DoD policy, and actions taken with respect to such activities. The reports shall also include significant oversight activities undertaken during the quarter and any suggestions for improvements in the oversight system. Separate, joint, or consolidated reports may be submitted. These reports should be prepared in accordance with DoD Directive 5000 11, (reference (j))

(1) The DA Inspector General will prepare the Quarterly Oversight Activities Report for the signature of The Inspector General and the Army General Counsel. The report will be forwarded not later than 30 days following the end of each quarter

(2) To assist in preparing this report, the ACSI, HQDA, Commanding General, INSCOM, CINCUSAREUR, Commanding General, US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), and the Commanding General, EUSA, will provide contributions not later than 15 days following the end of the quarter. These reports will be forwarded through HQDA (DAMI-CIC), WASH DC 20310

(3) The quarterly reports will include the following

a Description of significant oversight activities undertaken during the quarter

b Identification of unlawful or improper activities discovered or reported

c Suggestions for improvements of the oversight system

(4) Pursuant to AR 335-15, paragraph 7-2r, these quarterly reports are exempt from the requirement for a Requirements Control Symbol

(c) All reports made pursuant to subsections 3 a and b above, which involve a possible violation of federal criminal law shall be considered by the General Counsel concerned in accordance with the procedures adopted pursuant to section 17(a) of E.O. 12333 (reference (a))

(d) The General Counsel, DoD, and the ATSD (IO) may review the findings of other General Counsels and Inspectors General with respect to questionable activities

(e) The ATSD (IO) and the General Counsel, DoD, shall report in a timely manner to the White House Intelligence Oversight Board all activities that come to their attention that are reasonably believed to be illegal or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential directive. They will also advise appropriate officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense of such activities

(f) These reporting requirements are exempt from formal approval and licensing in accordance with subsection VII G of enclosure 3 to DoD Directive 5000 19 (reference (k))

4 Reporting and use of information concerning Federal crimes
This section implements section 17(a) of Executive Order 12333, (reference (a))

(a) Any member or employee of an Army intelligence component will report immediately (through command channels if possible) any facts and circumstances that tend to show the following

(1) That a member or employee of a DA intelligence component may have violated any Federal statute

(2) That any other person may have violated a Federal criminal statute in one of the following categories

a Crimes involving intentional infliction of threat of death or serious physical harm

b Crimes likely to impact on the national security, defense, or foreign relations of the United States

c Crimes involving foreign interference with the integrity of US governmental institutions or processes

d Crimes that appear to have been committed by or on behalf of a foreign power or in connection with international terrorist activity

e Any conspiracy or attempt to commit a crime reportable under categories (a) through (d) above

(b) The intelligence component receiving the report will report all available facts by electrical message to HQDA WASH DC/ DAMI-CIC// and to USACIDC when required by AR 195-2, within 5 days after discovery

(c) Questions involving the scope of this reporting requirement should be addressed to the legal advisor of the intelligence component receiving the report of possible criminal conduct

(d) The office of the ACSI, HQDA, will transmit reports pursuant to this section to the Army General Counsel, with recommendations concerning the following

(1) The need for the scope of further inquiry

(2) Whether the allegations are without basis

(3) Whether the crime involved is one against property and involving less than \$500

(4) Whether the offense is of such a minor nature that no further investigation is necessary and only an oral report to the Attorney General is required

(5) Whether further investigation or prosecution of the matter would or might result in a public disclosure of classified information or intelligence sources or methods or would jeopardize the security of ongoing intelligence operations (Where security considerations mandate, names in reports may be identified as "John Doe #_____", the true identity of such persons will be provided when so requested by the Army General Counsel)

(e) Reports received pursuant to this section will be reviewed and reported by the Army General Counsel under procedures adopted by the Department of Justice

(f) For purposes of this section the term "employee" is defined as

(1) A military member, employee, or contract employee of an intelligence component

(2) Former members and employees for purposes of offenses committed during their employment

(3) Former members and employees for offenses involving violation of section 207, title 18, United States Code (18 USC 207)

Appendix A Definitions

1. Administrative purposes.

Information is collected for "administrative purposes" when it is necessary for the administration of the component concerned but is not collected directly in performance of the intelligence activities assigned such components. Examples include information relating to the past performance of potential contractors, information to enable such components to discharge their public affairs and legislative duties, including the maintenance of correspondence files, the maintenance of employee personnel and training records, and training materials or documents produced at training facilities.

2 Available publicly

Information that has been published or broadcast for general public consumption, is available on request to a member of the general public, could lawfully be seen or heard by any casual observer, or is made available at a meeting open to the general public. In this context, the "general public" also means general availability to persons in a military community even though the military community is not open to the civilian general public.

3 Communications security.

Protective measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information derived from telecommunications of the United States Government related to national security and to ensure the authenticity of such telecommunications.

4 Consent

The agreement by a person or organization to permit DoD intelligence components to take particular action that affect the person or organization. Consent may be oral or written unless a specific form of consent is required by a particular procedure. Consent may be implied if adequate notice is provided that a particular action (such as entering a building) carries with it the presumption of consent to an accompanying action (such as search of briefcases). (Questions regarding what is adequate notice in particular circumstances should be referred to the legal office responsible for advising the DoD intelligence component concerned.)

5 Counterintelligence

Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel physical document, or communications security programs.

6 Counterintelligence investigation

Includes inquires and other activities undertaken to determine whether a particular United States person is acting for, or on behalf of, a foreign power for purposes of conducting espionage and other intelligence activities, sabotage, assassinations, international terrorist activities, and actions to neutralize such acts.

7 DoD Component

Includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense, each of the Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chief of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, and the Defense Agencies. For the purposes of this regulation, the head of the DoD Component is the Secretary or Under Secretary of the Army.

8. DoD intelligence components.

Include the following organizations

- a The National Security Agency/Central Security Service
- b The Defense Intelligence Agency
- c The offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs
- d The assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army General Staff
- e The Office of Naval Intelligence
- f The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force
- g The Army Intelligence and Security Command
- h The Naval Intelligence Command
- i The Naval Security Group Command
- j The Director of Intelligence, U.S. Marine Corps
- k The Air Force Intelligence Service
- l The Electronic Security Command, United States Air Force
- m The counterintelligence elements of the Naval Investigative Service
- n The counterintelligence elements of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations
- o The 650th Military Intelligence Group, SHAPE
- p Other organizations, staffs, and offices, when used for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities to which part 2 of E.O. 12333 (reference (a)), applies, provided that the heads of such organizations, staffs, and offices shall not be considered as heads of DoD intelligence components for purposes of this Regulation. Included in this subcategory are the following intelligence units that support unified or specified commands, intelligence staff offices supporting military commanders at all echelons including their subordinate intelligence units and offices, and other DA components performing intelligence activities as that term is defined at paragraph 13.

9 Electronic surveillance

Acquisition of a non-public communication by electronic means without the consent of a person who is a party to an electronic communication or, in the case of a nonelectronic communication, without the consent of a person who is visibly present at the place of communication, but not including the use of radio direction finding equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter (electronic surveillance within the United States is subject to the definitions in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, (reference (b))) Pen register organizations are included within the term electronic surveillance.

10 Employee

A person employed by, assigned to, or acting for an agency within the intelligence community, including contractors and persons otherwise acting at the direction of such an agency.

11 Foreign intelligence.

Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, and persons, but not including counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist activities.

12. Foreign power

Any foreign government (regardless of whether recognized by the United States), foreign-based political party (or faction thereof), foreign military force, foreign-based terrorist group, or any organization composed, in major part, of any such entity or entities.

13 Intelligence Activities.

Refers to all activities that DoD intelligence components are authorized to undertake pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (reference (a)).

14. Intelligence Community and an agency of or within the Intelligence Community

Refers to the following organizations

- a The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
- b The National Security Agency (NSA)
- c The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
- d The offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs
- e The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State
- f The intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Energy
- g The staff elements of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

15 International Narcotics Activities

Refers to activities outside the United States to produce, transfer or sell narcotics or other substances controlled in accordance with title 21, United States Code, Sections 811 and 812

16 Intelligence Terrorist Activities

Activities undertaken by or in support of terrorists or terrorist organizations that occur totally outside the United States, or that transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the local in which the perpetrators operate or seek asylum

17 Lawful Investigation

An investigation qualifies as a lawful investigation if the subject of the investigation is within DoD investigative jurisdiction, if it is conducted by a DoD component that has authorization to conduct the particular type of investigation concerned (for example, counterintelligence, personnel security, physical security, communications security), and if the investigation is conducted in accordance with applicable law and policy, including EO 12333 and this Regulation

18 Law Enforcement Activities

Activities undertaken for the purpose of detecting violations of law or to locate and apprehend persons who violate the law. This includes activities to enforce the Uniform Code of Military Justice

19 Personnel security

Measures designed to insure that persons employed, or being considered for employment, in sensitive positions of trust are suitable for such employment with respect to loyalty, character, emotional stability, and reliability and that such employment is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. It includes measures designed to ensure that persons granted access to classified information remain suitable for such access and that access is consistent with the interests of national security

20 Personnel security investigation.

a An inquiry into the activities of a person granted access to intelligence or other classified information, or a person who is being considered for access to intelligence or other classified information, including persons who are granted or may be granted access to facilities of DoD intelligence components, or a person to be assigned or retained in a position with sensitive duties. The investigation is designed to develop information pertaining to the suitability, eligibility and trustworthiness of the individual with respect to loyalty, character, emotional stability and reliability

b Inquiries and other activities directed against DoD employees or members of a military service to determine the facts of possible voluntary or involuntary compromise of classified information by them

c The collection of information about or from military personnel

in the course of tactical training exercises for security training purposes

21 Physical security.

The physical measures taken to prevent unauthorized access to, and prevent the damage or loss of, equipment, facilities, material and documents, and measures undertaken to protect DoD personnel from physical threats to their safety

22. Physical security investigation.

All inquiries, inspections, or surveys of the effectiveness of controls and procedures designed to provide physical security, and all inquiries and other actions undertaken to obtain information pertaining to physical threats to DoD personnel or property

23. Reasonable belief.

A reasonable belief arises when the facts and circumstances are such that a reasonable person would hold belief. Reasonable belief must rest on facts and circumstances that can be articulated, "hunches" or intuitions are not sufficient. Reasonable belief can be based on experience, training, and knowledge in foreign intelligence or counterintelligence work applied to facts and circumstances at hand, so that a trained experienced "reasonable person" might hold a reasonable belief sufficient to satisfy this criterion with someone unfamiliar with foreign intelligence or counterintelligence work might not

24. Signals intelligence

A category of intelligence including communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, either individually or in combination

25 Special Activities

Activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the US Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but which are not intended to influence US political processes, public opinion, or media, and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection or production of intelligence or related-support functions

26 United States

When used to describe a place, the term shall include the territories under the sovereignty of the United States

27 United States person

a The term "United States person" means

- (1) A United States citizen,
- (2) An alien known by the DoD intelligence component concerned to be a permanent resident alien,
- (3) An unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens,
- (4) A corporation incorporated intelligence the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments. A corporation or corporate subsidiary incorporated abroad, even if partially or wholly owned by a corporation incorporated intelligence the United States, is not a United States person

b A person or organization outside the United States shall be presumed not to be a US person unless specific information to the contrary is obtained. An alien in the United States shall be presumed

not to be a United States person unless specific information to the contrary is obtained

c A permanent resident alien is a foreign national lawfully admitted into the United States for permanent residence

Appendix B

Extract from "The Agreement between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Attorney General, April 5, 1979"

Section 6 DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR CI INVESTIGATIONS Responsibility for CI investigations shall be apportioned between the FBI and the military CI services of the DoD as follows

a All investigations of violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which might constitute a CI investigation as defined herein, shall be the responsibility of the FBI, regardless of the status or location of the subjects of such investigations

b Except as provided by paragraph c(2) herein, all CI investigations of foreign nationals undertaken within the United States shall be the responsibility of the FBI

c CI investigations within the United States shall be conducted in accordance with the following jurisdictional guidelines

(1) Except as provided herein, investigations of all civilians, including DoD civilian personnel, shall be the responsibility of the FBI,

(2) Investigations of US military personnel on active duty shall be the responsibility of the CI service of the appropriate military department,

(3) Investigations of related military personnel, active and inactive reservists, and National Guard members shall be the responsibility of the FBI, provided, however, that investigations of actions which took place while the subject of the investigation was, or is, on active military duty shall be conducted by the CI service of the appropriate military department, and,

(4) Investigations of private contractors of the DoD and their employees, shall be the responsibility of the FBI. Provided, however, that nothing contained in this paragraph shall prevent the military CI services of the DoD, in a manner consistent with applicable law and Executive Branch policy, from undertaking

(a) In those cases where the FBI chooses to waive investigative jurisdiction, investigative actions which are necessary to establish or refute the factual basis required for an authorized administrative action, to protect the security of its personnel, information, activities, and installations, or

(b) To provide assistant to the FBI in support of any CI investigation for which the FBI is herein assigned responsibility

d CI investigations outside the United States shall be conducted in accordance with the following guidelines

(1) Investigations of military personnel on active duty shall be the responsibility of the military CI services of the DoD

(2) Investigations of current civilian employees, their dependents, and the civilian dependents of active duty military personnel shall be the responsibility of the military CI services, unless such responsibility is otherwise assigned pursuant to agreement with the host government, US law or Executive directive

(3) Investigations of retired military personnel, active and inactive reservists, National Guard members, private contractors and their employees, and other US persons, who permanently reside in such locations, shall be undertaken in consultation with the FBI, CIA, and host government as appropriate. Provided, however, that nothing contained in this paragraph shall prevent the military CI services of the DoD, in a manner consistent with applicable law and Executive Branch policy from undertaking

(a) Investigative actions which are necessary to establish or refute the factual basis required for an authorized administrative action, to protect the security of its personnel, information, activities, and installations, or

(b) To provide assistant to the FBI or security service of a host

government in support of CI investigations outside the United States for which DoD is not herein assigned investigative responsibility

Appendix C

References to Army Implementation of DoD 5240.1-R

Section I Required Publications

AR 190-13

The Army Physical Security Program Cited in procedure 2, section C 7

AR 190-52

Countering Terrorism and Other Major Disruptions on Military Installations Cited in procedure 2, section C 3 c, C 4 a, C 7, C 7, and C 11

AR 195-2

Criminal Investigation Activities Cited in procedure 1, section A 3, and procedure 15, section C 6

AR 335-15

Management Information Control System Cited in procedure 15, sections C 2 a (4) and C 3 b (4)

AR 340-2

Maintenance and Disposition of Records in TOE units of the Active Army, the Army Reserve, and the National Guard Cited in procedure 3, section D 2

AR 340-18

The Army Functional Files System Cited in procedure 3, section D 2

AR 380-13

Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Nonaffiliated Persons and Organizations Cited in the applicability statement on the title page

AR 380-53

Telephone Communications Security Monitoring Cited in procedure 2, section C 9, and procedure 5, part 7, section A

AR 381-12

Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Army (SAEDA) Cited in procedure 1, section B, and procedure 2, sections C 4 a, C 7 and C 8

AR 381-20

US Army Counterintelligence (CI) Activities Cited in procedure 1, sections A 3 and B, and procedure 2, sections C 7 and C 8

AR 381-45

Investigative Records Repository (IRR) Cited in procedure 3, section D 2

AR 381-47

(S) (US Army Offensive Counterintelligence Operations (Short Title OFCO) (U) Cited in paragraph B-3

AR 500-51

Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Cited in procedure 12, section A

AR 604-5

Clearance of Personnel for Access to Classified Defense Information and Material Cited in procedure 2, section C 8

DoD 4525.6-M

DoD Postal Manual Cited in procedure 4525.6-M 8, sections C 1 a and C 3 a

Section II**Related Publications**

A related publication is merely a source of additional information. The user does not have to read it to understand this regulation.

AR 10-5

Department of the Army

AR20-1

Inspector General Activities and Procedures

AR 27-10

Military Justice

AR 195-1

Army Criminal Investigation Program

AR 340-21-5

The Army Privacy Program System Notices and Exemption Rules for Intelligence, Security, Military Police, and Mapping Functions

AR 380-5

Department of the Army Information Security Program

AR 381-1

Control of Dissemination of Intelligence Information

AR 600-50

Standards of Conduct for Department of the Army Personnel

Section III**Related Publications****Executive Order 12333**

United States Intelligence Activities December 4, 1981

Public Law 95-511

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978

DoD Directive 5200.29

DoD Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Survey Program February 12, 1975

Title 18

United States Code, Chapters 105 and 119

Public Law 73-416

Communications Act of 1934, Section 605

Title 10

United States Code, Sections 801-840, Uniform Code of Military Justice

Agreement Between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Attorney General, April 5, 1979 (App B)

Executive Order 12198

Prescribing Amendments to the Manual for Courts Martial United States 1969, March 12, 1980

DoD Directive 5525.5

DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials March 22, 1982

DoD Directive 5000.11

Data Elements and Data Codes Standardization Program December 7, 1964

DoD Directive 5000.19

Policies for the Management and Control of Information Requirements March 12, 1976

Appendix D**Part II, Executive Order 12333**

Conduct of Intelligence Activities

2-1. Need.

Accurate and timely information about the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons and their agents is essential to informed decision making in the areas of national defense and foreign relations. Collections of such information is a priority objective and will be pursued in a vigorous, innovative and responsible manner that is consistent with the Constitution and applicable law and respectful of the principles upon which the United States was founded.

2-2 Purpose

This Order is intended to enhance human and technical collection techniques, especially those undertaken abroad, and the acquisition of significant foreign intelligence, as well as the detection and countering of international terrorist activities and espionage conduct by foreign powers. Set forth below are certain general principles that, in addition to and consistent with applicable laws, are intended to achieve the proper balance between the acquisition of essential information and protection of individual interests. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to apply to or interfere with any authorized civil or criminal law enforcement responsibility of any department or agency.

2-3 Collection of Information

Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to collect, retain or disseminate information concerning United States persons only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General, consistent with the authorities provided by Part I of this Order. Those procedures shall permit collection, retention and dissemination of the following types of information:

a Information that is publicly available or collected with the consent of the person concerned,

b Information constituting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, including such information concerning corporations or other commercial organizations. Collection within the United States of foreign intelligence not otherwise obtainable shall be undertaken by the FBI or, when significant foreign intelligence is sought, by other authorized agencies of the Intelligence Community, provided that no foreign intelligence collection by such agencies be undertaken for the purpose of acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of United States persons,

c Information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, international narcotics or international terrorism investigation,

d Information needed to protect the safety of any persons or organizations, including those who are targets, victims or hostages of international terrorist organizations,

e Information needed to protect foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods from unauthorized disclosure. Collection within the United States shall be undertaken by the FBI except that other agencies of Intelligence Community may also collect such information concerning present or former employees, present or former intelligence agency contractors or their present or former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting,

f Information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts for the purpose of determining their suitability or credibility,

g Information arising out of a lawful personnel, physical or communications security investigation,

h Information acquired by overhead reconnaissance not directed at specific United States persons,

i Incidentally obtained information that may indicate involvement in activities that may violate federal, state, local or foreign laws, and

j Information necessary for administrative purposes

In addition, agencies within the Intelligence Community may disseminate information, other than information derived from signals intelligence, to each appropriate agency within the Intelligence Community, for purposes of allowing the recipient agency to determine whether the information is relevant to its responsibilities and can be retained by it

2-4 Collection Techniques

Agencies within the Intelligence Community shall use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible within the United States or directed against United States persons abroad. Agencies are not authorized to use such techniques as electronic surveillance, unconsented physical search, mail surveillance, h surveillance, or monitoring devices unless they are in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. Such procedures shall protect constitutional and other legal rights and limit use of such information to lawful governmental purposes. These procedures shall authorize

a The CIA to engage in electronic surveillance within the United States except for the purpose of training, testing, or conducting countermeasures to hostile electronic surveillance,

b Unconsented physical searches in the United States by agencies other than the FBI, except for

(1) Searches by counterintelligence elements of the military services directed against military personnel within the United States or abroad for intelligence purposes, when authorized by a military commander empowered to approve physical searches for law enforcement purposes, based upon a finding of probable cause to believe that such persons are acting as agents of foreign powers and

(2) Searches by CIA of personal property of non-United States persons lawfully in its possession

c Physical surveillance of a United States person in the United States by agencies other than the FBI, except for

(1) Physical surveillance of present or former employees, present or former intelligence agency contractors or their present or former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting, and

(2) Physical surveillance of a military person employed by a nonintelligence element of a military service

d Physical surveillance of a United States person abroad to collect foreign intelligence except to obtain significant information that cannot reasonably be acquired by other means

2-5 Attorney General Approval

The Attorney General hereby is delegated the power to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes provided that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney General has determined in each case that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Electronic surveillance, as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, shall be conducted in accordance with the Act, as well as this Order

2-6 Assistant to Law Enforcement Authorities

Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to

a Cooperate with appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of protecting the employees, information, property and facilities of any agency within the Intelligence Community,

b Unless otherwise precluded by law or this Order, participate in

law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities,

c Provide specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or assistant of expert personnel for use by any department or agency, or, when lives are endangered, to support local law enforcement agencies. Provisions of assistant by expert personnel shall be approved in each case by the General Counsel of the providing agency, and

d Render any other assistance and cooperation to law enforcement authorities not precluded by applicable law

2-7 Contracting.

Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to enter into contracts or arrangements for the provision of goods or services with private companies or institutions in the United States and need not reveal the sponsorship of such contracts or arrangements for authorized academic institutions may be undertaken only with the consent of appropriate officials of the institution

2-8 Consistency With Other Laws.

Nothing in this Order shall be construed to authorize any activity in violation of the Constitution or statutes of the United States

2-9 Undisclosed Participation in Organizations Within the United States

No one acting on behalf of agencies within the Intelligence Community may join or otherwise participate in any organization in the United States on behalf of any agency within the Intelligence Community without disclosing his intelligence affiliation to appropriate officials of the organization, except in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. Such participation shall be authorized only if it is essential to achieving lawful purposes as determined by the agency head or designee. No such participation may be undertaken for the purpose of influencing the activity of the organization or its members except in cases where

a The participation is undertaken on behalf of the FBI in the course of a lawful investigation, or

b The organization concerned is composed primarily of individuals who are not United States persons and is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power

2-10 Human Experimentation

No agency within the Intelligence Community shall sponsor, contract for or conduct research on human subjects except in accordance with guideline issued by the Department of Health and Human Services. The subject's informed consent shall be documented as required by those guidelines

2-11 Prohibition on Assassination

No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination

2-12 Indirect Participation

No agency of the Intelligence Community shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this Order

Unclassified

PIN 030887-000

USAPA

ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING SYSTEM
TEXT FORMATTER ... Version 2.45

PIN. 030887-000

DATE: 06-15-98

TIME. 14:58:35

PAGES SET. 28

DATA FILE. a381.fil

DOCUMENT: AR 381-10

DOC STATUS: NEW PUBLICATION

DAILY JOURNAL / DUTY OFFICER LOG

72ND MILITARY POLICE CO.

ABU GHRAIB / CENTRAL BAGHDAD DETENTION

DATE OPENED: AUGUST , 2003

OPENED AND OPERATED BY:

SGT. [REDACTED]
SGT. [REDACTED]
SPC. [REDACTED]
SGT. [REDACTED]

SPC. [REDACTED]

DAY
SHIFT

SSG [REDACTED]
SGT [REDACTED]
SGT [REDACTED]

NIGHT
SHIFT

(MICRO)MANAGEMENT BY

(WITH NO SPECIAL TRAINING)

ISG [REDACTED]

CPT. [REDACTED]

72ND MILITARY POLICE CO, JAILHOUSE DETENTION CTR.

SEPTEMBER 2003, DAY SHIFT

0400 COUNT A-WING: 10, B-WING: 70 TOTAL 80

0402 WALKTHROUGH, ALL APPEARS SECURE, ALL I/M'S PRESENT.

0435 WALKABOUT, EVERYBODY STILL BREATHING, ALL PRESENT

0510 STROLLTHROUGH; ALL SECURE, ALL TERRORISTS PRESENT.

0555 MEANDER, I/M'S STILL SNORING, ALL SECURE.

0650 CELL PERUSAL, EVERYBODY BRIGHT EYED, BUSHY TAILED? SECURE

0800 COUNT & FEED, ALL I/M'S PRESENT AND NOURISHED.

0829 I/M'S PRESENT, ROOMS APPEAR SECURE

0908 WALKTHROUGH, ALL APPEARS SECURE

0939 WALK THROUGH, ROOMS APPEAR SECURE

1000 I/PF SHIFT CHANGE COMPLETE

1030 ROOMCHECKS ALL APPEARS SECURE: LOCK#1000 BECKEN

1106 A-BLOCK APPEAR SECURE

1135 ALL ROOMS AND I/M'S APPEAR SECURE

1154 ROOMCHECK, ALL APPEARS SECURE

1227 ROOMCHECKS, ALL APPEARS SECURE

1302 ROOMS AND I/M'S APPEAR SECURE, VIP'S ARRIVED

1320 INMATES #1467 [REDACTED] #1514 [REDACTED]

#1515 [REDACTED] #1513 [REDACTED]

#1512 [REDACTED] PLACED IN #1513 [REDACTED]

1339 FIVE I/M'S RECEIVED AND PLACED IN PRETRIAL HOLDING

AS FOLLOWS: RM 51 #07205 [REDACTED]

Rm 52 #14033 [REDACTED]

Rm 53 #14756 [REDACTED]

Rm 54 #16079 [REDACTED]

Rm 55 #09430 [REDACTED]

11012 REPORT

Vertical column of handwritten marks and symbols on the right margin, including several 'A' characters and other symbols.

14 Sep 03

1635 By the #2 count 1A 9 28.5, 2A: 112

1645 Cells 2A 108-113 out for yard

1700 2A Back from yard

1815 Shows rotation 5 feet of

1910 MEDUS sand Pasovale 150370 time ZAVRAC. For

1915 MAUSA (PA)

2001 34 PMS from Gandy to out side (car)

2031 MED. SAND FROM GANDY TO OUT SIDE (car)

10094 - 117 - 14386 - 114 - 16666 115

13705 - No Sk. - 14402 - 117 - 16659 - 116

13831 - 116 - 14402 - 117 - 16659 - 116

13832 - 116 - 15620 - 114

13885 - 117 - 16628 - 118

13901 - 115 - 16632 - 118

13933 - 116 - 16637 - 115

14013 - 117 - 16640 - 117

14109 - 115 - 16618 - 117

14111 - 115 - 16657 - 116

14198 - 115 - 16658 - 116

14202 - 115 - 16659 - 114

14210 - 116 - 16660 - 114

14246 - 116 - 16661 - 114

14316 - 117 - 16662 - 114

14317 - 117 - 16665 - 115

14 Sep 03

2036 = ME on Tier 1A for when rounded

2135 = #1 on Tier 1A for when rounded

2218 For for sec

2330 ME Here to see Call 117

0005 Walk thru conducted, allow

0100 Walk thru conducted, allow

0200 Walk thru conducted, allow

0240 See Medus in area

0310 Count 1A 10, 2A 146, 28.5, total 161

0317 Post for sec

10 Sep 03, 1A 117

14109 - 115 - 16618 - 117

14111 - 115 - 16657 - 116

14198 - 115 - 16658 - 116

14202 - 115 - 16659 - 114

14210 - 116 - 16660 - 114

14246 - 116 - 16661 - 114

14316 - 117 - 16662 - 114

14317 - 117 - 16665 - 115

15 Sep - 0115

land site buy

15 SEPTEMBER 03, NIGHT SHIF (cont'd)

15 SEPTEMBER 03, NIGHT SHIF

0801 WORKTHERAPY, ALL APPEARANCES SECURED. 153 inmates to 75

0802 INS READ, ALL APPEARANCES SECURED

0832 ALL APPEARANCES SECURED

0848 All inmates arrive from SHX-1

0900 WAKE THROUGHOUT A/S

0935 WAKE THROUGHOUT A/S

1003 WAKE THROUGHOUT A/S

1020 WAKE THROUGHOUT A/S

1101 WAKE THROUGHOUT A/S

1126 2nd - 150339 Returned from 20" SH

1201 Wake throughout A/S

1227 Wake throughout A/S

1254 WAKE THROUGHOUT A/S

1320 WAKE THROUGHOUT A/S

1348 WAKE THROUGHOUT A/S

1405 WAKE THROUGHOUT A/S

1437 WAKE THROUGHOUT A/S

1615 Shift Change complete following arrival of inmates
Frost / GIP (see [redacted])

Sup for [redacted] 12 inmates brought in from G-101. MI build inmates brought in from G-101.

1920 MI on-the-floor to philosophy room 1/4

1930 All inmates being fed

2000 8 new MI inmates being fed

2015 WIPRESSING completed total # of 136. = 310
Frost / GIP (see [redacted])

15 SEP 0415 count = 167

0818 46 DEPARTURES ORANGE

TOTAL STAFF = 162 196 ON 200

RAIT 1620 count = 055, NOI 200

Haw 16 199

0801	14	2255	Received a total of 153 inmates on 9-15-03	CH
0802	14	2130	While THROCKLE OF TIBES, All SECURED Per M.I., Cell #9 can now have his outer cell door open for ventilation and is off the light schedule	CH
0848	14	2019	Buzzer went down - Code 4 - up at 2229	CH
0900	14	2246	Medics Call for TB Fever @ 2255	CH
0935	14		Medics arrive, call for IV fluids - fever of 104°	CH
1003	14		Medic Lt Arrives - fluids	CH
1020	14	7310	Frost VOK (see [redacted])	CH
1126	14	7321	All sec... [redacted]...	CH
1201	14	0711	MI... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]...	CH
1227	14	0711	Frost VOK (see [redacted])	CH
1254	14	0711	MI... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]...	CH
1320	14	0711	MI... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]...	CH
1348	14	0711	MI... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]...	CH
1405	14	0711	MI... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]...	CH
1437	14	0711	MI... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]...	CH
1615	14		MI... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]...	CH
Sup for [redacted]	14		MI... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]...	CH
1920	14	0801	MI... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]...	CH
1930	14	0811	MI... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]...	CH
2000	14	0818	MI... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]...	CH
2015	14	0821	MI... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]...	CH
2139	14	0825	MI... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]... [redacted]...	CH

1603-1615 (CONT'D)

0740 VPI'S, ORANGE'S A/S

0745 MI, VPI'S SEWER

0750 MEETS ECKHART'S HOLEY BODY

0800 BY NUMBERS COUNT 315 THIS ACCOUNTED FOR. TX (#16555) IS A NO SHOW. COMPLETED

0930 CHOW TO IM'S

0900 w/t A/S

0940 Performance Check.

1000 VISIT TO 2A WHICH WAS ALERT OF THIS

1010 BEFORE TO 5A 2A12Z ALSO STRIPPED

SHIRT WOULD DELIVER LETTERS FOR IM'S

FOR CASH PASSED AND TO CTR WAC FIVE DRY

1040 TN #1394 CELL 2A108 WAS PLACED INTO

1050 CELL #36 FOR FURNISHING W/ TP'S

SEE NOTE IN FILE.

1015 COMMANDING OFFICER HADEN'S TIME TO 1015 (511)

1050 MET ON DECK TO SEE CELL #13

1110 ALL ALIBI'S SECURE

1135 VPI'S ARRIVE IN LINK "STAFF", MATRONS SECURE

1200 VPI'S HOLD IN PROCESS ~~CELL #13~~ (A/S)

1235 MI HOLD IN PROCESS ~~CELL #13~~ (A/S)

INTER. HOLD HAS FAMILY IN IN BLOCK & YARD NOT COOPERATING WITH HIS SLEEP CHART & DATA TO FOLLOW.

1245 wake through V/S

1315 MI ON DECK

1320 MI OFF DECK

1340 MI ON DECK ~~ALERT DECK #1502114~~ (A/S)

1400 WALK THROUGH V/S FIGHT GUY ~~(A/S)~~ (A/S)

1420 ~~PIERED BACK END CELL 2B108~~ (A/S)

1440 WALK THROUGH -- #150425 CELL #1A11

MOVING TD 1A30 IN HOLD WAS COMMUNICATED

WHILE ADVANCES IN CELLS 24118, AND, 24119

2A BLOCK (A/S)

1440 VPI HURT IN LAID WAS STRIPPED DOWN

PER VPI HE IS NERKEN AND STANDING

FALL IN HIS CELL (A/S)

1500 REC SINTERED FOR 2A BLOCK COVER

1515 ~~2A~~ NEW MI HOLD IN PROCESS (A/S)

1530 VPI CELL 1A08, #150420 CELL #1A11 (A/S)

1510 BIRTH PREVIOUS SUIT TO SEC. ROOM (A/S)

1610 ~~MI~~ (A/S)

1635 In. inmates fighting in cell 3011, 1411 (A/S)

inmates separated & placed into isolation in U-1 (A/S)

1640 MI left U-1, All secured (A/S)

1641 MI to speed with 1502114 (A/S)

1738 #150421 returned to L's cell after made (A/S)

Sunday leave, h... Skerford acting (A/S)

20157 45559 51 55559

20 Sep 03

0005 Walk thru conducted, all OK
0026 MI off the PA leg
0100 [REDACTED]

0101 [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] is taking
one EA in cell 2411.
Be advised he has a pistol
and an NY

0300 Walk thru conducted, all OK
0300 Count 1A23, 2A-158, 2B-144, Total = 325
2. 2A 5 cell 2411A10 not counted

0330 Walk Thru NY
0410 Walk Thru NY
0440 Recimeter ✓ NY
0515 Walk Thru NY

0550 Walk Thru NY
0600 Choo Bue-lans NY
0630 Walk Thru NY

0700 (Jan's pup)
0730 (Jan's pup) NY
0800 (Jan's pup) NY
0830 (Jan's pup) NY

0830 Walk Thru NY
0920 (Jan's pup) NY
1000 Walk Thru NY
1030 Walk Thru NY

1000 064 AMI Sublimation NY
1000 Walk Thru NY
1000 Walk Thru NY

1000 064 AMI Sublimation NY
1000 Walk Thru NY
1000 Walk Thru NY

1000 064 AMI Sublimation NY
1000 Walk Thru NY
1000 Walk Thru NY

1000 064 AMI Sublimation NY
1000 Walk Thru NY
1000 Walk Thru NY

1000 064 AMI Sublimation NY
1000 Walk Thru NY
1000 Walk Thru NY

1000 064 AMI Sublimation NY
1000 Walk Thru NY
1000 Walk Thru NY

1000 064 AMI Sublimation NY
1000 Walk Thru NY
1000 Walk Thru NY

1000 064 AMI Sublimation NY
1000 Walk Thru NY
1000 Walk Thru NY

1000 064 AMI Sublimation NY
1000 Walk Thru NY
1000 Walk Thru NY

1145 Perimeter ✓ NY
1233. MATHIAS, ALL APBARS SEIZE, 1/21 meet NEMA
SWEENEY AND INSURANCE SERVICES

1301 ALL APBARS SEIZED
1500 1/21 moved from Camp Vigniant to cell 150553
1815 BUREAU DRIVERS SEIZURE

1606 1051/OK (500) [REDACTED]
1700 2B-TIP-ITER, OUT TO VANDS
1105 GAVE OUT 2-1-5 CELL, 1105 TO HIA I P. 2
1710 SPE [REDACTED] FEEDBACK of 2/10: 1105
1720 The 2 [REDACTED] for 2/10, 1105, 1105, 1105

1800 UGA is no longer on the list
1800 ZB-TIP-ITER IN FROM VANDS
1810 Region Plan, 1/21/03
1925 John Blot received from cell 1105 and placed
in front of 1105 for cleaning & removal

2015 Grand [REDACTED] to 2010
2115 3rd [REDACTED] 2010
2215 2nd [REDACTED] 2010
2315 1st [REDACTED] 2010

2415 3rd [REDACTED] 2010
2515 2nd [REDACTED] 2010
2615 1st [REDACTED] 2010
2715 3rd [REDACTED] 2010

2815 2nd [REDACTED] 2010
2915 1st [REDACTED] 2010
3015 3rd [REDACTED] 2010
3115 2nd [REDACTED] 2010

3215 1st [REDACTED] 2010
3315 3rd [REDACTED] 2010
3415 2nd [REDACTED] 2010
3515 1st [REDACTED] 2010

3615 3rd [REDACTED] 2010
3715 2nd [REDACTED] 2010
3815 1st [REDACTED] 2010
3915 3rd [REDACTED] 2010

4015 2nd [REDACTED] 2010
4115 1st [REDACTED] 2010
4215 3rd [REDACTED] 2010
4315 2nd [REDACTED] 2010

4415 1st [REDACTED] 2010
4515 3rd [REDACTED] 2010
4615 2nd [REDACTED] 2010
4715 1st [REDACTED] 2010

24 Sept 83

ACTIVATION OF [REDACTED] 24-1919

14SD MEDICAL ARRIVED AT 21195

1516 MEDICAL DEPARTED AO

1511 JUVENILES MOVED TO OUT PROCESS & TRANSFER

WARD ALSO STARTED AT SAME TIME FOR 24

Block PER IP STAFF

1520 [REDACTED] DEPARTED: 18033-18129

18027, 1825, 18026, 1873, 15026, 18021,

RATHER AS POLICE REPORTED. BLOCK STARTED: ONE OF THE

FOR THE POLICE TO BE RETRIEVALS, SOMETHING TOWARD

THEY WOULD KNOW WHICH ONE

1822 [REDACTED] UNCLE US IN HELICOPTER

[REDACTED]

1520 [REDACTED] 150480 - BECAME A

FOR [REDACTED] HERE ON THE 27TH

[REDACTED] 28/173

1555 - INFORMED TP'S HO JUVENILES TO IN - ON 1 1 1 1

UPRECORDED

1511 - IN [REDACTED] ATTENTION TO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] COMMUNICATIONS UNIT

OFFICE TYPISTS,

1557 - MEDICAL FINALLY CONCLUDING [REDACTED]

Possible [REDACTED] Dist

1610 SSG [REDACTED] SGT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1610 24 Yard complete

1603

24 Sept 83

1610 Cont 1A SC, 1B-2, 2A-159, 2B-145, T-332

1910 Caterers arrived

1950 Feeding complete

1951 Chorus rotation started

1955 Caterers left.

1957 SIC [REDACTED] are checked

1800 4 Ins out of cell [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] for fighting

1539 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 1809

1390 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] call 1802

1522 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

1511 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

2111 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

3038 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

1410 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

15045 call 145

15049 call 1410

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

29 Sept 83

0955 MI TOUR ON SITE

1000 FEMALE IP TOUR OF SENG.

1002 MEDICS ON SITE FOR MEDS PASSOUT -



1015 OGA HERE TO SPEAK WITH 2 DETAINees

(2) 400 OPEN & LOUEN

1020 PREPARE TO GET DETAINees ASKED

1015 Check TIMEBOOK AS

1100 All INMATES FROM WORK DETAINees SECURED

1130 MOVED 2 OGA PRISONERS TO #8 FOR SURVEILLANCE

1140 VIP ON SITE FOR TOUR

1145 MEDICS DEPART FOR LOUEN

1204 VIP DEPARTS STAY AREA

1200 ROACH CONTACT APPROVED TO FEED INMATES

1215 VULGAR MEAL ISSUED.

1217 ~~INMATES ARE ASKED TO PREPARE FOR MEDS PASSOUT~~

~~INMATES ARE ASKED TO PREPARE FOR MEDS PASSOUT~~

1222 IM 14400 CELL 2A114 OUT ON AFRICA/1

VISIT

1225 13135, 13333, 13336, 13342 RETURNED FROM

QUIET RUN ALL RETURNED TO CELLS

1232 14400 DEPARTED FOR FRONTIER VISIT

1233 IP STAFF (2) 413 PREPARING TO WORK

AND ACCOUNT FOR A LARGE QUANTITY OF SUPPLIES FOR REASON

1235 Power Out (2) Prison [redacted] ANTIHYPNIA (2)

TO GET IT ON AGAIN.

1250 CONTACTED BY BAL- 14210 & 142109 CELL.

~~1308~~ 1308 CONTACTED BY BAL- 14210 & 142109 CELL.

~~1308~~ 1308 CONTACTED BY BAL- 14210 & 142109 CELL.

PREPARED TO BANK FOR

1311 WORKER FOR PRISON CONTRACTOR CAUGHT TAKING TO INMATES (2) ZABAK IP'S INVOLVED

THE PROBLEM

1312 Perimeter check

1315 16115/ 16116 cell 2A121 16021 CELL

1325 WORKER FROM #8 PRISON SECURED

1340 IM ON SITE

1345 IM ON SITE

1350 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

1355 IM ON SITE

10CT 105D - 34911/34912
 1259 - 249A 1349A 1349B 1349C 1349D 1349E 1349F 1349G 1349H 1349I 1349J 1349K 1349L 1349M 1349N 1349O 1349P 1349Q 1349R 1349S 1349T 1349U 1349V 1349W 1349X 1349Y 1349Z

TIME	REMARKS	INITIALS	TIME	REMARKS	INITIALS
1239	Sick Call Completed 100's & Clinic	Jan 11	2345	NIGHT SHIFT Relieved DAWSHIN=	DK
1246	clean ears	Jan 11	0700	1 Oct 03	DK
1300	Call up called into Spec - Alveolar	Jan 11	0715	Roll up called into Spec 349A, 349P / SGT MILLERS	DK
1350	7 CT's Ref'n from SCA Case	Jan 11	0950	Toward notices CP withered 4ws CT's talking to CP#4 T-SNH 150736, 1507	DK
1430	25 CT's from Banc 1	Jan 11	1000	150619 put in Slinky For	DK
	150798, 150771, 150700, 150696, 150697, 150694, 150696		1045	disab'ing order / cur n- 1020	DK
	150714, 150701, 150737, 150762, 150796, 150701, 150706		1040	ISM Count Done in Compound	DK
	150779, 150673, 150677, 150712, 150720, 150714, 150708		1045	SICKCALL FINISHED	DK
	150721, 150681, 150684, 150689		1050	FEEDING CT's in Compound 150728 150852,	DK
1435	New milk up call to Spec Room	Jan 11		150729 150730 150731 150732 150733 150734	DK
1535	8 new CT's from previous 2?	Jan 11		150735 150736 150737 150738 150739 150740	DK
	150716, 150711, 150717, 150718, 150719, 150720, 150721, 150722			150741 150742 150743 150744 150745 150746 150747 150748	DK
	150705			150749 150750 150751 150752 150753 150754 150755 150756	DK
1546	New call up call to Spec Room	Jan 11		150757 150758 150759 150760 150761 150762 150763 150764	DK
1720	84 New prisoners from box of 100	Jan 11		150765 150766 150767 150768 150769 150770 150771 150772	DK
	150711, 150712, 150713, 150714, 150715, 150716, 150717, 150718, 150719, 150720, 150721, 150722, 150723, 150724, 150725, 150726, 150727, 150728, 150729, 150730, 150731, 150732, 150733, 150734, 150735, 150736, 150737, 150738, 150739, 150740, 150741, 150742, 150743, 150744, 150745, 150746, 150747, 150748, 150749, 150750, 150751, 150752, 150753, 150754, 150755, 150756, 150757, 150758, 150759, 150760, 150761, 150762, 150763, 150764, 150765, 150766, 150767, 150768, 150769, 150770, 150771, 150772, 150773, 150774, 150775, 150776, 150777, 150778, 150779, 150780, 150781, 150782, 150783, 150784, 150785, 150786, 150787, 150788, 150789, 150790, 150791, 150792, 150793, 150794, 150795, 150796, 150797, 150798, 150799, 150800			150799 150800 150801 150802 150803 150804 150805 150806	DK
1735	1 CI's	Jan 11		150807 150808 150809 150810 150811 150812 150813 150814	DK
1810	27 CI's	Jan 11		150815 150816 150817 150818 150819 150820 150821 150822	DK
	150720, 150815, 150816, 150817, 150818, 150819, 150820, 150821, 150822, 150823, 150824, 150825, 150826, 150827, 150828, 150829, 150830, 150831, 150832, 150833, 150834, 150835, 150836, 150837, 150838, 150839, 150840, 150841, 150842, 150843, 150844, 150845, 150846, 150847, 150848, 150849, 150850, 150851, 150852, 150853, 150854, 150855, 150856, 150857, 150858, 150859, 150860, 150861, 150862, 150863, 150864, 150865, 150866, 150867, 150868, 150869, 150870, 150871, 150872, 150873, 150874, 150875, 150876, 150877, 150878, 150879, 150880, 150881, 150882, 150883, 150884, 150885, 150886, 150887, 150888, 150889, 150890, 150891, 150892, 150893, 150894, 150895, 150896, 150897, 150898, 150899, 150900			150899 150900 150901 150902 150903 150904 150905 150906	DK
1843	14 CI's received	Jan 11		150907 150908 150909 150910 150911 150912 150913 150914	DK
	150794, 150795, 150796, 150797, 150798, 150799, 150800, 150801, 150802, 150803, 150804, 150805, 150806, 150807, 150808, 150809, 150810, 150811, 150812, 150813, 150814, 150815, 150816, 150817, 150818, 150819, 150820, 150821, 150822, 150823, 150824, 150825, 150826, 150827, 150828, 150829, 150830, 150831, 150832, 150833, 150834, 150835, 150836, 150837, 150838, 150839, 150840, 150841, 150842, 150843, 150844, 150845, 150846, 150847, 150848, 150849, 150850, 150851, 150852, 150853, 150854, 150855, 150856, 150857, 150858, 150859, 150860, 150861, 150862, 150863, 150864, 150865, 150866, 150867, 150868, 150869, 150870, 150871, 150872, 150873, 150874, 150875, 150876, 150877, 150878, 150879, 150880, 150881, 150882, 150883, 150884, 150885, 150886, 150887, 150888, 150889, 150890, 150891, 150892, 150893, 150894, 150895, 150896, 150897, 150898, 150899, 150900			150907 150908 150909 150910 150911 150912 150913 150914	DK
1910	New Roll up called into Spec Room	Jan 11		150915 150916 150917 150918 150919 150920 150921 150922	DK
2010	SI 150911 transferred from hospital to VJ4H	Jan 11		150923 150924 150925 150926 150927 150928 150929 150930	DK
	247A D 249P	Jan 11		150931 150932 150933 150934 150935 150936 150937 150938	DK

#	IN	OUT	ACT/Reason	Area Taken	Shift	IN	OUT	Notes	Secure
10	1100	1123	Shift Change 20231121999	Logged	SP	1200	1545	20266, 20696, 18162, 18161, 22238 21175, 22249, 22290, 20488 21893, 92203-1, 19488, 20508 19475, 20850, 19192	Secure
11	1200	1200	Shift Change	Logged	IR	1200	1545	Shift Change	Logged
12	1300	1300	Processors 202418 + 202419 = 487155 480 pills 3 clinic Aulits 43 pills	Logged	IR	1300	1545	Headcount conducted 21431 transferred from processors 490 (490 pills). 2 Hus 3 clinic 480 (480 pills) processor	Logged
13	1400	1400	Processors 202418 + 202419 = 487155 480 pills 3 clinic Aulits 43 pills	Logged	IR	1400	1545	Headcount conducted 21431 transferred from processors 490 (490 pills). 2 Hus 3 clinic 480 (480 pills) processor	Logged
14	1500	1500	Processors 202418 + 202419 = 487155 480 pills 3 clinic Aulits 43 pills	Logged	IR	1500	1545	Headcount conducted 21431 transferred from processors 490 (490 pills). 2 Hus 3 clinic 480 (480 pills) processor	Logged
15	1600	1600	Processors 202418 + 202419 = 487155 480 pills 3 clinic Aulits 43 pills	Logged	IR	1600	1545	Headcount conducted 21431 transferred from processors 490 (490 pills). 2 Hus 3 clinic 480 (480 pills) processor	Logged
16	1700	1700	Processors 202418 + 202419 = 487155 480 pills 3 clinic Aulits 43 pills	Logged	IR	1700	1545	Headcount conducted 21431 transferred from processors 490 (490 pills). 2 Hus 3 clinic 480 (480 pills) processor	Logged
17	1800	1800	Processors 202418 + 202419 = 487155 480 pills 3 clinic Aulits 43 pills	Logged	IR	1800	1545	Headcount conducted 21431 transferred from processors 490 (490 pills). 2 Hus 3 clinic 480 (480 pills) processor	Logged
18	1900	1900	Processors 202418 + 202419 = 487155 480 pills 3 clinic Aulits 43 pills	Logged	IR	1900	1545	Headcount conducted 21431 transferred from processors 490 (490 pills). 2 Hus 3 clinic 480 (480 pills) processor	Logged
19	2000	2000	Processors 202418 + 202419 = 487155 480 pills 3 clinic Aulits 43 pills	Logged	IR	2000	1545	Headcount conducted 21431 transferred from processors 490 (490 pills). 2 Hus 3 clinic 480 (480 pills) processor	Logged
20	2100	2100	Processors 202418 + 202419 = 487155 480 pills 3 clinic Aulits 43 pills	Logged	IR	2100	1545	Headcount conducted 21431 transferred from processors 490 (490 pills). 2 Hus 3 clinic 480 (480 pills) processor	Logged
21	2200	2200	Processors 202418 + 202419 = 487155 480 pills 3 clinic Aulits 43 pills	Logged	IR	2200	1545	Headcount conducted 21431 transferred from processors 490 (490 pills). 2 Hus 3 clinic 480 (480 pills) processor	Logged
22	2300	2300	Processors 202418 + 202419 = 487155 480 pills 3 clinic Aulits 43 pills	Logged	IR	2300	1545	Headcount conducted 21431 transferred from processors 490 (490 pills). 2 Hus 3 clinic 480 (480 pills) processor	Logged
23	2400	2400	Processors 202418 + 202419 = 487155 480 pills 3 clinic Aulits 43 pills	Logged	IR	2400	1545	Headcount conducted 21431 transferred from processors 490 (490 pills). 2 Hus 3 clinic 480 (480 pills) processor	Logged
24	2500	2500	Processors 202418 + 202419 = 487155 480 pills 3 clinic Aulits 43 pills	Logged	IR	2500	1545	Headcount conducted 21431 transferred from processors 490 (490 pills). 2 Hus 3 clinic 480 (480 pills) processor	Logged
25	2600	2600	Processors 202418 + 202419 = 487155 480 pills 3 clinic Aulits 43 pills	Logged	IR	2600	1545	Headcount conducted 21431 transferred from processors 490 (490 pills). 2 Hus 3 clinic 480 (480 pills) processor	Logged

5 AM 12

4 AM 12

7 11

#	IN	OUT	Action / Reason	Action Taken	DUTY	Pres. #	#	IN	OUT	Action / Reason	Action Taken	DUTY
11	1350	1350	Action / Reason	Logged	JR	453	12	1226	1226	Action / Reason	Logged	JR
12	1315	1315	2' chaff / 1' dog out	Logged	JR	453				20216 & 22248 Out to clinic (458) Bass (41) Clinic	Logged	JR
13	1300	1500	Feeding #1 Self Sees	Logged	JR	453	13	1330	1330	Sick call: 20679, 20678, 18164, (459) Present	Logged	JR
14	1340		455 Bass good 2 elms	Logged	JR	453				19034, 2034, 20693, 19048, 21608, 21015, 20656, 21808, 20216, 20216, 18798, 20610, 21041, 20258, 20680, 20694, 1897, 20510, 22246, 20308, 19726, 20118, 21801, 20839, 20164, 20341, 21160, 20611, 21175, 20162, 21545, 21251, 22248, 19056, 20544, 20216 & 22218 Back from clinic (458) Bass (2) Clinic	Logged	JR
15	1630		Received 4 wire prisoners	Logged	JR	457				458 pss, 2 elms & 456 present	Logged	JR
16	1640	1700	2 prisoners back up truck	Logged	JR	457	14	1544	1544	1171 lance with Compas	Logged	JR
17	1853	1953	Feeding - safe feed	Logged	JR	452	15	1915	1926	Rep. Maffone 18766	Logged	JR
18	1915		LOG OPENED	Logged	JR	451				11117 quit 11:40 due to [redacted] & [redacted] 11:40	Logged	JR
19	1915	2022	DECAL BEANS RECEIVED	Logged	JR	451	16	1915	1926	458 pss, 2 elms & 456 present	Logged	JR
20	1915		Prisoner # 20851 20851	Logged	JR	451	17	1915	1926	1171 lance with Compas	Logged	JR
21	1915		OUT for count (458) pss	Logged	JR	451	18	1915	1926	11117 quit 11:40 due to [redacted] & [redacted] 11:40	Logged	JR
22	1915		5 elms (2) count (458) pss	Logged	JR	451	19	1915	1926	1171 lance with Compas	Logged	JR
23	1915		11 elms count 1 elms (458) pss	Logged	JR	451	20	1915	1926	1171 lance with Compas	Logged	JR
24	1915		458 pss (458) pss (458) pss	Logged	JR	451	21	1915	1926	1171 lance with Compas	Logged	JR
25	1915		MOE Detail	Logged	JR	451	22	1915	1926	1171 lance with Compas	Logged	JR
26	1915		Water Truck	Logged	JR	451	23	1915	1926	1171 lance with Compas	Logged	JR
27	1915		SANITATION TRUCK	Logged	JR	451	24	1915	1926	1171 lance with Compas	Logged	JR
28	1915		20851, 20855 Back from	Logged	JR	451	25	1915	1926	1171 lance with Compas	Logged	JR
29	1915		OUT Dogged Hill Walker	Logged	JR	451	26	1915	1926	1171 lance with Compas	Logged	JR
30	1915		Notice (451) pss (451) pss	Logged	JR	451	27	1915	1926	1171 lance with Compas	Logged	JR
31	1915		SICK CALL started	Logged	JR	457	28	1915	1926	1171 lance with Compas	Logged	JR
32	1915		Shift Change	Logged	JR	457	29	1915	1926	1171 lance with Compas	Logged	JR
33	1915		Prisoner 20104 released	Logged	JR	456	30	1915	1926	1171 lance with Compas	Logged	JR

29 APR 1953
 23495 - 455 - 113211000
 23495 - 455 - 113211000
 23495 - 455 - 113211000

24 APR 1953

v

11:17 BU TOX CALLED SA SECURITY HP I/m's

From. Calicut. i. No: 1100100 WORKER
THEY WERE ALSO I/m's FOR BAD BEHAVIOR
OR JUST OFFICE GENERAL POP.

11:30 BU TOX ADVISED THAT HP 13

I/m's 'Age For General Pop

11:54 I/m's DROPPED OFF

21810

21807

21809

21808

12:28 I/m 20761 HAS OBSERVED BY APP

TACTICALLY APART THE REEL HAND FAILURE, IT

- I/m: SAID HE FOUND THE GIVE AWAY

- CONSIDER IT, USE IT FOR FURTHER H.

- TOURS HIM EXPLAINING THE CASE HE

EXTRA FOR ARRIVING TO THE

1248 CLINIC CALLED 153511 FROM CAR

CLINIC

1450 I/m 153511 URGENT FOR CAUTERIZ

134-159

1908211 318-181

194932 318-171

1535 4 AMV VASIS RETURN

CAIDECOS

1000 5564 ON DUTY 711 ASSIGNED 750 PRESENT IN ROOM

1805 FOOD CONTRACTOR ARRIVES WORKS AND FOOD SEARCHED

NOTE ABOVE WITH LTC WAGON ABOUT 11:40 AM IN 1413 HE

STATED HE WOULD CLEAR UP WITH M AND LET MRS RUN

W/B AS FAR AS WHAT INMATE GETS (CLOTHES)

1900 COUNT 1A 449141 0034, 11M1 ASSIGNED 711

1B 3613A 1C INMATE 17F 191 PRESENT 750

2A 144143 2C INMATE 16004 CLINIC 5

3A 124105 100 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

3B 1514149 100 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

4A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

5A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

6A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

7A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

8A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

9A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

10A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

11A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

12A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

13A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

14A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

15A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

16A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

17A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

18A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

19A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

20A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

21A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

22A 11371455 200 1000 1000 CLINIC 2

NOTE: PREVIOUS NEEDS HAVE BEEN

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures



Standard Operating Procedure

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

Table of Contents

Section A: Roll Call

1. Captains Duties and Responsibilities
2. Guards Duties and Responsibilities

Section B: Main Entry Gate

1. Duties and Responsibilities
2. Emergency Procedures

Section C: Tower Operations

1. Duties and Responsibilities
2. Emergency Procedures

Section D: Control Room

1. Duties and Responsibilities
2. Key Control
3. Communications
4. Emergency Procedures

Section E: Tool Room

1. Duties and Responsibilities
2. Emergency Procedures

Section F: Cell Blocks

1. Duties and Responsibilities
2. Emergency Procedures

Section G: Main Cell Entry Gate

1. Duties and Responsibilities
2. Emergency Procedures

Section H: Escort Personnel

1. Duties and Responsibilities
2. Emergency Procedures

Section I: Captains

1. Duties and Responsibilities
2. Emergency Procedures

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

Section J: Assistant Captains

1. Duties and Responsibilities
2. Emergency Procedures

Section K: In-Processing Team

1. Duties and Responsibilities
2. Out-Processing and Transfers
3. Emergency Procedures

Section L: Quick Response Force

1. Primary Duties and Responsibilities
2. Shield Men
3. Riot Baton Men
4. Handcuff Men
5. Security Men
6. Secondary Duties and Responsibilities
7. Finalizing Disturbances in Cell Areas

Section M: Medical Team

1. Duties and Responsibilities
2. Emergency Procedures

Appendix A: Facility Fire Plan

Appendix B: Major Disturbances and Mass Disorder

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

Section A:

Change of shift and roll call

1. Captains Duties and Responsibilities

- A. Captains from the on coming and off going shifts will exchange briefings prior to roll call meeting.
- B. The Captain from the off going shift will remain at the roll call until shift change is complete.
- C. Captains for the on coming shift will give special instructions from the Warden, significant events, and any other information required to have the shift run smoothly.
- D. Captains will answer any questions the guards have concerning the information that has been given, and will be responsible for the guards understanding the instructions given
- E. Captains will be responsible for all accountability of weapons, ammunition, and equipment given to the guards at the shift change
- F. Captains will be responsible to account for all personnel that are to report for duty. Captains will address any medical issues with the guards and will ensure the guards report to their assigned posts.
- G. Captains will ensure the guards reporting for duty meet all cleanliness and appearance standards.

2. Guard Duties and Responsibilities

- A. All Guards will report at the appropriate time for roll call. Reporting times will be set by the Warden and the Captains. Failure to do so may result in disciplinary action.
- B. All Guards will be expected to meet the cleanliness and appearance standards
- C. All Guards will listen and fully understand the special instructions and significant events given to them by the Captains
- D. All Guards will be held accountable for equipment, ammunition, weapons needed for their posts
- E. Guards with medical concerns will report the situation to the Captains prior to roll call.
- F. All Guards will report to their posts immediately following roll call.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

Section B:

Main Entry Gate

1. Duties and Responsibilities

- A. The Guard at this post will be responsible for reading and understanding all orders and instructions given to him at the beginning of the shift.
- B. The Guard will be responsible for access control through the main gate of the prison. This will be done by access control roster, special instructions of the Warden, or special orders given at the beginning of the shift.
- C. The guard will report, by radio or runner, all personnel entering or leaving the prison to the shift supervisor and/or Captain.
- D. The Guard will maintain a log book of every person entering the facility. This is to include name, reason entering the prison, date, time in, time out, and signature.
- E. All personnel before entering the gate will be searched.
- F. Any Military or Iraqi Police will be required to clear all weapons before entering through the main gate
- G. The Guard will inform any Iraqi Police Officers they may be asked to relinquish their weapons while in the prison.
- H. Coalition Forces will not be authorized to take any weapons beyond the areas that are marked with restricted signs. Coalition Forces will be responsible for their own weapons guards.
- I. The Guard will be responsible for all equipment assigned to that post
- J. The main gate will remain closed when not in use.
- K. The Guard will notify the shift supervisor and /or Captain of any suspicious activity with in the area around the main gate.
- L. The Guard will be responsible to keep non-essential personnel from loitering at the main gate. To include civilian personnel, off duty guards, and any vendors not doing business with the prison facility.
- M. The Guard will not leave his post until properly relieved by the shift supervisor and/or the Captain, or the on coming shift
- N. The guard will be responsible for keeping the area clean

2. Emergency Procedures

- A. In case of an emergency, that threatens the security of the prison, the Guard will follow the following procedures to ensure the safety of the prison and the personnel inside.
- B. The Guard will notify and alert all personnel by radio.

310th Military Police BN /
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- C. The Guard will enter the prison and secure the gate. The guard is to ensure that all prison personnel that may be outside the gate are inside the prison
- D. The Guard will sound the alarm for the main gate, if the situation allows.
- E. The Guard will not allow anyone to enter or exit the main gate unless ordered by the shift supervisor and/or Captain, or the Warden.
- F. The Guard is not to leave his post until directed by the shift supervisor and/or Captain.
- G. In case of major disturbance or riot refer to Appendix B.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

Section C:

Tower Operations

1. Guard Duties and Responsibility

- A. Guards will report to their posts on time
- B. Guards will not leave their posts until properly relieved by the shift supervisor and/or Captains
- C. Guards will inspect their post for proper equipment and cleanliness, and will report any discrepancies to the shift supervisor and/or Captains.
- D. Guards will conduct a radio check once they have assumed their post
- E. Guards will log activities at their post, to include coming on shift, leaving shift, any special instructions given during the shift, any discrepancies found at the beginning and end of shifts, and any suspicious activity around their post.
- F. Guards will conduct periodic radio checks. Captains and assistant Captains will determine the interval used for the radio checks
- G. Guards will watch the assigned areas inside and outside of the prison, and secondary areas within their range of vision
- H. Guards will report any suspicious activities by radio immediately to the shift supervisor and/or Captain
- I. Guards will be familiarized with the weapons assigned to their post, and will understand the policies on the use of force.
- J. In case of attempted escape the towers will notify, by radio, the shift supervisor and /or Captain, and will follow the policies governing the prevention of escape as set by the Warden.

2. Emergency Procedures

- A. In case of emergency the Guard will be responsible for the safety of the prison personnel and the prison facility
- B. The Guard will notify, by radio, the shift supervisor and/or Captain immediately upon having an emergency situation.
- C. The Guard will remain at his post and periodically update the shift supervisor and/or Captain to the changes in the situation.
- D. The Guard will not allow any personnel to enter the towers unless directed by the Warden, shift supervisor and /or Captain
- E. In Case of major disturbances or riot refer to Appendix B.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

Section D:

Control Room

1. Arms Room Duties and Responsibilities

- A. Guard will maintain the physical security of the arms room.
- B. Control room will remain closed and locked, except when in use by assigned personnel
- C. Guard will be responsible for all equipment placed in the arms room, to include the number of rounds in arms room, number of weapons, and full count of all sensitive items not mentioned here. Inventory of the arms room is to be done prior to the change of shift.
- D. Guard will log all equipment in and out of the arms room regardless of use, to include name of personnel receiving equipment, weapon serial number, number of rounds issued, time, date, and location equipment is being used
- E. Guard will be responsible to report any maintenance deficiencies found on weapons or equipment immediately to the shift supervisor and/or Captains
- F. Guard is to remain at his post unless directed otherwise by the Warden.
- G. Guard is **not** to allow any non authorized personnel into the arms room, unless directed by the Warden. An access roster should be posted at the Control Room. Roster should include Warden, Assistant Warden, Senior Captain and/or Shift Captain, Armor, and the Assistant Armor assigned to the Control Room.
- H. Guard will be responsible for the cleanliness and neat appearance of the arms room.
- I. At **NO** time will the arms room keys be allowed to enter the prisoner holding areas, or leave the prison facility.
- J. Control Room Guard will take the weapon from arriving Iraqi Police Officers tag the weapons and give a corresponding tag to the Officer for pick up upon leaving the prison.

2. Key Control

- A. Guard will be responsible for the inventory of all facility keys.
- B. Guard will inventory all keys prior to the change of shift. The results of the inventory will be place in a log book. **EXAMPLE.** date, time, and person who is on duty. Inventory of all keys have been completed With 2 vehicle keys, 3 padlock keys, and 1 door key present at this time.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- C. When the Guard issues the keys. The control room Guard will log date, time and who the key is issued to, why the key is needed, and the time the key is returned. See attachment 1A for example
- D. Broken keys will be returned to the Control Room Guard. All broken keys will be logged in the key log book and reported immediately to the Facility supervisor and/or the Warden.

3. Communications

- A. Control Room Guard will inventory all radio equipment prior to the change of shift.
- B. Control Room Guard is responsible for the accountability of all radio equipment assigned to the prison facility.
- C. The Guard will log all maintenance discrepancies and radio counts in a log book kept in the control room. The Guard will also notify the facility supervisor and/or Warden immediately of any discrepancies.
- D. The Control Room Guard will ensure all radios turned in are placed in the charger rack. This is to ensure the radios are charged for the on coming shift
- E. When radios and radio equipment is issued, the guard will issue equipment in the same manner as the key control procedures.

4. Emergency Procedures

- A. Guard will remain at his post until properly relieved by the facility supervisor and/or the Warden.
- B. Guard will stay to issue needed weapons or other equipment directed by the Warden.
- C. If instructed to leave the post. The Guard will ensure the control room is completely secure, and report to the location directed by the facility supervisor and/or the Warden.
- D. In case of major disturbance or riot refer to Appendix B.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

Section E:

Tool Room

1. Duties and Responsibilities

- A Guards will remain at their posts until properly relieved by the Shift supervisor and /or Captains, or the on coming shift.
- B. Guards will be accountable for all tools located in the tool room Guard will inventory all tools at the beginning and at the end of each shift to ensure all tools are accounted for.
- C. All tools will be signed out in a log book. The log will have the tool, quantity, reason for the use of the tool, and the person who is using the tool.
- D. The Guards will search the prisoners as they enter the work area and as they leave the work area. This will be done by both hand searches and by using the electronic devices.
- E. Prisoners in the work areas will not be allowed to leave the work area until all tools are accounted for.²
- F. If any tools are missing the prisoners in the work area will be strip searched, and the shift supervisor and/or Captain will be notified immediately
- G Guards will maintain a full count of prisoners entering and exiting the work area
- H. NO tools will leave the work area unless directed by the facility supervisor and/or the Warden

2. Emergency Procedures

- A In case of emergency the primary responsibility of the guard is the safety of the prison personnel and the prisoners
- B The Guard will remain calm and direct the prisoners to return the tools to the tool room An initial inventory will be done and the prisoners will begin the search process.
- C When searches are complete the prisoners will be taken by the Guards to the designated safe area If prisoners are not in any immediate danger the prisoners will be returned to the cells and full accountability of the prisoners, tools and equipment will be done
- D Guards will then report the tool room status to the facility supervisor and/or Captain following the end of any emergency
- E In case of fire in the work area. the facility supervisor will be notified immediately by radio, the Guards will instruct the prisoners to leave all tools where they are The Guards will then release the prisoners into the custody of the security team The tool room guards will aid in the fire fighting procedures The security team will escort the prisoners to the safe area and conduct searches there
- F In case of major disturbance or riot refer to Appendix B

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

Section F:

Cell Blocks

1. Duties and Responsibilities

- A. Guards in the cell block areas will not leave their posts until properly relieved by the shift supervisor and/or Captains.
- B. Guards will be responsible for the care and control of the prisoners assigned to the cell block. Example if a prisoner is ill he will report it to the shift supervisor for medical care.
- C. Guards will not have conversations with the prisoners concerning their legal case or anything not having to do with the care of the prisoner.
- D. When recreation is authorized only one cell at a time will be allowed to have recreation time. The guard is responsible to maintain a prisoner count and ensure the safety of the prisoners in the recreation area
- E. Guards will conduct rounds of the cells on a regular basis. Guards will also conduct prisoner counts and pick up any unauthorized items found during the rounds. The Guard will report any discrepancies to the shift supervisor and/or Captain. This count is in addition to the main prisoner count done by the Captains.
- F. Guards will assist in the main prisoner count at the beginning of each shift, or as directed by the shift supervisor and/or Captains.
- G. During meal times the prisoners will remain in their cells and trustees will be escorted by the guards and will distribute the meals to each cell.
- H. All cells and secondary cell block gates will remain locked at all times, except when in use.
- I. Guards will not allow prisoners from other cell blocks to mix unless directed by the shift supervisor and/or Captain, or the Warden.
- J. During visitors days two cell block Guards will provide security on the main visitor gate.
- K. Guards will perform a physical pat down search on any prisoner exiting or entering a cell block.
- L. Guards will ensure the prisoners are in full uniform when the prisoners are removed from their cells or cell blocks.
- M. Guards will supervise the prisoners during the cleaning of the cell block areas. Guards will be responsible for the accountability of all cleaning equipment and supplies used during the cleaning process

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

2. Emergency Procedures

- A. In case of emergencies the Guards will report the incident immediately to the shift supervisor and/or Captains. The Guards will remain calm and remain at their post until directed by shift supervisors and/or the Captains.
- B. Guards are responsible for the safety of prison personnel and prisoners.
- C. In case of attack or attempted escape Guards will lock all prisoners in cells and ensure all gates are secured. Guards will report their status to the shift supervisor as soon as possible.
- D. In case of fire, Guards will remain calm and maintain order in the cell blocks. The cell blocks will be evacuated in an orderly fashion, and the prisoners will be taken to a safe area, as designated by the fire safety plan, by additional guards, escort guards, and security personnel. Prisoners will be searched in a designated portion of the safe area, and a prisoner count will be conducted to account for all prisoners and prison personnel. Cell block Guards will remain and help with fire fighting if the fire is in the cell block areas.
- E. All prisoners will be searched and returned to their cells if possible following the emergency. Positive control of all prisoners must be maintained at all times.
- F. In case of illness or death of an inmate, the Guard should notify the shift supervisor and/or Captains immediately. For illness, the Guard will request an escort for the sick prisoner to the infirmary. In the case of a death, the Guard will remove the other prisoners in an orderly fashion. All prisoners will have a complete search done upon being removed from the cell. The guards will follow the direction of the Captain for the removal of the deceased prisoner. The guard will give a complete report of the circumstances of how the body was found.
- G. In the case of minor disturbance, the Guard will immediately secure all inmates in the cell block and maintain order over those prisoners. This is a measure to keep other prisoners from joining into a disturbance. The Guards will remain at their posts with prisoners secured until directed by the shift supervisor and/or Captains.
- H. In case of major disturbance or riot refer to Appendix B.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

Section G:

Main Cell Access Gate

1. Duties and Responsibilities

- A. The Guard is to remain at his post at all times, or until relieved by the shift supervisor, Captain, or the on coming shift.
- B. The guard is responsible for the access to the kitchen facility, and the four other gates that access the cell block areas, visitation areas, and other facility services.
- C. These gates are to remain closed and latched/locked at all times.
- D. Guards will ensure that no weapons are allowed through the gate other than those used by the Quick Response Force. These weapons will only be authorized in times of crisis.
- E. The Guard is to open the needed gates for the Quick Response Force during disturbances in the prison facility.
- F. The Guard will open the kitchen area gates, inspect the kitchen area and allow the food service personnel access as needed.
- G. The inspection of the kitchen area will include verifying all knives, equipment, and food supplies are accounted for and not tampered with.
- H. During meals the Guard will control access to the cell block area. No unnecessary personnel will be allowed into the cell block area and no trustee will be allowed to exit this gate. The gates will remain closed as much as possible during this period.
- I. The guard will search all food service workers before allowing the food service workers to change shifts, and verify all equipment is present.
- J. While in the area of the main access gate the Guard will assist other guards as needed.
- K. Any disturbances noticed will be reported to the shift supervisor and/or Captain immediately
- L. The guard will have and be fully accountable for the keys used for these gates; keys will not be passed to any other personnel without turning in and reissued from key control.

2. Emergency Procedures

- A. In cases of emergency the Guard will remain at his post until properly relieved by the shift supervisor, Captain, or the Warden.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- B. In case of minor disturbances or attempted escape the Guard will secure all gates and allow no access until directed by the Warden and/or Captains. The guard will assist the Captains, as needed, in directing the Quick Response Force and other additional Guards as called for by the Warden or the Captains.
- C. In case of major disturbance or riot refer to Appendix B.
- D. In case of fire the Guard will assist in the orderly evacuation of prisoners, and kitchen personnel, as they enter or exit through the main access area. The security of the gates will still be maintained to the highest level possible. The guard will then move to the safe area, when directed by the Captain or the Warden, as shown in the fire safety plan.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

Section H:

Escort Personnel

1. Duties and Responsibilities

- A Guards may be designated as escort personnel in addition to their other duties
- B Guards will be responsible for being at their proper posts in case they are needed for an escort detail
- C. If called for a detail the guard will remain as an escort until directed by the shift supervisor, Captain, or the Warden to change and/or end the detail.
- D. The Guards will have the responsibility of escorting visitors, prisoners, or any other personnel that escorts is necessary for, as per the instructions of the Captains, or the Warden.
- E Guards escorting visitors will remain with those visitors until they depart the prison facility Guards will prevent the visitors from entering any non authorized areas of the facility Guards will also have the responsibility of protecting the visitors from harm while in the prison facility.
- F On visiting days, the Escort Guards will escort the visitors to the search station. Escort Guards will work in pairs for this detail. After the searches are complete, one Guard will travel to the designated cell block the visitor is there to see The Escort Guard will have a set of handcuffs and will search and cuff the prisoner. The Escort will inform the Cell Block Guard, main cell entry guard, and a Captain as to the destination of the prisoner. The Escort will then take the prisoner to the visitor. At the end of the visit the prisoner will be handcuffed and returned to the cell block where a thorough search will be conducted. The Escort will return to the visiting area and escort the visitor back to the search station and then escorted back out the gate. The guards will pick up a new visitor and/or visitors and repeat the process described above.
- G In the case of a prisoner escort, outside the facility, to the hospital, other prison facilities, or other appointments The escort guards will also work in pairs for this detail. The guards will fully understand the destination of the prisoner. The escorts will be aware of which assigned driver will be taking them to the destination. The Escort personnel will make sure they have all necessary documentation the prisoner will need at the location the prisoner is traveling to. For hospitalization the two escorts will remain with the prisoner at the hospital. The driver and one escort will return to the prison facility, give

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

a full report of the situation involving the prisoner and await further instructions.

- H Escort personnel left at the hospital will remain at that post until properly relieved by the Captain, Warden, or relief sent by the prison facility

2. Emergency Procedures

- A. The safety of the personnel being escorted, whether it be a prisoner or not, is the primary safety concern of the Escort Guard.
- B In case of fire, the Escort Guard will take any visiting personnel to a safe area designated by the Warden and/or Captains. Visiting personnel will still not have any contact with the prison population, or be placed in a safe area accessible by prisoners. Visitors in the prison facility there to see a prisoner will remain in the visitor's area; however not in the same area the prisoners may be held. Any Escort Guards not assigned on a detail will help Cell Block Guards. The Escort Guards and security personnel will escort prisoners to the safe area, and escort them back following the conclusion of the disturbance.
- C In case of minor disturbances or attempted escape visiting personnel will again be taken to a safe area not accessible by prisoners. The safety of the visiting personnel is paramount in these situations. Visitors there to see prisoners will be placed in a safe area in the visitor's area away from any prisoner contact, until the situation is concluded or the visitors can be searched and removed from the prison safely and without compromising the prison security. Escort Guards will assist in controlling any prisoners as needed by the Quick Response Force and/or Captains.
- D In case of major disturbance or riot refer to Appendix B

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

Section I:

Captains

1. Duties and Responsibilities

- A Captains of the off going shift will ensure all equipment (ammunition, radios, weapons, and/or keys) is accounted for, radios are turned into the Control Room for charging, any keys used during the shift are accounted for and turned in or will be reassigned to the on coming shift by Key Control.
- B. Captain of the off going shift will brief the on coming Captain of any events that have occurred during the shift, any equipment concerns, and any other pass on information that is required by the on coming Captain and his shift. This briefing will be conducted prior to the roll call.
- C. Captain of the on coming shift should address any medical issues prior to roll call, ensure all personnel are at roll call on time, and explain that being late for roll call can have disciplinary consequences.
- D. Captain of the on coming shift will make sure he fully understands the information given to him at the Captains briefing, and will pass on all the needed information to the Guards at the roll call. The Captain will also make sure the Guards fully understand the information given to them.
- E The Captain of the on coming shift will be responsible to ensure all equipment is issued to the guards before heading to their posts.
- F. Captains will be responsible for maintaining a prisoner count throughout their shift
- G Captains will report to the Warden that all prisoners, weapons, radios, keys and ammo are accounted for. Captains will periodically report all information to the Warden throughout their shift.
- H Captains will do a communications check at the beginning and during the shift.
- I. Captain and/or Assistant Captains will do spot checks on the posts to ensure policies of the prison facility are being followed
- J During the in processing of new prisoners, Captains will ensure the Warden reviews the paperwork and that the in processing procedures work smoothly and efficiently
- K Captains will file reports for any disturbances or injuries to prisoners, Guards, or any other personnel inside the prison facility when the incident occurred
- L. Captains will ensure that all paperwork and/or reports are done correctly and completely before turning in for review by the Warden

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- M. Captains will be in complete control of the Quick Response Force in the times of crisis.
- N. In cases of prisoner hospitalizations, the Captains will assign guards to the hospital in an isolated ward to watch and protect the prisoner.
- O. For non prisoner visitations, the Captains may delegate the Assistant Captains to assign escorts for any visitors arriving at the prison facility.
- P. When told of incoming prisoners, the Captains will notify the In Processing Team as to the date and relative time of the arrival. This is to allow the In Processing Team the ability to properly prepare and gather the necessary materials needed to make a smooth running operation.
- Q. Captains and/or assistant Captains will be responsible for a training program in the prison. Captains and/or assistance Captains will ensure that the training is conducted in accordance's to the standards and conditions that were established by Coalition forces.

2. Emergency Responsibilities

- A. Captains will have to responsibility to know where all his personnel are during an emergency
- B. Captains will be responsible for the safety of all personnel to include visitor, Guards, and prisoners.
- C. During a fire the Captain will ensure that all visitors are escorted to a safe area away from contact of any prisoners, direct guards to escort and control prisoners in any danger to a safe area where they will be searched and isolated until the crisis is over, and will direct other guards by using the Assistant Captains to perform damage control and fire fighting measures.
- D. During a minor disturbance or attempted escape, Captains will direct the Quick Response Force to the area where force is needed. Captains will keep in constant contact with the Assistant Captains in case more security personnel are needed to put down any disturbances
- E. The process of putting down a disturbance will be as follows.
- F. The Captain will take the QRF to the area of the disturbance. The Captain will exhaust all Inter Personnel Communication Skills to end the disturbance
 - a. If this fails and all measures are exhausted, the QRF will be sent into the cell area and will put down the disturbance in accordance with the prison policies and guidelines
- G. Once the Captain releases the QRF teams into the cell area. The QRF leader will take control of both Alpha and Bravo Teams. The Captain will assume a monitoring role and observe the teams to ensure policies are being followed.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- H As the prisoners are removed from the cells; the prisoners will be given to the guards outside the cells. The Guards will escort the prisoners to safe location. The Guards will then conduct thorough searches and/or strip searches
- I. Control of the prisoners and the QRF team will be returned to the Captain upon leaving the cell area.
- J. After the QRF Teams have exited the cell areas; the Captain has taken full control of the prisoners, Guards, and the QRF teams. The QRF team will remain as a security team for searches of the prisoners, and the cell area checks and searches.
- K. The QRF Team Leader will begin to compile information for the reports to be given to the Captain. The report will consist of information dealing with the circumstances that occurred in the cell during the disturbance and how it was put down. The report will also consist of any injuries sustained by QRF Team members and any other pertinent information needed by the Captain.
- L While QRF Teams provide security the Captain, and five additional personnel needed by the Captain will conduct prisoner and cell searches on remaining prisoners left inside the cell area the disturbance originated from.
 - a Outside the cell there will be 2 guards.
 - i. One Guard will provide security on prisoners brought out of the cell
 - ii The second Guard will take the prisoner from the search Guard and position the prisoner in the designated holding area. The Guard will place the prisoner in the kneeling or sitting position.
 - b. There will be one Guard positioned on the cell gate to control access in and out of the cell.
 - c. One guard will be assigned to strip search the remaining prisoners in the cell the disturbance originated from.
 - d. The last guard will provide overall security and hand the search Guard the prisoners for searching
- M Once all prisoners have been strip searched and placed in the holding area. Cell searches will be conducted
 - a. The two Guards outside will now provide the security on the prisoners in the holding area
 - b The Guard assigned to the Access control of the cell will now assist in the documentation of the thorough search of the cell the disturbance originated from.
 - c. The Two Guards assigned inside the cell will conduct the thorough search of the cell the disturbance originated in.
 - i Searches will cover all areas inside the cell to include the following
 - ii Any window ledges and framing

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- iii. All mattresses and linens will be searched.
 - iv. All bed frames will be searched for tampering or destruction that may result in the production of a weapon.
 - v. Any electrical outlets will be checked for tampering to include the ceiling fans and lights
 - vi. The General condition of the walls will also be checked for destruction or tampering which may result in attempted escapes.
- N. Once the general searches are complete the Guards will escort one prisoner at a time in and out of the cell to have the foot locker assigned to that prisoner searched
- a. One of the Guards from outside will escort the prisoner to the cell gate
 - b. The Gate Guard inside will take the prisoner into the cell and hand him over to the Guard assigned to security inside the cell.
 - c. The Guard who was originally assigned to do the searches of the prisoner will search the foot locker with the prisoner present. Once the search of the prisoner's personal affects is completed the prisoner will be escorted back to the gate and handed back to the Guard outside.
 - d. The Guard outside will escort the prisoner back to the holding area and the next prisoner will be taken to the gate.
 - e. This process will be repeated until all the prisoner's personal affects are searched.
- O. Once all the searches of the prisoners and the cells the disturbance originated from is complete. The prisoners will be returned to their cell one at a time until all the prisoners are returned into the cell.
- P. The Captain at that time will compile all the information of the disturbance from the QRF leader and the search team, as well as, the statements taken from the prisoners to be put in a report that will be filed and reviewed by the Warden.
- Q. Once all the duties are completed the Captain will release the additional personnel, and the QRF Team to return to the regular duties assigned to them
- R. In case of major disturbance or riot refer to Appendix B.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

Section J:

Assistant Captains

1. Duties and Responsibilities

- A. The primary duty of the Assistant Captain is to carry out the orders of the Captain and the Warden, and to ensure the policies of the prison facility are being followed by the guards and other prison personnel.
- B. Assistant Captains will fully understand the briefings done at roll call and help answer any questions that arise.
- C. Assistant Captains will help ensure all equipment being assigned for the shift is in working order, and will ensure equipment is passed to the proper personnel prior to the guards assuming their posts.
- D. Assistant Captains will ensure all personnel is at their posts at assigned times and will report to the Captain anyone not completing their responsibilities as a guard
- E. Assistant Captains will make random checks on different posts to ensure prison facility policies and the general orders are being followed.
- F. Assistant Captains will help complete prisoner counts through out the shift, and help compile any reports needed by the Captains and/or Warden.
- G. During in processing the Assistant Captain will follow the direction of the Captain. If necessary the Assistant Captain will control the amount of prisoners, by using Guards assigned to the detail, allowed into the in processing area in cases of high volume arrivals

2. Emergency Responsibilities

- A. The Assistant Captain will help in any way possible to protect and maintain the safety of visitors, prison personnel, and prisoners.
- B. In cases of fire, the Assistant Captain will call for a radio check for accountability of all personnel not in the immediate area of the fire. The Assistant Captain will help set Guards to direct prisoners in danger to a safe area where they can be secured, they will instruct escort guards as to where they are to take visitors, and then will coordinate with the Captain to begin fire fighting and damage control procedures
- C. In cases of minor disturbances or attempted escape, the Assistant Captain will post himself at the Main Cell Entry Gate after assembling the secondary Quick Response Force. The Assistant Captain is to direct the secondary team to the location of the primary team if needed, as well as, any other additional security personnel needed.
- D. In case of major disturbance or riot refer to Appendix B.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- E. Following a crisis or disturbance the Assistant Captain will then help compile any needed reports for the Captain and the Warden to review.

Section K:

In- Processing Team

1. Duties and Responsibilities

- A. The In- Processing Team will receive the prisoners from the Iraqi Police, Prison transfer Escorts, or Coalition Forces.
- B. The Assistant Captain will take the prisoner portfolios to the Warden for review and then give to the In-Processing Team.
- C. Escort Guards, made up of a six man detail from the general guard force will bring prisoners from the prisoner receiving area (in the visitor's area) into a holding cell in the in processing area.
- D. As prisoners are brought in, name and information of each prisoner will be verified.
- E. Guards assigned to the in processing area by the Captain (made up of a five man team) will take the prisoner from the holding cell to a search cell.
 - a. The Team assigned will not come from the QRF Teams.
 - b. One guard will control access into the holding cell.
 - c. One Guard will escort prisoners from the holding cell into the search area (cell) and escort the prisoner through the in processing stations
 - d. One guard will control access to the search cell.
 - e. One Guard will be assigned to control access into the In-Processing Area.
 - f. The Last Guard will escort the prisoner into the assigned segregation cell
- F. The prisoner will be strip searched and the prisoner's property will be turned over to the property recorder
- G. The Property Recorder will inventory all the prisoners' belongings he entered the prison with and will take and number the property according to the policies set by the Warden. To include an inventory sheet of the property being stored the prisoner's number and signature of the prisoner and the property recorder.
- H. Any contraband will be impounded and any items authorized for the prisoner to keep, I.E. shoes some religious items etc., will be returned to the prisoner.
- I. After the prisoner has had the property recorded, the prisoner will proceed to the Medical examiner.
- J. The Medical Examiner will conduct a preliminary physical He will also record any distinguishing marks and record any medical needs or

310th Military Police BN

AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

concerns found in the examination. Information recorded will include name, date of birth, age, and a small listing of medical history.

- K. As the prisoners are being processed by the Social Worker the Assistant Captain will add the prisoners to the total prison count. This ensures new prisoners are accounted for immediately upon being processed.
- L. The Captains primary job is to monitor the process to ensure a smooth transition.
- M. Prisoner will receive his cell property to include mattress, plate, cup, jumpsuit, footlocker, and a listing of the rules of the prison.
- N. Prisoner will then be assigned a cell block, a specific cell number and a bed number. Then the prisoner will be escorted to the segregation cell.
- O. Two Copies of a data card should be made. The cards should have name, reason for arrest, term of sentence, age, DOB, next of kin, home address, cell block, cell number, and bed number. If possible a picture of the prisoner should be affixed to each data card.
- P. One card will be used during random cell searches, verifying any prisoner count discrepancies, or as easy identification of a prisoner needed from a cell.
- Q. The second card should be stored in the Captains files.
- R. The main portfolio will be maintained by the Warden or the Social Worker.

2. Out Processing and Transfers

- A. The processing team will be notified of all out processing and transfers from the prison. This is to allow the team to gather necessary paperwork and property of the prisoners being released or transferred.
- B. The day of out processing and/or transfer the paperwork will be turned over to the Warden for signature and property returned to the prisoner. Property will be secured by the Guard not the prisoner for transfers to other facilities.
- C. Escort Guards will receive transfer paperwork from the Warden or Captain. Prisoners being released will receive their property and sign for their release form then be escorted out of the prison facility. The Warden will process the paperwork according to the regulations of the Ministry of Justice.

3. Emergency Procedures

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- A. In case of emergency the Captain is responsible for the safety of the In-Processing Team.
- B. In cases of minor disturbances or attempted escape, or any other disturbances the Guards assigned to the in Processing area will secure all prisoners in the holding cell. Make a full accountability of all prisoners brought in for in processing.
- C. In case of major disturbance or riot refer to Appendix B.
- D. The Captain will direct the evacuation of the In -Processing Team and any other personnel not needed for security to a safe location. Then will resume the in processing activities once the disturbance is put down.
- E. In case of fire, The Captain will conduct the evacuation and safety precautions as outlined in the fire safety guideline.

Section L:

Quick Response Force

1 Duties and Responsibilities

- A. The Quick Response Force will be divided into 2 teams, Alpha and a Bravo team There will be 5 personnel per team
 - a. The first team or Alpha team will be in a down position, located in a designated area, waiting to be called for a disturbance. This team will be the primary team to enter a disturbance area This team will have the riot batons and shield.
 - b. The second team or Bravo Team will be divided into two groups The first group will be a 3 man detail with AK-47 inside the Main Gate The second group will be 2 men roving the inside of the interior security wall. These men will have riot batons
 - c. Bravo team will turn in the AK-47's and receive riot batons and a shield from the arms room in the event of a disturbance.
- B. The 2 teams will be rotated from the down team to roving and vice versa in regular intervals or shifts.
- C. The Guard assigned as the QRF leader (number 5 man) will be designated by the Captains and/or Warden.
 - a. QRF leader will designate the Shield Men for both Alpha and Bravo teams
 - b. Shield Men will have a short baton All other members of the QRF team will carry handcuffs and the full length riot baton.
 - c. The QRF leader will designate specific members of Alpha and Bravo teams as Cuff Men, and Security Men.
 - d. The order the team will line up for Alpha team will be as follows.
 - i. Number 1 man is the Shield Man

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- ii. Number 2 man is a Riot baton man that will support and protect the number 1 man
- iii. Number 3 man is a handcuff man with a riot baton.
- iv. Number 4 man is security for the number 1, number 2, number 3, and number 5 man. He is the primary security man for the Alpha team
- v. Number 5 man is the QRF leader.
- vi. Number 4 and 5 man will carry riot batons
- e. Once the primary targets are subdued; the number 1 man will become security for the team to allow the number 2 and number 3 men the ability to complete their job

- f. The order the team will line up for Bravo team will be as follows
 - vii. Number 6 man is the Shield Man
 - viii. Number 7 man is a Riot baton man that will support and protect the number 6 man.
 - ix. Number 8 man is a handcuff man with a riot baton.
 - x. Number 9 man is security for the number 6, number 7, and number 8 man.
 - xi. Number 10 man is security for the number 6, number 7, number 8, and number 9 men.
 - xii. Number 9 and 10 men will carry the riot batons.
- g. Once the primary targets are subdued the number 6 man will become a security man and allow the number 7 and number 8 men the ability to complete their jobs.
- h. Upon the QRF team leaving the cell, number 1 and number 6 will be the last to back out of the cell.
- D. The QRF leader (number 5 man) will be responsible for the accountability of all members of the QRF Team. The QRF leader will be the liaison between the Captain and the rest of the team during times of disturbance.
 - a. While the Captain and the QRF leader are communicating, Alpha and Bravo teams will stand in silence and await instruction.
- E. Upon hearing the alarm alerting the QRF the Alpha team will respond immediately to the rally point designated for the QRF. Bravo team will immediately exchange their equipment and report to the rally point
- F. The Captain will take the QRF to the area of the disturbance. The Captain will exhaust all Inter Personnel Communication Skills to end the disturbance.
 - a. If this fails and all measures are exhausted, the QRF will be sent into the cell area and will put down the disturbance in accordance with the prison policies and guidelines.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- G. Once the Captain releases the QRF teams into the cell area. The QRF leader will take control of both Alpha and Bravo Teams. The Captain will assume a monitoring role and observe the teams to ensure policies are being followed.
- H. Once the disturbance is put down. The QRF will exit the Cells in a specific pattern. The exit pattern will be as follows
 - a. The Handcuff and Riot Baton men (number 2&7 and number 3&8) will be the first to exit the cell with the prisoners.
 - b. Once all the subdued prisoners are removed from the cells. The Security Men (number 4 and number 9 men) will exit the cells.
 - c. Next, will be the rest of the Security Men and the QRF leader (number 5 and number 10)
 - d. Last will be the Shield Men (number 1 and number 6).
- I. As the prisoners are removed from the cells; the prisoners will be given to the guards outside the cells. The Guards will escort the prisoners to safe location. The Guards will then conduct thorough searches and/or strip searches.

- J. Control of the prisoners and the QRF team will be returned to the Captain upon leaving the cell area.

2 Shield Men

- A. The Primary responsibility of the Shield Men is to clear the entrance into the cell area. This is to ensure the rest of the QRF teams can enter into the cell area free from obstruction.
- B. The Shield Men will be the number 1 and number 6 men in the line up of the QRF team
- C. The Shield men will then target the point of greatest disturbance and clear or subdue the primary person or persons causing the disturbance.
- D. Shield men should take in account the priority of people to subdue.
 - a. The highest priority prisoner to subdue is anyone causing bodily harm to another prisoner, guard, or any other personnel in threat of bodily harm.
 - b. The next level of priority is anyone doing bodily harm to themselves
 - c. The final level of priority is anyone verbally inciting the other prisoners into a riot or other type of disturbances

3 Riot Baton Men

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- A. The primary job for the Riot Baton Men is to protect the Shield Men (number 1 and number 6 man)
- B. Once the primary target is subdued, the Riot Baton man will help the Handcuff man (number 3 and number 8 men) cuff and escort the prisoner or prisoners out of the cell area to be searched
- C. The Riot Baton man will be the number 2 and number 7 men in the line up of the QRF team.

4. Handcuff Men

- A. These members of the QRF teams will be assigned prior to entering the cell areas
- B. All members of the QRF teams will carry handcuffs. However, the members assigned as the handcuff team will use the cuffs from other members in the teams to subdue all prisoners in the cells involved in the disturbances.
 - a. The QRF team leader will have additional sets of cuffs if needed. This is to ensure there are enough cuffs on hand to properly subdue any number of prisoners that may be involved
- C. The Handcuff Men will escort the subdued prisoner or prisoners out of the cell with the help of the Riot Baton Men (number 2 and number 7 men).
- D. The handcuff man will be the number 3 and number 8 men in the line up of the QRF team

5 Security Men

- A. The primary job of this member of the QRF teams is to protect all the other members of the QRF teams
- B. The Security Men will form a half circle in front of the QRF team once they have entered the cell. This is to allow the Handcuff Men, The Riot Baton Men, and The Shield Men time to complete their jobs.
- C. The Shield men will become Security Men after the primary prisoners are subdued.
- D. Security Men will be the number 4, number 9, and number 10 men in the QRF team line up

6 Secondary Duties and Responsibilities

- A. After the QRF Teams have exited the cell areas; the Captain has taken full control of the prisoners, Guards, And the QRF teams. The QRF team will remain as a security team for searches of the prisoners, and the cell area checks and searches
- B. The QRF Team Leader will begin to compile information for the reports to be given to the Captain. The report will consist of information dealing with the circumstances that occurred in the cell during the disturbance

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

and how it was put down. The report will also consist of any injuries sustained by QRF Team members and any other pertinent information needed by the Captain.

7 Finalizing Disturbances in Cell Areas

- A. While QRF Teams provide security the Captain, and five additional personnel needed by the Captain will conduct prisoner and cell searches on remaining prisoners left inside the cell area the disturbance originated from
 - a. Outside the cell there will be 2 guards.
 - i. One Guard will provide security on prisoners brought out of the cell.
 - ii. The second Guard will take the prisoner from the search Guard and position the prisoner in the designated holding area. The Guard will place the prisoner in the kneeling or sitting position
 - b. There will be one Guard position on the cell gate to control access in and out of the cell.
 - c. One guard will be assigned to strip search the remaining prisoners in the cell the disturbance originated from.
 - d. The last guard will provide overall security and hand the search Guard the prisoners for searching.
- B. Once all prisoners have been strip searched and placed in the holding area Cell searches will be conducted.
 - a. The two Guards outside will now provide the security on the prisoners in the holding area.
 - b. The Guard assigned to the Access control of the cell will now assist in the documentation of the thorough search of the cell the disturbance originated from
 - c. The Two Guards assigned inside the cell will conduct the thorough search of the cell the disturbance originated in.
 - i. Searches will cover all areas inside the cell to include the following
 - ii. Any window ledges and framing.
 - iii. All mattresses and linens will be searched.
 - iv. All bed frames will be searched for tampering or destruction that may result in the production of a weapon.
 - v. Any electrical outlets will be checked for tampering to include the ceiling fans and lights.
 - vi. The General condition of the walls will also be checked for destruction or tampering which may result in attempted escapes

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- C. Once the general searches are complete the Guards will escort one prisoner at a time in and out of the cell to have the foot locker assigned to that prisoner searched.
 - a. One of the Guards from outside will escort the prisoner to the cell gate.
 - b. The Gate Guard inside will take the prisoner into the cell and hand him over to the Guard assigned to security inside the cell.
 - c. The Guard who was originally assigned to do the searches of the prisoner will search the foot locker with the prisoner present. Once the search of the prisoner's personal affects is completed the prisoner will be escorted back to the gate and handed back to the Guard outside
 - d. The Guard outside will escort the prisoner back to the holding area and the next prisoner will be taken to the gate.
 - e. This process will be repeated until all the prisoner's personal affects are searched.
- D. Once all the searches of the prisoners and the cells the disturbance originated from is complete The prisoners will be returned to their cell one at a time until all the prisoners are returned into the cell.
- E The Captain at that time will compile all the information of the disturbance from the QRF leader and the search team, as well as, the statements taken from the prisoners to be put in a report that will be filed and reviewed by the Warden.
- F. In case of major disturbance or riot refer to Appendix B

Section M:

Medical Team

1. Duties and Responsibilities

- A. The Doctor or another qualified member of the medical team will be available at the prison at all times
- B. The Doctor will be responsible for the medical treatment of all prisoners and the Prison Facility Personnel
 - a. The Doctor will screen Guards when any medical situation, illness or injury, may occur before sending a guard or any other personnel leave their post and go to the hospital.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- b. The Doctor will also screen all prisoners, illness or injury, before allowing the prisoner to go to the hospital.
- C. The Doctor will perform a medical exam on all prisoners as they are in-processed into the prison facility.
 - a. The Doctor will record any known medical issues.
 - b. The Doctor will also record any distinguishing marks, such as scars, tattoos, birthmarks, etc.
 - c. The Doctor will record any conditions or concern during the preliminary physical done during in-processing
- D. The Doctor will address any medical conditions through specialists that are present at the prison facility or at the hospital. This will be determined by the critical nature of the condition.
- E. The Doctor will ensure that a specialist is present daily. The specialists may be a Psychologist, Dentist, or any other medical specialty that may be required by the prison.
- F. If a specialist is not present, the Doctor will draft a memorandum or report for the Warden and the Supervisor of the specialists. This report is to make aware the lack of support for the prison personnel, prisoners, and the Doctor. The Supervisor should be given the courtesy to correct the situation.
- G. The Doctor will be responsible for inspecting the prison facility.
 - a. The Doctor will inspect the prisoner cells and in-processing areas for cleanliness. This is to ensure the prison is as sanitary as possible to avoid any disease or infestation
 - b. The Doctor will inspect the grounds of the prison to protect against standing water, sanitation or sewer leaks, or any other health related problems that occur with the facility.
 - i. The standing water and sewage may breed insects that can carry disease, and/or other contagious parasites.
 - c. The Doctor will inspect the kitchen area.
 - i. The kitchen area must remain as clean as possible to avoid dysentery problems.
 - ii. The doctor must also inspect to ensure the food is not expired or spoiled.
- H. The Doctor will keep a log of all medical supplies on hand.
- I. The doctor will also, Keep track of who the medications or medical supplies were used on and the reasons for the use.
- J. The Doctor or a member of his qualified staff and/or assistant must make a report or memorandum for supplies to ensure the proper supplies are kept on hand. The lack of medical supplies for a given situation will be the fault of the Doctor and may result in disciplinary action by the Warden.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- K. The Doctor will also make a report of any injuries incurred by Guards or prisoners during a disturbance. This report will be given to the Captain on duty.
- L. All Medical Supplies will remain secured by lock and key until needed for a given situation.
- M. The Doctor will also ensure all medical supplies are stored properly and will inspect the supplies for expiration dates

2. Emergency Procedures

- A. In case of medical emergency the Doctor will have the sole responsibility for the medical care of all personnel involved, prisoner and Guard alike.
- B. In case of fire, the Doctor will remain at his post until instructed by the Captain and/or Warden to go to the safe area. The Doctor will take an aid bag of first aid supplies with him/her to the safe area in case medical attention is needed there.
- C. The Doctor will attend to the injuries of most severely injured first regardless if it is a prisoner or Guard. The Doctor will be responsible for accessing and prioritizing casualties in the event of fire, minor disturbance, riot, attack, or attempted escape.
- D. The Doctor will be responsible for updating the Warden and Captains as to the situation of the injured.
- E. The Doctor will coordinate to have the necessary transportation of the injured needing hospitalization, or immediate care not available at the prison

Appendix A:

Facility Fire Plan

1. Purpose

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- A A Fire Prevention Program for the facility administrative/ guards and prisoners alike.
- B. A Fire Evacuation and Immediate Action Plan based upon the facts that: 1 the saving of life through immediate evacuation of the building is of primary importance. 2. Custody of prisoners and the saving of facility property are of secondary importance

2. Responsibilities

- A. It is the responsibility of all facility administrative/ guards and all prisoners to be aware of fire hazards, prevent fire, and to immediately report fires and assist, if feasible, in fighting fires until the arrival of fire fighting personnel.
- B The Warden should appoint a Fire Prevention Officer, Captain and/or Assistant Captain, to ensure the compliance with the fire safety directive. 2 Conduct serviceability inspections of all facility fire prevention and fire fighting equipment at least once a month. 3. Conduct periodic fire drills to ensure the plan is fully understood.

3 Fire Prevention Program

- A Will be actively observed and conducted by all facility personnel and prisoners alike.
- B Fire Routes will be free of any obstructions at all times 2. Tampering with electrical circuits by unauthorized personnel is prohibited. With the exception of replacing fuses, light bulbs. All electrical deficiencies will be reported to the Captain and/or Warden. 3. Rubbish and trash will not be allowed to accumulate in any part of the facility 4. Paint thinners, solvents, diesel, or gasoline or any other flammable combustible materials will not be stored in the main facility building
- C. Combustible materials will be stored in designated areas away from main facility buildings
- D Cooking equipment will be free of obstructions, well ventilated and if feasible be disconnected when not in use.
- E. Ammunition and explosives will not be stored in the main prison facility building. It will only be stored in the facility arms room
- F Smoking will not be permitted around or in the arms room for any reason

- G Smoking should be prohibited in the following areas 1 The main supply area, arms room, main kitchen and food storage area, or within 30 meters of any flammable material storage area.
- H. Guards will not be permitted to smoke in bed; signs to enforce this policy should be posted around facility

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- I Smoking should be prohibited where ash trays or noncombustible containers are not available, and posts signs designating all no smoking area
- J Ash trays will not be emptied into waste containers or receptacles containing flammable materials
- K. Captains and/or Assistant Captains will inspect perspective area prior to the end of shifts.
- L. In addition to the plan above the following should be observed
- M. A suitable amount of ash trays should be provided throughout the facility in smoking areas, and out side non smoking areas
- N. If Prisoners are authorized to smoke, they should be allowed to smoke in a designated area during the times of recreation or detail as authorized by the Captain of the shift.
- O. All facility personnel and prisoners should be familiar with the location and utilization of fire prevention equipment, fire alarms and fire fighting apparatus
- P Trustees may be assigned to help fight fires in the cell block areas. This is based on the policies set forth by the Warden.
- Q. Emergency fire routes will be posted throughout the facility and prisoner bulletin boards.

4. Fire Evacuation and Immediate Action Plan

- A. In The event of a fire the following priorities of action are established
 - a Saving human life through the immediate evacuation of all personnel
 - b The custody of prisoners
 - c. Saving facility property and confinement records, if feasible
 - d Extinguishing or controlling the fire, if feasible, until the arrival of fire fighting personnel.
- B. The following actions in the sequence listed will immediately be taken upon the discovery of a fire
 - a Sound the fire alarm and notify all posts by radio.
 - b. Guards should assume their positions for directing personnel through the cell gates and visitor area gates
 - c Guards should post themselves along the emergency fire escape route.
 - d Guards will help maintain a calm and orderly evacuation.
- C. The primary facility prisoner safe area will be in designated portion of the visitor's area. As a possible secondary area the vehicle storage area may be utilized.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- D. All available guards will conduct a quick follow up check to ensure all prisoners and personnel are out of the danger area and in the safe areas. They will then report the findings to the Assistant Captain and /or Captains.
- E. When all personnel are accounted for the Captain will divide the prisoners by their cell blocks and immediately conduct a head count, and preliminary search. The results will be reported to the Warden.
- F. As soon as possible after all prisoners are accounted for the Captain will notify or appoint a Guard to notify the following personnel. The personnel will be the Iraqi Police, and Fire Department, or any medical facilities that may be needed.
- G. When the fire is extinguished and prisoners are secured back in the cells. The Captain, Assistant Captain will complete all the proper reports and submit them to the Warden for review and placed in a packet that may be required for an investigation.

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

Appendix B:

Major Disturbances and Mass Disorders

1. In the event of an attempted group or mass breakout, a riot or other general serious disorder The Guard discovering or receiving notification of such an incident or the Captain will immediately implement the following actions.

- A. The riot alarm will be immediately activated.
- B. Upon Hearing the riot alarm All Guards will immediately close and secure all gates in order to secure prisoners in cell blocks and isolate the area of the disorder.

2. upon hearing the riot alarm or receiving other notification of the disorder. The Captain will immediately.


- A. Activate the riot alarm; if the alarm has not already been sounded
- B. Ensure that all doors, gates, and exit gates are secure
- C. The Captain will also ensure the prisoners are secure in the area of the disturbance.
- D. Proceed to the area of the disorder and ensure that, if possible, the affected area has been isolated
- E. Assume command and supervision of subduing/controlling (using the QRF) the disorder and all prisoners until the arrival of the Warden, and any other personnel contacted for the incident
- F. Remove all involved prisoners from the affected area
- G. Attempt to identify, isolate, and remove the ring leaders of the disturbance. If this can not be accomplished the Captain will attempt to reason with the prisoners involved, and inform them that the authorities will ensure that order will be restored
- H. The Captain will also inform the prisoners that the means to forcefully restore order are available, and will be used if necessary
- I. **NO ONE** will bargain with or make concessions to prisoners in a state of revolt or riot.
- J. Captain will ensure that additional personnel will be disbursed to affected area to strengthen the perimeter security

3 Upon the arrival of the Warden the following measures will be taken:


- A. The Warden will assume command of the situation and direct all control measures
- B. Make an estimate of the situation and make sure the Captain has implemented the actions and procedures proscribed above
- C. If not already accomplished by the Captain attempt to:
 - a. Remove all uninvolved prisoners from the affected area of the building.
 - b. Isolate and identify the ring leaders

310th Military Police BN
AL-Hillah Prison Standard Operating Procedures

- c. Reason it the prisoners involved.
- D. The Warden will inform the prisoners that the authorities will prevail, but the possibility still exists for a peaceful resolution and avoid any forceful measures. If the prisoners promptly agree and readily desist and surrender forceful measures will be avoided
- E. The Warden will not bargain or make concessions with the prisoners in the state of revolt and/or riot
- F. The Warden Will brief and post additional security and corrections Guards who arrive at the prison to provide support
- G. If reasoning and warnings have failed to subdue or quell the disorder the Warden will issue a direct order to the prisoners. The order will consist of the demand to the end of the disturbance. This order will not be given until it can be enforced by application of such measures of force as the situation might require.
- H. If the direct order does not attain the restoration of order and the use of force becomes necessary, the degree of force to be applied will in accordance with the list of priorities found below and is strictly limited to that force that is deemed reasonable and necessary, under all intended circumstances.
 - a. The show of force will be the first step.
 - b. Use of physical force other than with weapons or firing into the crowd.
 - c. Use of disabling fire. This fire is to be used on selected targets, by selected marksman
 - d. Use of full firepower NOTE. when the use of full firepower the weapons will be used to disable rather than to kill.
- I. The incident that involves the taking of a hostage and/or hostages, or the demand for concessions does not preclude the application of force
- J. Such incidences will immediately be reported to the Captain and /or Warden. If the situation permits prior to the application of force.
- K. The investigation to determine the cause and/or causes of the disorder. The identity of the ring leader and the recommendations to prevent the recurrence will be conduct/ completed as the Warden might direct.



800th MP BDE
 Dec 03 - Jan 04
 C2 of 4 BNS



800th MP BDE
 Peak Detainee Population 11,699
 as of 1 Dec 03

Mission
 Complete/Redeployed


724th MP BN
115th MP BN
400th MP BN
324th MP BN

Secret

Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility)

Detainee Population 5953 as of 1 Dec 03


C2 30 Jul - 18 Nov 03 320 th MP BN	C2 19 Nov 03 - 30 Jan 04 (FOB Abu Ghraib) 205 th MI BDE TACON of all subordinate units in the FOB	C2 31 Jan 04 - Present (FOB Abu Ghraib) 504 th MI BDE TACON of all subordinate units in the FOB
---	---	---



Secret

Camp Bucca Internment Facility

Detainee Population 1500 as of 1 Dec 03




<p>C2 Jun - Nov 03 530th MP BN</p>	<p>C2 Jun - Dec 03 724th MP BN</p>	<p>C2 Dec 03 - Present 310th MP BN</p>
---	---	---

~~Secret~~

High Value Detention Site at Camp Cropper

Detainee Population 101 as of 1 Dec 03




C2
Dec 03 - Present
744th MP BN

C2
Jun - Nov 03
115th MP BN

~~Secret~~

Mujahedin - E - Khalq (MEK) Temporary Internment Facility

Detainee Population 43 as of 1 Dec 03




C2
Dec 03 - Present
530th MP BN

C2
Jun - Nov 03
324th MP BN

~~Secret~~

Joint Publication 0-2



**Unified Action
Armed Forces
(UNAAF)**



10 July 2001



The enduring theme, "joint warfare is team warfare," is an attitude based on the foundation of joint doctrine that is universally understood and practiced. This team approach ensures the most effective employment of US forces for joint warfare. If we are to continue to improve the structure of US forces for joint warfare, everyone must be involved. Capstone publications *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* and this publication, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, provide the foundation for all the joint publications.

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) provides the basic doctrine and policy governing the unified direction of forces and discusses the functions of the Department of Defense and its major components. This revision represents the evolution in US warfighting guidance since the last edition, serves as the policy document for all command relationships and other authorities directed by law, and clarifies these relationships. This publication also sets forth the concepts, relationships, and processes necessary for unified action of joint, interagency, and multinational operations and specifies fundamental principles and concepts for joint operations.

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team. Unified action resulting from clear command relationships and unity of effort is crucial to making this possible. Commanders must ensure the widest distribution and application of this and other supporting joint publications in order to enable success in joint force employment.



HENRY H. SHELTON
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

1. Scope

The principles set forth in this publication will be applied to accomplish congressional intent expressed in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, in the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, and in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433). This publication provides basic doctrine and policy for unified action and, together with Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, serves as the capstone for all US joint doctrine. As such, this publication specifies the authorized command relationships and authority that military commanders can use, provides policy for the exercise of that military authority, provides doctrine and principles for command and control, prescribes guidance for organizing joint forces, and describes policy for selected joint activities.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the unified and joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in unified actions and joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine for unified actions and joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this

publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b The doctrine and guidance in this publication is authoritative, as such, it will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US laws, regulations, and doctrine.

Preface

Intentionally Blank

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	vii
CHAPTER I	
DOCTRINE AND POLICY GOVERNING UNIFIED DIRECTION OF FORCES	
• Constitutional Foundation	I-1
• National Strategic Direction	I-2
• Unity of Effort	I-3
• Unified Action	I-5
• Objectives	I-6
• Roles, Missions, and Functions	I-6
• Chain of Command	I-6
• The Combatant Commands	I-8
• The Military Departments, Services, and Forces	I-9
• Relationship Between Combatant Commands and Military Departments, Services, or Forces	I-9
• Interagency Coordination	I-10
CHAPTER II	
FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ITS MAJOR COMPONENTS	
SECTION A THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	II-1
• General	II-1
• Organizations in the Department of Defense	II-1
• Functions of the Department of Defense	II-1
• Functions and Responsibilities Within the Department of Defense	II-1
• Executive Agents	II-2
SECTION B THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	II-2
• Composition and Functions	II-2
• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	II-5
• Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	II-11
• The Joint Staff	II-11
SECTION C COMMON FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND SERVICES	II-12
• Common Functions of the Military Departments	II-12
• Common Functions of the Military Services and the United States Special Operations Command	II-12

Table of Contents

SECTION D FUNCTIONS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS	II-12
• General	II-12
• Assigned Responsibilities	II-14
• Additional Authority	II-16
• Authority Over Subordinate Commanders	II-16
CHAPTER III	
DOCTRINE AND POLICY FOR JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL	
SECTION A COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS	III-1
• General Principles	III-1
• Command Relationships and Assignment and Transfer of Forces	III-2
• Combatant Command (Command Authority)	III-3
• Operational Control	III-7
• Tactical Control	III-8
• Support	III-9
• Support Relationships Between Combatant Commanders	III-10
• Relationships Between Component Commanders	III-11
• Other Authorities	III-11
• Command of National Guard and Reserve Forces	III-12
SECTION B JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL	III-13
• Background	III-13
• Command and Control Theory	III-13
• Organization for Joint Command and Control	III-17
• Joint Command and Control Support	III-18
• National Military Command System	III-18
• Nuclear Command and Control System	III-18
• Continuity of Operations	III-19
CHAPTER IV	
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS	
• General	IV-1
• Multinational Unity of Effort	IV-1
• Multinational Organizational Structure	IV-2
• Command and Control of US Forces in Multinational Operations	IV-4
CHAPTER V	
DOCTRINE AND POLICY FOR JOINT COMMANDS	
SECTION A ESTABLISHING UNIFIED, SPECIFIED, AND SUBORDINATE JOINT COMMANDS	V-1
• General	V-1
• Unified Command	V-5
• Specified Command	V-8
• Subordinate Unified Command	V-9
• Joint Task Force	V-10

Table of Contents

SECTION B THE COMMANDER, STAFF, AND COMPONENTS OF A JOINT FORCE	V-11
• Commander Responsibilities	V-11
• Staff of a Joint Force	V-12
• Joint Command and Staff Process	V-16
• Service Component Commands	V-16
• Functional Component Commands	V-18
 SECTION C DISCIPLINE AND PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION	 V-20
• Responsibility	V-20
• Uniform Code of Military Justice	V-20
• Rules and Regulations	V-20
• Jurisdiction	V-21
• Trial and Punishment	V-21
• Morale and Welfare	V-21
• Awards and Decorations	V-22
• Efficiency and Fitness Reports	V-22
 APPENDIX	
A References	A-1
B Administrative Instructions	B-1
 GLOSSARY	
Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms	GL-1
Part II Terms and Definitions	GL-4
 FIGURE	
I-1 Unity of Effort	I-4
I-2 Chain of Command and Control	I-7
II-1 Responsibilities of an Executive Agent	II-3
II-2 Common Functions of the Military Departments	II-13
II-3 General Functions of a Combatant Commander	II-14
III-1 Command Relationships	III-2
III-2 Assignment and Transfer of Forces to a Joint Force	III-3
III-3 Categories of Support	III-10
IV-1 Principles of Multinational Unity of Effort	IV-2
IV-2 Notional Multinational Command Structure	IV-3
V-1 Possible Components in a Joint Force	V-3
V-2 Unified Command Organizational Options	V-5
V-3 Specified Command Organizational Options (When Designated)	V-8
V-4 Subordinate Unified Command Organizational Options	V-9
V-5 Joint Task Force Organizational Options	V-10

Table of Contents

Intentionally Blank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Provides Doctrine and Policy Governing Unified Direction of Forces**
- **Covers the Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components**
- **Discusses Doctrine and Policy for Joint Command and Control**
- **Covers Multinational Operations**
- **Provides Doctrine and Policy for Establishing Joint Commands**

Unity of Effort

Unity of effort requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and among nations in any alliance or coalition

The President is responsible for national strategic unity of effort

The President of the United States, advised by the National Security Council, is responsible to the American people for national strategic unity of effort

The Secretary of Defense is responsible for national military unity of effort.

The Secretary of Defense is responsible to the President for national military unity of effort for creating, supporting, and employing military capabilities

The Chairman transmits missions to combatant commanders

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions under the authority, direction, and control of the National Command Authorities (NCA) and transmits communications between the NCA and combatant commanders and oversees activities of combatant commanders as directed by the Secretary of Defense

Combatant commanders accomplish the mission

Combatant commanders exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces and are directly responsible to the NCA for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions

Executive Summary

In a foreign country, the **US Ambassador** is responsible to the President for directing, coordinating, and supervising all US Government (USG) elements in the host nation except those under the command of a combatant commander

Unified Action

Unified action describes the broad scope of actions taking place within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force (JTF)

The term "unified action" is a broad generic term referring to the **broad scope of activities** (including the synchronization and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental agencies) **taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces (JTFs) under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands**. Within this general category of operations, subordinate commanders of forces conduct either single-Service or joint operations to support the overall operation. Unified action synchronizes and/or integrates joint, single-Service, special, multinational, and supporting operations with the operations of government agencies, NGOs, and IOs to achieve unity of effort in the operational area. Unified action within the military instrument of national power supports the national strategic unity of effort through close coordination with the other instruments of national power.

Unified action starts with unified direction

Unified direction is normally accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander (JFC), establishing command relationships, assigning and/or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the JFC with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission.

Objectives

Objectives provide focus for military action

In the abstract sense, an objective is the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every military operation should be directed — the military objective. Objectives are essential to achieve unity of effort. In the concrete sense, an objective may be a **physical object** of the action taken (e.g., a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan, or the destruction of an enemy force without regard to terrain features). This is more accurately termed the "physical objective." Physical objectives must not be confused with military objectives, although occasionally they may overlap. Usually, physical objectives contribute to the attainment of military objectives. Military objectives must contribute to the achievement of national objectives.

Roles, Missions, and Functions

Roles, missions, and functions provide direction and establish responsibility

Roles are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) were established in law. **Missions** are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. **Functions** are specific responsibilities assigned by the NCA to enable the Services to fulfill their legally established roles.

Chain of Command

The chain of command runs from the National Command Authorities (NCA) to the combatant commanders for missions and forces assigned to their commands and from the NCA to the Secretaries of the Military Departments for forces not assigned to a combatant commander

The NCA exercise authority and control of the Armed Forces through **two distinct branches of the chain of command**. One branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, directly to the commanders of combatant commands for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The other branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to combatant commands, runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Military Departments, organized separately, operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority through their respective Service Chiefs over their forces not assigned to the combatant commanders.

Interagency Coordination

Military operations must be synchronized and/or integrated with those of other agencies of the US Government, as well as with foreign forces, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and regional organizations

Interagency coordination **forges the vital link** between the military and the economic, diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG as well as NGOs and IOs. Successful interagency coordination and planning enables these agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation — to achieve unity of effort.

Across the range of military operations, a broad variety of agencies — many with indispensable practical competencies and major legal responsibilities — interact with the Armed Forces of the United States.

Obtaining coordinated and integrated effort in an interagency operation should not be equated to the command and control (C2) of a military operation. Various agencies' different and sometimes conflicting goals, policies, procedures, and decisionmaking techniques make unity of effort a challenge.

Functions of the Department of Defense

Unified action in carrying out the military component of National Security Strategy is accomplished through an organized defense framework. As prescribed by higher authority, the Department of Defense will maintain and employ Armed Forces to **support and defend** the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, **ensure**, by timely and effective military action, **the security of the United States**, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest, and **uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States**

Command Relationships and Assignment and Transfer of Forces

Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort **Command** Although commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the attainment of these missions

Command and Staff. JFCs are provided staffs to assist them in the decisionmaking and execution process **The staff is an extension of the commander**, its sole function is command support, and its only authority is that which is delegated to it by the commander

Levels of Authority The authority vested in a commander must be commensurate with the responsibility assigned **Levels of authority** include the four types of command relationships: COCOM, operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and support. The other authorities are coordinating authority, administrative control (ADCON), and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH)

A force assigned or attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense. **All forces** (except as noted in title 10, US Code (USC), section 162) are **assigned to combatant commands** by the Secretary of Defense's "Forces for Unified Commands" memorandum. A force assigned or attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President. The command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) will be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and JTFs may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise over those forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense

Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands.

When the transfer of forces to a joint force will be **permanent** (or for an unknown but long period of time) **forces should be reassigned.**

When transfer of forces to a joint force is **temporary**, the forces are **attached** to the gaining command and JFCs will exercise OPCON or TACON, as appropriate, over the attached forces

Combatant Command (Command Authority)

Combatant command (command authority) is vested only in commanders of combatant commands or as directed by the President and is nontransferable.

COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by title 10, USC, section 164, or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), and cannot be delegated or transferred. **COCOM** is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or, in the case of USSOCOM, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command

Operational Control

Operational control is command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and may be delegated within the command

OPCON is inherent in **COCOM** and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. **OPCON** includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command

Tactical Control

Tactical control is the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks

TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or military capability made available for tasking that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. **TACON** is inherent in **OPCON** and may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command

Support

The four categories of support are general, mutual, direct, and close.

Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Several categories of support have been defined for use within a combatant command as appropriate to better characterize the support that should be given. Support relationships may be categorized as general, mutual, direct, and close.

Administrative Control

Administrative control is authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support.

ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. This is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for administration and support.

Coordinating Authority

Coordinating authority is used for coordinating special functions and activities.

Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement.

Direct Liaison Authorized

Direct liaison authorized is the authority to directly consult or coordinate an action.

DIRLAUTH is that authority granted by a commander (at any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.

Training and Readiness Oversight

Training and readiness oversight (TRO) is the authority that combatant commanders may exercise over Reserve

Component (RC) forces when not on active duty and when on active duty for training. Combatant commanders will normally exercise TRO over assigned RC forces through their Service component commanders.

Joint Command and Control

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces

Command (the lawful authority of a commander) and **control** (the regulation of forces and functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander's intent) is the most important function undertaken by a JFC. C2 is the means by which a JFC synchronizes and/or integrates joint force activities in order to achieve unity of command and unity of effort. C2 ties together all the operational functions and tasks and applies to all levels of war and echelons of command across the range of military operations.

Unity of effort is strengthened through adherence to the following C2 tenets:

Unity of command requires clearly defined authorities, roles, and relationships

C2 of joint operations begins by establishing **unity of command** through the designation of a JFC with the requisite authority to accomplish assigned tasks using an uncomplicated chain of command. It is essential for the JFC to ensure that subordinate commanders, staff principals, and leaders of C2 nodes understand their authorities, their role in decisionmaking and controlling, and their relationships with others.

Information management

Control of information is a prerequisite to maintaining C2 of a joint operation. Identifying, requesting, receiving, tracking, and disseminating the needed information ensures that decision makers make informed, timely decisions.

Implicit communication

Because JFCs seek to minimize restrictive control measures and detailed instructions, they must find efficient and effective ways to create cooperation and compliance. The JFC does this by fostering implicit communication and understanding with all subordinates. Two joint C2 concepts that nurture implicit communications are **commander's intent** and **mission-type orders**.

Timely decisionmaking

The JFC can get inside the adversary's decision and execution cycle by **making more timely decisions**. Doing so generates adversary confusion and disorder and slows opponent decisionmaking. The commander who can gather information and make decisions faster and better will generate a quicker tempo of operations and gain a decided military advantage.

Executive Summary

<i>Robust integration, synchronization, and coordination mechanisms</i>	Integration, synchronization, and coordination methods and tools encourage synergistic interaction among joint force components
<i>Battle rhythm discipline</i>	Every joint force command headquarters has a rhythm regulated by the flow of information and the decision cycle The keys to capturing and maintaining control over the battle rhythm are simplicity and a sensitivity to the components' battle rhythms.
<i>Responsive, interoperable support systems</i>	Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), space-based, and command, control, communications, and computer support systems must be responsive in real time to provide the JFC with accurate, timely, relevant, and adequate information
<i>Situational awareness</i>	The primary objective that the staff seeks to attain for the commander, and for subordinate commanders, is understanding or situational awareness — a prerequisite in order for commanders to anticipate opportunities and challenges
<i>Mutual trust</i>	Trust among the commanders and staffs in a joint force expands the JFC's options and enhances flexibility, agility, and the freedom to take the initiative when conditions warrant Mutual trust results from honest efforts to learn about and understand the capabilities that each member brings to the joint force, demonstrated competence, and planning and training together

Multinational Operations

<i>The United States often has common or mutually-compatible security interests and participates in operations with other nations</i>	Where commonality or compatibility of interests exists, nations may enter into political, economic, informational, and military partnerships These partnerships occur in both regional and worldwide patterns as nations seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats, and conduct foreign humanitarian assistance and peace operations Cultural, psychological, economic, technological, informational, and political factors as well as transnational dangers, all impact on multinational operations
---	--

Multinational Unity of Effort

Attaining unity of effort through unity of command for a multinational operation may not be politically feasible, but it should be a goal.

Some **principles** must be attained to ensure unity of effort among allied or coalition forces. First, there must be **common understanding** among all national forces of the **overall aim** of the multinational force (MNF) and the **concept for its attainment**. **Coordinated policy**, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders' authority over national logistics (including infrastructure) and ISR, is **required**. Finally, commanders and their representatives must establish and maintain **trust and confidence** among the MNFs. **Plain and objective communication**, together with common courtesy, is essential.

Command and Control of US Forces in Multinational Operations

The chain of command from the President to the lowest US commander in the field remains inviolate.

The President retains command authority over US forces. This includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and employment planning along with organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and protecting military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. **It is sometimes prudent or advantageous** (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of effort) to place **appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander** to achieve specified military objectives (see restrictions in Chapter IV, "Multinational Operations"). In making the determination to place US forces under the OPCON of non-US commanders, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement.

Principles and Policy for Establishing Joint Commands

Joint forces are established at three levels: unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and JTFs.

In accordance with the UCP, combatant commands are established by the President through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JTFs can be established by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing JTF commander.

Basis for Establishing Joint Forces

Joint forces can be established on either a geographic or functional basis

The joint force commander (JFC) is assigned a geographic area by the establishing authority

Geographic Area. Establishing a joint force on a geographic area basis is the most commonly used method to assign responsibility for continuing operations. A JFC assigned a geographic area is considered an area commander. **Only commanders of geographic combatant commands are assigned areas of responsibility. Subordinate JFCs are normally assigned other operational areas.**

The JFC is assigned a functional area for certain types of continuing operations

Functional Area. Sometimes a joint force based solely on military functions without respect to a specific geographic region is more suitable to fix **responsibility for certain types of continuing operations** (e.g., the unified commands for transportation, space, special operations, and strategic operations). The commander of a joint force established on a functional basis is assigned a functional responsibility by the establishing authority.

Organizing Joint Forces

The JFC organizes forces to accomplish the mission

JFCs have the **authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission** based on their concept of operations. The JFC will establish subordinate commands, assign responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate command relationships, and establish coordinating instructions for their component commanders. **Sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution.**

The composition of the JFC's staff will **reflect the composition of the joint force** to ensure that those responsible for employing joint forces have a thorough knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of assigned or attached forces.

All joint forces contain Service components because of administrative and logistic requirements

Administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service component commands. The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, through Service force commanders.

Functional components may be established by JFCs when forces of two or more Services must operate in the same dimension

Functional component commands can be appropriate when **forces from two or more Services must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission.** Functional component commands do not constitute a joint force

Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional component commands with operational responsibilities

Unified Command

Unified and specified commands are established by the President through the Secretary of Defense.

A **unified command** is a command with broad continuing missions under a single commander and composed of forces from two or more Military Departments and which is established by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The unified commander can **adapt** a command structure using any of the following six options: 1) subordinate unified command, 2) JTF, 3) functional component, 4) Service component, 5) single-Service force (normally the combatant commander assigns operations requiring a single-Service force to a Service component), or 6) Specific operational forces that, because of mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the combatant commander. These options do not in any way limit the commanders' authority to organize their forces as they see fit

Specified Command

A **specified command** is a command that has broad continuing missions and that is established by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a **single Military Department**, but it may include units and staff representation from other Services

Subordinate Unified Command

Subordinate unified commands are established by commanders of unified commands when so authorized by the NCA.

When authorized by the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands (also called subunified commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be **established on a geographical area or functional basis.**

Joint Task Force

A JTF can be established by the Secretary of Defense, and/or by commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, or existing JTFs

A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing JTF commander. **A JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis** when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides basic doctrine and guidance for unified action and, together with Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, serves as the capstone for all US joint doctrine. As such, this publication specifies the authorized command relationships and authority that military commanders can use, provides policy for the exercise of that military authority, provides doctrine and principles for C2, prescribes guidance for organizing joint forces, and describes policy for selected joint activities.

integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an overall armed forces general staff.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1966 makes the following statement of policy:

"In enacting this Act it is the intent of Congress, consistent with the congressional declaration of policy in section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401)

(1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department

(2) to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense

(3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the United States Pacific Command and the United States Military Command for the accomplishment of national assignments to those commands;

(4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the United States Pacific Command and the United States Military Command is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of national assignments to their commands;

(5) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to continuing plans;

(6) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;

(7) to improve joint officer and civilian policies; and

(b) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense."

2. National Strategic Direction

a **Context.** National security strategy (NSS) is the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. It encompasses national defense, foreign relations, and economic relations and assistance, and aims, among other objectives, at providing a favorable foreign relations position and a defense posture capable of defeating hostile action.

b **The Military Component of National Security Strategy.** As the national leadership generates national objectives and an NSS to pursue them, the leadership also will devise — or modify — the **military instrument of national power** as a component of NSS. This strategy includes objectives for the development of **broad military capabilities**, their **worldwide posture**, and their **functional and geographic orientation**. In the event of armed conflict, this strategy will include military objectives for the establishment of military conditions essential to support national security objectives and terminate the

Doctrine and Policy Governing Unified Direction of Forces

conflict on terms favorable to US interests. These objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives.

c **National Military Strategy (NMS).**

NMS entails the art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war. NMS is derived from the NSS and **attempts to promote peace and stability, and, when necessary, defeat adversaries that threaten the United States, its interests, or its allies.** In the larger context, defeating an enemy military force is rarely sufficient by itself to ensure a long-term solution to a crisis. Accordingly, the Armed Forces of the United States advance national security by applying military power as directed to help shape the international environment, respond to the full spectrum of crises, and prepare for an uncertain future. NMS and defense policy provide **strategic guidance for the employment of military forces.** The NMS provides advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) (in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders) to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) regarding the recommended strategy for attaining the national security objectives given a fiscally constrained force structure.

d **Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)**

The JSCP provides planning guidance to the combatant commanders and Service Chiefs in order to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. The JSCP serves to integrate the deliberate planning activities of the entire joint planning and execution community with a coherent and focused approach. It provides specific theater planning tasks and objectives, delineates necessary planning assumptions, and apportions resources and forces to the combatant commanders for planning based on

military capabilities. Supplemental instructions are published separately from the JSCP to provide further planning guidance in specified functional areas like intelligence and logistics.

e **Unified Command Plan (UCP).**

The UCP is a document approved by the President that sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders, establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure, delineates the general geographic area of responsibility (AOR) for geographic combatant commanders, and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders.

3. Unity of Effort

Unity of effort, as shown in Figure I-1, **requires coordination among government departments and agencies** within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and among nations in any alliance or coalition. **National unified action** is influenced by the Constitution, federal law, international law, and the national interest. **Responsibilities for strategic coordination** established in law and practice are as follows:

a **The President of the United States**, advised by the NSC, is responsible to the American people for national strategic unity of effort.

b **The Secretary of Defense** is responsible to the President for national military unity of effort for creating, supporting, and employing military capabilities. Unity of effort among the Military Services at the national level is obtained from the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense, by the strategic planning of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by cross-Service efforts by the




Figure I-1 Unity of Effort

Military Departments The Secretary of Defense exercises authority, direction, and control over the Services through the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of their forces assigned to combatant commanders.

c The **National Command Authorities (NCA)**, consisting of the President and the Secretary of Defense or their authorized alternates, exercise authority over the Armed Forces through the combatant commanders

for those forces assigned to the combatant commands and through the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Service Chiefs for those forces not assigned to the combatant commands

d The **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** functions under the authority, direction, and control of the NCA, transmits communications between the NCA and combatant commanders, and oversees activities of combatant commanders as directed by the Secretary of Defense

Doctrine and Policy Governing Unified Direction of Forces

e **Commanders of combatant commands** exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces, and are directly responsible to the NCA for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions

f In a foreign country, the **US Ambassador** is responsible to the President for directing, coordinating, and supervising all US Government (USG) elements in the host nation, except those under the command of a combatant commander. Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for coordinating with US ambassadors in their geographic AOR (as necessary) across the range of military operations, and for negotiating force protection memoranda of agreement with the chiefs of mission in designated countries

4. Unified Action

a The term "unified action" is a broad generic term referring to the **wide scope of activities** (including the synchronization and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within **unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces (JTFs)** under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. Within this general category of operations, **subordinate commanders** of assigned or attached forces conduct either **single-Service or joint operations** to support the overall operation. Unified action synchronizes and/or integrates joint, single-Service, special, multinational, and supporting operations with the operations of government agencies, NGOs and IOs (e.g., United Nations (UN)) to achieve **unity of effort** in the operational area. Unified action within the military instrument of national power **supports the national strategic unity of effort** through close coordination with the other instruments of national power as they

apply within the theater environment and its unity of effort

b **Success often depends on these unified actions.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all combatant commanders are in pivotal positions to ensure that unified actions are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from the NCA in coordination with other authorities (i.e., alliance or coalition leadership). Combatant commanders should ensure that their **unified action synchronizes and/or integrates joint and single-Service operations with the actions of supporting combatant commands, other military forces (multinational operations), and nonmilitary organizations** (Department of Defense [DOD] and other federal government agencies such as the Defense Logistics Agency [DLA] and the Agency for International Development, the UN, and NGOs and IOs)

c **Unified action** of the Armed Forces of the United States **starts with unified direction.** For US military operations, unified direction normally is accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander (JFC), establishing command relationships, assigning and/or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the JFC with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission

- **Joint Force, Joint Force Commander, and Joint Operations.** Complete definitions for these terms are in the glossary. This discussion highlights the differences. "**Joint force**" is a general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single JFC. "**Joint force commander**" is also a general term applied to a combatant

commander, subunified commander, or JTF commander "**Joint operations**" are military actions conducted by joint forces or Service forces with relationships between them (e.g., support, coordinating authority) which, of themselves, do not create joint forces

- **Multinational Operations** An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations is termed a "**multinational**" operation. An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations in a **formal arrangement** is termed an "**allied**" or "**alliance**" operation. Military action in a **temporary or informal arrangement** for common interests is termed a "**coalition**" operation. Though the description of "multinational" always will apply to such forces and commanders, they also can be described as "allied," "combined," "alliance," or "coalition," as appropriate.

5 Objectives

In the abstract sense, an objective is the clearly defined, decisive and attainable goal toward which every military operation should be directed — the military objective. **Objectives provide the focus for military action; they are essential for unity of effort.** In the concrete sense, an objective may be a physical object of the action taken (e.g., a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan, or the destruction of an enemy force without regard to terrain features). This is more accurately termed the "physical objective." Physical objectives must not be confused with military objectives, although occasionally they may overlap. Usually, **physical objectives contribute to the attainment of military objectives.** Military objectives must contribute to the achievement of national objectives.

6. Roles, Missions, and Functions

The terms "roles, missions, and functions" often are used interchangeably, but the distinctions between them are important. "**Roles**" are the broad and enduring **purposes** for which the Services and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) were established in law. "**Missions**" are the **tasks** assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. "**Functions**" are specific **responsibilities** assigned by the NCA to enable the Services to fulfill their legally established roles. Simply stated, the primary function of the Services and USSOCOM is to provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform a role — to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission.

For further information on functions, refer to Chapter II, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components."

7. Chain of Command

The NCA **exercise authority and control** of the Armed Forces through **two distinct branches of the chain of command** (see **Figure I-2**). One branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the commanders of combatant commands for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The other branch used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commands, runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Military Departments, organized separately, operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority through their respective Service Chiefs over their forces not assigned to the combatant commanders. The Service Chiefs, except as




Figure I-2 Chain of Command and Control

Chapter I

otherwise prescribed by law, perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretaries and are directly responsible to their Secretaries

For when the king is on the field, nothing is done without him; he in person gives general orders to the polemarchs, which they convey to the commanders of divisions; these again to the commanders of battalions, the commanders of files, to the commanders of companies, and these to the enemy. In like manner, any more precise instructions are passed down through the army, and quickly reach their destination. For almost the whole Lacedaemonian army are officers who have officers under them, and the responsibility of executing an order devolves upon many.

Thucydides
History of the Peloponnesian Wars, 422 B.C.

a The commanders of combatant commands exercise COCOM of assigned forces and are directly responsible to the NCA for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. Combatant commanders prescribe the chain of command within their combatant commands and designate the appropriate command authority to be exercised by subordinate commanders.

b The Military Departments operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. This branch of the chain of command embraces all military forces within the respective Service not assigned to commanders of combatant commands. This branch is separate and distinct from the branch of the chain of command that exists within a combatant command.

8. The Combatant Commands

a The President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance

of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, establishes combatant (unified or specified) commands for the performance of military missions and prescribes the force structure of such commands.

b The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the President and Secretary of Defense in performing their command functions. The Chairman transmits to the commanders of the combatant commands the orders given by the NCA and, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, oversees the activities of those commands. Orders issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense normally are conveyed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense. Reports from combatant commanders normally will be submitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who forwards them to the Secretary of Defense and acts as the spokesman for the commanders of the combatant commands.

c Commanders in the chain of command exercise authority (COCOM, operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), or a support command relationship) as prescribed by law or a superior commander over the military capability made available to them. Unless otherwise directed by the NCA, COCOM is reserved for the commanders of the combatant commands. During deliberate planning, the majority of forces are apportioned to support the missions of more than one combatant commander. This requires combatant commanders that do not exercise COCOM over an apportioned force to continuously coordinate with the combatant commander that exercises COCOM in order to fully prepare for mission success.

Command relationships are discussed in detail in Chapter III, Section A, "Command Relationships."

Doctrine and Policy Governing Unified Direction of Forces

9. The Military Departments, Services, and Forces

a The authority vested in the Secretaries of the Military Departments in the performance of their role to organize, train, equip, and provide forces runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries. Then, to the degree established by the Secretaries or specified in law, this authority runs through the Service Chiefs to the Service component commanders assigned to the combatant commands and to the commanders of forces not assigned to the combatant commands. This administrative control (ADCON) provides for the preparation of military forces and their administration and support, unless such responsibilities are specifically assigned by the Secretary of Defense to another DOD component.

b The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the Service forces assigned or attached to combatant commands. They fulfill their responsibilities by exercising ADCON through the commanders of the Service component commands assigned to combatant commands and through the Service Chiefs (as determined by the Secretaries) for forces not assigned to the combatant commands. The responsibilities and authority exercised by the Secretaries of the Military Departments are subject by law to the authority provided to the commanders of combatant commands in their exercise of COCOM.

c Each of the Secretaries of the Military Departments, coordinating as appropriate with the other Department Secretaries and with the combatant commanders, has the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces to fulfill specific roles and for administering and supporting these forces. This responsibility, however, is subject to the combatant commander's

authority to organize assigned forces and ensure their preparedness as necessary to accomplish a specific mission.

d Commanders of forces are responsible to their respective Service Chiefs for the administration, training, and readiness of their unit(s). Commanders of forces assigned to the combatant commands are under the authority, direction, and control of (and are responsible to) their combatant commander to carry out assigned operational missions, joint training and exercises, and logistics.

e The Coast Guard is a military Service and a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States at all times. However, it is separately established by law as a Service in the Department of Transportation, except when operating as part of the Navy during war or when the President directs. The Coast Guard is required to maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized Service in the Navy when necessary. It is authorized to assist the Department of Defense in the performance of any activity for which it is especially qualified. Coast Guard units routinely serve under the OPCON of Navy component and fleet commanders.

10. Relationship Between Combatant Commands and Military Departments, Services, or Forces

a **Continuous Coordination** The roles and functions of the Military Services and USSOCOM share the division of responsibility for developing military capabilities for the combatant commands. All components of the Department of Defense are charged to coordinate on matters of common or overlapping responsibility. The Joint Staff, Service, and USSOCOM headquarters play a critical role in ensuring that combatant commanders' concerns and comments are included or advocated during the coordination.

Chapter I

b Interoperability. Unified action demands maximum interoperability. The forces, units, and systems of all Services must operate together effectively. This effectiveness is achieved in part through interoperability, which includes the development and use of joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP), the development and use of joint plans, the conduct of joint training and exercises, and a materiel development and fielding process that provides materiel that is fully compatible with and complementary to systems of all Services. A key to successful interoperability is to ensure that planning processes are joint from their inception. Those responsible for systems and programs intended for joint use must establish working groups that fully represent the services and functions that will be affected and interoperability must be considered in all joint program reviews. Combatant commanders will ensure maximum interoperability and identify interoperability issues to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has overall responsibility for the joint interoperability program.

11. Interagency Coordination

It is imperative that our Joint Forces also enhance their ability to operate in consonance with other US Government agencies, and with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and international organizations (IO) in a variety of settings. The specialized access and knowledge these organizations possess can facilitate prompt, efficient action to prevent conflict, resolve a crisis, mitigate suffering, and restore civil government upon conflict termination. Achieving interagency and civil interoperability through the continuing development of our doctrine and interagency participation in our training exercises is important to the unity of effort upon which success in many missions depends.

National Military Strategy, 1997

The integration of political, economic, informational, and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of operations.

a A rapidly changing global environment that is characterized by regional instability, the challenges of pluralistic governments, and asymmetric threats requires significant interagency cooperation with a fully functioning civil-military relationship. **Military operations must be synchronized and/or integrated with those of other agencies of the USG, as well as with foreign forces, NGOs, IOs, and regional organizations.** These actions must be mutually supporting and proceed in a logical sequence. In order to successfully undertake interagency operations, the roles and relationships among various Federal agencies, combatant commands, state and local governments, Country Teams, and engaged organizations must be clearly understood.

b Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the economic, diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG as well as NGOs, and IOs. Successful interagency coordination and planning enables these agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation — to achieve unity of effort.

c Across the range of military operations, a broad range of agencies — many with indispensable practical competencies and major legal responsibilities — interact with the Armed Forces of the United States.

d Interagency coordination demands planners consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best postured to achieve the objective. This consideration is especially

Doctrine and Policy Governing Unified Direction of Forces

necessary because the security challenges facing the United States today are growing in complexity, requiring the skills and resources of many organizations

e The solution to a problem normally will not reside within the capability of just one agency. Therefore, campaign plans, operation plans (OPLANs), or as an operation plan in concept format (CONPLAN), and operation orders must be crafted to leverage the core competencies of all available agencies, synchronizing and/or integrating their efforts with military capabilities toward a single objective. The NCA employ the Armed Forces of the United States because they have deemed it necessary to use military means to meet national interests. **The use of the military instrument of national power as a component of the NSS requires the development of military objectives. These objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives. The military instrument often plays a supporting role.** The Department of Defense may have little or no choice regarding the agencies engaged in a particular operation and normally will have little control over their agendas. **Understanding how military commanders and their staffs coordinate with other organizations is key to success in joint operations and unified actions.**

f The synergy derived from combining each organization's culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills is the strength of the interagency process. During this process diverse views, capabilities, and responsibilities are integrated to best achieve the military objectives.

g Obtaining coordinated and integrated effort in an interagency operation should not be equated to the

command and control (C2) of a military operation. Various agencies' different and sometimes conflicting goals, policies, procedures, and decisionmaking techniques make unity of effort a challenge. **Although there is no overarching interagency doctrine that delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies, departments, and organizations in interagency operations,** Presidential Decision Directive-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, provides procedures for the management and planning of complex contingency operations. Additionally, there is no oversight organization to ensure that the myriad of agencies, departments, and organizations have the capabilities and tools to work together.

h The interagency process often is described as "more art than science," while military operations tend to depend on structure and doctrine. However, some of the techniques, procedures, and systems of military C2 can assist in obtaining unity of effort if they are adjusted to the dynamic world of interagency operations. **Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation,** which are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations. At the combatant command level, liaisons and the political advisor (POLAD) or foreign policy advisor to the combatant commander can be of great assistance in interagency coordination. In summary, **action will follow understanding.**

For further detail concerning interagency coordination, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol I

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER II

FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ITS MAJOR COMPONENTS

It is a matter of record that the strategic direction of the war, as conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was fully as successful as were the operations which they directed. The proposals or the convictions of no one member were as sound, or as promising of success, as the united judgments and agreed decisions of all the members.

Ernest J. King: The U.S. Navy at War, 1945

SECTION A. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1. General

Unified action in carrying out the military component of NSS is accomplished through an **organized defense framework**. This chapter describes the **components** and their **functions** within that framework.

2. Organizations in the Department of Defense

a **Responsibility** The Secretary of Defense is the **principal assistant to the President** in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. All functions in the Department of Defense and its component agencies are performed under the **authority, direction, and control** of the Secretary of Defense.

b **Organization of the Department of Defense** The Department of Defense includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, Defense agencies, DOD field activities, Military Departments and Military Services within those departments, combatant commands, and other organizations and activities that may be established or designated by law, the President, or the Secretary of Defense.

3. Functions of the Department of Defense

As prescribed by higher authority, the Department of Defense will maintain and employ Armed Forces to fulfill the following aims:

a **Support and defend** the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

b **Ensure**, by timely and effective military action, the **security of the United States**, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest.

c **Uphold and advance** the **national policies and interests of the United States**.

4. Functions and Responsibilities Within the Department of Defense

a The **functions and responsibilities** assigned to the Military Departments, the Services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commands will be carried out in such a manner as **to achieve the following**:

- **Effective strategic direction** of the Armed Forces

- **Employment** of the Armed Forces in **joint force commands** whenever such

Chapter II

arrangement is in the best interest of national security

- **Integration** of the Armed Forces into an **effective and efficient team** of land, naval, air, space, and special operations forces
- **Prevention of unnecessary duplication or overlapping** among the Services by using personnel, intelligence, facilities, equipment, supplies, and services of any or all Services such that military effectiveness and economy of resources will thereby be increased
- **Coordination** of Armed Forces operations to promote efficiency and economy and to prevent gaps in responsibility
- **Effective multinational operations**

b **Development of Major Force Requirements.** Major force requirements to fulfill any specific primary function of an individual Service must be justified on the basis of existing or predicted need as recommended by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, and as approved by the Secretary of Defense

c **Exceptions to Primary Responsibilities**
The development of special weapons and equipment and the provision of training equipment required by each of the Services are the responsibilities of the individual Service concerned unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense

d **Responsibility of a Service Chief on Disagreements Related to That Service's Primary Functions.** Each Service Chief is responsible for presenting to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff any disagreement within the field of that

Service's primary functions that has not been resolved. This action will not be construed to prevent any Service Chief from presenting unilaterally any issue of disagreement with another Service

5. Executive Agents

a **The Secretary of Defense may designate an immediate subordinate,** normally the Secretary of a Military Department or a combatant commander, to act as the **executive agent** for the performance of duties or activities, normally temporary or transitory, that do not warrant assignment of an additional permanent function. The **purpose, scope of authority,** and **duration** of such designation is made clear in the establishing directive

b **Executive agent responsibilities and activities** assigned to the Secretary of a Military Department may serve as **justification of budgetary requirements** but will not be used as the basis for establishing additional force requirements

c **Responsibilities of an executive agent** are as shown in Figure II-1

SECTION B THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF



6. Composition and Functions

a **The Joint Chiefs of Staff** consist of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the




Figure II-1 Responsibilities of an Executive Agent

Chief of Staff, US Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps

b The **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense

c The **other members** of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are **military advisors** to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as specified in subparagraphs 6d to 6f below

d A **member** of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit to the **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or in addition to, the

advice provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will present such advice or opinion when presenting the Chairman's advice. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will not unduly delay advice by reason of such submission. The Chairman also will inform, as considered appropriate, the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to any matter.

e The **members** of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisors, will provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter upon request.


Chapter II

f The Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted by the Joint Staff, constitute the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense

The Director and the Operations Deputies, or the Vice Director and the Deputy Operations Deputies, collectively recommend actions to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

g Each Service Chief has an Operations Deputy and a Deputy Operations Deputy. The Director, Joint Staff, presides over meetings of the Operations Deputies, and the Vice Director, Joint Staff, presides over meetings of the Deputy Operations Deputies

h To the extent it does not impair independence in the performance of duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, each member (except the Chairman) will inform



Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components

their respective Service Secretary regarding **military advice** rendered by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters affecting their Military Department

1 The **duties** of the Service Chiefs as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff **take precedence** over all their other duties

j After first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make such **recommendations to Congress** relating to the Department of Defense as the member may consider appropriate

k When there is a **vacancy** in the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or in the **absence** or **disability** of the Chairman, **the Vice Chairman acts as and performs the duties of the Chairman** until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases

l When there is a **vacancy** in the offices of both the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the **absence** or **disability of both** the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, or when there is a vacancy in one such office and in the absence or disability of the officer holding the other, **the President will designate another member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as and perform the duties of the Chairman** until a successor to the Chairman or Vice Chairman is appointed or the absence or disability of the Chairman or Vice Chairman ceases

m The Commandant of the Coast Guard is a Service Chief but not a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When appropriate, the Commandant of the Coast Guard may be invited by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Service Chiefs to participate in meetings or to discuss matters of mutual interest to the Coast Guard and the other Services

7. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

a The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is **appointed by the President**, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular component of the United States Armed Forces

b The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff **arranges for military advice**, as appropriate, **to be provided to all offices** of the Secretary of Defense

c While holding office, the **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outranks all other officers of the Armed Forces**. The Chairman, however, **may not exercise military command** over the combatant commanders, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or any of the Armed Forces

d The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acts as the **spokesman for the combatant commanders**, especially on the operational requirements of their commands. These commanders will send their reports to the Chairman, who will channel them to the Secretary of Defense, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense, so that the Chairman may better incorporate the views of these commanders in advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman also communicates, as appropriate, the combatant commanders' requirements to other elements of the Department of Defense

e The **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** assists the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their **command functions**. The Chairman **transmits their orders** to the combatant commanders as directed by the NCA and **coordinates all communications** in matters of joint interest addressed to the combatant commanders by other authority

Chapter II

f In addition to other duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, **the Chairman will**, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense

- **Preside** over the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
- **Provide an agenda for each meeting** of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (including, as the Chairman considers appropriate, any subject for the agenda recommended by any other member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff),
- **Assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff** in carrying out their business as promptly as practicable, and
- **Determine when issues** under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be decided

g In performing CJCS functions, duties, and responsibilities including those enumerated above, **the Chairman will**

- **Convene regular meetings** of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
- As appropriate, **consult with and seek the advice** of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, collectively or individually, and of the combatant commanders

h Subject to the direction, authority, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, **the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the following responsibilities**

- **Prepare military strategy and assessments** of the associated risks. These will include the following
 - **A military strategy** to support national security objectives within policy and resource-level guidance provided by

the Secretary of Defense. Such strategy will include broad military options prepared by the Chairman with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders

- **Net assessments** to determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared to those of potential adversaries
- **Perform duties**, as assigned by the President, to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command functions
- Assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in **providing for the strategic direction** of the Armed Forces, including the direction of operations conducted by the combatant commanders
- **Prepare strategic plans**, including plans that conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective
- **Advise the Secretary of Defense** on the preparation of policy guidance for the preparation and review of operation and campaign plans
- Provide for the **preparation and review of joint operation plans** that conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense
- **Prepare joint logistic and mobility plans** to support those joint operation plans and recommend the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans. Ascertain the logistic support available to execute the **joint operation and campaign plans** of the combatant commanders. Review and recommend

Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components

to the Secretary of Defense appropriate logistic guidance for the Military Services that, if implemented, will result in logistic readiness consistent with approved plans

- **Advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities** (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of joint operation plans and assess the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives, policy, and strategic plans
- **Establish and maintain a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of each combatant command** to carry out their assigned missions
- **Advise the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of the requirements**, especially operational requirements, identified by the combatant commanders
- Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense concerning the **preparation of annual policy guidance** to be provided to the heads of DOD components for the preparation and review of program recommendations and budget proposals of their respective components
- Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the **program recommendations and budget proposals** of the Military Departments and other DOD components **conform with the priorities** established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the combatant commanders
- Submit to the Secretary of Defense **alternative program recommendations and budget proposals**, within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense, to achieve greater conformity with the priorities established in strategic plans and the requirements priorities of the combatant commanders
- **Recommend a budget proposal** for activities of each combatant command. Activities for which funding may be requested in such a proposal include
 - Joint exercises,
 - Force training,
 - Contingencies, and
 - Selected operations
- Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the **major programs and policies** of the Armed Forces in the area of manpower **conform with strategic plans**
- **Develop and establish doctrine for all aspects** of the joint employment of the Armed Forces
- **Formulate policies for the joint training** of the Armed Forces
- **Formulate policies for coordinating the military education and training** of members of the Armed Forces
- Provide for **representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the UN** in accordance with the Charter of the UN
- Submit to the Secretary of Defense, not less than once every 3 years, a **report** containing such **recommendations for changes** in the assignment of **roles and functions** of the Services and changes in the **assignment of missions** of the combatant commanders as the Chairman

Chapter II

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the Armed Forces

- Prepare **integrated plans for military mobilization**
 - Subject to the direction of the President, **attend and participate in meetings of the NSC**
 - Advise and assist the President and the Secretary of Defense on **establishing combatant commands** to perform military missions and on **prescribing the force structure** of those commands
 - Periodically (not less than every 2 years) **review the missions, responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force structure of each combatant command, and recommend** to the President through the Secretary of Defense any **changes** to missions, responsibilities, and force structures as may be necessary
 - **Oversee the activities** of the combatant commands
 - **Serve as the spokesman for combatant commanders**, especially on the operational requirements of their commands. In performing this function the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will
 - Confer with and obtain information from the combatant commanders with respect to the requirements of their commands,
 - Evaluate and integrate this information,
 - Advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense with respect
- to the requirements of those commands, individually and collectively, and
- Communicate, as appropriate, those requirements to other elements of the Department of Defense
 - **Review the plans and programs of combatant commanders to determine their adequacy, consistency, acceptability, and feasibility** for the performance of assigned missions
 - Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on measures to provide for the **administration and support of forces** assigned to each combatant command
 - Determine the **headquarters support**, such as facilities, personnel, and communications, required by combatant commanders and recommend the assignment to the Military Departments of the responsibilities for providing such support
 - Provide **guidance and direction** to the combatant commanders on aspects of C2 that relate to the conduct of operations
 - **Provide military guidance** to the Military Departments, Military Services, and Defense agencies in the preparation of their respective detailed plans
 - Participate, as directed, in the **preparation of multinational plans** for military action in conjunction with the Armed Forces of other nations
 - **Prepare and submit** to the Secretary of Defense, for consideration in connection with the preparation of budgets, **statements of military requirements** based on US strategic considerations, current national security policy, and strategic plans. These statements of

Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components

- requirements include tasks, priority of tasks, force requirements, and general strategic guidance for developing military installations and bases and for equipping and maintaining military forces
- **Assess military requirements** for defense acquisition programs
 - Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense in **research and engineering matters** by preparing the following
 - Statements of broad strategic guidance to be used in the preparation of an integrated DOD program,
 - Statements of overall military requirements,
 - Statements of the relative military importance of development activities to meet the needs of the combatant commanders, and
 - Recommendations for the assignment of specific new weapons to the Armed Forces
 - Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for information and consideration, general strategic guidance for the **development of industrial and manpower mobilization programs**
 - Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense military guidance for use in the **development of security assistance programs** and other actions relating to foreign military forces, including recommendations for allied military forces, materiel, and facilities requirements related to US strategic objectives, current national security policy, strategic plans, and the implementation of approved programs, and to make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, as necessary, for keeping the Military Assistance Program aligned with agreed strategic concepts
 - **Manage**, for the Secretary of Defense, **the National Military Command System (NMCS)**, to meet the needs of the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and establish operational policies and procedures for all components of the NMCS and ensure their implementation
 - **Provide overall supervision** of those Defense agencies and DOD field activities assigned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Secretary of Defense Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of a Defense agency or DOD field activity, for which the Chairman has been assigned overall supervision, conform with the requirements of the Military Departments and of the combatant commands
 - Periodically (not less than every 2 years) **report** to the Secretary of Defense on the **responsiveness and readiness of designated combat support agencies** Those include the following
 - Defense Contract Management Agency
 - Defense Information Systems Agency
 - Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
 - DLA
 - National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
 - National Security Agency

Chapter II

- Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
- Any other Defense agency designated as a combat support agency by the Secretary of Defense
- Provide for the **participation of combat support agencies in joint training exercises**, assess their performance, and take steps to provide for changes to improve their performance
- **Develop a uniform readiness reporting system** for reporting the readiness of combat support agencies
- Identify deficiencies in the capabilities of the DIA and the National Security Agency to the Secretary of Defense so that necessary policy and programs can be implemented to correct deficiencies
- Oversee military aspects of the **activities of DTRA**
- Advise the Secretary of Defense on requirements and priorities for geospatial information and services, and provide guidance to NIMA and the combatant commands to serve as the basis for **relationships between these organizations**
- **Select officers to serve on the Joint Staff** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may suspend from duty and recommend the reassignment of any officer assigned to the Joint Staff
- Exercise **exclusive direction** of the Joint Staff
- Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the establishment and review of **joint duty positions**, including those designated as critical joint duty positions
- Advise the Secretary of Defense on **establishing career guidelines** for officers with the joint specialty and on procedures for overseeing the careers, including promotions and career assignments, of officers with the joint specialty and other officers who serve in joint duty assignments
- Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the periodic review, accreditation, and revision of the **curriculum** of each professional **military education school** to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters
- Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense in **preparing guidelines** to be furnished to the Secretaries of the Military Departments for ensuring that specified officer promotion boards give appropriate consideration to the performance of officers who are serving, or have served, in joint duty assignments
- **Designate at least one officer** currently serving in a joint duty assignment to each **officer promotion board** that will consider officers who are serving or have served in a joint duty assignment (The Secretary of Defense may waive this requirement in the case of any selection board of the Marine Corps)
- **Review the reports of selection boards** that consider for promotion officers serving, or having served, in joint duty assignments in accordance with guidelines furnished by the Secretary of Defense and return the reports with determinations and comments to the Secretary of the appropriate Military Department
- Submit to the Secretary of Defense an **evaluation of the joint duty**

Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components

performance of officers recommended for an initial appointment to the grade of lieutenant general or vice admiral, or initial appointment as general or admiral

- **Prescribe the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman** with the approval of the Secretary of Defense
- **Appoint consultants to the Joint Staff** from outside the Department of Defense, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense
- **Perform such other duties** as the President or the Secretary of Defense may prescribe

8. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

a The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is **appointed by the President**, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular components of the United States Armed Forces

b The Vice Chairman holds the grade of general or admiral and **cutranks all other officers of the Armed Forces except the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**. The Vice Chairman **may not exercise military command** over the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or any of the Armed Forces

c The Vice Chairman **performs the duties prescribed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** and such other duties and functions as may be **prescribed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** with the approval of the Secretary of Defense

d When there is a vacancy in the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, **the Vice Chairman acts as and performs the duties of the Chairman** until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases

e The Vice Chairman is a member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council, is the Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board, and may be delegated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as **the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council**

9. The Joint Staff

a The Joint Staff is under the **exclusive authority, direction, and control of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**. The Joint Staff will perform duties using procedures that the Chairman prescribes to assist the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities

b The Joint Staff includes **officers selected in proportional numbers** from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and Air Force Coast Guard officers may also serve on the Joint Staff

c **Selection of officers** to serve on the Joint Staff is **made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** from a list of officers submitted by the Services. Each officer whose name is submitted must be among those officers considered to be the **most outstanding officers of that Service**. The Chairman may specify the number of officers to be included on such a list

d After coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may select a **Director, Joint Staff**

e **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manages the Joint Staff and its Director**

f The Joint Staff will not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and will have **no executive authority**

Chapter II

The Joint Staff is **organized and operates along conventional staff lines** to support the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in discharging their assigned responsibilities. In addition, the Joint Staff is the focal point for the Chairman to ensure that **comments and concerns of the combatant commanders are well represented and advocated** during all levels of coordination.

SECTION C. COMMON FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND SERVICES

10. Common Functions of the Military Departments

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the provisions of Chapter 6, title 10, United States Code (USC), the **functions of the Military Departments**, under their respective Secretaries, are prescribed by DOD Directive (DODD) 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, and shown in Figure II-2.

11. Common Functions of the Military Services and the United States Special Operations Command

a. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the provisions of title 10, USC, chapter 6, the **Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force**, under their respective Secretaries, are responsible for the **functions prescribed in detail in DODD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components***. Specific Service functions also are delineated in that directive.

b. USSOCOM is unique among the combatant commands in that it performs

certain Service-like functions (under title 10, USC, chapter 6), including the following:

- Train, equip, and provide combat-ready special operations forces (SOF) to the other combatant commands and, when directed by the NCA, conduct selected special operations (SO). USSOCOM's role in equipping SOF is generally limited to SO-peculiar equipment and supplies.
- Develop strategy, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures for SOF, to include psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA). (Note: Joint doctrine and JTTP are developed under the procedures approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)
- Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense program recommendations and budget proposals for SOF and other forces assigned to USSOCOM.

SECTION D. FUNCTIONS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS

12. General

Geographic combatant commanders are assigned a geographic AOR by the NCA. **Functional combatant commanders** support geographic combatant commanders, conduct operations in direct support of the NCA, and may be designated by the NCA as the supported combatant commander for an operation. Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the **authority, direction, and control of the commander of a combatant command**, with respect to the commands and the forces assigned to that command, are shown in Figure II-3.

COMMON FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

To prepare forces and establish reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies for the effective prosecution of war and military operations other than war and plan for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war.

To maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly organized, trained, and equipped for employment in an emergency.

To provide adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence and counterintelligence for the Military Departments and other agencies as directed by competent authority.

To recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to combatant commands.

To prepare and submit programs and budgets for their respective departments; justify before Congress budget requests as approved by the President; and administer the funds made available for maintaining, equipping, and training the forces of their respective departments, including those assigned to combatant commands. The budget submissions to the Secretary of Defense by the Military Departments will be prepared on the basis, among other things, of recommendations of combatant commanders and of Service component commanders of forces assigned to combatant commands.

To conduct research; develop tactics, techniques, and organization; and develop and procure weapons, equipment, and supplies essential to the fulfillment of the functions assigned by Chapter 6, title 10, United States Code and by Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*.

To develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations, including lines of communications, and to provide administrative and logistic support for all forces and bases unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

To provide, as directed, such forces, military missions, and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national interest of the United States.

To assist in training and equipping the military forces of foreign nations.

To provide, as directed, administrative and logistic support to the headquarters of combatant commands, to include direct support of the development and acquisition of the command and control system of such headquarters.

To assist each other in the accomplishment of their respective functions, including the provisions of personnel, intelligence, training, facilities, equipment, supplies, and services.

To prepare and submit, in coordination with other Military Departments, mobilization information to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Figure II-2 Common Functions of the Military Departments

GENERAL FUNCTIONS OF A COMBATANT COMMANDER

- ⑥ Giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.
- ⑥ Prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.
- ⑥ Organizing commands and forces within that command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- ⑥ Employing forces within that command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- ⑥ Assigning command functions to subordinate commanders.
- ⑥ Coordinating and approving those aspects of administration, support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- ⑥ Exercising the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders; selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial as delineated in title 10, US Code, section 164.

Figure II-3 General Functions of a Combatant Commander

13. Assigned Responsibilities

a **The Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command (USCINCJFCOM)** is the lead joint force integrator and trainer USCINCJFCOM, among other responsibilities, serves as the DOD executive agent for joint warfighting experimentation, supports the joint doctrine development program, serves as the joint force provider of its assigned continental United States (CONUS)-based forces, provides, within CONUS, military assistance to civil authorities including

consequence management operations in response to nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction incidents, and plans for the land defense of CONUS, domestic support operations to assist government agencies, and the binational Canada-US land and maritime defense of the Canada-US region

b **The Commanders in Chief, US Central Command, US European Command, US Pacific Command, US Southern Command, and US Joint Forces**

Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components

Command are each assigned a geographic AOR within which their missions are accomplished with assigned and/or attached forces. Forces under the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense may conduct operations **from or within any geographic area** as required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the commanders concerned or as specifically directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

c **Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC)** provides combat-ready SOF to other combatant commands and, if directed by the NCA, exercises command of selected SO missions.

- USCINCSOC exercises COCOM of all Active and Reserve Component SOF, US Army PSYOP forces, and CA (except for Marine Corps Reserve Civil Affairs Groups) stationed in CONUS. Most SO within a geographic combatant commander's AOR are conducted by the designated theater SO command or a joint SO task force formed temporarily to conduct SO in a specific operational area or to prosecute SO in support of a theater campaign or other operations.
- USCINCSOC exercises authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds for forces assigned to USSOCOM and SO forces assigned to other combatant commands. (Note: This authority extends to the development and acquisitions of SO-peculiar equipment, the acquisition of SO-peculiar material, supplies, and services, and other expenditures directed by the Secretary of Defense.)

d **The Commander in Chief, US Space Command (USCINCSpace)** conducts space operations, including support of

strategic ballistic missile defense for the United States and missile warning and space surveillance in support of US agreements with North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). USCINCSpace also is the Commander, US Element, NORAD, and normally is designated the commander in chief of the binational command of the United States and Canada. (**NOTE: Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CINCNORAD)** is not a combatant commander but, when also acting as Commander US Element NORAD, does exercise COCOM over US forces made available in the "Forces for Unified Commands" memorandum. CINCNORAD provides aerospace warning for North America, to include integrated tactical warning and threat assessment as well as aerospace control of North America.) US Space Command also serves as the military lead for computer network defense (CND) and computer network attack (CNA), to include advocating the CND and CNA requirements for all combatant commanders, conducting CND and CNA operations, and planning and developing national requirements for CND and CNA.

e **The Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command** is responsible primarily for strategic nuclear forces to support the national objective of strategic deterrence.

f **The Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTrans)** is the single manager for defense transportation. USCINCTrans provides global transportation management of common-user air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense by employing an integrated transportation system across the range of military operations both in peace and war. USCINCTrans is the DOD-designated single port manager for all common-user aerial and sea ports worldwide.

Chapter II

USCINCTRANS is also the single manager for patient movement, other than for intratheater patient movement

For further detail concerning combatant commanders' assigned responsibilities, refer to the UCP

14. Additional Authority

If a combatant commander at any time considers his or her authority, direction, or control with respect to any of the commands or forces assigned to his or her command to be **insufficient to command effectively**, the commander will **promptly inform the Secretary of Defense** through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

15. Authority Over Subordinate Commanders

Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, **commanders of the combatant commands exercise authority over subordinate commanders as follows.**

a **Commanders of commands and forces assigned to a combatant command are under the authority, direction, and control of, and are responsible to, the commander of the combatant command on all matters for**

which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority as outlined in paragraph 13

b **The commander of a command or force assigned to a commander of a combatant command will communicate with other elements of the Department of Defense on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the commander of the combatant command**

c **Other elements of the Department of Defense will communicate with the commander of a command or force assigned to a commander of a combatant command on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the commander of the combatant command**

d The commander of a subordinate command or force will **advise the commander of the combatant command**, if so directed, of **all communications** to and from other elements of the Department of Defense on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has not been assigned authority

CHAPTER III

DOCTRINE AND POLICY FOR JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL

Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command.

Napoleon I: Maxims of War

SECTION A. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. General Principles

a **Command.** Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort. Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates and confers authority to assign missions and to demand accountability for their attainment. Although commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the attainment of these missions. Authority is never absolute, the extent of authority is specified by the establishing authority, directives, and law.

b **Command and Staff.** JFCs are provided staffs to assist them in the decisionmaking and execution process. The staff is an extension of the commander, its sole function is command support, and its authority is delegated to it by the commander. A properly trained and directed staff will free the commander to devote more attention to directing subordinate commanders and maintaining a picture of the situation as a whole. The staff should be composed of the smallest number of qualified personnel who can do the job.

- “**Command channel**” is the term used to describe the chain of command through which command is exercised.

- “**Staff channel**” is the term used to describe the channel by which commanders interact with staffs. It also describes the channel by which staff officers contact their counterparts at higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. These staff-to-staff contacts are for coordination and cooperation only. Higher headquarters staff officers exercise no independent authority over subordinate headquarters staffs, although staff officers normally honor requests for information.

c **Levels of Authority.** The authority vested in a commander must be commensurate with the responsibility assigned. Levels of authority include the four types of command relationships — COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and support. The other types of authority are coordinating authority, ADCON, and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH). An overview of command relationships is shown in Figure III-1.

d **Unity of Command.** Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. It is the foundation for trust, coordination, and teamwork necessary for unified action and requires clear delineation of responsibility among commanders up, down, and laterally.




Figure III-1 Command Relationships

2. Command Relationships and Assignment and Transfer of Forces

All forces under the jurisdiction of the Secretaries of the Military Departments (except as noted in title 10, USC, section 162) are assigned to combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense's "Forces for Unified Commands" memorandum. A force assigned or attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command as directed by the Secretary of Defense and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President. The command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) will be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands

and JTFs may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands and delegate the command relationship as appropriate (see Figure III-2)

a **The combatant commander exercises COCOM** over forces assigned or reassigned by the NCA. Subordinate JFCs will exercise OPCON over assigned or reassigned forces. Forces are assigned or reassigned when the transfer of forces will be permanent or for an unknown period of time, or when the broadest level of C2 is required or desired. **OPCON** of assigned forces is **inherent in COCOM** and may be delegated within the combatant command by the combatant commander.

b **The combatant commander normally exercises OPCON** over forces attached by the NCA. Forces are attached when the




Figure III-2 Assignment and Transfer of Forces to a Joint Force

transfer of forces will be temporary
Establishing authorities for subordinate
unified commands and JTFs normally will
direct the delegation of OPCON over forces
attached to those subordinate commands

c In accordance with the "Forces for
Unified Commands" memorandum and the
UCP, except as otherwise directed by the
President or the Secretary of Defense, all
forces operating within the geographic area
assigned to a combatant command shall be
**assigned or attached to, and under the
command of, the commander of that
command** Transient forces do not come
under the chain of command of the area
commander solely by their movement across
operational area boundaries, except when the

combatant commander is exercising TACON
authority for force protection purposes

3 Combatant Command (Command Authority)

COCOM is the **command authority over
assigned forces vested only in the
commanders of combatant commands** by
title 10, USC, section 164 (or as **directed by
the President** in the UCP) and cannot be
delegated or transferred

a **Basic Authority** COCOM is the
authority of a combatant commander to
**perform those functions of command over
assigned forces** involving organizing and
employing commands and forces, assigning

Chapter III

tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or in the case of USSOCOM, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be **exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations**. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders. COCOM provides **full authority to organize and employ commands** and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

b. **COCOM includes the authority to perform the following**

- **Exercise or delegate OPCON** of assigned or attached forces, as described in paragraph 4 below
- **Exercise directive authority for logistic matters** (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability)
- **Give authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces** necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics
- **Coordinate the boundaries of geographic areas** specified in the UCP with other combatant commanders and inform USG agencies or organizations of other countries in the AOR, as necessary, to prevent both duplication of effort and lack of adequate control of operations in the delineated areas
- Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, **function as the US military single point of contact and exercise directive authority over all elements of the command** in relationships with other

combatant commands, DOD elements, US diplomatic missions, other US agencies, and organizations of other countries in the AOR (if assigned). Whenever a combatant commander undertakes exercises, operations, or other activities with the military forces of nations in another combatant commander's AOR, those exercises, operations, and activities and their attendant command relationships will be mutually agreed to between the commanders.

- **Determine those matters** relating to the exercise of COCOM in which **subordinates must communicate with agencies external to the combatant command through the combatant commander**
- Coordinate with subordinate commands and components and **approve those aspects of administration and support** (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), **and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command**
- **Establish personnel policies** to ensure proper and uniform standards of military conduct
- **Participate in the development and acquisition of the command's command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems and direct their operation.**
- **Submit recommendations** through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense concerning the content of **guidance affecting the strategy and/or fielding of joint forces**
- **Participate in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System**, as follows

Doctrine and Policy for Joint Command and Control

- **Submit to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff comments and recommendations** to be used in planning the proposed DOD policy, strategy, and force guidance for programming
- **Provide guidance** to subordinate commands and components on warfighting requirements and priorities for addressing their program and budget requests to the respective Military Departments
- **Provide an integrated priority list** of essential warfighting requirements prioritized across Service and functional lines for consideration by the Secretaries of the Military Departments, USCINCSOC, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense in developing the DOD program and budget
- **Review reports from subordinate component commanders** on the degree to which their program and budget requests meet the warfighting requirements of the command. Combatant commanders may communicate directly with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, USCINCSOC, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning their assessments of operational capability deficiencies associated with program and budget requests
- **Review and provide comments and recommendations** on the degree to which Service and Defense agencies' programs satisfy warfighting requirements to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- **Assess the impact of Office of the Secretary of Defense program and budget decisions and provide recommendations** to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- As directed by the Secretary of Defense, **prepare and submit budget proposals** to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for activities of the command
- **Participate in the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)**. Combatant commanders' comments are critical to ensuring that warfighting and peacetime operational concerns are emphasized in all JSPS and JOPES documents
- **Concur in the assignment (or recommendation for assignment) of officers as commanders** directly subordinate to the combatant commander and to positions on the combatant command staff. **Suspend from duty and recommend reassignment, when appropriate, of any subordinate officer assigned to the combatant command**
- **Convene general courts-martial** in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
- In accordance with laws and national and DOD policies, **establish plans, policies, programs, priorities, and overall requirements for C4 systems and the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities of the command**
 - c. When directed in the UCP or otherwise authorized by the Secretary of Defense, the

Chapter III

commander of US elements of a multinational command may exercise COCOM of those US forces assigned to that command

d Directive Authority for Logistic Matters. Commanders of combatant commands exercise directive authority for logistics and may delegate directive authority for a common support capability. The combatant commander may delegate directive authority for as many common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC as required to accomplish the subordinate JFC's assigned mission. For some commodities or support services common to two or more Services, one Service may be given responsibility for management based on DOD executive agent designations or regional agreements. The exercise of directive authority for logistics by a combatant commander includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures necessary to ensure the following: **effective execution of approved operation plans, effectiveness and economy of operation, and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands**

- A combatant commander's **directive authority does not**
 - Discontinue Service responsibility for logistic support,
 - Discourage coordination by consultation and agreement, or
 - Disrupt effective procedures or efficient use of facilities or organizations
- Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments and Services continue to have **responsibility for the logistic**

support of their forces assigned or attached to joint commands, subject to the following guidance

•• **Under peacetime conditions**, the scope of the logistic authority exercised by the commander of a combatant command will be **consistent with the peacetime limitations** imposed by legislation, DOD policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where these factors preclude execution of a combatant commander's directive by component commanders, the comments and recommendations of the combatant commander, together with the comments of the component commander concerned, normally will be referred to the appropriate Military Department for consideration. If the matter is not resolved in a timely manner with the appropriate Military Department, it will be referred by the combatant commander, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.

•• **Under crisis action, wartime conditions**, or where **critical situations** make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic authority of combatant commanders enables them to **use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned and/or attached to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their missions**. Joint logistic doctrine and policy developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establishes wartime logistic support guidance that will assist the combatant commander in conducting successful joint operations.

- A combatant commander will **exercise approval authority over Service**

Doctrine and Policy for Joint Command and Control

logistic programs (base adjustments, force beddowns, and other aspects, as appropriate) within the command's AOR that will have **significant effects on operational capability or sustainability**. When the combatant commander does not concur with a proposed Service logistic program action and coordination between the combatant commander and the Service Chief fails to result in an arrangement suitable to all parties, the combatant commander may forward the issue through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

4. Operational Control

OPCON is the command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense.

a **Basic Authority** OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the **authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces** involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes **authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions** assigned to the command. It should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations, normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders. OPCON normally provides full authority to **organize commands and forces**

and **employ those forces** as the commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. **It does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.** These elements of COCOM must be specifically delegated by the combatant commander. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and operational areas of subordinate JFCs.

b **Commanders of subordinate commands**, including JTFs, normally will be given OPCON of assigned or attached forces by the superior commander.

c OPCON conveys the authority for the following.

- **Exercise or delegate** OPCON and TACON, **establish** support relationships among subordinates, and **designate** coordinating authorities.
- **Give direction** to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training.
- **Prescribe** the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.
- **Organize** subordinate commands and forces within the command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- **Employ** forces within the command, as necessary, to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- **Assign** command functions to subordinate commanders.

Chapter III

- **Plan** for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the actions of subordinate forces
- **Establish** plans, policies, priorities, and overall requirements for the ISR activities of the command
- **Conduct** joint training and joint training exercises required to achieve effective employment of the forces of the command, in accordance with joint doctrine established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and establish training policies for joint operations required to accomplish the mission. This authority also applies to forces attached for purposes of joint exercises and training
- **Suspend** from duty and recommend reassignment of any officer assigned to the command
- **Assign** responsibilities to subordinate commanders for certain routine operational matters that require coordination of effort of two or more commanders
- **Establish** an adequate system of control for local defense and delineate such operational areas for subordinate commanders as deemed desirable
- **Delineate** functional responsibilities and geographic operational areas of subordinate commanders

d The Secretary of Defense may specify **adjustments to accommodate authorities beyond OPCON** in an establishing directive when forces are transferred between combatant commanders or when member's and/or organizations are transferred from the Military Departments to a combatant command. Adjustments will be coordinated with the participating combatant commanders

5. Tactical Control

TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, **that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers** within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks

a **Basic Authority.** TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be **delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command**. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense

b TACON provides the authority to

- **Give direction** for military operations, and
- **Control designated forces** (e.g., ground forces, aircraft sorties, missile launches, or satellite payload management)

c TACON provides sufficient authority for **controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task**. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support, the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise these authorities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive

d TACON typically is exercised by **functional component commanders** over military capability or forces made available to the functional component for tasking

6. Support

Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should **aid, protect, complement, or sustain** another force.

a **Basic Authority.** Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. This includes the NCA designating a support relationship between combatant commanders as well as within a combatant command. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it **conveys priorities** to commanders and staffs that are **planning or executing joint operations**. The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common superior commander) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commander understand the degree of authority that the supported commander is granted.

b The supported commander should ensure that the supporting commander **understands the assistance required**. The supporting commander will then **provide the assistance needed**, subject to the supporting commander's existing capabilities and other assigned tasks. When the supporting commander **cannot fulfill the needs** of the supported commander, **the establishing authority will be notified** by either the supported or the supporting commander. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution.

c An **establishing directive** normally is issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It also should include

- The forces and resources allocated to the supporting effort,
- The time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort,
- The relative priority of the supporting effort,
- The authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency, and
- The degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort.

d Unless limited by the establishing directive, the **supported commander will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort**. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

e **The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications** to be employed in providing this support. The supporting commander will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters concerning the **employment and limitations** (e.g., logistics) of such support, assist in planning for the **integration** of such support into the supported commander's effort as a whole, and ensure that **support requirements** are appropriately communicated within the supporting commander's organization.

f The supporting commander has the responsibility to **ascertain the needs** of the supported force and **take action to fulfill**

Chapter III

them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks

g Several categories of support have been defined for use within a combatant command to better characterize the support that should be given. For example, land forces that provide fires normally are tasked in a direct support role. The categories are shown in Figure III-3.

7. Support Relationships Between Combatant Commanders

a The NCA establish support relationships between the combatant commands for the planning and execution of joint operations

This ensures that the tasked combatant commander(s) receives the necessary support. Supported combatant commanders request capabilities, task supporting DOD components, coordinate with the appropriate Federal agencies, and develop a plan to achieve the common goal. As part of the team effort, supporting combatant commanders provide the requested capabilities, as available, to assist the supported commander to accomplish missions requiring additional resources.

b The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organizes the joint planning and execution community for joint operation planning to carry out support relationships between the combatant commands. The supported commander is the combatant




Figure III-3 Categories of Support

commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the JSCP or other joint operation planning authority. Supporting commanders provide augmentation forces, develop supporting plans, or provide other support to designated supported commanders.

8. Relationships Between Component Commanders

a. The JFC may establish support relationships between components to facilitate operations. Support relationships afford an effective means to prioritize (and ensure unity of effort for) various operations. Component commanders should establish liaison with other components to facilitate the support command relationship and to coordinate the planning and execution of pertinent operations.

b. When the commander of a Service component is designated as a functional component commander, the associated Service component responsibilities for assigned or attached forces are retained, but are not applicable to forces made available by other Service components. The operational requirements of the functional component's subordinate commands are prioritized and represented to the JFC by the functional component commander, relieving the commanders of the affected Service components of this responsibility, but the commanders of the affected Service components are not relieved of their administrative and support responsibilities.

9. Other Authorities

Other authorities outside the command relationships delineated above are described below.

a. **Administrative Control** ADCON is the **direction or exercise of authority** over

subordinate or other organizations **with respect to administration and support**, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in title 10, USC. This is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for administration and support. **ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders of Service forces assigned to a combatant commander at any echelon at or below the level of Service component command.** ADCON is subject to the command authority of combatant commanders.

b. **Coordinating Authority** Coordinating authority may be **exercised by commanders or individuals at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command.** Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of **two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service (e.g., joint rear area coordinator exercises coordinating authority for rear area operations among the component commanders).** Coordinating authority may be granted and modified through a memorandum of agreement to provide unity of command and unity of effort for operations involving National Guard, Reserve Component (RC), and Active Component forces engaged in interagency activities. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement. The common

Chapter III

task to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters. Coordinating authority is a **consultation relationship between commanders**, not an authority by which command may be exercised. It is more **applicable to planning** and similar activities than to operations. Coordinating authority is not in any way tied to force assignment. **Assignment of coordinating authority** is based on the missions and capabilities of the commands or organizations involved.

c **Direct Liaison Authorized.** DIRLAUTH is that authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. DIRLAUTH is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting DIRLAUTH informed. DIRLAUTH is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

10 Command of National Guard and Reserve Forces

a All National Guard and Reserve forces (except those forces specifically exempted) are assigned by the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands under the authority provided in title 10, USC, sections 162 and 167, as indicated in the "Forces for Unified Commands" memorandum. However, those forces are available for operational missions only when mobilized for specific periods in accordance with the law, or when ordered to active duty with the consent of the member and after being validated for employment by their parent Service.

b Combatant commanders will exercise COCOM over assigned RC forces when mobilized or ordered to active duty (other than

for training). Combatant commanders will exercise OPCON of RC forces (less strategic mobility forces assigned to US Transportation Command) on active duty for training or performing inactive-duty training within their AORs (except in CONUS, Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the US territories), or participating anywhere in military operations or joint training under their jurisdiction.

c The authority combatant commanders may exercise over assigned RC forces when not on active duty or when on active duty for training is training and readiness oversight (TRO). Combatant commanders normally will exercise TRO over assigned forces through the Service component commanders. TRO includes the authority to

- Provide guidance to Service component commanders on operational requirements and priorities to be addressed in Military Department training and readiness programs,
- Comment on Service component program recommendations and budget requests,
- Coordinate and approve participation by assigned RC forces in joint exercises and other joint training when on active duty for training or performing inactive duty for training,
- Obtain and review readiness and inspection reports on assigned RC forces, and
- Coordinate and review mobilization plans (including post-mobilization training activities and deployability validation procedures) developed for assigned RC forces.

d Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the following applies

- Assigned RC forces on active duty (other than for training) may not be deployed until validated by the parent Service for deployment

- Combatant commanders may employ RC forces assigned to their commands in contingency operations only when the forces have been mobilized for specific periods in accordance with the law, or when ordered to active duty with the consent of the member and validated by their parent Service

- RC forces on active duty for training or performing inactive-duty training may be employed in connection with contingency operations only as provided by law, and when the primary purpose is for training consistent with their mission or specialty

e Combatant commanders will communicate with assigned RC forces through the Military Departments when the RC forces are not on active duty or when on active duty for training

f Combatant commanders may inspect assigned RC forces in accordance with DODD 5106.4, *Inspectors General (IGs) of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands*, when such forces are mobilized or ordered to active duty (other than for training)

g USCINCSOC will exercise additional authority for certain functions for assigned RC forces and for all SOF assigned to other combatant commands in accordance with the current memoranda of agreement between USCINCSOC and the Secretaries of the Military Departments

For further guidance on command of National Guard and Reserve forces, see the SecDef memorandum, "Assignment of Forces," dated 6 September 1996

SECTION B. JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL

11. Background

Command (the lawful authority of a commander) and control (the regulation of forces and functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander's intent) is the most important function undertaken by a JFC. It is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces. C2 is the means by which a JFC synchronizes and/or integrates joint force activities in order to achieve unity of command and unity of effort. C2 ties together all the operational functions and tasks, and applies to all levels of war and echelons of command across the range of military operations.

For further information on joint tasks refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3500.04B, Universal Joint Task List.

12. Command and Control Theory

C2 enhances the commander's ability to make sound and timely decisions and successfully execute them. To assist commanders in making sound and timely decisions, subparagraphs 12a and 12b discuss various tenets and a decision model that impact on C2. Unity of effort over complex operations is made possible through decentralized execution of centralized, overarching plans. Advances in information management and communications greatly enhance the situational awareness of tactical commanders, subordinate JFCs, combatant commanders, and even the NCA. These technological advances increase the potential for superiors, once focused solely on the strategic and operational decisionmaking, to assert themselves at the tactical level. While this will be their prerogative, decentralized

Chapter III

execution remains a basic C2 tenet of joint operations. The level of control used will depend on the nature of the operation or task, the risk or priority of its success, and the associated comfort level of the commander.

a **Tenets.** Unity of effort is strengthened through adherence to the following C2 tenets:

- **Clearly Defined Authorities, Roles, and Relationships.** Effective C2 of joint operations begins by establishing unity of command through the designation of a JFC with the requisite authority to accomplish assigned tasks using an uncomplicated chain of command. It is essential for the JFC to ensure that subordinate commanders, staff principals, and leaders of C2 nodes (e.g., information operations cell, joint movement center) understand their authorities, their role in decisionmaking and controlling, and their relationships with others. The assignment of responsibilities and the delegation of authorities foster initiative and speed the C2 process. Joint force staff principals must understand that their primary role is to provide sufficient, relevant information to produce understanding or situational awareness for the JFC and for subordinate commanders. Once a decision is made, commanders depend on their staffs to communicate the decision to subordinates in a manner that quickly focuses the necessary capabilities *within the command to achieve the commander's intent*. The commander should give the staff the authority to make routine decisions *within the constraints of the commander's intent* while conducting operations. Appropriate application of the command relationships discussed previously in Chapter III, Section A, "Command Relationships," will help ensure that the requisite amount of control is applied while enabling

sufficient latitude for decentralized execution. Additionally, commander-staff and staff-staff relationships must be developed through training to promote the understanding of all regarding the direction and/or support required.

- **Information Management.** Control of information is a prerequisite to maintaining C2 of a joint operation. Identifying, requesting, receiving, tracking, and disseminating the needed information ensures that decision makers make informed, timely decisions. This requires efficient use of people, procedures, and systems to keep the commanders and staffs from being overwhelmed by information. The commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) must be made known, and development of an information management plan is necessary to address vertical and horizontal information flow, filtering, fusing, protecting, prioritizing, and common operational picture criteria. Effective use of information systems requires users to be knowledgeable about them and the criteria for usable information, as well as the need to protect both the systems and the information.
- **Implicit Communication.** Because JFCs seek to minimize restrictive control measures and detailed instructions, they must find efficient and effective ways to create cooperation and compliance. The JFC does this by fostering implicit communication and understanding with all subordinates. This common understanding builds teamwork and mutual trust, allowing intuitive, harmonious actions. Two joint C2 concepts that nurture implicit communication are the commander's intent and mission-type orders.

Doctrine and Policy for Joint Command and Control

- **Commander's intent** represents a unifying idea that allows decentralized execution within centralized, overarching guidance. It describes the commander's desired outcome, while allowing subordinates to exercise initiative in consonance with the commander's overall goals. During execution the situation may change, possibly making some assigned tasks obsolete, but the commander's intent is overarching and usually remains unchanged.
- JFCs use **mission-type orders** to decentralize execution. Mission-type orders direct a subordinate to perform a certain task without specifying how to accomplish it. The senior leaves the details of execution to the subordinate, allowing the freedom — and the obligation — to take whatever steps are necessary to deal with the changing situation. This freedom of action encourages the initiative needed to exploit the volatile nature of joint operations.
- **Timely Decisionmaking**. The JFC can get inside the adversary's decision and execution cycle by making more timely decisions. Doing so generates confusion and disorder and slows an adversary's decisionmaking. The commander who can gather information and make decisions faster and better will generate a quicker tempo of operations and gain a decided military advantage. Consequently, decisionmaking models and procedures must be flexible and allow abbreviation should the situation warrant it. Adoption of a decision aid(s) offers the commander and staff a method(s) for maintaining situational awareness of the ongoing operation as well as identifying critical decision points where the commander's action may be required to maintain force momentum.
- **Robust Integration, Synchronization, and Coordination Mechanisms**. Integration, synchronization, and coordination methods and tools encourage synergistic interaction among joint force components. Integration is achieved through joint operation planning and the skillful assimilation of forces, capabilities, and systems to enable their employment in a single, cohesive operation rather than a set of separate operations. A synchronization matrix may be employed to visually portray critical actions that must be accomplished by multiple elements of the joint force. Coordination is facilitated through the exchange of liaisons. These mechanisms provide the JFC with a linkage to the joint force staff and subordinate commands' activities, and works to execute plans and coordinate changes required by the unfolding situation. In interagency and/or multinational environments where unity of command may not be possible, unity of effort may be achieved through effective coordination. Constant coordination and cooperation between the combatant command and component staffs — and with other combatant commands — is a prerequisite for ensuring timely command awareness.
- **Battle Rhythm Discipline**. Battle rhythm is described as the sequencing and execution of actions and events within a joint force headquarters that are regulated by the flow of information and the decision cycle. Every joint force command headquarters has a rhythm regulated by the flow of information and the decision cycle. Scheduled and unscheduled meetings, briefings, electronic mail, and discussions are the methods by which information is imparted to the JFC, the staff, and the chain of command. Left uncontrolled, this rhythm can become a source of friction that drags on the JFC's decision

cycle. Conversely, by controlling the battle rhythm, the JFC accelerates the decision cycle and unobtrusively extends and enhances C2 over the joint force. **The keys to capturing and maintaining control over the battle rhythm are simplicity and a sensitivity to the components' battle rhythms**

•• Simple, focused displays of information delivered in a disciplined way are necessary. Information displayed or discussed should be mission-related. The attention of the JFC and joint staff is pulled both from above, by requirements from seniors, and from below, by the needs of component commanders and their staffs. These requirements must also be integrated into the activities of the JFC, but must not be allowed to dominate JFC actions. Technology offers a means to reduce the time required for conducting these essential C2 events. For example, video teleconferencing is a common method used in many headquarters to conduct scheduled and unscheduled meetings and conferences that include a wide range of key participants, some of whom may be on a different continent.

•• The JFC and staff must be sensitive to the battle rhythm of subordinate organizations. Component commanders also need information to function properly within their own decision cycles. The JFC should establish and require adherence to norms that increase the speed of the component commanders' decision cycles.

- **Responsive, Interoperable Support Systems.** ISR, space-based, and C4 support systems must be responsive in real time to provide the JFC with accurate, timely, relevant, and adequate information. Linking support systems that possess commonality, compatibility,

and standardization to the greatest extent possible will contribute to a higher state of interoperability and thus C2 utility. Integrating the support systems of multinational and other agency partners also must be considered.

- **Situational Awareness.** The primary objective that the staff seeks to attain for the commander and for subordinate commanders is understanding, or situational awareness — a prerequisite for commanders anticipating opportunities and challenges. True understanding should be the basis for information provided to commanders in order to make decisions. Knowledge of friendly capabilities and enemy capabilities, intentions, and likely courses of action (COAs) enables commanders to focus joint efforts where they best and most directly contribute to achieving objectives. Further, the JFC's situational awareness must be broad to include the actions and intentions of multinational partners, civilian agencies, adjacent commands, higher headquarters, and host-nation authorities.
- **Mutual Trust.** Decentralized execution, operating within the JFC's intent, and mission-type orders capitalize on the initiative of subordinate commanders. However, for these methods to work within a joint force and, indeed, for the joint force to function at all, there must be a high degree of mutual trust. Trust among the commanders and staffs in a joint force expands the JFC's options and enhances flexibility, agility, and the freedom to take the initiative when conditions warrant. The JFC trusts the chain of command, leaders, and staffs to use the authority delegated to them to fulfill their responsibility for mission accomplishment, and the joint force trusts the JFC to use component capabilities appropriately. Mutual trust results from

Doctrine and Policy for Joint Command and Control

honest efforts to learn about and understand the capabilities that each member brings to the joint force, demonstrated competence, and planning and training together

b **Decision Model** JOPES, which is used for deliberate and crisis action planning and execution, is essentially the "model" used by the joint community to make decisions. Various other models are in existence that may be applied to assist JFCs in making decisions, exercising authority over subordinate commands, and accomplishing their missions. These models describe processes that should be understood by commanders and staff in order to fully realize the tenets of C2. The JOPES is the principal DOD system for translating policy decisions into operation plans and orders in order to make the most effective use of US military capabilities and to meet US requirements for the employment of military forces. The JOPES includes deliberate and crisis action planning processes. It guides US military action during crises and transition to operations through rapid, coordinated planning and implementation of plans. Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes.

For further guidance on decisionmaking, see Appendix A, "The Decision Cycle" in JP 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

13. Organization for Joint Command and Control

Component and supporting commands' organizations and capabilities must be integrated into a joint organization that enables effective and efficient joint C2. The C2

structure is centered on the JFC's mission and concept of operations, available forces and capabilities, and joint force staff composition, capabilities, location, and facilities. The JFC should be guided in this effort by the following principles:

a **Simplicity.** Unity of command must be maintained and unity of effort fostered through an unambiguous chain of command, well-defined command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities.

b **Span of Control.** The desired reach of the JFC's authority and direction over assigned or attached forces will vary depending on the mission and the JFC's ability to C2 the actions required. Span of control is based on many factors including the number of subordinates, number of activities, range of weapon systems, force capabilities, the size and complexity of the operational area, and the method used to control operations (centralized or decentralized).

c **Unit Integrity.** To achieve unity of effort in accomplishment of the joint force mission, component forces should remain organized as designed and in the manner accustomed through training. The JFC may reorganize component units, if necessary. However, these situations should be rare and any reorganization affecting the unit integrity of component forces should be done only after careful consultation and coordination with the component commander.

d **Interoperability.** of joint force components' capabilities must be ensured. The simplest and most streamlined chain of command can be thwarted by an absence of interoperability among the components' forces and systems. This includes an emphasis on the use of joint doctrine and JTTP, development of ISR, C4 systems, and logistic architectures, joint training and exercises, and establishment of a liaison structure.

Chapter III

14. Joint Command and Control Support

A command and control support (C2S) system, which includes interoperable supporting C4 systems, is the JFC's principal tool used to collect, transport, process, disseminate, and protect data and information. Joint C2S systems must provide relevant information in a useable form to allow relevant and timely JFC decisions and provide feedback on the attendant outcome. To facilitate the execution and processes of C2, military C4 systems must furnish rapid, reliable, and secure information throughout the chain of command. Current operations, intelligence, logistic, and planning functions all depend on responsive C4 systems that tie together all aspects of joint operations and allow the JFCs and their staffs to initiate, direct, monitor, question, and react. Ultimately, effective C2 depends on the right person having the right information at the right time to support decisionmaking.

For further guidance on C2S systems, refer to JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations.

15. National Military Command System

a The NMCS is the priority component of the Global Command and Control System designed to support the NCA in exercising their responsibilities. The NMCS provides the means by which the President and the Secretary of Defense can send and receive information that supports timely decisions. It also supports their communications with the combatant commanders or the commanders of other established commands. The NMCS must be capable of providing information to the NCA so they can select and direct appropriate and timely responses and ensure their implementation. In addition, the NMCS

supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities.

b The NMCS includes four primary nodes (the National Military Command Center, Alternate National Military Command Center (Site R), United States Strategic Command Center, and National Airborne Operations Center) and such other command centers as may be designated by the Secretary of Defense. Support of the NMCS will be the priority function of all primary and alternate command centers.

c An enduring command structure with survivable C4 systems is required and fundamental to NMCS's continuity of operations.


For further detail concerning the NMCS, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 6120 05, Manual for Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance for Joint Operations, Joint Interface Operational Procedures for Message Text Formats, and JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations.

16. Nuclear Command and Control System

a The purpose of nuclear forces is to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to serve as a hedge against the emergence of an overwhelming conventional threat. Control of US nuclear weapons has been established to preclude unauthorized or inadvertent use either by US or allied forces, foreign powers, or terrorists without degrading the operational readiness of these weapons. Command is managed via dedicated media message delivery systems standardized for joint operations. C2 must support theater and strategic employment of nuclear weapons through all phases of a conflict.

Doctrine and Policy for Joint Command and Control

b National policy requires centralized execution authority of nuclear weapons. The President is the sole authority for release of US nuclear weapons. The President's decision to authorize release of these weapons is based on recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, geographic combatant commanders, and allies. The President will monitor all aspects of the authorization and employment of nuclear weapons. Release and related instructions will be transmitted for the NCA via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with established emergency action procedures.



For further detail concerning the nuclear C2 system refer to JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, and other publications in the JP 3-12 series.

c Command Responsibilities

- The geographic combatant commander is responsible for promptly requesting nuclear support. The commander must be able to ascertain the military situation, assess intelligence inputs and pass information and conclusions to higher levels of control, and finally, upon receipt of execution instructions, control assigned forces to achieve the desired objectives. Subordinate commanders responsible for target nominations submit requests to the geographic combatant commander.

- Execution procedures must be flexible and allow for changes in the situation. Commanders must ensure that constraints and release guidance are met. The commander controlling the nuclear strike package must **maintain communications with the delivery unit and establish a chain of succession** that will avoid loss of control resulting from the loss of a headquarters.
- Operations with multinational forces (MNFs) require multinational doctrine and procedures for taskings, conflict resolution, target selection, and analysis. The US element commander in a multinational command will provide guidance and publish directives on the use of nuclear weapons by US forces in such commands.
- The Nuclear Supplement to the JSCP describes situations that could lead to a request for the selective release of nuclear weapons. The commander's request must communicate sufficient information about the situation that has led to the request for the release of nuclear weapons so that there is a complete understanding at the highest level of government.

For further detail concerning the employment guidance for nuclear weapons, refer to theater-specific plans, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Emergency Action Procedures, Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command Emergency Action Procedures, and the Nuclear Supplement to the JSCP.

17 Continuity of Operations

Continuity of operations (COOP) is the degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of functions, tasks, or duties necessary.

Chapter III

to accomplish a military action or mission in carrying out the national military strategy. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commands, and the Defense Agencies are required to prepare, implement, and exercise COOP plans and to ensure that COOP plans

are updated, tested, and validated at least every 2 years.

For further detail concerning COOP, refer to DODD 3020.26, Continuity of Operations (COOP) Policy and Planning, and CJCSM 3410.01, The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Continuity of Operations Plan.

CHAPTER IV

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

"We are a strong nation, but we cannot live to ourselves and remain strong."

George C. Marshall

1. General

The United States often has common or mutually compatible security interests and participates in operations with other nations. Contemporary threats to collective security objectives have become more ambiguous and regionally focused since the end of the Cold War.

a Where commonality or compatibility of interests exists, nations may enter into political, economic, informational, and military partnerships. These partnerships occur in both regional and worldwide patterns as nations seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats, and conduct foreign humanitarian assistance and peace operations (PO). Cultural, psychological, economic, technological, informational, and political factors as well as transnational dangers all impact on multinational operations. Many operation plans to deter or counter threats are prepared within the context of a treaty or alliance framework. Sometimes they are developed in a less structured coalition framework, based on temporary agreements or arrangements. Much of the information and guidance provided for unified action and joint operations are applicable to multinational operations. However, differences in laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion, and language within alliances and coalitions must be considered. Normally, each alliance or coalition develops its own protocols and contingency plans to guide multinational action.

b No single command structure best fits the needs of all alliances and coalitions. Each coalition or alliance will create the structure that will best meet the objectives, political realities, and constraints of the participating nations. Political considerations heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure. However, participating nations should strive to achieve unity of command for the operation to the maximum extent possible, with missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities clearly defined and understood by all participants. While command relationships are well defined in US doctrine, they are not necessarily part of the doctrinal lexicon of nations with whom the United States may operate in an alliance or coalition.

2. Multinational Unity of Effort

Attaining unity of effort through unity of command for a multinational operation may not be politically feasible, but it should be a goal. Figure IV-1 lists some other principles that must be attained to ensure unity of effort among allied or coalition forces.

a First, there must be a **common understanding** among all national forces of the **overall aim** of the MNF and the **concept for its attainment**. Simplicity of plan and organization is essential.

b **Coordinated policy**, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders' authority over national logistics (including infrastructure) and ISR, is **required**. Coordinated planning for rules of engagement (ROE), fratricide prevention, deception, information operations,



Figure IV-1 Principles of Multinational Unity of Effort

communications, special weapons, source and employment of reserves, and timing of operations is essential for unity of effort. Actions to improve interoperability and the ability to share information need to be addressed early. This includes an emphasis on the uses of multinational doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures, development of ISR, C4 systems, and logistic architectures, multinational training and exercises, and establishment of liaison structures. Nations should exchange qualified liaison officers at the earliest opportunity to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort.

c. Finally, commanders and their representatives must establish and maintain trust and confidence among the MNFs. Plain and objective communication together with common courtesy, is essential.

3. Multinational Organizational Structure

a. As in the case of unified action and joint operations, basic organizational options are area or functional orientation and single-

Service or joint organization, to which are added national or multinational formations. Regardless of how the MNF is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces normally establishes a national component to ensure effective administration of its forces. Its functions are similar to a Service component command at the unified command level in a US joint organization. (The US military structure that is used to conduct multinational operations normally is a JTF.) The logistic support element of this component is referred to as the national support element. The national component provides a means to administer and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations directly to the multinational commander, and facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations. A multinational joint logistic center is an option available to the coalition and/or alliance commander to centrally coordinate specified logistic functions. As in the case of a joint headquarters, a multinational headquarters should reflect the general composition of the

Multinational Operations

MNF as a whole. The national element will be the vehicle for execution of title 10, USC responsibilities for US forces (see Figure IV-2 for a notional multinational command structure)

b After considering the basic organizational options, MNF commanders may assign the following

- National single-Service or joint forces to a specific operational area (e.g., area of operations, joint operations area [JOA])

- National single-Service or joint forces to a specific function (e.g., electronic warfare)

- A multinational joint force to a specific operational area (e.g., amphibious objective area) or function (e.g., riot control, advance force operations)

- c US commanders should expect to conduct operations as part of an MNF. US forces may participate in these multinational efforts across a range of military operations




Figure IV-2 Notional Multinational Command Structure

Chapter IV

in concert with a variety of USG agencies, military forces of other nations, local authorities, NGOs, and IOs

4. Command and Control of US Forces in Multinational Operations

a **Chain of Command.** *The chain of command from the President to the lowest US commander in the field remains inviolate.* The President retains command authority over US forces. This includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and employment planning along with organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and protecting military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It is sometimes prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of effort) to place appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives (see restrictions below). In making the determination to place US forces under the OPCON of non-US commanders, the *President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE.* There is no intention to subvert command links. While unity of command is certainly an important element of any command structure, the emphasis may change in operations when coordination and consensus building become the key elements and the means to achieve unity of effort. Additional C2 considerations include the following

- **Operational Control.** OPCON is a **type of command authority.** Within the US command structure, OPCON is specified, then delegated and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Any large scale participation of US forces in a mission that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted

under US command and OPCON or through competent regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or ad hoc coalitions. On a case-by-case basis, the President may place US forces participating in multilateral PO under UN auspices under the OPCON (with modifications) of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council. The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over US forces. The greater the US military role, the less likely it will be that the United States will agree to have a UN commander exercise OPCON over US forces. OPCON for UN multilateral PO is given for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to US forces already deployed by the President and to US units led by US officers. Within the limits of OPCON, a foreign UN commander cannot change the mission or deploy US forces outside the operational area agreed to by the President. Nor may the foreign UN commander separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization.

- **US Forces Under OPCON of a Foreign Commander.** The fundamental elements of US command apply when US forces are placed under the OPCON of a foreign commander. US commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to higher US military authorities in addition to foreign commanders. For matters perceived as illegal under US or international law, or outside the mandate of the mission to which the United States has agreed, US commanders will first attempt resolution with the appropriate foreign commanders. If issues remain unresolved, the US commanders will refer the matters to higher US authorities. Concerns relating

to legality, mission mandate, and prudence must be addressed early in the planning process. These same considerations apply to foreign forces placed under the OPCON of US MNF commanders. Nations do not relinquish their national interests by participating in multinational operations. US commanders must be prepared to deal with these issues as they arise during an operation. This is one of the major distinguishing characteristics of operating in the multinational environment. In multinational operations, consensus through compromise often is essential to success. The United States will continue to work with MNFs to streamline C2 and maximize effective coordination.

- **Tactical Control.** TACON is another form of command authority to be exercised during multinational operations. It provides for the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish the missions or tasks assigned. The commander of the parent unit continues to exercise OPCON (when so authorized) and ADCON (when so authorized) over that unit unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.
- **Support.** Supporting relationships will be established among participating forces in multinational operations. The establishing authority is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commander understand the

degree of authority that the supported commander is granted and the opportunities for establishing mutual support arrangements among participating forces. US force commanders must be apprised of the opportunities, limitations, and/or conditions under which logistic support may be provided to forces of other nations.

- **Coordinating Authority.** In many cases coordinating authority may be the only acceptable means of accomplishing a multinational mission. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority by which command or control may be exercised. It is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. Use of coordinating authority requires agreement among participants, as the commander exercising coordinating authority does not have the authority to resolve disputes. For this reason, its use during operations should be limited. It is an extremely restrictive tool for commanders.

b **Termination.** The President has the right to terminate US participation in multinational operations at any time.

For further details concerning multinational operations refer to JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, and Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine.

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER V

DOCTRINE AND POLICY FOR JOINT COMMANDS

Our most challenging task is to determine how to organize our strengths into a formidable joint force.

SECTION A. ESTABLISHING UNIFIED, SPECIFIED, AND SUBORDINATE JOINT COMMANDS

1. General

Joint forces are established at **three levels** unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and JTFs

a **Authority to Establish** In accordance with the UCP, **combatant commands are established by the President**, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. **Commanders of unified commands** may establish **subordinate unified commands** when so authorized by the *Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*. JTFs can be established by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, subordinate unified commander, or an existing JTF commander

b **Basis for Establishing Joint Forces.** Joint forces can be established on either a geographic area or functional basis

- **Geographic Area** Establishing a joint force on a geographic area basis is the most common method to assign responsibility for continuing operations. The title of the areas and their delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive. **A JFC assigned a geographic area is considered an area commander.** Note Only commanders of geographic combatant commands are assigned

AORs Subordinate JFCs normally are assigned other operational areas

For further information on operational areas refer to JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations

•• The boundaries defining these AORs are not intended to delineate restrictive geographic AORs. **Combatant commanders may operate forces wherever required to accomplish their missions**

•• The UCP contains descriptions of the geographic boundaries assigned to combatant commanders. It provides that, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, **when significant operations overlap the boundaries of two combatant commands, a JTF will be formed** and assigned an appropriate JOA. Command of this JTF will be determined by the NCA and forces transferred to the appropriate combatant commander

•• **Each area commander will be kept apprised of the presence, mission, movement, and duration of stay of forces within the AOR and/or JOA other than those assigned to the area command.** The area commander also will be apprised of the command channels under which these transient forces will function. The authority directing movement or permanent location of transient forces is responsible for providing this information

•• Forces not assigned to an area commander often are assigned missions that require them to cross AOR and/or JOA boundaries. In such cases, it is the duty of the joint force area commander to assist the operations of these forces to the extent of existing capabilities and consistent with other assigned missions. Area commanders may be assigned specific responsibilities with respect to installations or activities exempted from their control, such as logistic support or area defense, particularly if enemy forces should traverse the area commander's AOR and/or JOA to attack the exempted installation or activity. Geographic combatant commanders' force protection policies take precedence over all force protection policies or programs of any other DOD component deployed in that command's AOR and not under the security responsibility of the Department of State (DOS). The combatant commander or a designated representative (e.g., a JTF or component commander) shall delineate the force protection measures for all DOD personnel not under the responsibility of the DOS.

•• **Transient forces** within the assigned AOR of a combatant commander are **subject to the area commander's orders in some instances** (e.g., for coordination of emergency defense, force protection, or allocation of local facilities). However, transient forces are **not part of the area commander's command**, and the area commander is **not in their normal chain of command**.

• **Functional.** Sometimes a joint force based solely on military functions without respect to a specific geographic region is **more suitable** to fix responsibility for certain types of continuing operations (e.g., the unified commands for transportation, space, SO,

and strategic nuclear operations). The **commander of a joint force** established on a functional basis is assigned a **functional responsibility** by the establishing authority.

•• When defining functional responsibilities, the focus should be on the **effect desired or service provided**. The title of the functional responsibility and its delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive.

•• The missions or tasks assigned to the commander of a functional command may require that **certain installations and activities of that commander be exempt, partially or wholly, from the command authority of an area commander** in whose area they are located or within which they operate. Such exemptions must be specified by the authority who establishes the functional command. Such exemptions do not relieve the commanders of functional commands of the responsibility to coordinate with the affected area commanders.

c **Organizing Joint Forces.** A JFC has the **authority to organize forces** to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations (see Figure V-1). The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. The JFC will **establish subordinate commands, assign responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate command relationships, and establish coordinating instructions for the component commanders**. Sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. **Unity of effort** is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. **Centralized planning and direction** is




Figure V-1 Possible Components In a Joint Force

essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. **Decentralized execution** is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. **When organizing joint forces with MNFs, simplicity and clarity** are critical. Complex or unclear command relationships or organization are counterproductive to developing synergy among MNFs.

- The **composition of the JFC's staff** will reflect the **composition of the joint force** to ensure that those responsible for employing joint forces have a thorough knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of assigned or attached forces

- **All joint forces include Service components**, because administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service components. **Service forces** may be assigned or attached to subordinate joint forces without the formal creation of a respective Service component command of that joint force. The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and the scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service forces for conducting operations

Chapter V

See paragraph 9, "Service Component Commands," below for more information on Service component commands

- The JFC can establish **functional component commands to conduct operations**. Functional component commands can be appropriate when **forces from two or more Military Departments must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission**. Joint force land, air, maritime, and SO component commanders are examples of functional components. (NOTE: **Functional component commands** are component commands of a joint force and **do not constitute a "joint force"** with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force as described in this document, even when composed of forces from two or more Military Departments.) When a **functional component command employs forces from more than one Service, the functional component commander's staff must be joint** and requires advanced planning for efficient operation. Joint staff billets for needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified. Those individuals should be used when the functional component command is formed for exercises or actual operations.

See paragraph 10, "Functional Component Commands," for more information on functional component commands

- Normally joint forces are organized with a **combination of Service and functional component commands** with operational responsibilities. Joint forces organized with Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps components may have **SOF** (if assigned) organized as a

functional component. The JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of the Service and functional component commanders, however, the Service responsibilities (i.e., administrative and logistics) of the components must be given due consideration by the JFC.

- The JFC has full authority to **assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination** among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the JFC while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the Service organizations. The **following policy** for C2 of United States Marine Corps tactical air (TACAIR) recognizes this and deals with Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) aviation during sustained operations ashore.

•• **The MAGTF commander will retain OPCON of organic air assets.** The primary mission of the MAGTF aviation combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground combat element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets normally will be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the JFC, for tasking through the joint force air component commander (JFACC), for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the JFC for tasking through the JFACC for the support of other components of the joint force or the joint force as a whole. Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the geographic combatant or subordinate JFC in the exercise of OPCON to assign missions, redirect efforts (e.g., the

Doctrine and Policy for Joint Commands

reapportionment and/or reallocation of any MAGTF TACAIR sorties when it has been determined by the JFC that they are required for higher priority missions), and direct coordination among the subordinate commanders to ensure unity of effort in accomplishment of the overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force

NOTE Sortes provided for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance are not "excess" sorties and will be covered in the air tasking order. These sorties provide a distinct contribution to the overall joint force effort. The JFC must exercise integrated control of air defense, long-range reconnaissance, and interdiction aspects of the joint operation or theater campaign. Excess sorties are in addition to these sorties.

2. Unified Command

A unified command is a command with broad continuing missions under a single commander, is composed of forces from two or more Military Departments, and is established by the President through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff (see Figure V-2). The unified commander can adapt a **command structure** using any of the following **six options**: **subordinate unified command**, **JTF**, **functional component**, **Service component**, **single-Service force** (normally the combatant commander assigns operations requiring a single-Service force to a Service component), or **specific operational forces** that, because of the mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the combatant commander. These options do not in any way limit the commanders' authority to organize their forces as they see fit.

a Unless authorized by the Secretary of Defense, the **commander of a unified command will not act as the commander of a subordinate command**. For example, the commander of a unified command also should not act as a functional component commander without prior approval of the Secretary of Defense.

b **Criteria for Establishing a Unified Command.** When either or both of the following criteria apply generally to a situation, a **unified command normally is required to secure the necessary unity of effort**.




Figure V-2 Unified Command Organizational Options

Chapter V

- A broad continuing mission exists requiring execution by significant forces of two or more Military Departments and necessitating a single strategic direction
- Any combination of the following exists and significant forces of two or more Military Departments are involved
 - A large-scale operation requiring positive control of tactical execution by a large and complex force,
 - A large geographic or functional area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations therein, and/or
 - Necessity for common use of limited logistic means

c The **commander of a unified command** will have a **joint staff** (see guidance in Section B of this chapter) Normally, a member of the joint staff also will not function as the commander of a subordinate force The commander of a unified command has the authority to **communicate to the Services** views on the nomination of senior officers serving in the command for immediate follow-on assignment, further joint assignments, and promotion potential

d **Primary Responsibilities of the Commander of a Unified Command** The combatant commanders are responsible for the development and production of joint operation plans During peacetime, they act to deter war and prepare for war by planning for the transition to war and military operations other than war (MOOTW) During war, they plan and conduct campaigns and major operations to accomplish assigned missions **Combatant command responsibilities include the following.**

- **Planning and conducting military operations** in response to crises, to include the security of the command and protection of the United States and its possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion The JSCP tasks the combatant commanders to prepare joint operation plans that may be OPLANs, CONPLANs with or without time-phased force and deployment data, or functional plans -

For further detail concerning joint planning, refer to JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

- **Maintaining the preparedness of the command** to carry out missions assigned to the command
- **Carrying out assigned missions, tasks, and responsibilities.**
- **Assigning tasks to, and directing coordination among, the subordinate commands** to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the assigned missions
- **Communicating directly with the following.**
 - The **Service Chiefs** on single-Service matters as appropriate
 - The **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** on other matters, including the preparation of strategic, joint operation, and logistic plans, strategic and operational direction of assigned forces, conduct of combat operations, and any other necessary function of command required to accomplish the mission
 - The **Secretary of Defense**, in accordance with applicable directives

Doctrine and Policy for Joint Commands

- **Subordinate elements**, including the development organizations of the **Defense agency or the Military Department** directly supporting the development and acquisition of the combatant commander's C2 system in coordination with the Director of the Defense agency or Secretary of the Military Department concerned

- Keeping the **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** promptly advised of **significant events and incidents** that occur in the functional area or geographic AOR, particularly those incidents that could create **national or international repercussions**

For further detail, refer to Chapter I, "Doctrine and Policy Governing Unified Direction of Forces," paragraph 8, Chapter II, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components," Section D, "Functions of the Combatant Commanders", and Chapter III, "Doctrine and Policy for Joint Command and Control " Section A "Command Relationships " paragraph 3

e Authority of the Commander of a Unified Command in an Emergency

- In the event of a **major emergency** in the geographic combatant commander's AOR requiring the use of all available forces, the **geographic combatant commander may temporarily assume OPCON of all forces in the assigned AOR**, including those of another command, but excluding those forces scheduled for or actually engaged in the execution of specific operational missions under joint operation plans approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would be interfered with by the contemplated use of such

forces. The **commander determines when such an emergency exists** and, on assuming OPCON over forces of another command, **immediately advises the following individual(s)** of the nature and estimated duration of employment of such forces

- The **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

- The appropriate **operational commanders**

- The **Service Chief** of the forces concerned

- The **authority to assume OPCON** of forces in the event of a major emergency **will not be delegated**

- Unusual circumstances in wartime, emergencies, or crises involving MOOTW (such as a terrorist incident) may require a **geographic combatant commander to directly exercise COCOM through a shortened chain of command to forces assigned for the purpose of resolving the crisis**. Additionally, the combatant commander can assume COCOM, **in the event of war or an emergency** that prevents control through normal channels, of **security assistance organizations** within the commander's general geographic AOR, or **as directed by the NCA**. All commanders bypassed in such exceptional command arrangements will be advised of all directives issued to and reports sent from elements under such exceptional command arrangements. Such arrangements will be terminated as soon as practicable, consistent with mission accomplishment

f Geographic Combatant Commanders' Authority for Force Protection.

Chapter V

- Combatant commanders with geographic responsibilities shall exercise authority for force protection over all DOD personnel (including their dependents) assigned, attached, transiting through, or training in the combatant commander's AOR, except for those for whom the chief of mission retains security responsibility
- This authority enables combatant commanders to change, modify, prescribe, and enforce force protection measures for covered forces
- Directives from combatant commanders having authority for force protection should consider the worldwide mission of those commanders with global responsibilities

For further detail concerning the force protection authority of the geographic combatant commanders, refer to DODD 2000 12 DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program.

g Assumption of Temporary Command In the temporary absence of a combatant commander from the command,

interim command will pass to the deputy commander If a deputy commander has not been designated, interim command will pass to the **next senior officer** present for duty who is eligible to exercise command, regardless of Service affiliation

3. Specified Command

There are currently no specified commands designated. Because the option to create a specified command still exists, the following information is provided. A specified command is a **command that has broad continuing missions** and is established by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see Figure V-3)

a Composition Although a specified command normally is composed of forces from one Military Department, it may include units and staff representation from other Military Departments

b Transfer of Forces from Other Military Departments. When units of other Military Departments are transferred (assigned or attached) to the commander of a specified command, the purpose and duration




Figure V-3 Specified Command Organizational Options (When Designated)

of the transfer normally will be indicated. Such transfer, in and of itself, does not constitute the specified command as a unified command or a JTF. If the transfer is major and to be of long duration, a unified command normally would be established in lieu of a specified command.

c Authority and Responsibilities The commander of a specified command has the same authority and responsibilities as the commander of a unified command, except that no authority exists to establish subordinate unified commands.

4. Subordinate Unified Command

When authorized by the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, **commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands** (also called **subunified commands**) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for

unified commands (see Figure V-4). A subordinate unified command (e.g., United States Forces Korea, Special Operations Command of Joint Forces Command) may be established on a **geographical area** or **functional basis**. **Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands** and exercise OPCON of assigned commands and forces and normally over attached forces within the assigned JOA or functional area. **The commanders of components or Service forces of subordinate unified commands have responsibilities and missions similar to those for component commanders within a unified command.** The Service component or Service force commanders of a subordinate unified command normally will communicate directly with the commanders of the Service component command of the unified command on Service-specific matters and inform the commander of the subordinate unified command as that commander directs.




Figure V-4 Subordinate Unified Command Organizational Options

5. Joint Task Force

As shown in Figure V-5, a **JTF** is a **joint force** that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing JTF commander (A naval force consisting of Navy and Marine Corps forces does not by itself constitute a JTF)

a A JTF may be established on a **geographical area** or **functional basis** when the mission has a **specific limited objective** and does **not require overall centralized control of logistics**. The mission assigned to a JTF should require execution of responsibilities involving a joint force on a significant scale and close integration of effort, or should require coordination within a subordinate area or coordination of local defense of a subordinate area. A JTF is **dissolved by the proper authority** when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.

b The authority establishing a JTF designates the commander and assigns the mission and forces.

c The commander of a JTF exercises **OPCON** over assigned (and normally over attached) forces. The commander is responsible for making **recommendations to the superior commander** on the proper employment of assigned and attached forces and for accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned by the establishing commander. JTF commanders also are responsible to the establishing commander for the **conduct of joint training of assigned forces**.

d Although not recommended, due to the need to concentrate on JTF-level considerations, **the JTF commander also may act as the commander of a subordinate command, when authorized by the establishing authority**. When this is the case, the commander also has the responsibilities associated with the subordinate command for




Figure V-5 Joint Task Force Organizational Options

the forces belonging to the parent Service. The JTF establishing authority should consider that dual-hatting a commander also means dual-hatting the commander's staff that can result in forcing the staff to operate at the operational and tactical levels simultaneously.

e. The JTF commander will have a **joint staff** with appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service or functional component having significant forces assigned to the command.

f. JTF headquarters basing depends on the JTF mission, operational environment, and available capabilities and support. Basing options for a JTF headquarters include the following:

- Land-based,
- Sea-based,
- Initially sea-based, then transition to a different land-based staff, or
- Initially sea-based, then moves ashore while retaining control.

For further detail concerning JTFs, refer to JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

SECTION B. THE COMMANDER, STAFF, AND COMPONENTS OF A JOINT FORCE

6. Commander Responsibilities

a. **Responsibilities of a Superior Commander.** Although specific responsibilities will vary, every superior commander possesses the general responsibilities to provide the following:

- **Timely communication** of clear-cut missions or tasks, together with the role of each subordinate in the superior's plan. Tasks must be realistic and leave the subordinate as much freedom of execution as possible.
- **Forces and other means** in a timely manner to immediate subordinates for accomplishing assigned tasks. This includes the requisite time to plan and prepare for military action.
- **All available information** to subordinates that bears on the changing situation, including changes in plans, missions and tasks, resources, and friendly, enemy, and environmental situations.
- **Delegation of authority** to subordinates commensurate with their responsibilities.

b. **Responsibilities of a Subordinate Commander.** In addition to other responsibilities that change according to circumstances, **all subordinate commanders possess the general responsibilities to provide for the following:**

- **The accomplishment of missions or tasks** assigned by the plans and orders of the superior. Authority normally is given to the subordinate commander to select the methodology for accomplishing the mission, however, this may be limited by establishing directives issued by the superior commander to ensure effective joint operations. When required by a changing situation, a subordinate commander may depart in some measure from the plan if the action will not unnecessarily jeopardize friendly forces and is in the best interest of better accomplishing the overall objective. Any such departure from the plan by a

Chapter V

subordinate commander should, if possible, be coordinated with other concerned commanders prior to departure from the plan. In addition, the departure must be communicated as soon as practicable to the superior

- **Advice to the superior commander** regarding employment possibilities of and consequences to the subordinate command, cooperation with appropriate government and nongovernmental agencies, and other matters of common concern
- **Timely information to the superior commander** relating to the subordinate commander's situation and progress


c Responsibilities of Adjacent Commanders. Commanders who share a common superior or a common boundary are responsible for the following

- **Consider the impact** of one's own actions or inactions on adjacent commanders
- **Provide timely information** to adjacent commanders regarding one's own intentions and actions, as well as those of nonmilitary agencies or of the enemy, which may influence adjacent activity
- **Support** adjacent commanders as required by the common aim and the unfolding situation
- **Coordinate the support** provided and received

d Responsibilities of Deputy Commanders. Deputy commanders in a joint force may be designated as the JFC's principal assistant available to replace the JFC, if needed. The deputy commander should not be a member of the same Service as the JFC. The deputy commander's responsibilities may include the following

- Performing special duties (e.g., chair the joint targeting coordination board, cognizance of liaison personnel reporting to the joint force headquarters, interagency coordination)
- Working with the components to keep the commander updated
- Refining the relationship with the components to ensure the most efficient and effective command relationships
- Tracking the JFC's CCIR to ensure compliance

7. Staff of a Joint Force



A joint staff should be established for commands comprised of more than one Service. The staff of the commander of a combatant command, subordinate unified command, JTF, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Service) must be composed of Service members that comprise significant elements of the joint force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force

a Basic Doctrine

- A JFC is authorized to **organize the staff** and **assign responsibilities** to individual Service members assigned to the staff as deemed necessary to ensure **unity of**

effort and accomplishment of assigned missions

- A joint staff should be reasonably **balanced** as to **numbers, experience, influence of position, and rank of the** Service members concerned. The composition of a joint staff should be commensurate with the **composition of forces** and the **character of the contemplated operations** to ensure that the staff understands the capabilities, needs, and limitations of each element of the force. The **number of personnel** on a joint staff should be kept to the **minimum** consistent with the task to be performed. The joint staff members should be assigned long enough to gain experience and be effective.
- **Each person assigned** to serve on a joint staff will be **responsible to the JFC** and should have thorough knowledge of the JFC's policies.
- The commander of a force for which a joint staff is established should ensure that the **recommendations of any member** of the staff receive **consideration**.
- **The degree of authority to act in the name of and for the commander is a matter to be specifically prescribed by the commander.**
- **Orders and directives** from a higher to a subordinate command should be issued **in the name of the commander of the higher command to the commander of the immediate subordinate command** and not directly to elements of that subordinate command. Exceptions may sometimes be required under certain emergency or crisis situations. C2 of nuclear forces is an example of one such exception.
- To expedite the execution of orders and directives and to promote teamwork between commands, a **commander may authorize the command's staff officers to communicate directly with appropriate staff officers of other commands** concerning the details of plans and directives that have been received or are to be issued.
- **Each staff division must coordinate its actions and planning with the other staff divisions concerned** and keep them informed of actions taken and the progress achieved. Normally, each of the general joint staff divisions is assigned responsibility for a particular type of problem and subject and for coordinating the work of the special staff divisions and other agencies of the staff that relate to that problem or subject.
- **Joint staff divisions and special staff sections** should be **limited** to those functions for which the JFC is responsible or that require the commander's general supervision in the interest of unity of effort.
- The authority that establishes a joint force should make the provisions for **furnishing necessary personnel** for the commander's staff.

b **Staff Organization** The staff organization should generally conform to the principles established in this section

- **Principal Staff Officer.** The chief of staff functions as the **principal staff officer, assistant, and advisor** to the commander. The chief of staff coordinates and directs the work of the staff divisions. One or more **deputies** to the chief of staff and a **secretary** of the staff may be provided to assist the chief of staff in the performance of

Chapter V

assigned duties. A deputy chief of staff normally should be from a Service other than that of the chief of staff. The secretary of the staff is the executive in the office of the chief of staff and is responsible for routing and forwarding correspondence and papers and maintaining office records.

- **Personal Staff Group of the Commander.** The commander's personal staff performs duties prescribed by the commander and is responsible directly to the commander. This group, normally composed of aides to the commander and staff officers handling special matters over which the commander wishes to exercise close personal control, will usually include a staff judge advocate, POLAD, public affairs officer, inspector general, provost marshal, chaplain, surgeon, historian, and others as directed.
- **Special Staff Group.** The special staff group consists of representatives of technical or administrative services and can include representatives from government or nongovernmental agencies. The general functions of the special staff include furnishing technical, administrative, and tactical advice and recommendations to the commander and other staff officers, preparing the parts of plans, estimates, and orders in which they have primary interest, and coordinating and supervising the activities for which each staff division is responsible. Because the headquarters of a joint force is concerned primarily with broad operational matters rather than with technical problems associated with administration and support of assigned and/or attached forces, this group should be small to avoid unnecessary duplication of corresponding staff sections or divisions within the Service component headquarters.

When a commander's headquarters is organized without a special staff group, the officers who might otherwise compose the special staff group may be organized as branches of the divisions of the joint staff or as additional joint staff divisions.

- **Joint Force Staff Directorates.** The general or joint staff group is made up of staff directorates corresponding to the major functions of command, such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and C4 systems. The head of each staff directorate may be designated as a director or as an assistant chief of staff. The directors or assistant chiefs of staff provide staff supervision for the commander of all activities pertaining to their respective functions.
 - **Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1).** The J-1 is charged with manpower management, the formulation of personnel policies, and supervision of the administration of personnel of the command (including civilians under the supervision or control of the command) and enemy prisoners of war. Because many of the problems confronting this division are necessarily of a single-Service nature, the division should consider the established policies of the Military Departments.
 - **Intelligence Directorate (J-2).** The primary function of the J-2 is to support the commander and the staff by ensuring the availability of reliable intelligence and timely indications and warnings on the characteristics of the operational area. Within the scope of the essential elements of information, the J-2 participates in joint staff planning and in planning, coordinating, directing, integrating, and controlling a concentration of intelligence efforts on the proper items.

of intelligence interest at the appropriate time. The J-2 tells the JFC what the adversaries or potential adversaries are doing, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future. Intelligence assists the JFC and staff in visualizing the operational area and in achieving information superiority. Intelligence also contributes to information superiority by attempting to discern an adversary's probable intent and future COA. The J-2 also ensures adequate intelligence collection and reporting to disclose enemy capabilities and intentions as quickly as possible. The J-2 is responsible for the operation of the **joint intelligence center and/or joint analysis center** for the combatant commander and the joint intelligence support element for a subordinate JFC.

•• **Operations Directorate (J-3).** The J-3 assists the commander in the discharge of assigned responsibility for the **direction and control of operations**, beginning with planning and follow-through until specific operations are completed. In this capacity the J-3 **plans, coordinates, and integrates** operations. The flexibility and range of modern forces require close coordination and integration for effective unity of effort. When the joint staff includes a plans directorate (J-5), the J-5 performs the long-range or future planning responsibilities. The J-3 is responsible for the operation of the **Joint Operations Center** for the JFC.

•• **Logistics Directorate (J-4).** The J-4 is charged with the **formulation of logistic plans** and with the **coordination and supervision** of supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, engineering, salvage, procurement, health services, mortuary affairs, security assistance, host-nation support, and related logistic activities. Because many

of the problems confronting this directorate are necessarily of a single-Service nature, the established policies of the Military Departments should be considered. The J-4 is responsible for **advising the commander** of the **logistic support** that can be provided for proposed COAs. In general, the J-4 formulates policies to ensure **effective logistic support** for all forces in the command and **coordinates execution** of the commander's policies and guidance.

•• **Plans Directorate.** The J-5 assists the commander in **long-range or future planning, preparation of campaign and joint operation plans, and associated estimates** of the situation. The J-5 may contain an analytic cell that conducts simulations and analyses to assist the commander in plans preparation activities, or such a cell may be established as a special staff division or section.

•• **Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate (J-6).** The J-6 assists the commander in all responsibilities for **communications infrastructure, communications-computer networking, communications electronics, information assurance, tactical communications, and interoperability**. This includes development and integration of C4 architectures and **plans** that support the command's operational and strategic requirements, as well as **policy and guidance for implementation and integration** of interoperable C4 systems to exercise command in the execution of the mission.

• **Liaison Officers.** Liaisons from various higher, lower, and adjacent organizations are normally spread throughout the joint force staff and not grouped as a separate entity. The administration and

Chapter V

assignment of liaison officers is normally under the cognizance of the deputy JFC or the chief of staff

8. Joint Command and Staff Process

a **General.** The nature, scope, and tempo of military operations continually changes, requiring the commander to make new decisions and take new actions in response to these changes. This may be viewed as part of a cycle, which is repeated when the situation changes significantly. The cycle may be deliberate or rapid, depending on the time available. However, effective decisionmaking and follow-through require that the basic process be understood by all commanders and staff officers and adapted to the prevailing situation. Although the scope and details will vary with the level and function of the command, **the purpose is constant: analyze the situation and need for action, determine the COA best suited for mission accomplishment, and carry out that COA,** with adjustments as necessary, while **continuing to assess the unfolding situation.**

b **Estimates, Decisions, and Directives.** These processes are iterative, beginning with the initial **recognition that the situation has changed** (e.g., change of mission, change in the friendly or enemy situation) requiring a new decision by the commander. **The staff assembles available information** regarding the enemy, friendly, and environmental situations and **assists the commander in analyzing the mission and devising COAs.** **The staff then analyzes these COAs and the commander makes a decision.** This decision identifies what the command is to do and becomes the **“mission” paragraph** of a plan or order. A format as depicted in JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, may be used as a checklist to assist the staff and commander during the preparation of estimates and directives. Simulation and analysis capabilities can assist in correlation of friendly

and enemy strengths and weaknesses, as well as in analysis of COAs

c **Follow-Through.** Having received and analyzed the mission, the commander determines how it will be accomplished and **directs subordinate commanders to accomplish certain tasks** that contribute to the common goal. Then the **commander** is responsible for carrying out the mission to **successful conclusion**, using supporting staff studies, coordination, and analysis relating to

- Supervision of the conduct of operations,
- Changes to orders, priorities, and apportionment of support,
- Commitment and reconstitution of the reserve, and
- After mission attainment, consolidation and refit in preparation for the next task

9 Service Component Commands

A combatant command-level Service component command **consists of the Service component commander and all the Service forces** (such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations, including the support forces) **that have been assigned to a combatant command** or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or JTF (forces assigned to the combatant commands are identified in the “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum signed by the Secretary of Defense). Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations may operate directly under the Service component commander and contribute to the mission of the JFC. When a Service command is designated as the “Service component” to **multiple combatant commanders, the commander and only that portion of the commander’s assets**

Doctrine and Policy for Joint Commands

assigned to a particular combatant commander are under the command authority of that particular combatant commander

a Designation of Service Component Commanders. With the exception of the commander of a combatant command and members of the command's joint staff, **the senior officer of each Service assigned to a combatant command and qualified for command by the regulations of the parent Service is designated the commander of the Service component forces, unless another officer is so designated by competent authority.** The assignment of any specific individual as a Service component commander of a combatant command is subject to the concurrence of the combatant commander

b Responsibilities of Service Component Commanders. Service component commanders have responsibilities **that derive from their roles in fulfilling the Services' support function.** The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. In the event that OPCON of Service component forces is delegated by the JFC to a Service component or force commander of a subordinate joint force command, the authority of the Service component of the superior JFC is described as ADCON that includes responsibilities for certain Service-specific functions. **Service component commanders are responsible to the JFC for the following**

- **Make recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment** of the forces of the Service component
- **Accomplish such operational missions** as may be assigned
- **Select and nominate specific units** of the parent Service component for

assignment to other subordinate forces. Unless otherwise directed, these units revert to the Service component commander's control when such subordinate forces are dissolved

- **Conduct joint training,** including the training, as directed, of components of other Services in joint operations for which the Service component commander has or may be assigned primary responsibility, or for which the Service component's facilities and capabilities are suitable
- **Inform their JFC (and their combatant commander, if affected) of planning for changes in logistic support** that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability sufficiently early in the planning process for the JFC to evaluate the proposals prior to final decision or implementation. If the combatant commander does not approve the proposal and discrepancies cannot be resolved between the combatant commander and the Service component commander, the combatant commander will forward the issue through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for resolution. Under crisis action or wartime conditions, and where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, Service component commanders will implement directives issued by the combatant commander
- **Develop program and budget requests** that comply with combatant commander guidance on warfighting requirements and priorities. The Service component commander will provide to the combatant commander a copy of the program submission prior to forwarding it to the Service headquarters. The Service component commander will keep the combatant commander

Chapter V

informed of the status of combatant commander requirements while Service programs are under development

- **Inform the combatant commander (and any intermediate JFCs) of program and budget decisions** that may affect joint operation planning. The Service component commander will inform the combatant commander of such decisions and of program and budget changes in a timely manner during the process in order to permit the combatant commander to express the command's views before a final decision. The Service component commander will include in this information Service rationale for nonsupport of the combatant commander's requirements
- **Provide, as requested, supporting joint operation and exercise plans** with necessary force data to support missions that may be assigned by the combatant commander

c Service component or force commanders in joint forces at any level within a combatant command are responsible to the combatant command-level Service component commander for the following

- **Internal administration and discipline**
- **Training** in own Service doctrine, tactical methods, and techniques
- **Logistic functions** normal to the command, except as otherwise directed by higher authority
- **Service intelligence matters and oversight of intelligence activities** to ensure compliance with the laws, policies, and directives

d Communication with a Service Chief. Unless otherwise directed by the combatant commander, the Service component commander will communicate through the combatant command on those matters over which the combatant commander exercises COCOM. **On Service-specific matters** such as personnel, administration, and unit training, the **Service component commander will normally communicate directly with the Service Chief**, informing the combatant commander as the combatant commander directs

e Logistic Authority. The **operating details of any Service logistic support system will be retained and exercised** by the Service component commanders in accordance with instructions of their Military Departments, subject to the directive authority of the combatant commander. Joint force transportation policies will comply with the guidelines established in the Defense Transportation System

10. Functional Component Commands

Combatant commanders and commanders of subordinate unified commands and JTFs have the **authority to establish functional component commands to control military operations**. JFCs may decide to establish a functional component command to integrate planning, reduce their span of control, and/or significantly improve combat efficiency, information flow, unity of effort, weapon systems management, component interaction, or control over the scheme of maneuver. **Functional component commanders have authority over forces or military capability** made available to them as delegated by the establishing JFC. Functional component commands may be established across the range of military operations **to perform operational missions that may be of short or**

Doctrine and Policy for Joint Commands

extended duration JFCs may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces (NOTE Functional component commands are component commands of a joint force and **do not constitute a "joint force"** with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force as described in this document, even when composed of forces from two or more Military Departments)

a The JFC establishing a functional component command has the **authority to designate its commander** Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked will be designated as the functional component commander, however, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in selecting a commander

b The **responsibilities and authority** of a functional component command must be **assigned by the establishing JFC** The establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the command relationships between Service component commanders and the JFC

c The JFC **must designate the forces and/or military capability that will be made available for tasking** by the functional component commander and the **appropriate command relationship(s)** the functional component commander will exercise (e.g., a **joint force special operations component commander** normally has **OPCON** of assigned forces and a **JFACC** normally is delegated **TACON** of the sorties or other military capabilities made available, except for land forces that provide supporting fires which normally are tasked in a direct support role)

d The commander of a functional component command is **responsible for making recommendations to the establishing commander** on the proper employment of the forces and/or military capability made available to accomplish the assigned responsibilities

e **The functional component commander normally will be a Service component commander.** As a Service component commander, the functional component commander also has the **responsibilities associated with Service component command for those assigned forces** When a functional component command is composed of forces of two or more Services, the functional component commander must be cognizant of the **constraints imposed by logistic factors** on the capability of the forces attached or made available and the **responsibilities retained by the Service component commanders**

f When a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Service, **the functional component commander's staff should reflect the composition of the functional component command** to provide the commander with the expertise needed to effectively employ the forces made available **Staff billets for the needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified and used** when the functional component staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations **The number of personnel** on this staff should be kept to the **minimum** and should be consistent with the task performed **The structure of the staff** should be flexible enough to expand or contract under changing conditions without a loss in coordination or capability

Chapter V

For additional information on C2 by functional component commanders, see JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, and JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations

SECTION C. DISCIPLINE AND PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

11. Responsibility

a **Joint Force Commander.** The JFC is responsible for the **discipline and administration of military personnel assigned to the joint organization**. In addition to the administration and disciplinary authority exercised by subordinate JFCs, a combatant commander may prescribe procedures by which the senior officer of a Service assigned to the headquarters element of a joint organization may exercise administrative and nonjudicial punishment authority over personnel of the same Service assigned to the same joint organization.

b **Service Component Commander.** Each Service component commander in a combatant command is responsible for the **internal administration and discipline** of that Service's component forces, subject to Service regulations and directives established by the combatant commander. The JFC exercises disciplinary authority vested in the JFC by law, Service regulations, and superior authority in the chain of command.

c **Method of Coordination.** The JFC normally should **exercise administrative and disciplinary authority through the Service component commanders** to the extent practicable. When this is impracticable, the JFC may establish **joint agencies responsible directly to the JFC** to advise or make

recommendations on matters placed within their jurisdiction or, if necessary, to carry out the directives of a superior authority. A **joint military police force** is an example of such an agency.

12. Uniform Code of Military Justice

The UCMJ provides the basic law for **discipline of the Armed Forces**. The **Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), United States (as amended)**, prescribes the **rules and procedures governing military justice**. Pursuant to the authority vested in the President under article 22(a), UCMJ, and in Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM) 201(e)(2)(a) of the MCM (as amended), combatant commanders are given courts-martial jurisdiction over members of any of the Armed Forces. Pursuant to article 23(a)(6), UCMJ, subordinate JFCs of a detached command or unit have special courts-martial convening authority. Under RCM 201(e)(2)(c), combatant commanders may expressly authorize subordinate JFCs who are authorized to convene special and summary courts-martial to convene such courts-martial for the trial of members of other Armed Forces.

13. Rules and Regulations

Rules and regulations implementing the UCMJ and MCM are, for the most part, of single-Service origin. In a **joint force**, however, the **JFC should publish rules and regulations that establish uniform policies** applicable to all Services' personnel within the joint organization where appropriate. For example, joint rules and regulations normally should be published to cover hours and areas authorized for liberty, apprehension of Service personnel, black market and currency control regulations, and other matters that the JFC deems appropriate.

14. Jurisdiction

a **More than one Service involved.** Matters that involve more than one Service or that occur outside a military reservation but within the jurisdiction of the JFC may be handled either by the JFC or by the **Service component commander** unless withheld by the JFC

b **One Service involved.** Matters that involve only one Service, and occur on the military reservation or within the military jurisdiction of that Service component, normally should be handled by the **Service component commander**, subject to Service regulations

15 Trial and Punishment

a **Convening Courts-Martial** General courts-martial may be convened by the **commander of a combatant command**. An accused may be tried by any courts-martial convened by a member of a different Military Service when the courts-martial is convened by a JFC who has been specifically empowered by statute, the President, the Secretary of Defense, or a superior commander under the provisions of the RCM (201(e)(2) of the MCM) to refer such cases for trial by courts-martial

b **Post-trial and Appellate Processing** When a courts-martial is convened by a JFC, the convening authority may take action on the sentence and the findings as authorized by the UCMJ and MCM. If the convening authority is unable to take action, the case will be forwarded to the combatant commander or superior JFC exercising general courts-martial convening authority. Following convening authority action, the review and appeals procedures applicable to the accused's Service will be followed

c **Nonjudicial Punishment** The JFC may impose nonjudicial punishment upon any military personnel of the command, unless such authority is limited or withheld by a superior commander. **The JFC will use the regulations of the alleged offender's Service** when conducting nonjudicial punishment proceedings, including punishment, suspension, mitigation, and filing. Except as noted below, appeals and other actions involving review of nonjudicial punishment imposed by a JFC will follow the appropriate regulations of the alleged offender's Service. **When the combatant commander personally imposes nonjudicial punishment, or is otherwise disqualified from being the appellate authority, appeals will be forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** for appropriate action by the Secretary of Defense or SecDef designee. Collateral decisions and processing (e.g., personnel and finance actions and unfavorable notations in selection records and personnel files) will be handled in Service channels

d **Execution of Punishment.** Execution of any punishment adjudged or imposed within any Service may be carried out by another Service under regulations provided by the Secretaries of the Military Departments

16. Morale and Welfare

In a joint force, the morale and welfare of the personnel of each Service are the responsibility of the **Service component commander and the JFC** insofar as they affect the accomplishment of the mission. Morale, welfare, and recreational facilities may be operated either by a single-Service or jointly as directed by the combatant commander in whose AOR the facility is located. Facilities operated by one Service should be made available to personnel of other Services to the extent practicable. Facilities

Chapter V

that are jointly operated should be available equitably to all Services. Religious support to the personnel of each Service is the responsibility of the Service component commander and the JFC insofar as it affects the accomplishment of the mission.

For further information on morale and welfare, see JP 1-05, Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations.

17. Awards and Decorations

Recommendations for decorations and medals will be **made by the JFC** in accordance with Service regulations or as prescribed by DOD 1348 33-M, *Manual of Military Decorations & Awards*, as applicable. **Recommendations for joint awards** will be processed through **joint channels**. Concurrence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required prior to initiating a request for a joint award for a combatant commander. When a member of a joint staff is recommended for a **Service award**, the JFC

will **process the recommendation through Service channels**.

18. Efficiency and Fitness Reports

The **immediate superior** of an officer in a joint organization is responsible for **preparing and forwarding an efficiency or fitness report** in accordance with the regulations (and on the prescribed form) of the reported member's Service. Completed reports will be forwarded to the reported officer's Service for filing. Letter reports prepared by combatant commanders for component commanders will be forwarded through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the reported officer's Service.

For further information on personnel administration and discipline, refer to JP 1-0, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations, and JP 1-04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Legal Support to Joint Operations.

APPENDIX A REFERENCES

The development of JP 0-2 is based upon the following primary references

1. Federal Statutory Laws

- a The National Security Act of 1947, as amended
- b Titles 10 and 32, US Code, as amended
- c Title 14, US Code, sections 1, 2, and 141

2. NCA Guidance

- a Unified Command Plan
- b Forces for Unified Commands
- c Presidential Decision Directive-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*
- d Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, *United States Intelligence Activities*
- e SecDef Memorandum, *Assignment of Force*, 6 September 1996
- f Nuclear Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

3. Memoranda of Agreement and Understanding

- a DOD and Department of Transportation Memorandum of Agreement, 3 October 1995, *The Use of US Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy*
- b DOD and DOS Memorandum of Understanding, 16 December 1997, *Security of DOD Elements and Personnel in Foreign Areas*

4. DOD Directives

- a DOD 1348 33-M, *Manual of Military Decorations & Awards*
- b DODD 2000 12, 13 April 1999, *DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program*
- c DODD 3020 26, 26 May 1995, *Continuity of Operations (COOP) Policy and Planning*
- d DODD 5100 1, 25 September 1987, *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components*

Appendix A

e DODD 5100 20, 23 December 1971, *The National Security Agency and the Central Security Service*

f DODD 5105 19, 25 June 1991, *Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)*

g DODD 5105 21, 18 February 1997, *Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)*

h DODD 5105 60, 11 October 1996, *National Imagery and Mapping Agency*

i DODD 5105 62, 30 September 1998, *Defense Threat Reduction Agency*

j DODD 5106 4, 7 January 1993, *Inspectors General (IGs) of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands*

k The integrated policies and procedures established by the Secretary of Defense for the coordination of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives

a CJCSI 6120 05, *Manual for Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance for Joint Operations, Joint Interface Operational Procedures for Message Text Formats*

b CJCSM 3122 01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Vol I (Planning Policies and Procedures)*

c CJCSM 3410 01, *The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Continuity of Operations Plan*

d *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Emergency Action Procedures*

6. Joint Publications

a JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*

b JP 1-0, *Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations*

c JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

d JP 1-04, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Legal Support to Military Operations*

e JP 1-05, *Religious Ministry Support to Joint Operations*

f JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*

g JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I*

- h JP 3-12, *Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations*, and JP 3-12 series
- i JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*
- j JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*
- k JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*
- l JP 3-32, *Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations*
- m JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*
- n JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*
- o JP 5-00 2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*
- p JP 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations*

7. Other References

- a *Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command Emergency Action Procedures*
- b *AJP-4, Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine*

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX B
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 0-2, 24 February 1995, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.

4. Change Recommendations

- a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted

TO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDET//
INFO USCINCFCOM NORFOLK VA//JW100//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), JDET, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

- b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

- c. Record of Changes

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY	REMARKS

Appendix B

5. Distribution

a Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the joint publication is not available from the Service

b Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, PO-FL, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400

c Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, *Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands*

Army	US Army AG Publication Center SL 1655 Woodson Road Attn Joint Publications St Louis, MO 63114-6181
Air Force	Air Force Publications Distribution Center 2800 Eastern Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21220-2896
Navy	CO, Naval Inventory Control Point 700 Robbins Avenue Bldg 1, Customer Service Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099
Marine Corps	Commander (Attn Publications) 814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321 Albany, GA 31704-0321
Coast Guard	Commandant Coast Guard (G-OPD), US Coast Guard 2100 2nd Street, SW Washington, DC 20593-0001 Commander USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102 Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution) 116 Lake View Parkway Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

d Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, *Information Security Program*

GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADCON	administrative control
AJP	allied joint publication
AOR	area of responsibility
C2	command and control
C2S	command and control support
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
CA	civil affairs
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CINCNORAD	Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
CNA	computer network attack
CND	computer network defense
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
CONUS	continental United States
COOP	continuity of operations
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorized
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DOS	Department of State
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
IO	international organization
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6	command, control, communications, and computer systems directorate of a joint staff
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JOA	joint operations area
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

Glossary

JP	joint publication
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JTF	joint task force
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MCM	Manual for Courts-Martial
MNF	multinational force
MOOTW	military operations other than war
NCA	National Command Authorities
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIMA	National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NMCS	National Military Command System
NMS	national military strategy
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	national security strategy
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
PO	peace operations
POLAD	political advisor
PSYOP	psychological operations
RC	Reserve Component
RCM	Rules for Courts-Martial
ROE	rules of engagement
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SO	special operations
SOF	special operations forces
TACAIR	tactical air
TACON	tactical control
TRO	training and readiness oversight
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UN	United Nations
USC	United States Code
USCINCFCOM	Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command
USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command
USCINCSpace	Commander in Chief, United States Space Command
USCINCTrans	Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command

USG	United States Government
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

- administrative control.** Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON (JP 1-02)
- alliance.** An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members (JP 1-02)
- area of responsibility.** The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)
- armed forces.** The military forces of a nation or a group of nations (JP 1-02)
- Armed Forces of the United States.** A term used to denote collectively all components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. See also United States Armed Forces (JP 1-02)
- assign.** 1 To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2 To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. See also attach (JP 1-02)
- attach.** 1 The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. 2 The detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., attached for quarters and rations, attached for flying duty. See also assign (JP 1-02)
- battlespace.** The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest (JP 1-02)
- boundary.** A line which delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas (JP 1-02)
- campaign.** A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. See also campaign plan (JP 1-02)
- campaign plan.** A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. See also campaign (JP 1-02)
- chain of command.** The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. Also called command channel (JP 1-02)

close support That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force (JP 1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action (JP 1-02)

combatant command A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority) Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant

command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. See also combatant command, combatant commander, operational control, tactical control (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called CINC (JP 1-02)

combined. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., combined navies) (JP 1-02)

command. 1 The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. 2 An order given by a commander, that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. 3 A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the command of one individual. See also combatant command, combatant command (command authority). Also called CMD (JP 1-02)

command and control The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control

Glossary

functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2 (JP 1-02)

command and control system. The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned (JP 1-02)

commander's critical information requirements A comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision making process that affect successful mission accomplishment. The two key subcomponents are critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements. Also called CCIR (JP 1-02)

command relationships The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command, defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or support. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

component 1 One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. Normally, a joint force is organized with a combination of Service and functional components. 2 In logistics, a part or combination of parts having a specific function which can be installed or replaced only as an entity (JP 1-02)

continuity of operations. The degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission in carrying out the national military strategy. It includes the functions and duties of the commander, as well as the supporting functions and duties performed by the staff and others acting under the authority and direction of the commander. Also called COOP (JP 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

decentralized execution The delegation of execution authority to subordinate commanders. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

direct liaison authorized That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct

liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Also called DIRLAUTH (JP 1-02)

direct support. A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force's request for assistance (JP 1-02)

directive authority for logistics. Combatant commander authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans. Essential measures include the optimized use or reallocation of available resources and prevention or elimination of redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component commands. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)

executive agent. A term used to indicate a delegation of authority by the Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on the Secretary's behalf. An agreement between equals does not create an executive agent. For example, a Service cannot become a Department of Defense executive agent for a particular matter with simply the agreement of the other Services, such authority must be delegated by the

Secretary of Defense. Designation as executive agent, in and of itself, confers no authority. The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the document designating the executive agent. An executive agent may be limited to providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions, or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources for specified purposes. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

force. 1 An aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and necessary support, or combination thereof. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

general support. 1 That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. (JP 1-02)

integration. 1 In force protection, the synchronized transfer of units into an operational commander's force prior to mission execution. 2 The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole. 3 In photography, a process by which the average radar picture seen on several scans of the time base may be

Glossary

obtained on a print, or the process by which several photographic images are combined into a single image (This term and its definitions modify the existing term and its definitions and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate (JP 1-02)

joint doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Military Departments in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is authoritative, as such joint doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. It will be promulgated by or for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands and Services (JP 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC (JP 1-02)

joint operations. A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces (JP 1-02)

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate

unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also called JOA (JP 1-02)

joint operations center. A jointly manned facility of a joint force commander's headquarters established for planning, monitoring, and guiding the execution of the commander's decisions. Also called JOC (JP 1-02)

joint staff. 1 The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Military Department), which includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force. 2 (capitalized as Joint Staff) The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided for in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman in carrying out their responsibilities. Also called JS (JP 1-02)

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides

guidance to the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions resources to combatant commanders, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions and intelligence assessments. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the National Command Authorities. Also called JSCP (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF (JP 1-02)

Military Department. One of the departments within the Department of Defense created by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (JP 1-02)

Military Service. A branch of the Armed Forces of the United States, established by act of Congress, in which persons are appointed, enlisted, or inducted for military service, and which operates and is administered within a military or executive department. The Military Services are the United States Army, the United States Navy, the United States Air Force, the United States Marine Corps, and the United States Coast Guard (JP 1-02)

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. See also multinational operations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

multinational force commander. A general term applied to a commander who exercises

command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the multinational force commander's command authority is determined by the participating nations. Also called MNFC (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 1-02)

mutual support. That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities (JP 1-02)

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA (JP 1-02)

National Military Command System. The priority component of the Global Command and Control System designed to support the National Command Authorities and Joint Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their responsibilities. Also called NMCS (JP 1-02)

national military strategy. The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war (JP 1-02)

national security strategy. The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called national strategy or grand strategy (JP 1-02)

national support element. Any national organization or activity that supports national forces that are a part of a

Glossary

multinational force. Their mission is nation-specific support to units and common support that is retained by the nation. Also called NSE. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

nongovernmental organizations. Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). "Nongovernmental organizations" is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGOs. (JP 1-02)

objective. 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals towards which every military operation should be directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken (for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan, or, an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features). (This term and its definition are provided for information only and are proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP 3-0.)

operational area. An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, and area of operations. (This term and its definition are provided for information only and are proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP 3-0.)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions, it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments,

organizations, and installations under the command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command, or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. See also component, functional component command (JP 1-02)

specified command. A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department. Also called specified combatant command (JP 1-02)

subordinate unified command. A command established by commanders of unified commands, when so authorized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established on an area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise operational control of assigned commands and forces within the assigned operational area. Also called subunified command (JP 1-02)

support 1 The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2 A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3 An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

supported commander. 1 The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2 In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander's force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (This term and its definition are provided for information only and are proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP 3-0)

supporting commander. 1 A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. 2 In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (This term and its definition are provided for information only and are proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP 3-0)

tactical control Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant

Glossary

command When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

tactics 1. The employment of units in combat. 2. The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use their full potentialities. (JP 1-02)

training and readiness oversight The authority that combatant commanders may exercise over assigned Reserve Component (RC) forces when not on active duty or when on active duty for training. As a matter of Department of Defense policy, this authority includes: a. Providing guidance to Service component commanders on operational requirements and priorities to be addressed in Military Department training and readiness programs, b. Commenting on Service component program recommendations and budget requests, c. Coordinating and approving participation by assigned RC forces in joint exercises and other joint training when on active duty for training or performing inactive duty for training, d. Obtaining and reviewing readiness and inspection reports on assigned RC forces, and e. Coordinating and reviewing mobilization plans (including post-mobilization training activities and deployability validation procedures) developed for assigned RC forces. Also called TRO. (This term and

its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

transient forces. Forces which pass or stage through, or base temporarily within, the operational area of another command but are not under its operational control. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

unified action A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. (JP 1-02)

Unified Action Armed Forces. A publication setting forth the policies, principles, doctrines, and functions governing the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States when two or more Military Departments or Service elements thereof are acting together. Also called UNAAF. (JP 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (JP 1-02)

Unified Command Plan. The document, approved by the President, which sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders, establishes their missions,


responsibilities, and force structure, delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders, and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders Also called UCP (JP 1-02)

United States Armed Forces Used to denote collectively only the regular components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard See also Armed Forces of the United States (JP 1-02)


Glossary

Intentionally Blank

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics (techniques and procedures) are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 0-2 is in the capstone series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process.







REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFRD-CG

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COALITION FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND
HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND
APO AE 09304

29 NOV 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR Command Sergeant Major [REDACTED] 800th Military Police
Brigade, Camp Arifjon, Kuwait, APO AE 09304

SUBJECT Memorandum of Reprimand

1 You are hereby reprimanded. It has been reported to me that despite numerous verbal and written counselings warning you of your perceived misconduct, you continued to blatantly violate the Army's Fraternization policy by having inappropriate relationships with at least two junior enlisted female soldiers within your unit.

2 Between January and September 2003, during your unit mobilization and while deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, you were seen hugging, massaging, kissing, touching, and socializing with junior enlisted female soldiers. Although you were warned that your actions were unacceptable, you continued your misconduct by giving preferential housing assignments, having female soldiers in your room late at night, and escorting certain female soldiers to and from their living quarters on a regular basis. When questioned about your conduct you provided a sworn statement that you knew to be materially false. Your behavior constitutes a violation of Article 134 for Fraternization and False Swearing.

3 Your conduct is reprehensible. As a Command Sergeant Major, you have set an extremely poor example for your peers and subordinates. Your misconduct is especially disturbing in light of the rank of the soldiers you effected and our deployed environment. Your actions cause me to question your integrity, judgment, professionalism, and potential for future service.

4 This reprimand is imposed as an administrative measure LAW AR 600-37, and not as punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It is, however, intended to promptly and directly signal my disapproval of your conduct. I have not determined whether I will direct the filing of this reprimand, but you must be aware that my disposition options include a decision not to file the reprimand, local filing, as well as filing in the Performance Fiche of your Official Military Personnel File. I will not make a final determination, however, until I receive and consider any response you may submit. Within ten days of your receipt of this memorandum, you may provide to me, in writing, any information in rebuttal that you wish me to consider. You will acknowledge receipt of this memorandum, by signing and dating the attached memorandum. Submit the acknowledgement and any rebuttal or extenuating and mitigating matters through, LTC [REDACTED] Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, CFLCC.

DAVID D. MCKIERNAN
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COALITION FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND
HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND
APO AE 09304

AFRD-C'G

25 MAY 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR MSG [REDACTED] Headquarters, 800th MP Brigade, APO AE 09366

SUBJECT Memorandum of Reprimand

- 1 You are hereby reprimanded. It has been reported to me that on 16 May 2003, you consumed an alcoholic beverage at Camp Bucca, Iraq, the theater internment facility for enemy prisoners of war (EPW).
- 2 Your misconduct in consuming alcohol was both foolhardy and a deviation from the high standards the Army sets for its noncommissioned officers. The foolhardiness of your decision is established by a review of the highly volatile operational environment at Camp Bucca. Camp Bucca is an EPW camp, located in recently occupied enemy territory. EPWs have been shot while escaping or threatening guards or other prisoners, and suspected war criminals are still being found within the general EPW population. In this volatile operating environment, any use of alcohol, even the consumption of a single beverage, is extremely poor judgment. The known effects of alcohol on the body include diminished reflexes and judgment. Your poor judgment in consuming an alcoholic beverage is compounded by the continuous requirement for you, as a senior noncommissioned officer, to be prepared to lead soldiers who may be called upon to respond to crises. While your consumption of an alcoholic beverage on duty in Iraq is not an express violation of CENTCOM General Order IA, it breaches the spirit of that order.
- 3 Your misconduct causes me to question your judgment and professionalism. With a clear appreciation of the challenges involved in EPW operations, you should have set the example. Instead, if only on one occasion, you have engaged in misconduct that can erode unit standards. Your misconduct calls into question your fitness to continue to serve in a combat theater.
- 4 This reprimand is imposed as an administrative measure IAW AR 600-37 and not as punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It is, however, intended to promptly and directly demonstrate my disapproval of your conduct. I have not determined whether I will direct the filing of this reprimand, but you must be aware that my disposition options include a decision not to file the reprimand, local filing, as well as filing in the Performance Section of your Official Military Personnel File. I will not make a final determination, however, until I receive and consider any response you may submit. Within ten days of your receipt of this memorandum, you may provide to me, in writing, any information in rebuttal that you wish me to consider.

AFRD-CG
SUBJECT Memorandum of Reprimand

You will acknowledge receipt of this memorandum, by signing and dating the attached memorandum. Submit the acknowledgement and any rebuttal or extenuating and mitigating matters through COL [REDACTED], Staff Judge Advocate, CFLCC

Encl



DAVID D McKIERNAN
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COALITION FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND
HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND
APO AE 09304

25 MAY 2003

AFRD-CG

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJ [REDACTED] Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 320th
MP Battalion APO AE, 09375

SUBJECT Memorandum of Reprimand

1 You are hereby reprimanded. It has been reported to me that on 16 May 2003, you observed MAJ [REDACTED] and MSG [REDACTED], both of the 800th MP Brigade consume alcoholic beverages at Camp Bucca, Iraq, the theater internment facility for enemy prisoners of war (EPW), and took no actions to stop their consumption of alcohol. Additionally, the consumption of alcohol that you witnessed and failed to stop occurred in the presence of a junior enlisted soldier. Your actions constitute fraternization.

2 Your failure to stop these soldiers' consumption of alcohol reflects a failure to internalize the high standards expected of an Army officer. Your duty was clear; you should have ordered MAJ [REDACTED] and MSG [REDACTED] to not consume the alcoholic beverage. As a leader, you should have recognized that their consumption of alcohol in the extremely volatile operating environment of Camp Bucca would have had the potential to diminish these senior soldiers' ability to lead soldiers who may be called upon to respond to crises. The presence of a junior enlisted soldier constitutes misconduct. Your mandate is to not merely obey established orders and rules; you are counted on to ensure other soldiers follow established standards.


3 As an officer who has extensive operational experience, and a clear appreciation of the challenges involved in EPW operations, you should have enforced standards. Instead, you chose to ignore a significant act of misconduct that has the potential to erode unit standards. Your actions cause me to question your judgment and professionalism.

4 This reprimand is imposed as an administrative measure IAW AR 600-37, and not as punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It is, however, intended to promptly and directly signal my disapproval of your conduct. I have not determined whether I will direct the filing of this reprimand. My disposition options include a decision not to file the reprimand, local filing, as well as filing in the Performance Section of your Official Military Personnel File. I will not make a final determination, however, until I receive and consider any timely response you may submit. Within ten days of your receipt of this memorandum, you may provide to me, in writing, any information in rebuttal that you wish me to consider. You will acknowledge

AFRD-CG
SUBJECT Memorandum of Reprimand

receipt of this memorandum, by signing and dating the attached memorandum. Submit the acknowledgement and any rebuttal or extenuating and mitigating matters through COL [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Staff Judge Advocate, CFLCC

Encl


DAVID D McKIERNAN
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COALITION FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND
HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND
APO AE 09304

AFRD-CG

25 MAY 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJ [REDACTED] Headquarters, 800th MP Brigade, APO AE, 09375

SUBJECT Memorandum of Reprimand

- 1 You are hereby reprimanded. It has been reported to me that on 16 May 2003, you consumed an alcoholic beverage at Camp Bucca, Iraq, the theater internment facility for enemy prisoners of war (EPW). Your consumption of alcohol occurred in the presence of a junior enlisted soldier.
- 2 Your decision to consume alcohol was both foolhardy and reflects a failure to conform to the high standards expected of an Army officer. The foolhardiness of your decision is established by review of the highly volatile operational environment at Camp Bucca. Camp Bucca is an EPW camp located in recently occupied enemy territory. EPWs have been shot while escaping or threatening guards or other prisoners and suspected war criminals are still being found within the general EPW population. In this volatile operating environment, any use of alcohol, even the consumption of a single beverage, is extremely poor judgment. The known effects of alcohol on the body include diminished reflexes and judgment. Your poor judgment in consuming an alcoholic beverage is compounded by the continuous requirement for you, as a senior officer, to be prepared to lead soldiers who may be called upon to respond to crises. The severity of your misconduct is magnified by the fact that it occurred in the presence of a junior enlisted soldier. Finally, while your consumption of an alcoholic beverage while on duty in Iraq is not expressly prohibited by CENTCOM General Order 1A, it both contravenes the spirit of that order, and indicates a lack of appreciation of the expectations of officers. Your mandate is to not merely obey established orders and rules; you are counted on to aspire to a higher standard of personal conduct.
- 3 Your misconduct is singularly troubling to me in light of the tremendous promise you have demonstrated in the past. As an officer who has extensive operational experience, and a clear appreciation of the challenges involved in EPW operations, you should have set the example instead. Even if this is a momentary departure from standards, you have engaged in misconduct which has the potential to erode unit standards. Your actions cause me to question your judgment and professionalism.
- 4 This reprimand is imposed as an administrative measure IAW AR 600-37, and not as punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It is, however, intended to promptly and directly signal my disapproval of your conduct. I have not determined whether I will direct the filing of this reprimand. My disposition options include a decision not to file the reprimand, local filing, as well as filing in the Performance Fiche of your Official Military Personnel Section. I will not make a final determination, however, until I receive and consider any timely response.

AFRD-CG
SUBJECT Memorandum of Reprimand

you may submit. Within ten days of your receipt of this memorandum, you may provide to me, in writing, any information in rebuttal that you wish me to consider. You will acknowledge receipt of this memorandum, by signing and dating the attached memorandum. Submit the acknowledgement and any rebuttal or extenuating and mitigating matters through COL [REDACTED] [REDACTED], Staff Judge Advocate, CFLCC



DAVID D McKIERNAN
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

Encl



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (I/R)
CAMP VICTORY, IRAQ
AE 09302



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFRC-CNY-AJ-CG

10 November 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED]


SUBJECT REPRIMAND UP AR 600-37

1 On 8 November 2003 another six detainees escaped from the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). These escapes included a detainee accused of murdering a US soldier. This incident highlights the lapses in security existing at BCCF since the 320th MP Battalion assumed control of the installation. Various deficiencies and lapses have been brought to the attention of your staff by the 800th MP Brigade Headquarters personnel and others. I have personally brought these matters to your direct attention. Remedial action has been wholly inadequate. I am forced to conclude this results from a lack of leadership on your part.

2 We are fortunate no soldier or other prisoner was killed or seriously injured as a result of these lapses. We cannot wait until after such a preventable tragedy to act. This is your last warning. Correct deficiencies in security at BCCF immediately corrected or you will force implementation of more severe action.

3 This is an administrative reprimand imposed UP of AR 600-37, and not as punishment pursuant to Article 15, UCMJ.

4 I intend to file this reprimand in your Military Personnel Record Jacket (MPRJ). If you should decide to submit matters in rebuttal, extenuation or mitigation I will carefully consider them in making a final determination on imposition of this reprimand. You have one week from receipt of this memorandum to submit such matters, and the response, if any, should be by endorsement to this memorandum. I will withhold final decision on imposing or filing this memorandum until that time period has passed.


JANIS L. KARPINSKI
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (I/R)
CAMP VICTORY, IRAQ
AE 09302



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFRC-CNY-AI-CG

10 November 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR Major [REDACTED]


SUBJECT REPRIMAND UP AR 600-37

1 On 8 November 2003 another six detainees escaped from the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). These escapes included a detainee accused of murdering a US soldier. This incident highlights the lapses in security existing at BCCF since the 320th MP Battalion assumed control of the installation. Various deficiencies and lapses were brought to your attention through an AR 15-6 investigation on a previous escape, and in numerous staff assistance visits by 800th MP Brigade Headquarters personnel. You failed to carry through with your duties as the Battalion Operations Officer to identify these issues and implement prompt corrective action.

2 We are fortunate no soldier or other prisoner was killed or seriously injured as a result of these lapses. We cannot wait until after such a preventable tragedy to act. This is your last warning. Correct deficiencies in security at BCCF immediately corrected or you will force implementation of more severe action.

3 This is an administrative reprimand imposed UP of AR 600-37, and not as punishment pursuant to Article 15, UCMJ.

4 I intend to file this reprimand in your Military Personnel Record Jacket (MPRJ). If you should decide to submit matters in rebuttal, extenuation or mitigation I will carefully consider them in making a final determination on imposition of this reprimand. You have one week from receipt of this memorandum to submit such matters, and the response, if any, should be by endorsement to this memorandum. I will withhold final decision on imposing or filing this memorandum until that time period has passed.


JANIS L. KARPINSKI
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (IR)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT APO AE 09366


AFRC-CNY-AI-CG

20 August 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR LTC [REDACTED] 400th Military Police
Battalion

SUBJECT REPRIMAND UP AR 600-37

- 1 This letter of reprimand is a result of the incident on 19 August 2003 when one of your soldiers from the 770th Military Police Company negligently discharged an M-16 round while exiting his vehicle in the vicinity of the clearing barrels at Checkpoint 1 on BLAP. The discharge caused damage to the vehicle's fuel tank and rendered the vehicle inoperable.
- 2 This incident demonstrates a failure in training on proper weapons clearing procedures and a lack of command emphasis by you on proper safety procedures to reduce the risk to your soldiers from accidental injury or death. A Battalion Commander sets the tone for the entire unit. It is your responsibility to ensure adherence to safety measures and standards. Soldier safety is my top priority. I hold you accountable for the safe environment of your soldiers.
- 3 This is an administrative reprimand imposed UP of AR 600-37, and not as punishment pursuant to Article 15, UCMJ.
- 4 I intend to file this reprimand in your local MPRJ. I will carefully consider any matters in rebuttal, extenuation or mitigation. You have one week from receipt of this memorandum to submit such matters. I will withhold final decision on imposing this memorandum until the time period passes.


JANIS L. KARPINSKI
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (IR)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT APO AE 09366


AFRC-CNY-AI-CG

20 August 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR CSM [REDACTED] 400th Military Police
Battalion

SUBJECT REPRIMAND UP AR 600-37

- 1 This letter of reprimand is a result of the incident on 19 August 2003 when one of your soldiers from the 770th Military Police Company negligently discharged an M-16 round while exiting his vehicle in the vicinity of the clearing barrels at Checkpoint 1 on BIAP. The discharge caused damage to the vehicle's fuel tank and rendered the vehicle inoperable.
- 2 This incident demonstrates a failure in training on proper weapons clearing procedures and a lack of command emphasis by you on proper safety procedures to reduce the risk to your soldiers from accidental injury or death. A Battalion Command Sergeant Major sets the tone for the entire unit. It is your responsibility to ensure adherence to safety measures and standards. Soldier safety is my top priority. I hold you accountable for the safe environment of your soldiers.
- 3 This is an administrative reprimand imposed UP of AR 600-37, and not as punishment pursuant to Article 15, UCMJ.
- 4 I intend to file this reprimand in your local MPRJ. I will carefully consider any matters in rebuttal, extenuation or mitigation. You have one week from receipt of this memorandum to submit such matters. I will withhold final decision on imposing this memorandum until the time period passes.


JANIS L. KARPINSKI
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (IR)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT APO AE 09366


AFRC-CNY-AI-CG

20 August 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR CPT [REDACTED] 770th Military Police
Company

SUBJECT REPRIMAND UP AR 600-37

- 1 This letter of reprimand is a result of the incident on 19 August 2003 when one of your soldiers negligently discharged an M-16 round while exiting his vehicle in the vicinity of the clearing barrels at Checkpoint 1 on BIAP. The discharge caused damage to the vehicle's fuel tank and rendered the vehicle inoperable.
- 2 This incident demonstrates a failure in training on proper weapons clearing procedures and a lack of command emphasis by you on proper safety procedures to reduce the risk to your soldiers from accidental injury or death. A Company Commander sets the tone for the entire unit. It is your responsibility to ensure adherence to safety measures and standards. Soldier safety is my top priority. I hold you accountable for the safe environment of your soldiers.
- 3 This is an administrative reprimand imposed UP of AR 600-37, and not as punishment pursuant to Article 15, UCMJ.
- 4 I intend to file this reprimand in your local MPRJ. I will carefully consider any matters in rebuttal, extenuation or mitigation. You have one week from receipt of this memorandum to submit such matters. I will withhold final decision on imposing this memorandum until the time period passes.


JANIS L. KARPINSKI
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (IR)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT APO AE 09366


AFRC-CNY-AI-CG

20 August 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR 1SG [REDACTED] 770th Military Police
Company

SUBJECT REPRIMAND UP AR 600-37

- 1 This letter of reprimand is a result of the incident on 19 August 2003 when one of your soldiers negligently discharged an M-16 round while exiting his vehicle in the vicinity of the clearing barrels at Checkpoint 1 on BIAP. The discharge caused damage to the vehicle's fuel tank and rendered the vehicle inoperable.
- 2 This incident demonstrates a failure in training on proper weapons clearing procedures and a lack of command emphasis by you on proper safety procedures to reduce the risk to your soldiers from accidental injury or death. A First Sergeant sets the tone for the entire unit. It is your responsibility to ensure adherence to safety measures and standards. Soldier safety is my top priority. I hold you accountable for the safe environment of your soldiers.
- 3 This is an administrative reprimand imposed UP of AR 600-37, and not as punishment pursuant to Article 15, UCMJ.
- 4 I intend to file this reprimand in your local MPRJ. I will carefully consider any matters in rebuttal, extenuation or mitigation. You have one week from receipt of this memorandum to submit such matters. I will withhold final decision on imposing this memorandum until the time period passes.


JANIS L. KARPINSKI
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT 800th Military Police Brigade Tactical SOP (TACSOP)

1 REFERENCES

- a FM 19-1 Military Police Support for the AirLand Battlefield
- b FM 19-4 Military Police Team, Squad and Platoon
- c FM 3-19-40, Internment/Resettlement Operations
- d FM 100-5 Operations
- e FM 100-15 Corps Operations
- f FM 101-5 Staff Organizations and Functions
- g ARTEP 19-472-MTP Mission Training Plan for the Military Police Combat Support and Internment/Resettlement Brigades and CID Groups

2 PURPOSE To provide units assigned or attached to the 800th MP Brigade (EPW/CI) with standard operational, logistical, and administrative procedures for tactical operations

3 GENERAL

- a Subordinate units will develop and maintain a Tactical SOP Units are responsible to ensure that the Brigade S-3 maintains a current copy of their SOP
- b Production and revision of this SOP is a staff responsibility of the Brigade S-3 Staff sections will review their portion of the SOP annually and submit approved revisions to the Brigade S-3 in final form for publication Published changes will be page for page substitutions and will be forwarded to the Brigade S-3 Operations prior to publication
- c Local time will be used by the 800th Military Police Brigade during all field operations Zulu Time will only be used at the direction of the Brigade S-3
- d Organization
 - (1) Task organizations will be identified for each operation and listed as Annex Z in all orders published by this headquarters

(2) Subordinate commanders will identify internal organization

e Recommended Changes This TACSOP is a "living" document. It should be continuously revised and validated after each field operation. You are encouraged to submit changes. Key comments to specific page, paragraph, and line of text. Provide reasons for each comment to ensure understanding and complete evaluation. Submit changes and comments to this Headquarters, ATTN: AFRC-CNY-AI-OP

4 TACTICAL OPERATIONS Coordination and execution of tactical operations are discussed in ANNEXES B, C, F, H, J, K, L, M, N, P, U, and V

5 ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS Coordination and execution of administrative support operations are discussed in ANNEXES E, G, I, O, Q, R, S, T and Z

PAUL H HILL
BG, USAR
Commanding

ANNEXES

ANNEX B - Intelligence

APPENDIX 1 - S-2 TOC Procedures

APPENDIX 2 - Weather

APPENDIX 3 - Topographic Support

APPENDIX 4 - Tactical Counterintelligence Operations/OPSEC

APPENDIX 5 - Prisoners of War, Captured Documents and Equipment

APPENDIX 6 - Sensitive Items

APPENDIX 7 - Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plans

APPENDIX 8 - Security Classification Guide

APPENDIX 9 - Request for Imagery

APPENDIX 10 - Request for Intelligence Information

ANNEX C - Command Post Organization and Operations

APPENDIX 1 - Command Post Organization Responsibilities

APPENDIX 2 - Quartering Party Duties

APPENDIX 3 - Internal Operations Of Command Post

APPENDIX 4 - Diagrams Of CP, TOC, ALOC & Briefing Tent

ANNEX E - Rules of Engagement

APPENDIX 1 - Use of Force

APPENDIX 2 - Standard Rules of Engagement

APPENDIX 3 - Sample Rules of Engagement Card

ANNEX F - Force Protection

APPENDIX 1 - Fighting/Survivability Positions

APPENDIX 2 - Levels of Threat

- APPENDIX 3 – Threat Conditions
- ANNEX G – Engineer
 - APPENDIX 1 - Engineer Overlay
 - APPENDIX 2 – IF BOM
- ANNEX H - Signal (Communications-Electronics)
 - APPENDIX 1 - Brigade Radio Nets
 - APPENDIX 2 - Telephone Subscribers
 - APPENDIX 3 - UXC-7 Facsimile
 - APPENDIX 4 - MSE Operating Instructions
- ANNEX I - Service Support (Logistics)
 - APPENDIX 1 - Internment Facility (IF) Logistical Requirements List
 - APPENDIX 2 -
- ANNEX J - NBC Operations
 - APPENDIX 1 - Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP)
 - APPENDIX 2 - Automatic Masking Indicators
 - APPENDIX 3 - NBC Threat Warning System
 - APPENDIX 4 - NBC Attack Warning System
 - APPENDIX 5 - NBC Report Routing
 - APPENDIX 6 - Operating Exposure Guidance
 - APPENDIX 7 - Decontamination
 - APPENDIX 8 - NBC Principles
- ANNEX K - JAG
- ANNEX L - Operation Security
 - APPENDIX 1 - EEFI
 - APPENDIX 2 - SIGSEC Program
- ANNEX M -PAO
- ANNEX O - Chaplain/Unit Ministry Teams
- ANNEX P - Enemy Prisoner of War
 - APPENDIX 1 - EPW/CI Flow Chart
 - APPENDIX 2 - Sample Forms (DD Form 515, DA Form 2708, DD Form 2745 and DA Form 4137)
 - APPENDIX 3 - Policy, Forms. and the Preparation of Forms for Evacuating, Processing, and Interning Captives
 - APPENDIX 4 – Transfer EPW Procedures
- ANNEX Q - Medical Services
- ANNEX R - Tactical Safety
- ANNEX S - Personnel
 - APPENDIX 1 - Personnel Strengths & Reports
 - APPENDIX 2 - US Personnel Replacement Procedures/Admin
 - APPENDIX 3 - Casualty System
 - APPENDIX 4 - Personnel Procurement
 - APPENDIX 5 - Personnel Actions
 - APPENDIX 6 - Recovered US and Allied Personnel
 - APPENDIX 7 - Awards and Decorations
 - APPENDIX 8 - Stockage of Publications and Forms
 - APPENDIX 9 - Postal

APPENDIX 10 - Health, Morale, and Welfare Services

APPENDIX 11 - Labor

APPENDIX 12 – Historical

APPENDIX 13 – Accounting for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW), Civilian Internees (CI)
and Displaced Civilians (DC)

APPENDIX 14 – Accounting for U S Prisoners in U S Confinement Facility

ANNEX T - Reports

APPENDIX 1 - Required Reports

APPENDIX 2 - Personnel Reports

APPENDIX 3 - Intelligence Reports

APPENDIX 4 - Operations Reports

APPENDIX 5 - Logistics Reports

ANNEX U - Civil Military Operations

APPENDIX 1 - Civil Affairs (CA)

APPENDIX 2 - Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

APPENDIX 3 - Displaced Civilians

ANNEX V - Prisoner of War Information Center

ANNEX Z – Distribution

ANNEX AA – Inspector General

ANNEXES A, D, N, W, X and Y are deleted from this FSOP

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PURPOSE To prescribe responsibilities for intelligence requirements and describe procedures for intelligence operations

2 REFERENCES

- a FM 34-25, Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
- b FM 34-6, Counterintelligence
- c FM 100-5, Operations
- d FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis
- e AR 380-5, Army Information Security Program
- f FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
- g FM 34-2-1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance

3 GENERAL

- a Commanders coordinate through Brigade S-2 to Theater Support MP Bde S-2 to determine likely targets for enemy unconventional, or heliborne forces in the theater rear area
- b Enemy activity to include aircraft or suspected terrorist activity must be reported immediately through the chain of command to the Brigade S-2, via SALUTE Report format located in Tab A, Appendix 3, Annex T
- c Road conditions and traffic summaries on MSRs must be reported when necessary. It is necessary to report road conditions when any substantial change occurs in the trafficability of the movement corridor. Reports will be submitted to the Brigade S-2 via Tab D (Intell Reports), Appendix 3, Annex T
- d Topographic support will be provided IAW Appendix 3

4 PROCEDURES Battalion collection plans are synchronized with the brigade's Information answering the brigade Priority Intelligence Requirements/Information Requirements (PIR/IR) is in the SPOT report format. Brigade S-2 publishes an Intelligence Summary to Bn twice daily. Bn can submit Requests for Intelligence Information (RII) (Appendix 10)

5 REQUIREMENTS Brigade S-2 will provide subordinate units with the current PIR/IR, and answer these if the intelligence is available. If not available, the S-2 will request support from higher. PIRs are the highest priority intelligence requirements, must be approved by the commander and are listed in priority. IRs provide intelligence which is less critical to tactical decisions.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

6 RESPONSIBILITIES

a Brigade S-2

- (1) Prepares input to estimates, plans and orders
- (2) Develops and recommends Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and Information Requirements (IR)
- (3) Monitors subordinate unit intelligence requests and submits additional request as required
- (4) Publishes intelligence summary (INTSUM) twice daily
- (5) Conducts Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
- (6) Collects, analyzes and disseminates intelligence
- (7) Keeps the commander and staff informed

b The brigade S-2 NCOIC supervises the administration of the S-2 section, maintains section logs, maps, and overlays, requisitions and distributes maps, charts and geodesy, and monitors physical security program and supervises TOC access

7 REPORTS See Appendix 3 (Intelligence) to Annex T (Reports)

APPENDICES

- 1 - S-2 TOC Procedures
- 2 - Weather
- 3 - Topographic Support
- 4 - Tactical Counterintelligence Operations/OPSEC
- 5 - Prisoners of War, Captured Documents and Equipment
- 6 Sensitive Items
- 7 Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plans
- 8 - Security Classification Guide
- 9 Request for Imagery
- 10 - Request for Intelligence Information

APPENDIX 1 (S-2 TOC PROCEDURES) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- 1 GENERAL This appendix prescribes S-2 TOC procedures and requirements
- 2 SITUATION BOARD In addition to the operational graphics posted on the TOC situation board, S-2 will post
 - a Current Brigade/Third US Army Intelligence Summary (INTSUM)
 - b Current weather
 - c Current CCIR
- 3 JOURNALS S-2 will maintain two journals
 - a Incoming message journal The incoming message journal will contain a copy of intelligence and weather-related information and messages. Each message will be logged into the journal at the time of receipt using DA Form 159. Each log entry will be sequentially numbered. The log entry number will be annotated with the DTG on each message.
 - b Outgoing message journal The journal will contain a copy of outgoing messages from the S-2 section. Each outgoing message will be logged on DA Form 159 and sequentially numbered. The log entry number and DTG are annotated on each message.
- 4 TOC SECURITY
 - a A perimeter will be constructed around the brigade TOC
 - b Access to the TOC will be limited to one entrance. Access badges administered by the S-2 will control entry.
- 5 Document Security
 - a The S-2 is overall responsible for the security of classified material located at the brigade TOC
 - b The S-2 will ensure classified documents are correctly marked IAW AR 380-5
 - c The S-2 will have a plan for the emergency destruction of classified documents

APPENDIX 2 (WEATHER) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

- 1 PURPOSE To outline procedures by which weather support is provided to the brigade
2. GENERAL. Weather intelligence is a key element of combat intelligence. The S2 will integrate critical weather requirements into all operational plans and provide the necessary weather support.
- 3 RESPONSIBILITIES The S-2 will provide weather information to subordinate units. Weather and light data will be presented to the commander during operational briefings. The TUSA Staff Weather Officer (SWO) and G-2 will provide the weather and light data.
- 4 CLIMATIC SUMMARIES The S-2 will provide the following weather information: temperature, humidity, precipitation, wind, visibility, and EENT/BMNT.
- 5 WEATHER FORECASTS Forecasts can normally be obtained for the below listed periods:
 - a Short period - (12, 24, 48 hours)
 - b Medium period - (3 to 5 days)
 - c Extended period - (more than 5 days)
- 6 WEATHER WARNINGS See Tab to this Appendix.

APPENDIX 3 (TOPOGRAPHIC SUPPORT) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PURPOSE To establish policy and procedures for the requisitioning and issuance of maps and other topographic products required for combat operations and training exercises.

2 RESPONSIBILITY Brigade S-2 provides guidance and coordinates for surveys, mapping, geodetic and military geographic intelligence products and capabilities

3 GENERAL

a The Brigade S-2 section is responsible for preparing plans, policies and priorities for their map program and ensuring appropriate stocks are on hand

b Requests for maps will be addressed to the unit S-2 The S-2 will consolidate and forward the request to the HHC Supply Sergeant for request submission

c Standard map issue is 10 sets per HHC, 15 sets per escort guard MP Company City maps will be issued IAW mission requirements

d Subordinate units must provide personnel to pick up and inventory maps All maps will be inventoried and sorted prior to issue

e Subordinate units will be issued 30% of their basic load of maps for planning purposes and the final 0% of the basic load once in the theater of operation

f Battalion S-2s will order maps for their subordinate units

4 REQUESTING FORMAT Requests for maps, charts or geodetic products will be submitted to the brigade S-2 using a memorandum format Units must be specific on the scale and amount required The brigade S-2 will forward the request to Corps map depot using SF 344 (multi-use standard requisitioning/issue system document)

**APPENDIX 4 (TACTICAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX B
(INTELLIGENCE) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP**

1 PURPOSE To outline procedures that will deny the enemy information as to the capabilities, organization and intent of friendly action

2 RESPONSIBILITY The Brigade S-2 will closely coordinate with the S-3 and Signal Officer for the application of denial, detection and deception measures. Unit commanders will implement the following OPSEC measures to increase security and deny the enemy information about unit missions

a Denial Measures Measures to deny the enemy information about your unit

- (1) Operations security
- (2) Security discipline
- (3) Document security

b Detection Measures Implement these measures to increase security and detect possible enemy personnel

- (1) Ground reconnaissance
- (2) Reporting suspicious personnel
- (3) Civilian pass system and access roster
- (4) Challenge and password system

APPENDIX 5 (PRISONER OF WAR, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PURPOSE To prescribe procedures for handling EPW/CI, equipment and documents captured by units assigned to this brigade

2 RESPONSIBILITIES

a Commanders at all level are responsible for ensuring

(1) EPW/CI are handled IAW the Geneva and Hague Conventions and US National Policy governing handling of EPW/CI

(2) Captured enemy property is disposed of IAW higher HQ directives

b Each soldier in the brigade is responsible for treating EPW/CI IAW the Geneva and Hague Conventions and for reporting incidents of EPW/CI maltreatment to the chain of command

3 PROCEDURES

a Prisoners of War (Members of Current 800th MP Bde Task Organization as Capturing Unit)

(1) Immediately following the capture of an EPW/CI, the battalion will notify brigade HQ by the fastest available means EPW/CIs will be moved rapidly to the capturing units Internment Facility (IF) Notification should include circumstance of the capture

(a) Number of enemy personnel and their unit

(b) Place of capture (grid coordinates)

(c) Time of capture

(d) Information of potential intelligence value (type equipment, documents captured, etc)

(2) Equipment will be confiscated and evacuated with the EPW/CI who was in possession of the equipment at the time of capture

(3) Report crew served weapons, equipment and material (i.e. tanks, artillery pieces, trucks, aircraft, etc) immediately to the IF commander/S-4 Provide time of capture, type of equipment, grid coordinates Brigade S-4 will provide instructions for the handling and disposition of the equipment

(4) Information obtained from the EPW/CI by the capturing unit will be provided to an MI representative at the IF

**APPENDIX 5 (PRISONER OF WAR, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT) TO
ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP**

(5) Capturing personnel will complete an appropriate capture tag (Enemy Prisoner Of War (EPW) Capture Tag See STANAG 2044) and attach it to EPW/CI prior to evacuation to the IF

b Captured documents (Members of Current 800th MP Bde Task Organization as Capturing Unit)

(1) Papers, overlays, maps, etc , obtained from an EPW/CI will be considered intelligence information and provided protection commensurate with documents classified SECRET

(2) Capturing personnel should evaluate the material to determine if it has immediate tactical value. However, such evaluation should not delay evacuation of the document with the EPW/CI who possessed the document at the time of capture

(3) At the time of capture, capturing personnel should inform the Brigade S-2 of the captured documents by the quickest available secure means. The following information should be provided

(a) Place and time of capture

(b) Type of document

(4) The acquisition of any communication and COMSEC documents will be reported to the Brigade S-2. Courier will deliver the documents directly to the MI representative at the IF

(5) Documents found in the possession of enemy intelligence agents will be evacuated directly to the MI representative at the nearest IF

(6) All other categories of captured documents will be forwarded as expeditiously as possible to the Brigade S-2

c Captured Material

(1) Capturing personnel should contact the unit commander/S-2 to have the captured equipment screened for intelligence value

(a) Guard captured material and documents to prevent looting by souvenir hunters and prevent recapture by the enemy

(b) Tag captured enemy equipment

(c) Contact the Brigade S-4 for instructions on handling and disposition of captured equipment

APPENDIX 5 (PRISONER OF WAR, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT) TO
ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(2) Captured enemy technical documents, maintenance handbooks, operation manuals, drawings, photographs or other written or printed matter will be treated as captured equipment. Technical documents found with and related to an item will remain with the equipment.

(3) Captured enemy equipment, documents and/or other material will not be destroyed without prior approval of the Brigade S-2 except to prevent capture. If permission is requested and granted, the unit having custody will destroy captured equipment and documents. The destruction will be reported through S-4 channels. Medical items will not be destroyed under any circumstances.

(4) Special Documents. Documents containing information on the following subjects will receive minimum essential processing at subordinate levels and will be forwarded immediately to TUSA G-2, XMI - Corps by courier:

- (a) Location of enemy weapons used in delivery of nuclear warheads
- (b) Enemy NBC capabilities
- (c) Probability of enemy courses of action
- (d) Enemy vulnerabilities
- (e) Enemy special, psychological and/or unconventional operations

APPENDIX (SENSITIVE ITEMS) TO AN NEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PURPOSE To provide guidance for sensitive item inventories

2 DEFINITION Sensitive items are defined as weapons, COMSEC, night vision devices, ammunition, NBC equipment and GPS

3 COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

a Comply with the procedures of this appendix.

b Ensure measures are taken to safeguard sensitive items

c Submit serious incident reports as outlined in AR 19-40

d Report sensitive item losses immediately to Brigade CP

e Report the status of all sensitive items to the Brigade CP

f Conduct a weekly serial number inventory and report the result NLT 1800 hours every Sunday to the Brigade S-2

4 PROCEDURES

a All sensitive items will remain under continuous control. If the sensitive items count is not accurate, immediately conduct a serial number inventory

b Persons charged with custody of sensitive items will be properly trained to safeguard the security of these items. They will sound an alarm if a forceful theft is attempted

c Soldiers in leadership positions will maintain a serial number list of sensitive items assigned to their soldiers

d At any time a discrepancy is discovered in the serial number inventory immediately notify the Brigade S-2

5 REPORTS

a A sensitive items report is required every 12 hours. A weekly serial number inventory will be completed every Sunday

b Weapons, ammunition, SOIs, Protective Masks, NDBs, and GPSs will be counted and inventoried

c The commander can tailor this list to meet the situation

APPENDIX 7 (INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT) TO ANNEX
B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1. **PURPOSE** To outline critical intelligence information that should be obtained prior to deploying to an objective area
2. **GENERAL** The following intelligence information should be answered prior to deployment for any unit in this brigade
 - a Rear area, enemy forces capabilities, size, organization and likely courses of action
 - b Climate, terrain and the impact this will have
 - c Attitude of the local populace toward US soldiers
 - d Size of unconventional forces, - SPF units, airmobile units and doctrinal usage.
3. **INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION** The following MP-specific intelligence information should also be answered
 - a Reliability of local national military and police forces
 - b Number of police officers per city
 - c Location/size of detention facilities
 - d How police forces are organized
 - e Critical/protective targets (power plants, public utilities, ammo plants, and communication buildings)
 - f Local logistical facilities
 - g Level of training of local police, equipment and weapons
 - h Terrorist and/or subversive groups operating in the area
 - (1) Names
 - (2) Locations
 - (3) Membership size/leaders
 - (4) Activities/goals, etc

APPENDIX 8 (SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE)
TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL The provisions of AR 380-5 shall apply in all cases dealing with security classification Any dispute or conflict concerning classification of information will be referred to the S-2, this headquarters, for resolution

2. CLASSIFICATION AND REPRODUCTION OF OPORDS AND OPLANS OPORDs and OPLANs developed by this brigade, in support of those issued by TUSA, will bear the same classification and downgrading instructions as the higher headquarters OPLANs and OPORDs received from higher headquarters will not be reproduced without permission from the originating headquarters The following will be classified at least CONFIDENTIAL

- a Unit strength reports
- b Unit status reports
- c Intelligence summaries and reports
- d Status of supplies and ammunition
- e Movement of units and/or troops and equipment
- f Casualty reports
- g Air strikes and artillery support request
- h MIJ reports
- i Reports of deceptive practices
- j Reports of land, naval or air assaults and bombing operations
- k Reports relating to enemy operations, identification of enemy units/personnel

l Any other reports/information which could be utilized by the enemy to capitalize on strengths or weaknesses

3 CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT(S) CUSTODIAL PRECAUTIONS

a Classified material removed from storage is kept under constant surveillance and covered when not in use Attach cover sheets, Standard Form 05 (CONFIDENTIAL Cover Sheet), Standard Form 04 (SECRET Cover Sheet), and Standard Form 03 (TS Cover Sheet), whenever the document is not in secure storage When classified material is within the TOC, ensure it is covered from viewing and protective cover sheets are not exposed

APPENDIX 9 (REQUEST FOR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL Requests for Intelligence Information (RII) are used to update the intelligence estimate. An RII is a means of requesting information not available to a user/producer in local databases where a valid requirement exists to support assessments or planning. When published intelligence documents or reports do not answer specific questions of the user or raise additional questions, local intelligence data bases are searched for answers to the questions. If answers are not available, a request for information to a higher headquarters is submitted. Requests for information are prepared using the RII format. Requests received exceeding organic requirements are always consolidated and forwarded to the next higher echelon as RII.

2 METHOD OF SUBMISSION

- a All RII will be formatted IAW Tab A this Appendix.
- b The Brigade S-2 will answer RIIs using intelligence assets, assigned or attached, or local database.
- c If unable to answer the RII, the Brigade S-2 will forward them to TUSA G-2, Collection Management Officer (CMO).
- d Once the RII is answered, the information is disseminated via the most expeditious means.
- e RII priority is coded either 1 (immediate), 2 (priority), or 3 (routine).

TAB A (RII SAMPLE FORMAT) TO APPENDIX 9 (REQUEST FOR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP B-10-A-1

REQUEST FOR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION (RII)

OFFICE SYMBOL

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI), ATTN. S-2

SUBJECT Request for Intelligence Information #

(RII number consists of unit number - year number - and sequence number of RII, for example 44-9-001)

- 1 (U) Request the following information be provided to this office
 - a (U) REQUEST
 - b (U) REQDAT (Required Date of Receipt of Requested Information)
 - c (U) LTIOV (Latest Time Information is of Value)
 - d (U) PRY (Mission Priority)
 - e (U) NARR
 - (1) Should describe nature of desired information. Be as specific as possible
 - (2) State desired classification level of information
 - f (U) JUSTIFICATION Explain why information is needed
- 2 POC this office is (name and phone of personnel familiar with request)

NAME
RANK BRANCH, USAR
COMMANDING

ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL

a Purpose To establish a Command Post Organization and Operations policy for field operations within this command

b Scope Applicable to units assigned or attached to the 800th MP Bde (EPW/CI)

2 COMMAND AND CONTROL.

a Command Post

(1) Garrison

(a) The Brigade and Battalions Emergency Operations Center (EOC) will be located in their respective S-3 Offices or a designated alternate location

(b) The Emergency Operations Center will be activated by direction of 77th RSC, Third US Army, 377th TSC, or the Brigade Commander. The EOC operates on a 24-hour basis until control is passed to the Field Tactical Operations Center (TOC) or until the center is directed to cease operations by the Brigade Commander

(c) The EOC communication capabilities are

(1) COMM 516-481-3248/3249, DSN 456-0856

(2) STU-III 516-481-9770

(d) The EOC, during activation, will be the POC for all reports and requests for information by subordinate units through their chain of command

(2) Field Operations

(a) The TOC will be deployed as directed. Upon activation, it will be the POC for all requests and reports previously submitted to the EOC unless otherwise directed

(b) The brigade tactical HQ's site (command post) will include members of all headquarters staff sections, the HHC, the PWIC and other HQ LNOs

b Succession of Command and Control Unless directed otherwise, BDE CDR, DBC, S-3, then the senior battalion/group commander

c Deployment routes from assembly areas to tactical locations will be detailed in operation orders

**ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE
(EPW/CI) TACSOP**

3 DEVELOPMENT This annex is comprised of Appendices, which address a variety of field requirements. The following is a brief description of each Appendix.

APPENDICES

- 1 COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES**
- 2 QUARTERING PARTY DUTIES**
- 3 INTERNAL OPERATIONS OF COMMAND POST**
- 4 DIAGRAMS OF CP, TOC, ALOC & BRIEFING TENT**

APPENDIX 1 (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES) TO ANNEX C
(COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

1 TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (TOC) Is located in the CP It includes the S-2, S-3 and COMMO section personnel

a S-2

- (1) Coordinates TOC and CP Access
- (2) Maintains current enemy situation charts/maps as well as pertinent weather data
- (3) Obtains maps from S-4 and disseminates maps to subordinate units
- (4) Prepares/updates Intel estimates

b S-3

(1) Maintains current situation charts/maps for all assigned/attached units depicting area of operation, missions, reserves, etc

(2) Notifies S-1/S-4 on task organization changes, location changes and/or mission changes that impact on their operations

- (3) Recommends CP locations
- (4) Briefs concepts of the operation
- (5) Prepares and updates the Operation Estimate
- (6) Advises commander on mission priorities and courses of action
- (7) Prepares, coordinates and authenticates OPLANs and OPORDs
- (8) Establishes the TOC and coordinates TOC operations
- (9) Publishes tactical movement orders

c Signal Officer

(1) Advises HHC CDR, on the suitability of location of TOC as it pertains to communications

- (2) Determines and recommends requirements for communication support
- (3) Supervises the operation of the Brigade Message Center and distribution
- (4) Assists sections with communications support

APPENDIX 1 (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES) TO ANNEX C
(COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

(5) Establishes communications in the TOC to include all FM, wire, computers, and LAN connections

d Chemical Officer

- (1) Advises the commander and staff on NBC matters
- (2) Prepares NBC annexes for plans
- (3) Provides NBC vulnerability assessment

2 ADMINISTRATIVE/LOGISTIC CENTER (ALOC) Is located in the CP It includes the S-1 section, S-4 section PBO, BMO

a S-1/PAC

- (1) Maintains constant visual data on status of personnel, to include daily losses, personnel available for duty and known gains or losses for all assigned and attached units
- (2) Prepares and continually updates Personnel Estimate
- (3) Publishes locations of medical support facilities
- (4) Coordinates PX and barber services in the area to include publication of hours of operation, location, etc
- (5) Supervises/provides guidance on awards and decorations

b S-4/PBO/BMO

- (1) Maintains constant status on vehicle maintenance and availability, status of equipment, rations, POL and ammunition supplies for all assigned and attached units
- (2) Responsible for maintaining on hand or access to all classes of supply
- (3) Coordinates decontamination operations with NBC Officer
- (4) Trains and places class A agents, field ordering officers and contracting officers for subordinate units
- (5) Prepares and continually updates Logistics Estimates
- (6) Supervises troop dining facility
- (7) Coordinates graves registration process

APPENDIX 1 (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES) TO ANNEX C
(COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

- (8) Publishes schedules and locations of shower and laundry points

3 ESTABLISHMENT OF CP

a The HHC Commander is responsible for the establishment of the CP and will coordinate the overall movement of the CP

b HHC First Sergeant/Commander

- (1) Establishes Brigade CP complex IAW App 4
- (2) Designates the areas for use by various staff sections
- (3) Coordinates with sections to provide traffic control, security and dismount point operations
- (4) Responsible for lighting/maintenance of electrical power (to include approving any power circuit changes) for the CP
- (5) Responsible for all classes of supply
- (6) Responsible for receiving and accommodating visitors
- (7) Organizes and supervises security of the headquarters CP
- (8) Prescribes the uniform to be worn during the operation
- (9) Provides hot water for daily hygiene
- (10) Provides field mess operations
- (11) Coordinates with Base/Base Cluster Commander for security
- (12) Prepares company movement order
- (13) Provides CP life support

c A map recon by the CG, followed by a site-recon will be completed by the HHC Cdr, Ops SGM and Command Group representative to insure adequate real estate and force protection concerns are considered prior to establishing a TOC

d The quartering party should include the OPS SGM, the Chemical officer, the Signal Officer, and an NBC survey team with required communications personnel and assets to establish communications with the Rear CP and a small security force. Normally the quartering party will be dispatched to a designated CP location for occupation, reconnaissance and security. The advanced

APPENDIX 1 (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES) TO ANNEX C
(COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

party will be dispatched next to begin establishing the CP and to guide in the main body. The advance party will be composed of the representatives from each staff section and security forces as necessary. See Appendix 2 for quartering party duties.

e. Upon arrival at a new field location, the priority of work will be local security, communications, establishment of TOC and work areas, camouflage (if necessary) and sleeping areas. The TOC complex will be established to standard within 12 hours of main body occupation of site (see Tab B (Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Diagram) to Appendix 4 (DIAGRAMS OF CP, TOC, ALOC & BRIEFING TENT) to this Annex.)

4 BIVOUAC SITE SELECTION: Select a defensible piece of terrain in proximity to a road network (but not close enough to allow the enemy a high speed avenue of approach) with good cover and concealment. As a general rule, 300-400 meters in diameter is normally adequate for the headquarters, and 500-550 meters in diameter for a brigade headquarters when co-located with a company headquarters and platoon. The defensive perimeter should be as circular as possible to avoid exposed flanks and weak points.

5 CONVOY OPERATIONS: All vehicular movements to, in, and from a field environment will be tactical. Speeds will be limited to 10 MPH on trails, 25 MPH on unimproved (dirt) roads and 40-45 MPH on improved (secondary, paved) roads, 45 MPH on paved highways. Soldiers will remain in the prescribed uniform, and tactical discipline will be enforced at all times. Active and passive air defense measures will be employed, and soldiers will dismount and seek cover at halts when the intent is to remain stationary for a period of time. When traveling on paved roads, 100 meters distance between vehicles will be maintained. 50 meters will be maintained when moving on other roads and trails.

a. For major convoy operations, a convoy commander and serial commanders will be designated. Leaders will carefully inspect load plans during the loading process. A maintenance contact team with tow bars will be positioned near the end of the convoy to facilitate repairs as needed. Just prior to departing operators will perform PMCS under leader supervision. Each vehicle will have a trash bag, which will remain in the vehicle throughout the field operation. This bag will be emptied, daily, at the trash collection point.

b. Advance and rear guard elements will be employed at appropriate distances (normally 500 meters).

6 RECOVERY OPERATIONS: When returning from the field, equipment cleaning will begin immediately on return to garrison and will continue during the next day, as required. As a minimum Phase I through Phase III will be accomplished on the day of return.

a. Phase I -- Serial number inventory of sensitive items

b. Phase II -- Clean and properly store of sensitive items

c. Phase III - Cleaning and storing of vehicles

APPENDIX 1 (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES) TO ANNEX C
(COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

d Phase IV --Cleaning and storing of other equipment

e Phase V -- Cleaning and storing of personal equipment

APPENDIX 2 (QUARTERING PARTY) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- 1 **PROCEDURE** The quartering party precedes the unit to the field location for the purpose of selecting and securing the bivouac site
- 2 **PERSONNEL** The composition of the quartering party will be as directed by the HHC Cdr, in coordination with the DBC/XO and S-3
- 3 **TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS** A minimum of one vehicle with radio will be in the quartering party. If distance necessitates, an additional vehicle with radio may be required for radio relay
- 4 **FUNCTIONS** When moving into an area, the quartering party should halt the vehicles approximately 300 - 400 meters upwind of the proposed site. The personnel should dismount and sweep across the area. Sufficient personnel should be left back with each vehicle to monitor the radio. The quartering party should take the following actions
 - a Maintain 360 degree security as element moves forward to clear the area of enemy activity
 - b Check and probe for mines and booby traps as element sweeps forward
 - c The clearing party should sweep 200 - 300 meters past the far side of the proposed perimeter, then fall back while staying on line, to the perimeter
 - d The leader of the quartering party (usually HHC Cdr) should ensure 360 degree security is established and designate vehicles egress points, dismount point and 24 hour positions
 - e The NBC operators (IAW the threat) should utilize VDR-2 radiac detectors to scan the bivouac area while other operators utilize the M256 kit to detect chemical agents
 - f The quartering party leader should contact the Bde Cdr, DBC/XO and advise of the tactical situation and location
- 5 **SIGNS** The quartering party leader is responsible for marking specific unit locations within the bivouac/perimeter (e.g., CP, mess, dismount point, motor pool/park, etc.) to include placing a sign to mark the site from the major roadway
- 6 **AREA ASSIGNMENT**
 - a Using the template/clock method, the quartering party will subdivide the unit area and determine space allocations for the headquarters. The quartering party will complete the following as time permits
 - (1) Prescribe temporary measures for internal security to include clearing and securing the site and monitoring of chemical and radiation hazards
 - (2) Locate mess area, maintenance area and latrines
 - b Prior to the arrival of the main body element, the quartering party will

APPENDIX 2 (QUARTERING PARTY) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(1) Select individuals to guide specific elements to assigned locations within the bivouac area.

(2) The OIC/NCOIC of the quartering party will be prepared to brief the Bde Cdr/DBC on *arrangement of the bivouac and ensure that a representative meets the main body at the release point (RP)* and leads them to the bivouac site

(3) HHC Cdr will determine the placement of the seven M8A1 Alarms on the outer boundary of the perimeter

APPENDIX 3 (INTERNAL OPERATIONS OF CP) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 STATE OF POLICE Equipment and food items will be neatly organized to facilitate efficient operations. Field stoves will never be used as a body-warming device. The area around stoves and MKTs will be completely cleared of grass, leaves, and other combustible matter. An ample amount of trash bags will be located near the field-feeding site to accommodate the amount of trash generated from the number of personnel fed.

2 SHAVING WATER Soldiers will shave daily while in the field. Leaders will furnish water for shaving and other hygienic needs. Immersion heaters will be lit early enough to ensure the water is hot when soldiers wake. Once in operation, heaters will be continuously monitored by a licensed person. Operators will not be permitted to return to sleep after lighting the heaters unless properly relieved by another licensed operator.

3 WARM-UP TENT When weather conditions dictate, a warm-up tent will be erected at a minimum for support of the soldiers. The warm-up tent will consist of a GP small with a stove, field table and some chairs. A soldier who is trained and certified on an SF 46 to operate the heater will be appointed as the monitor and will remain with the tent at all times while the heater is in operation. Under no circumstances will soldiers be permitted to sleep in the warm-up tent. Unit leadership will rotate personnel through the warm-up tent as frequently as necessary for protection against the cold. Soldiers will be required to remove several layers of clothing, boots, and socks, change socks, apply foot powder, and warm the clothes and body before continuing the mission. Normally, 15-30 minutes will be necessary for this purpose. NO HEATERS IN SLEEP TENTS!

4 FIELD MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS While operating in the field, daily preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) will be performed on all vehicles and equipment IAW operator's manual and under first line supervision.

5 GENERATORS

a Generators will be appropriately grounded and inspected frequently by unit leadership while in operation. Oil levels will be checked, and generators will be rotated, to preclude exceeding the limit of continuous operation, as prescribed in the operator's manual. A generator mechanic will be assigned.

b Generators will be sandbagged (or dug in, if digging is permissible) for protection against incoming artillery and for protection of persons should the equipment explode. Sandbags will be placed in such a manner as to provide protection to a height of one foot above the top of the generator, and to avoid suffocating generators, sandbags will be three feet away from the equipment. A fire extinguisher and shovel will be positioned in close proximity to the generator site.

c Fuel containers will also be protected by sandbags or by digging below ground. Fuel cans must be protected to a height one foot above the tops of the cans, and fire extinguishers and shovel are also required on the fuel site.

APPENDIX 3 (INTERNAL OPERATIONS OF CP) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

6 **TENTAGE** Tents will normally be used for operations, supply, maintenance, mess, warm-up, and other collective purposes. All tents will be erected in accordance with instructions sewn inside the tent entrance. The trench around tents should be dug on all four sides, approximately six inches deep and wide, directly at the base of the canvas. Runoff trenches should be connected at different points to divert the water to lower ground.

7 **WATER TRAILER/LISTER BAGS** The water should be positioned in relatively close proximity to the dining facility--the location at which soldiers can most easily be served. A lister bag should be erected in a central location, to ensure a sufficient quantity of clean, potable water is always available and if weather dictates ice should be added to provide cool water. The HHC Cdr will ensure the water trailer is kept filled and water is potable.

8 **TRASH COLLECTION POINT** A trash collection point will be designated in a concealed location within each bivouac site. Trash will be collected from this location and transported to an authorized disposal point. Trash collection will be performed daily by an established schedule to maintain an acceptable standard of area cleanliness.

9 **FIELD SANITATION** Instruction on field sanitation must be integrated into all field training exercises. Particular attention must be directed toward personal hygiene and installation and operation of field latrines. As a minimum, the headquarters will have one qualified Field Sanitation Team.

10 **BLANKS AND PYROTECHNICS** Blank ammunition and pyrotechnics are dangerous and must be carefully managed and controlled. Blanks will not be fired directly at a person when any closer than 25 meters. Weapons will remain on SAFE at all times when not in use. Blank ammunition will be collected and inventoried, and weapons will be cleared and inspected after ENDEX and before departing the field. Only officers and NCOs will handle smoke grenades and exploding devices. Exploding devices will never be used closer than 25 meters to personnel and equipment.

11 SENSITIVE ITEMS

a The following are considered sensitive items: weapons, ammunition, classified documents, communications and electronics operational instructions (SOI's), communication security (COMSEC) equipment, night vision devices, and GPS. These items will be controlled and safeguarded at all times employing the most rigid security measures.

b Individual weapons will remain in the possession of the persons to whom issued at all times while in the field, unless specific circumstances, such as the return of a soldier to garrison, dictate otherwise. In such instances, the company commander, or the senior leader on the site, will ensure the weapon is properly secured and supervised in the TOC weapons rack.

APPENDIX 3 (INTERNAL OPERATIONS OF CP) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

c Inventory sensitive items by serial number twice daily Inventories will be conducted as of 0600 and 1800 The report is submitted by phone or radio to brigade not later than 0800 and 2000

d A physical count of sensitive items is conducted when an element moves, the conclusion of an exercise, or the need exists

TABS

A - Dismount Point

B - Brigade Headquarters Defensive Positions

C - TOC Procedures

TAB A (DISMOUNT POINT) TO APPENDIX 3 (INTERNAL OPERATION OF COMMAND POST) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL This TAB prescribes procedures for establishing and operating a dismount point

2 LOCATION The dismount point is the only entrance into the bivouac site and will be located at the 6 o'clock position on the perimeter All traffic should be circulated to this location, other access roads should be blocked to avoid uncontrolled entry

3 PERSONNEL Dismount point will be manned twenty-four hours per day, as required by METT-T

a A minimum of two individuals will be at the dismount point at all times The senior of the two occupants will be clearly identified as being in charge and will supervise operation of the site in accordance with proper control and security procedures

b Individuals manning dismount points will have the following information available

(1) Location of the CP

(2) Location of the other elements such as company headquarters, mess hall, maintenance area, etc

(3) Sign and countersign

4 EQUIPMENT Personnel will wear complete prescribed uniform and will present the highest standards of dress Personnel will be armed with assigned weapon(s) and crew served weapon, preferably mounted on a tripod A TA-312 will be connected to the TOC Hourly communications checks will be made to ensure the operability of the telephone Leaders should periodically check the dismount point to ensure the camouflage is effective, a high state of police is maintained, soldiers are rotated from the point, and the health and welfare of the soldiers is provided

5 SECURITY OPERATIONS

a All personnel will be required to give the password during the hours of darkness Anyone not able to do so will be detained and the TOC notified

b During daylight hours, a person whose identity is known need not be challenged During periods of limited visibility, a ground guide will be used to escort vehicles from the dismount point to the parking area, the dismount point supervisor will enforce this rule

c The TOC will be notified of the arrival of any visiting field grade (LTC or above) officer All field grade officers will be escorted to their destination

TAB A (DISMOUNT POINT) TO APPENDIX 3 (INTERNAL OPERATION OF COMMAND POST) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

d The dismount point entrance will be blocked with an appropriate barrier, preferably concertina wire. The crew served weapon will be emplaced in a covered and concealed position, which offers a clear field of fire down the long axis of the entrance road. The sign/countersign will also be issued/received from a covered and concealed position forward of, but not in the line of fire. The person issuing the challenge will be in a different position from the crew served weapon. This position should be in close proximity to the barrier to preclude exposure of the person issuing the sign. Personnel in a vehicle will be challenged when the vehicle stops at the barrier.

e When personnel on foot approach the dismount point, the group will be halted at a safe distance (normally 30 to 40 meters). The group will then be instructed "advance and be recognized." The person advancing will be issued the challenge only loud enough to be heard by the one person. When the countersign is properly given, the identity of the person and other members of the group and the purpose for the visit will be determined. When necessary, instructions will be requested from the TOC.

f Tactical marking signs can be used, but not at the expense of security.

g Escorted prisoners will not be permitted past the dismount point without authority from the S-3/Battle Captain.

TAB B (BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS DEFENSIVE POSITIONS) TO APPENDIX 3 (INTERNAL OPERATION OF COMMAND POST) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PREPARATION OF POSITIONS When occupying a bivouac site, all units will immediately be organized in defensive positions. Sequence for preparation is

a. The Cdr HHC establishes security to include occupying the dismount point at the six o'clock position and positions at twelve, three, and nine o'clock

b. Position weapons. Crew served weapons should be located at six, twelve, three, and nine o'clock positions and positioned to maximize capabilities

c. Clear fields of fire and determine probable target locations, coordinate FPF, and prepare range cards

d. Prepare aiming stakes for night firing

e. Prepare communications and observation systems. FM communications should be utilized at each position until wire can be installed. All wire should run into the TOC, and the use of a "hot loop" to connect positions is advised.

f. Prepare weapons emplacements and individual positions to include overhead cover and concealment, prepare alternative and supplementary positions. Perimeter overlay will be maintained at the headquarters CP and will be furnished to S-3

g. Prepare protective shelters as required

h. Organization of the defensive area begins immediately after troop arrival and continues as long as the position is occupied. Improvement of cover and concealment of supplementary and alternative positions must be continuous.

2 ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE

a. The headquarters will establish a perimeter. Each unit/section will be assigned a portion of the perimeter to organize and defend. The DBC will direct the reserve.

b. Areas between sections/units will be covered by observation and overlapping fires.

c. Supporting fires from outside the perimeter may be available and should be planned and coordinated.

3 CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE. A spot report will be submitted immediately when the enemy is first observed. Subsequent spot reports will be submitted as the situation warrants.

a. If it appears that the enemy is aware of the location of the unit, all weapons will be fired on order, when the enemy comes into range.

TAB B (BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS DEFENSIVE POSITIONS) TO APPENDIX 3 (INTERNAL OPERATION OF COMMAND POST) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

b If the enemy is probing to locate defensive positions, fires should be withheld until the enemy force is well within range

c Leaders at all levels will actively control fires to ensure maximum effective fire distribution
Weapons will be moved to alternative or supplementary positions as required

4 NIGHT DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

a Illumination must be coordinated with adjacent units. As a rule, weapons will not fire until targets are visible. Leaders will ensure rigid fire control measures are enforced to prevent indiscriminate firing, disclosure of positions and needless expenditure of ammunition

b Crew served weapons will be fired by, using predetermined fire data, aiming stakes and/or artificial illumination

c When the enemy begins a full-scale assault, final protective fires (FPF) may be used to repel the attack. In employment of FPF, each individual will place maximum firepower within assigned sectors

5 SUPPORTING FIRES Supporting fires may consist of mortars, artillery or close air support. Plans for use of supporting fires will be accomplished prior to or concurrently with organization for defense

6 RANGE CARDS

a PURPOSE A range card is a record of firing data necessary to engage designated target areas within a sector of fire. Range cards may also be used to engage targets during periods of limited visibility and in preparing fire plans

b APPLICABILITY Range cards will be prepared for each position on the perimeter

c PROCEDURES

(1) Muzzle of weapon should be oriented on the center of the sector, or the final protective line (FPL) when assigned

(2) Sketch the symbol of the weapon, orienting it towards the center of the sector, or the FPL

(3) Indicate the limits of the primary and secondary sectors of fire

(4) Indicate and label friendly positions, at a minimum, the positions with sectors of fire to the left and right

TAB B (BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS DEFENSIVE POSITIONS) TO APPENDIX 3 (INTERNAL OPERATION OF COMMAND POST) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(5) Indicate a magnetic north arrow from the base of the weapon symbol, pointing towards magnetic north

(6) Orient the gun position with a prominent terrain feature

(7) Place distance and elevation data to each target shown on the range card

(8) Record marginal data and weapons number data on the range card

(9) Range cards will be continually reviewed and updated.

7 PERIMETER SKETCH The sketch is prepared for user and a copy for the TOC Section leaders will have a copy for their respective areas of responsibility The sketch includes

a Location of primary, supplemental and alternate positions to include primary and secondary sectors of fire and FPL

b Location of M-8 Chemical Alarms, and other obstacles and surveillance equipment

c Location of unit activities within perimeter (CP, mess, supply, maintenance, sleeping areas, latrines. etc)

d Direction of magnetic north

TAB C (TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (TOC) PROCEDURES) TO APPENDIX 3
(INTERNAL OPERATION OF CP) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION
AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1. Designated operations personnel will man the Brigade TOC. The S-3 SGM is designated as TOC Chief and has overall responsibility for TOC operations.

a. TOC Chief

(1) Admin Responsibilities

(a) Supervises and monitors the timely and accurate submission of reports to higher headquarters and from subordinate elements.

(b) Ensures reports are posted to the proper reports folder on the reports table.

(c) Ensures situation/operation maps are posted, current, and that the sector sketch and internal defense plan are complete and posted in the TOC.

(d) Supervises the Radio Telephone Operator (RTO) and ensures all information incoming/outgoing is complete and properly recorded in the TOC journal.

(e) Ensures operational/sensitive data in the TOC journal is highlighted.

(f) Ensures the S-3 is immediately informed of any change(s) to the current situation.

(g) Ensures only authorized shift personnel are in the TOC during daily operations.

(2) Logistics Responsibilities

(a) Ensures shift times are established, posted, and all assigned personnel are briefed.

(b) Ensures the TOC is maintained in a neat, orderly fashion.

(c) Ensures no eating in the TOC. The break area serves this purpose.

(d) Schedules meal breaks.

(e) Ensures war chests remain stocked with supplies.

(f) Develops and enforces sleep plans.

(g) Ensures all pubs and field manuals are available.

(h) Ensures field safes are available for storage of classified material.

b. S-3 Operations Sergeant is designated as the assistant TOC Chief and performs duties as directed by the S-3 and TOC Chief.

TAB C (TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (TOC) PROCEDURES) TO APPENDIX 3
(INTERNAL OPERATION OF CP) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION
AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

c Battle Captain Assists the S-3 in synchronizing and coordinating the staff's effort. During the battle, the battle captain should focus his efforts on supervising the soldiers within the S-3 operations cell, rather than synchronizing the efforts of other staff members

- (1) Keeps Command Group informed
- (2) Ensures the battle staff collects, processes, and disseminates information
- (3) Shields commander from non-critical information
- (4) Gets decisions from commander
- (5) Serves as TOC OIC during the absence of field grade officers

d RTO/Clerk typist

- (1) Monitors the radio
- (2) Receives and records reports
- (3) Updates status charts as necessary
- (4) Assists in the publication of orders and graphics
- (5) Assists in setting up and dismantling of the TOC
- (6) Serves as recorder during TDMP
- (7) Cleans and prepares charts and overlays for TDMP

e S-2

- (1) Coordinates TOC and CP access
- (2) Advises commander on enemy courses of action and situation
- (3) Maintains current enemy situation charts/maps as well as pertinent weather data
- (4) Obtains and disseminates maps to subordinate units
- (5) Issues Signal Operating Instructions (SOI) to staff and subordinate elements
- (6) Prepares intelligence input to estimates, plans, and orders

TAB C (TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (TOC) PROCEDURES) TO APPENDIX 3
(INTERNAL OPERATION OF CP) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION
AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(7) Develops and recommends priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IR)

(8) Provides technical guidance on captured enemy materiel

(9) Monitors subordinate unit requests and submits additional requests as required

(10) Publishes intelligence summary (INTSUM) twice daily to subordinate units

(11) Formulates brigade reconnaissance and surveillance plan

(12) Conducts intelligence preparation of the battlefield

(13) Coordinates collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence

f Signal Officer

(1) Advises CDR, HHC on the suitability of location of TOC as it pertains to communications

(2) Determines and recommends requirements for communication support

(3) Supervises the Brigade Message Center and distribution

g Chemical Officer

(1) Advises the commander on NBC defense measures, smoke and flame operations

(2) Conducts vulnerability analysis

(3) Receives, processes, disseminates NBC reports

(4) Coordinates and directs actions of plotter personnel

h A day shift and night shift will always be established ensuring that a minimum of a battle captain, shift NCOIC, and one RTO are always on duty. These personnel will be augmented as needed. A shift will be 12 hours long in duration, thereby allowing TOC personnel to perform perimeter guard (if required) and obtain rest prior to reporting back for TOC duties.

2 REPORTS Reporting procedures and formats are covered in Annex T. All reports coming into the Brigade TOC, after review and verification, are filed in appropriate reports folders which are placed on the reports table. This action allows any member of the staff access to all incoming/outgoing reports for review and update on the current situation. All TOC personnel must understand the reports system.

TAB C (TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (TOC) PROCEDURES) TO APPENDIX 3
(INTERNAL OPERATION OF CP) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION
AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

a TOC JOURNAL DA Form 1594 (Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log) will be utilized, no other form is acceptable. All information that comes into and goes out of the TOC will be placed in the journal no matter how insignificant it may seem. The TOC Chief will highlight all operational/sensitive data in yellow.

b FRAGO LOG All missions passed through FRAGOs and assigned to subordinate elements will be recorded on a cover sheet and posted in the FRAGO log. On completion of a mission, remarks will be annotated on the appropriate cover sheet, thereby closing out the mission.

c SPOT REPORT A spot report is generated and forwarded on any operational event or incident encountered by Brigade units and is a time sensitive document. On receipt of a spot report, location will be decoded and posted to the situation maps. The report is then filed in the spot report folder.

d TUSA FRAGO LOG All FRAGOs from higher headquarters will be logged on a cover sheet and filed in the TUSA FRAGO Log.

e INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (INTSUM) - An INTSUM report is submitted daily by subordinate elements as of 1800 to arrive at the TOC NLT 1900, negative reports are required. On receipt, the S-2 representative will thoroughly review the report, extract and pass data concerning other staff sections, post locations of events/incidents to intelligence /operations/ situation maps and file the report in the INTSUM report folder.

f PERSONNEL STATUS REPORT (PERSREP) A PERSREP report is submitted daily to the Brigade TOC NLT 0900 with an as of time of 0600. On receipt, the S-1 section will thoroughly review the report for completeness. All information required for the Brigade Commander's data book will be extracted, the report will then be filed in the PERSREP folder.

g CASUALTY FEEDER REPORT A casualty feeder report is submitted to the TOC when a soldier is killed as a result of hostile or non-hostile action, wounded or injured, missing -- non-hostile, missing in action, died of wounds or injuries, or died not as a result of hostile action. On receipt, the S-1 section will review the report, extract data, and file in the casualty feeder report folder.

h DAILY DEADLINE REPORT A daily deadline report is submitted covering a 24-hour period from 1200-1200 daily, and arrives at the Brigade TOC NLT 1500. On receipt, the S-4 section reviews the report for completeness, extracts data for the Brigade Commander's data book, and files the report in the daily deadline report folder. Negative reports are required.

i BATTLE LOSS REPORT A battle loss report is submitted as required to the Brigade TOC. On receipt, the S-4 section reviews the report for completeness, extracts data for the Brigade Commander's data book, and files the report in the daily deadline report folder.

TAB C (TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (TOC) PROCEDURES) TO APPENDIX 3
(INTERNAL OPERATION OF CP) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION
AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

J SENSITIVE ITEMS REPORT A sensitive item report is submitted daily as of 1800 and arrives at the Brigade TOC NLT 1900 daily This report is submitted verbally and negative reports are required

3 Vehicular traffic moving into and out of the CP will be controlled from the TOC The dismount point will notify the TOC of vehicles entering the CP by reporting bumper number and number of passengers in vehicles

4 Headquarters commander is responsible for providing the sector sketch for the HHC sector of responsibility and the perimeter defense plan for the HHC sector to the TOC NLT four hours after bivouac site is established

5 The commanders and staff will brief the brigade commander daily at 1900 in the briefing tent The briefings will include the operations of the last 24 hours and future operations The S-3 is the lead staff officer for the briefing and is responsible for coordinating the brief

6 BRIEFINGS Shift change briefings will occur with the change of each shift They are designed for the on coming shift to be able to acclimate themselves to the current situation prior to assuming responsibility On coming shift should arrive 30-60 minutes prior to the beginning of their shift At a minimum, it will include a summarized description of events occurring since the shift began It should include current situation, any current missions in process or warning orders received and any necessary coordinating instructions It should also include a review of items/events in the journal and updates on the map boards/battle tracking charts Each soldier being relieved should brief the oncoming soldier as to any items pertaining to that specific position Outgoing shift is responsible for insuring map boards and battle tracking charts are updated prior to shift change

7 INFORMATION FLOW The flow of information is a primary responsibility of the shift Battle Captain It is imperative that the Battle Captain communicates critical information immediately, analyzes information and puts in coherent form for unit use, integrates information into Commander's update and synchronizes output of information for mission success

8 BATTLE TRACKING & INFORMATION DISPLAY Critical information needs to be identified and prioritized Charts, sketches and matrices should be utilized to clearly and concisely display information Map boards should be standardized See Attachment A (Battle Tracking Charts) to Tab C (Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Procedures) To Appendix 3 (Internal Operation Of CP) To Annex C (Command Post Organization And Operations) To The 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

ATTACHMENT A (BATTLE TRACKING CHARTS) TO TAB C (TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (TOC) PROCEDURES) TO APPENDIX 3 (INTERNAL OPERATION OF CP) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(SEE ATTACHED POWERPOINT DOCUMENT)

APPENDIX 4 (DIAGRAMS OF CP, TOC, ALOC & BRIEFING TENT) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 DIAGRAMS The following diagrams provide the necessary guidance to set up and operate an I/R Brigade Command Post.

TABS


A – Command Post Sketch

B – Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Diagram


C – Administrative & Logistical Operations Center (ALOC) Diagram

D – Briefing Tent Diagram

TAB A (COMMAND POST (CP) SKETCH) TO APPENDIX 4 (DIAGRAMS OF CP, TOC, ALOC & BRIEFING TENT) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP




TAB B (TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (TOC)) TO APPENDIX 4 (DIAGRAMS OF CP, TOC, ALOC & BRIEFING TENT) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP




TAB C (ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (ALOC))
 TO APPENDIX 4 (DIAGRAMS OF CP, TOC, ALOC & BRIEFING TENT) TO
 ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE
 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

ALOC




TAB D (BRIEFING TENT LAYOUT) TO APPENDIX 4 (DIAGRAMS OF CP, TOC, ALOC & BRIEFING TENT) TO ANNEX C (COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP












BRIEFING TENT LAYOUT

GP MED TENT WITH FLOORS - LINER AND STOVE



INTERNAL TOC

LAY OUT



ENTRANCE


EXIT

CHARTS &


S-3 MAP BOARD

INFO/BOARD

S-2 MAP BOARD



COMMO



ASST



ADMIN WORK AREA




ASST



ADMIN SGT




PHONES




INTERNAL A-LOC

LAY OUT

ALOC







800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)




UNIT STATUS

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Personnel</i>	<i>Commo</i>	<i>Weapons</i>	<i>Vehicles</i>
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
		<input checked="" type="radio"/> 100-90	<input type="radio"/> 89-80	<input checked="" type="radio"/> 79 >




800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)



CCIR-800th MP BDE




800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)



CCIR-CFLCC



800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)



C + _____

THREATCON: _____


THREAT LEVEL: _____

MOPP LEVEL: _____

TIME ZONE IN USE: _____




800th Military Police Brigade (I/R) Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI)



(Information Needed to Protect Friendly Forces from the
Enemy's Information Gathering Systems)




800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)



Priority Intelligence Requirements(PIR) (Information about the Enemy)



800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)



WEATHER


TEMP: LO _____ HI _____

WIND: _____


VISIBILITY: _____

SR: SS: MR: MS: MOON%: _____

NEXT 24-72 HRS: _____




800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)



HOST NATION ASSETS



800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)




TIME LINE

TIME	EVENT	POC
0000-0100		
0100-0200		
0200-0300		
0300-0400		
0400-0500		
0500-0600		
0600-0700		
0700-0800		
0800-0900		
0900-1000		
1000-1100		
1100-1200		
1200-1300		
1300-1400		
1400-1500		
1500-1600		
1600-1700		
1700-1800		
1800-1900		
1900-2000		
2000-2100		
2100-2200		
2200-2300		
2300-2400		




800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)




INTENT ONE LEVEL UP

INTENT TWO LEVELS UP



800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)




RESTATED MISSION

COMMANDER'S INTENT



800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)




RESTATED MISSION-1 LEVEL UP

COMMANDER'S INTENT-1 LEVEL UP



800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)




RESTATED MISSION-2 LEVELS UP

COMMANDER'S INTENT-2 LEVELS UP




800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)



SPECIFIED TASKS



800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)



SPECIFIED TASKS/ESSENTIAL TASKS



800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)



FACTS/ASSUMPTIONS



800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)



FACILITY STATUS


<p>___MP BN</p> <p>___MP GD CO</p> <p>___MP GD CO</p> <p>___MP DET</p> <p>___</p> <p>G 100-90</p>	<p>___MP BN</p> <p>___MP GD CO</p> <p>___MP GD CO</p> <p>___MP DET</p> <p>___</p> <p>A 89-80</p>	<p>___MP BN</p> <p>___MP GD CO</p> <p>___MP GD CO</p> <p>___MP DET</p> <p>___</p> <p>I 79 ></p>
--	---	---




800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)



BATTLE RHYTHM






800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)




BATTLE RHYTHM





800th Military Police Brigade (I/R)



ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO THE 800th MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 REFERENCES

- a FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare
- b Annex D, Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) for US Forces, to Chapter 3 (Operations) to USARCENT/MARCENT Deputy Joint Force Land Component Commander HQ SOP
- c AR 190-8, OPNAVINST 3461 6, AFJI 31-304, MCO 3461 1, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997
- d AR 190-28, Use of Force by Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties
- e FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances
- f FM 3-19-40, Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001
- g FM 19-60, Confinement and Correctional Treatment of US Military Prisoners

2 PURPOSE This annex defines the Rules of Engagement (ROE), explaining their purpose and sources, and sets forth responsibilities for their drafting and development

3 SCOPE This annex discusses rules on targeting and methods of engagement. This gives soldiers and leaders a framework for deciding whether and how to engage or treat specific targets on the battlefield. Appendix 1 provides standing rules of engagement, but theater specific requirements may be modified by OPLAN/OPORD

4 RESPONSIBILITIES

- a ROE will be incorporated into every 800th MP Brigade (EPW/CI) OPLAN and OPORD, as applicable
- b The ROE is developed by the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) under the direction of the S-3
- c The Brigade Commander will approve all ROE before publication

5 GENERAL

a Definition of ROE ROE are directives that a government may establish to delineate the circumstances and limitations under which its own naval, ground, and air forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with enemy forces

ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO THE 800th MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

b Purpose of ROE ROE have the following principal purposes

- (1) To ensure compliance with the Law of War (LOW)
- (2) To ensure compliance with presidential orders, US law, Army regulations, and higher headquarters' ROE
- (3) To minimize political and international fallout
- (4) To enhance the confidence and aggressiveness of soldiers and leaders at all levels by providing them with clear coherent guidance

6 Law Of War The Law of War (LOW) defines the outermost limit of permissible conduct in time of war No rules of engagement can authorize violations of LOW All ROE will be drafted IAW the LOW

7 Limitations On Use Of Weapons Systems All US weapons and ammunition procured through normal armed forces supply channels are legal These weapons will not be modified to cause unnecessary suffering

8 Protected Persons Units will take every precaution to ensure that they do not endanger the following categories of persons noncombatants, combatants who are out of combat, or EPW/CI

9 Riot Control Agents Use of riot control agents will be released by the National Command Authority or to a commander who is delegated the authority

Appendixes

- 1 Use of Force
- 2 Standard Rules of Engagement
- 3 Sample Rules of Engagement Card

APPENDIX 1 (USE OF FORCE) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO THE 800th MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 REFERENCES

a AR 190-8,, , OPNAVINST 3461 6, AFJI 31-304, MCO 3461 1, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997

b AR 190-28, Use of Force by Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties

c FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances

d FM 3-19-40 ,Internment/Resettlement Operations

e FM 19-60, Confinement and Correctional Treatment of US Military Prisoners

2 PURPOSE This Appendix provides guidance to all guard force personnel in the appropriate use of force in the protection of EPW/CI, the protection of EPW/CI facilities, and the control of unruly or rebellious EPW/CI populations and/or US prisoners in custody

3 POLICY

a Military police personnel of this brigade involved in the custody of EPW/CIs at the theater EPW/CI IF will not carry weapons into the IF

b Those Military Police involved in the custody of US personnel will carry loaded magazines in their ammunition pouches

c In all cases Military Police will have their weapons on safe and at NO time will a round be in the chamber

d Rounds will be chambered only upon the direction of the senior NCO or OIC
Weapons will be loaded upon the direction of the NCOIC or OIC of the shift

f Upon relief, the NCOIC will have the individual guard, one at a time, perform the following weapons clearance procedure

(1) Ensure the weapon is on safe

(2) Remove the magazine

(3) Point the weapon skyward, and away from personnel

APPENDIX 1 (USE OF FORCE) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO THE 800th MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(4) Pull the bolt to the rear and lock it. The NCOIC and guard will look into the chamber and ensure that it is clear. The weapon will be returned to Port Arms, where the NCOIC will insert a cleaning rod into the barrel of the weapon and clear it. The weapon will remain at Port Arms and pointed skyward during this procedure.

(5) Release the bolt to the forward position, close the dust cover.

(6) Ensure the weapon is on safe.

g. Notify the OIC / NCOIC immediately if you chamber a round.

h. Any changes to the preceding guidance will be reported through the Sergeant of the Guard by Officer of the Guard.

i. Military Police engaged in the control of EPW/CI and US prisoners will use force only when they cannot fulfill their duties without it. Minimum force will be used initially, only as a last resort will deadly physical force be used.

j. Commanders will develop a plan to use non-lethal devices such as batons when adequate for Military Police personnel to safely accomplish the mission. Commanders will make every attempt possible to have members of their units certified in the use of and training of non-lethal weapon systems.

k. The use of force will be dependent upon the situation. Accordingly, it should be applied on the following scale:

(1) The use of verbal persuasion and direct orders.

(2) The use of unarmed defense techniques.

(3) Use of riot control agents dependent upon host nation or local restrictions.

(4) Use of Military Police baton or riot control baton.

l. As a last resort, the use of deadly force will be applied only upon the direction of properly authorized individuals and only after a proper challenge and order to halt has been issued. The challenge and order to halt must be in the language of the EPW/CI population or other individuals involved. Military Police must be instructed on how to issue the appropriate commands in the proper language.

4 USE OF DEADLY FORCE

a. DEFINITION: Deadly force is destructive physical force directed against a person or persons (e.g. Firing a lethal weapon). It will be used only in extreme need, when all lesser means have failed or cannot be reasonably used.

APPENDIX 1 (USE OF FORCE) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO
THE 800th MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

b The use of deadly force can be used for one or more of the following reasons

(1) In self-defense, when an MP or guard has been placed in a position of imminent danger of death or serious injury.

(2) To protect property related to national security when necessary to prevent

(a) Theft, damage, espionage of property, or information considered vital to national security

(b) Theft, damage or espionage of property or information although not considered vital, is substantially important to national security to warrant the application of deadly force

(c) The escape of an individual who may have been involved in (a) or (b) cited above

(d) To prevent the theft of weapons or munitions which could cause harm to US or allied forces

(e) To prevent serious offenses against US allied forces or prisoners in custody

(f) To apprehend a suspect reasonably believed to have committed any of the offenses cited in (a) , (b) , (d),or (e) above

(g) To prevent the escape of prisoner (when authorized by a commander or other competent authority and when deemed reasonably necessary)

(h) To obey a lawful order from a higher authority governed by AR 190-8, OPNAVINST 3461 6, AFJI 31-304, MCO 3461 1, and cited in this TACSOP

c A commander or other competent authority will specify what property or information is vital to national security or substantially important, that its theft, damage or compromise would warrant the use of deadly physical force to prevent

d A commander may further restrict the use of deadly force, however, those restrictions should not unduly compromise US security interest or place US personnel in jeopardy

5 USE OF FIREARMS Should it be necessary to use deadly force in any of the circumstances described in paragraph 4 above, observe the following precautions when possible

APPENDIX 1 (USE OF FORCE) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO THE 800th MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- a Give an order to halt three (3) times before firing, in the language of the country
 - b Do NOT fire shots if those shots are likely to harm innocent bystanders
 - c Warning shots will not be fired unless in the judgement of Military Police or security personnel, their use would serve to control the situation without resorting to the use of deadly force
 - d In all instances when the use of deadly force has been authorized, any shots fired will be aimed to disable, not to kill. If conditions are such as to preclude the placement of a well-aimed disabling shot, those conditions will not rule out the use of deadly force where it is warranted
- 6 Commanders of personnel assigned to security, US prisoner, and EPW/CI custody missions will ensure that, as a minimum, those personnel will be knowledgeable in the following
- a AR 190-28 and this TACSOP, regarding the use of deadly force
 - b The use of
 - (1) Unarmed defense techniques
 - (2) The Military Police baton and riot baton
 - c The use of the individual chemical aerosol irritant protectors, and riot control agent dispersers and their employment
 - d Their assigned weapons and crew served weapon if applicable
- 7 Commanders will
- a Ensure individuals with law enforcement duties qualify annually with their individual and crew served weapon
 - b Provide refresher training to Military Police personnel regarding the use of force to ensure continued familiarity with the regulations
 - c Ensure personnel are knowledgeable in all those security measures that must be implemented before the use of deadly force is authorized
- 8 Deadly Force in the EPW/CI Environment IAW AR 190-8, paragraph 3-6, Discipline and Security, deadly force is authorized the use of preventing escape, if no other means are available. The following steps must be taken before the use of deadly force is employed

APPENDIX 1 (USE OF FORCE) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO THE 800th MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

a The camp commander will ensure that all EPW/CI understand the meaning of the English word "HALT"

b The guard must be familiar with the term for "HALT" in the language of the EPW/CI. If an EPW/CI attempts to escape the guard must shout "HALT" three (3) times

c. If the attempt to escape is from a fenced-in enclosure, the detainee will not be fired upon unless the person has actually cleared the outside wire and is continuing their efforts to escape

d The use of deadly force is authorized to prevent an act of violence by all EPW/CI against another EPW/CI or a member of the guard force or enclosure personnel, providing all necessary prior measures to prevent the act have been employed

e Guard towers will be located on the perimeters of each enclosure and will be constructed so as to provide a secure platform for the employment of weapons to prevent escape. The use of weapons from the guard towers are a last resort to control major incidents within the wire. Fields of fire will be carefully controlled to preclude damage to adjacent towers and US personnel manning those towers. Weapons will be securely placed to prevent shifting during employment of the weapon

f Escort guards will employ sufficient numbers of personnel to control the EPW/CI in their custody according to the method of transport. Guards must be aware that they not only have the responsibility to prevent escape of EPW/CI in their custody, but also to protect them from hostile acts, which require the use of deadly force. All the previous cited stipulations apply in either case

g The guarding of EPW/CI in medical channels will normally be a joint operation with the US Military Police working with host nation Military Police assets. Guidance for the use of force when guarding EPW/CI in medical channels is covered in Appendix X (Guard SOP for the EPW/CI in Medical Channels) to Annex P, 800th MP BRIGADE TACSOP

9 Use of Force as it Pertains to US Personnel in Custody

a Each facility will draw up an emergency control plan to

- (1) Restore and maintain order in the event of minor disturbance
- (2) Regain control and maintain order in the event of a major disorder (RIOT)
- (3) Overcome prisoner disorders that occur outside the facility

b The emergency control plan will define those measures of force deemed necessary to restore order in the facility, and include a delegation of those individuals authorized to

APPENDIX 1 (USE OF FORCE) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO
THE 800th MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

direct the use of those measures. These measures will be strictly limited to that force which is deemed reasonable and necessary under all attendant circumstances. Individuals cited in the delegation of authority must authorize the levels of the use of force. The measures of force to be employed within the facility are:

- (1) A show of force by guard personnel or the reaction force
- (2) Use of high-pressure water and or CS riot control agent
- (3) Use of physical force other than lethal weapons
- (4) Fire by selected marksmen

(5) Use of full firepower. When this measure is directed and authorized all firing will be aimed to disable rather than to kill.

c. When using physical force, sufficient personnel will be employed to prevent injury to the prisoner.

d. Disorders occurring inside the correctional facility:

(1) After exhausting all efforts to restore order (to include counseling, warning, reprimand, and direct order), if the disturbance continues and the prisoner(s) attempt to escape the guard will:

(a) In a loud voice, three (3) times call upon the prisoner(s) to "HALT"

(b) If the prisoner(s) continues his attempt to escape after the order "HALT" is repeated three (3) times and if the prisoner has gotten through all the barriers preventing the escape, the guard(s) will direct fire at the prisoner(s), aim to disable, rather than to kill.

e. Guards will NOT fire at an escaping prisoner if that fire will endanger the lives of innocent bystanders.

f. The use of deadly force in any circumstance is only justified when all other measures have been taken and there are no other reasonable means left to prevent the escape.

g. The guard will immediately notify the facility commander of the incident, all remaining prisoners will be returned to the facility. The commander of the facility or his delegate will assume command at the incident site and initiate a preliminary investigation of the incident.

APPENDIX 2 (STANDARD RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO THE 800TH MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

a The purpose of these SROE is to provide implementation guidance on the inherent right and obligation of self-defense and the application of force for mission accomplishment. The SROE establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by US force commanders during all military operations, contingencies, or prolonged conflicts.

b Except as augmented by supplemental rules of engagement (ROE) for specific operations, missions, or projects, the policies and procedures establish herein remain in effect until rescinded.

c U S forces operating with multinational forces

(1) U S forces assigned to the operational control (OPCON) of a multinational force will follow the ROE of the multinational force unless otherwise directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA). U S forces will be assigned and remain OPCON to a multinational force only if the combatant commander and higher authority determine that the ROE for that multinational force are consistent with the policy guidance on unit self-defense contained in this document.

(2) When U S forces, under U S OPCON, operate in conjunction with a multinational force, reasonable efforts will be made to effect common ROE. If such ROE cannot be established, U S forces will exercise the right and obligation of self-defense contained in this document while seeking guidance from the appropriate combatant command. To avoid mutual interference, the multinational forces will be informed prior to U S participation in the operation of the U S forces' intentions to operate under these SROE and to exercise unit self-defense.

(3) Participation in multinational operations may be complicated by varying national obligations derived from international agreements, i.e., other members in a coalition may not be signatories to treaties that bind the United States, or they may be bound by treaties to which the United States is not a party. U S forces still remain bound by U S treaty obligations even if the other members in a coalition are not signatories to a treaty and need not adhere to its terms.

d Commanders of U S forces subject to international agreements governing their presence in foreign countries (e.g., Status of Forces Agreements) are not relieved of the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action for unit self-defense.

APPENDIX 2 (STANDARD RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO THE 800TH MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

e U S forces in support of operations not under operational or tactical control of a combatant commander or performing missions under direct control of the NCA, Military Departments, or other U.S. government departments/agencies (i.e , marine security guards, certain special security forces) will operate under use-of-force or ROE promulgated by those departments or agencies

f U.S Coast Guard (USCG) units and units under USCG OPCON conducting law enforcement operations, and USCG personnel using their law enforcement authority, will follow the use-of-force policy issued by the Commandant, USCG. Nothing in the USCG use-of-force policy negates a commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action for unit self-defense in accordance with these SROE

g The guidance in this document does not cover U S forces deployed to assist federal and local authorities during times of civil disturbance within the territorial jurisdiction of any state, the District of Columbia, Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and the Northern Marianas, U S possessions, and U S territories. Forces in these situations will follow use-of-force policy found in DOD Civil Disturbance Plan, "Garden Plot" (Appendix 1 to Annex C of Garden Plot)

h U S forces deployed to assist foreign, federal, and local authorities in disaster assistance missions, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, will follow use-of-force guidelines as set forth in the mission's execute order and subsequent orders

i U S forces will always comply with the Law of Armed Conflict. However, not all situations involving the use-of-force are armed conflicts under international law. Those approving operational rules of engagement (ROE) must determine if the international recognized Law of Armed Conflict applies. In those circumstances when armed conflict, under international law, does not exist, Law of Armed Conflict principles may nevertheless be applied as a matter of national policy. If armed conflict occurs, the actions of U S forces will be governed by both the Law of Armed Conflict and rules of engagement (ROE)

2 POLICY

a These rules do not limit a commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self-defense of the commander's unit and other U S forces in the vicinity

APPENDIX 2 (STANDARD RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO THE 800TH MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

b U S national security policy serves to protect the United States, U.S. forces, and , in certain circumstances, U.S. citizens and their property, U S commercial assets, and other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals, and their property from hostile attack U S national security policy is guided, in part, by the need to maintain a stable international environment compatible with U S national security interests In addition, U S national security interests guide our global objectives of deterring armed attack against the United States across the range of military operations, defeating an attack should deterrence fail, and preventing or neutralizing hostile efforts to intimidate or coerce the United States by the threat or use of armed force or terrorist actions Deterrence requires clear and evident capability and resolve to fight at any level of conflict and, if necessary, to increase deterrent force capabilities and posture deliberately so that any potential aggressor will assess its own risks as unacceptable U S policy, should deterrence fail, provides flexibility to respond to crises with options that

- (1) Are proportional to the provocation
- (2) Are designed to limit the scope and intensity of the conflict
- (3) Will discourage escalation
- (4) Will achieve political and military objectives

3 INTENT These SROE are intended to

- a Provide general guidelines on self-defense and are applicable worldwide to all echelons of command
- b Provide guidance governing the use of force consistent with mission accomplishment
- c Be used in operations other than war, during transition from peacetime to armed conflict or war, and during armed conflict in the absence of superseding guidance

4 COMBATANT COMMANDERS' SROE

- a Combatant commanders may augment these SROE as necessary to reflect changing political and military policies, threats, and missions specific to their AOR When specific standing rules governing the use of force in a combatant commander's AOR are required that differ from these SROE, they will be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for NCA approval
- b Combatant commanders will distribute these SROE to subordinate commanders and units for compliance

APPENDIX 2 (STANDARD RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO THE 800TH MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

5 DEFINITIONS

a **INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE** A commander has the authority and obligation to use any necessary means available and to take all appropriate action to defend that commander's unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Neither these rules, nor the supplemental measures activated to augment these rules, limit this inherent right and obligation. At all times, however, the requirements of necessity and proportionality as amplified in these SROE will be the basis for the judgement of the commander as to what constitutes an appropriate response to a particular hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.

b **NATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE** National self-defense is the act of defending the United States, U.S. forces, and in certain circumstances, U.S. citizens and their property, U.S. commercial assets, and other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals and their property, from a hostile act or hostile intent. Once a force or terrorist unit is declared hostile by appropriate authority exercising the right and obligation of national self-defense, individual U.S. units do not need to observe a hostile act or determine hostile intent before engaging that force.

NOTE **COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE**, as a subset of national self-defense, is the act of defending other designated non-U.S. forces, personnel and their property from a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. Only the NCA may authorize U.S. forces to exercise collective self-defense.

c **UNIT SELF DEFENSE** Unit self defense is the act of defending a particular unit of U.S. forces, including elements or personnel thereof, and other U.S. forces in the vicinity, against a hostile act or hostile intent. The need to exercise unit self-defense may arise in many situations such as localized low-level conflicts, TACSOP humanitarian efforts, peace enforcement actions, terrorist response, or prolonged engagements. Individual self-defense is a subset of unit self-defense.

d Elements of Self Defense The application of armed force in self-defense requires the following two elements:

(1) **NECESSITY** A hostile act occurs or a force or terrorist unit exhibits hostile intent.

(2) **PROPORTIONALITY** The force used must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude, based on all facts known to the commander at the time, to decisively counter the hostile intent and to ensure the continued safety of U.S. forces.

APPENDIX 2 (STANDARD RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO THE 800TH MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

e **HOSTILE ACT** A hostile act is an attack or other use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit (organization or individual) against the United States, U.S. forces, and in certain circumstances, U S citizens, their property, U.S commercial assets, and other designated non-U.S forces, foreign nationals and their property It is also force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of U S forces, including the recovery of U S personnel and vital U S Government property When a hostile act is in progress, the right exists to use proportional force, including armed force, in self defense by all necessary means available to deter or neutralize the potential attacker or, if necessary, to destroy the threat

f **HOSTILE INTENT** Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit (organization or individual) against the United States, U S forces, and in certain circumstances, U S citizens, their property, U S. commercial assets, or other designated non-U S forces, foreign nationals and their property When hostile intent is present, the right exists to use proportional force, including armed force, in self-defense by all necessary means available to deter or neutralize the potential attacker or, if necessary, to destroy the threat

g **HOSTILE FORCE** Any force or terrorist unit (civilian, paramilitary, or military), with or without national designation, that has committed a hostile act, demonstrated hostile intent, or has been declared hostile

6 **DECLARING FORCES HOSTILE** Once a force is declared hostile by appropriate authority, U S units need not observe a hostile act or a demonstration of hostile intent before engaging that force The responsibility for exercising the right and obligation of national self-defense and clearing a force hostile is a matter of the utmost importance demanding considerable judgement of command All available intelligence, the status of international relationships, the requirements of international law, the possible need for a political decision, and the potential consequences for the United States must be carefully weighed Exercising the right and obligation of national self-defense by competent authority is in addition to and does not supplant the right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense

7 **AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE SELF-DEFENSE**

a **NATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE** The authority to exercise national self-defense is outlined in Appendix A to Enclosure A of this Annex

b **COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE** Only the NCA may authorize the exercise of collective self-defense

APPENDIX 2 (STANDARD RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO THE 800TH MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

c UNIT SELF-DEFENSE A unit commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action to defend the unit, including elements and defending against a hostile act or hostile intent under these SROE, unit commanders should use only that degree of force necessary to decisively counter the hostile act or hostile intent and to ensure the continued safety of U S forces

8 ACTION IN SELF-DEFENSE

a MEANS OF SELF-DEFENSE All necessary means available and all appropriate actions may be used in self-defense The following guidelines apply for unit or national self-defense

(1) ATTEMPT TO CONTROL WITHOUT THE USE OF FORCE The use of force is normally a measure of last resort When time and circumstances permit, the potentially hostile force should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions

(2) USE PROPORTIONAL FORCE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION When the use of force in self-defense is necessary, the nature, duration, and scope of the engagement should not exceed that which is required to decisively counter the hostile act or hostile intent and to ensure the continued safety of U S forces or other protected personnel or property

(3) ATTACK TO DISABLE OR DESTROY An attack to disable or destroy a hostile force is authorized when such action is the only prudent means by which a hostile act or hostile intent can be prevented or terminated When such conditions exist, engagement is authorized only until the hostile force no longer poses an imminent threat

b IMMEDIATE PURSUIT OF HOSTILE FOREIGN FORCES In self-defense, U S forces may pursue and engage a hostile force that has committed a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent and that remains an imminent threat

c DEFENDING U S CITIZENS, PROPERTY, AND DESIGNATED FOREIGN NATIONALS

(1) WITHIN A FOREIGN NATION'S U S RECOGNIZED TERRITORY OR TERRITORIAL AIRSPACE A foreign nation has the principal responsibility for defending U S citizens and property within these areas

(2) AT SEA Detailed guidance contained in Annex A to Appendix B of this Annex

APPENDIX 2 (STANDARD RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO THE 800TH MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(3) IN INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE Protecting civil aircraft in international airspace is principally the responsibility of the nation of registry. Guidance for certain cases of actual or suspected hijacking of airborne U.S. or foreign civil aircraft is contained in MCM-102-92, 24 July 1992, "Hijacking of Civil Aircraft."

(4) TERRORISM Terrorist attacks are usually undertaken by civilian or paramilitary organizations, or by individuals under circumstances in which a determination of hostile intent may be difficult. The definitions of hostile act and hostile intent set forth above will be used in situations where terrorist attacks are likely. The term "hostile force" includes terrorist units when used in this document. When circumstances and intelligence dictate, supplemental ROE will be issued to meet this special threat.

(5) PIRACY Piracy is defined as an illegal act of violence, depredation (i.e., plundering, robbing, or pillaging), or detention in or over international waters committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship or aircraft or against persons or property on board such a ship or aircraft. U.S. warships and aircraft have an obligation to repress piracy on or over international waters directed against any vessel, or aircraft, whether U.S. or foreign flagged. If a pirate vessel or aircraft fleeing from pursuit proceeds into the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or superjacent airspace of another country every effort should be made to obtain the consent of nation sovereignty to continue pursuit. Where circumstances permit, commanders will seek guidance from higher authority before using armed force to repress and aft of piracy.

d OPERATIONS WITHIN OR IN THE VICINITY OF HOSTILE FIRE OR COMBAT ZONES NOT INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES

(1) U.S. forces should not enter, or remain in, a zone in which hostilities (not involving the United States) are imminent or occurring between foreign forces unless directed by proper authority.

(2) If a force commits a hostile act or demonstrates a hostile intent against U.S. fire or combat zone, the commander is obligated to act in unit self-defense in accordance with SROE guidelines.

e RIGHT OF ASSISTANCE ENTRY

(1) Ships, or under certain circumstances aircraft, have the right to enter a foreign territorial sea or archipelagic waters and corresponding airspace without the permission of the coastal or island state to engage in legitimate efforts to render emergency assistance to those in danger or distress from perils of the sea.

APPENDIX 2 (STANDARD RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO THE 800TH MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(2) Right of assistance extends only to rescues where the location of those in danger is reasonably well known. It does not extend to entering their territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or national airspace to conduct a search.

(3) For ships and aircraft rendering assistance on scene, the right and obligation of self-defense extends to and includes persons, vessels, or aircraft being assisted. The right of self-defense in such circumstances does not include interference with legitimate law enforcement actions of a coastal nation. However, once received on board the assisting ship or aircraft, persons assisted will not be surrendered to foreign authority unless directed by the NCA.

(4) Further guidance for the exercise of the right of assistance entry is contained in CJCS Instruction 2410.01, 20 July 1993, "Guidance for the Exercise of Right Assistance Entry."

APPENDIX 3 (SAMPLE STANDARD RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CARD) TO
ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO THE 800TH MP BRIGADE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

- **NOTHING IN THESE RULES LIMITS THE AUTHORITY OF ANY GUARD TO USE ANY FORCE NECESSARY IN SELF DEFENSE OR IN DEFENSE OF ANOTHER FROM ATTACK BY A DETAINEE.**
 - **IF CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE, DEADLY FORCE MAY BE USED IN SELF DEFENSE**
 - **NEVER USE MORE FORCE THAN MINIMUM NECESSARY TO TO MAINTAIN DISCIPLINE AND COMPLIANCE WITH DETENTION FACILITY RULES**
 - **WARNING SHOTS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.**
 - **ESCAPING PRISONERS.**
 - SHOUT "HALT" OR "KIF" THREE TIMES, THEREAFTER,
 - USE LEAST AMOUNT OF FORCE TO HALT DETAINEE,
 - IF NO OTHER MEANS IS AVAILABLE AND DETAINEE IS OUTSIDE OF EXTERIOR FENCE, USE OF DEADLY FORCE IS AUTHORIZED
 - **RIOTING PRISONERS**
 - SHOUT "HALT, OR KIF" THREE TIMES, THEREAFTER,
 - USE NON LETHAL FORCE, AFTER AUTHORIZATION BY UNIT DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE
 - USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS TO STOP A DETAINEE RIOT IS
-
- USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN DEFENSE OF GUARDS OR OTHERS HELD HOSTAGE BY DETAINEES IS AUTHORIZED

(FRONT)

English/Arabic Key Phrases

ENGLISH

ARABIC

SIT DOWN	OOW-GA-AD
STAND UP	ALLAH-IG- JURIC
KNEEL	OSE-JED
STOP	KIF
MOVE	IM-SHE
BE QUIET	MAFI-HACKEY
LIE FACE DOWN	THUMIC-AL- THURD-ICH
NOW!	A-LAN!

(BACK)

ANNEX F (FORCE PROTECTION) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) FSOP

1 REFERENCES

- a Chapter 3 (The Threat) to FM 3-19.1 Military Police Operations
- b FM 5-103, Survivability
- c FM 100-14, Risk Management
- d FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations
- e Appendix 2 (Threat Conditions) to Annex 1 (NBC Operations) to Chapter 3 (Operations Division) to USARCENT/MARCENT JTF HQ SOP
- f ARTEP 19-472-MTP, HHC, MP Brigade, Corps or TAACOM
- g ARTEP 19-476-MTP, HHD, MP Battalion
- h ARTEP 19-100-10, MP Drills
- i Appendix B (Force Protection Conditions and Threat Levels) to AR 525-13 AntiTerrorism

2 PURPOSE This annex defines the standard force protection measures conducted by personnel and units assigned or attached to this brigade when operating in a field environment

3 RESPONSIBILITIES

- a All sub-units and attachments will incorporate the requirements of this annex into unit FSOP and/or TACSOP
- b The brigade commander reserves the authority to approve any changes to established Rules of Engagement Conditions (ROECON)

4 SPECIFIC This annex addresses the interrelationship of brigade force protection operations in the following areas

- a Unit Force Protection Tasks
 - (1) Fighting/Survivability positions
 - (2) Risk Management
 - (3) Preventive Medicine

ANNEX F (FORCE PROTECTION) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) FSOP

a Unit Force Protection Tasks Brigade/Battalion/company will drill on the following critical ARTEP tasks that support unit force protection. The following tasks are fundamental to successful field operations, repetitive training is essential to develop confidence and skill in individual and collective tasks.

- (1) Brigade Task/Battalion Task
 - (a) Plan and Direct Force Protection Measures
 - (b) Secure/Defend Unit Position
 - (c) Prepare for Operations Under NBC Conditions
 - (d) Plan and Direct Risk Management Measures
 - (e) Coordinate Base/Base Cluster Defense Operations
 - (f) Plan and direct Preventive Medicine Measures
 - (h) Perform Personnel Safety and Soldier Sustainment
- (2) Company Task
 - (a) Secure/Defend Unit Position
 - (b) Prepare for Operations Under NBC Conditions
 - (c) Coordinate Base/Base Cluster Defense Operations
 - (d) Perform Personnel Safety and Soldier Sustainment

b Fighting/Survivability Positions As a decentralized force, MP will normally not occupy and defend a 360-degree perimeter, but rather collocate with adjacent units in a base forming a mutually supporting defensive perimeter. As a centralized force, as in the scenario of defending the perimeter of an Internment/Resettlement Facility, MP will prepare to occupy and defend a 360-degree perimeter. MP can expect to occupy several positions on an established perimeter, especially a dismount point, since MP may have the most powerful crew-served weapons on the base. When initially assuming a defensive sector, MP will establish hasty/deliberate fighting and survivability positions, determined by METT-T, described in Appendix I. At a minimum, units will establish a crew-served weapons position with a supporting two-soldier position on each flank. All positions will have overhead protection. This standard supports unit force protection tasks in para (1).

c Risk Management (RM) Risk management is the Army's principal means to identify and reduce hazards to force protection. All leaders will use the RM procedures IAW Appendix J (Risk Management) to FM 101-5 to identify and assess risks, and develop and implement risk reduction controls. Leaders must be observant to the changes

ANNEX F (FORCE PROTECTION) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) FSOP

in the prevailing environment to ensure the adequacy of implemented risk reduction controls. A risk assessment will be conducted for any event that involves simultaneous vehicle and soldier maneuvers, use of pyrotechnic training devices, live ammunition, and soldiers performing with less than four uninterrupted hours of sleep.

d Preventive Medicine (PM) Sound PM practices are essential in everyday activities to keep soldiers healthy and ready. In a field environment, PM is vital to successful mission accomplishment. Soldiers must perform it and leaders must enforce it. See Annex Q (Medical Services) to this TACSOP.

e Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) Each unit responsible for defending its own separate base will have a QRF available at all times. The size of the QRF will be determined by METT-T and will be employed only upon the order of that base's Commander. (ex BN controls the QRF at an Internment Facility)

f Tactical Combat Force (TCF) At echelons above corps (EAC) or in the joint rear area (JRA), the commander may have a TCF ready to be employed in order to defeat Level III threats. The TCF is a controlled asset of the JRA Commander and will be employed typically as a last resort. (See Appendix 2 (Levels of Threat) to this annex)

APPENDICES

- 1 - Fighting/Survivability Positions
- 2 - Levels of Threat
- 3 - Threat Conditions

APPENDIX 1 (FIGHTING/SURVIVABILITY POSITIONS) TO ANNEX F (FORCE PROTECTION) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) FSOP

1 POSITIONS

a Survivability bunkers will be built to accommodate all assigned personnel within a location

b The bunkers will be placed approximately 10 yards away from each area at an approximately 45-degree angle

c The TOC and ALOC bunkers for the Command Post will have field phone connectivity and operate remote radio sites during times of occupancy

d The dimensions of this bunker are designed to protect up to 120mm Mortar fragments

e Widening the bunker places more centralized weight on the overhead supports and roof, length is as necessary

f See Appendix 4 (Diagrams of CP, TOC, ALOC & Briefing Tent) to Annex C (Command Post Organization and Operations) to this TACSOP for an example of fighting/survivability position locations within a command post

APPENDIX 2 (LEVELS OF THREAT) TO ANNEX F (FORCE PROTECTION) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) FSOP

1 LEVEL I THREAT Level I threats include the following types of individuals or activities: Enemy controlled agents, enemy sympathizers, terrorism and civil disturbances. Unit base and base cluster self defensive measures are responsible for defeating these forces.

2 LEVEL II THREAT Level II threats include the following types of forces: Guerilla forces, unconventional forces, small tactical units. Unit self defense measures and response forces with supporting fires are responsible for defeating these forces.

3 LEVEL III THREAT Level III threats are made up of conventional forces. Potential threat forces are capable of projecting combat power rapidly. Level III forces may use a combination of the following tactics as a precursor to a full scale offensive operation:

- Air or missile attack
- Nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) attack

The timely commitment of a TCF would be responsible for defeating these measures.

APPENDIX 3 (THREAT CONDITIONS) TO ANNEX F (FORCE PROTECTION) TO
800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) FSOP

1 THREATCON NORMAL

a Probability of attack is negligible

b Definition Applies when there is no discernible terrorist activity Under these conditions, only a routine security posture, designed to defeat the routine criminal threat is warranted

c Enemy indicators None

d Recommended actions

(1) A deploying force will not necessarily have to carry their full compliment of chemical defense equipment (CDF) However, protective masks should be carried by ground forces and components should have a contingency plan to deploy and distribute their full compliment of CDF if the situation warrants

(2) Chemical personnel should concentrate effort in smoke and herbicide employment planning and constantly monitor threat indicators for any change in the enemy NBC status

2 THREATCON Alpha

a Probability of attack Possible

b Definition Applies when there is a general threat of possible threat activity against personnel and/or installations, the nature and extent of which is unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON Bravo measures Commands must be capable of maintaining THREATCON Alpha measures for extended periods, with only limited impact on normal operations

c Indicators there has been no overt NBC activity The enemy has a CB capability but weapons have not been dispersed or deployed

d Recommended unit actions

(1) Personnel carry their individual CDE and commanders have additional contingency CDE stockpile identified readily available for distribution if the threat status should increase

(2) Conduct refresher NBC training to include individual NBC common survival skills training, NBC team training, and unmasking procedures

(3) Activate the NBCWRS

APPENDIX 3 (THREAT CONDITIONS) TO ANNEX F (FORCE PROTECTION) TO
800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) FSOP

(4) Activate passive NBC defense measures

(5) Identify decontamination sites, water sources, and civilian nuclear, biological and chemicals hazards

(6) Analyze CDE logistics requirements Submit requests for Host Nation Support if required

3 THREATCON Bravo

a Probability of attack Probable

b Definition

Applies when an increased or more predictable threat exists Commanders must be capable of maintaining the measures of this THREATCON for several weeks without causing undue hardship to personnel, substantially affecting operational capabilities, or aggravating relations with local authorities and members of the local civilian or host nation community

c Indicators

(1) The enemy has CB weapons in the theatre outside the DJFLCC AO

(2) CB munitions have been deployed to either field storage sites or firing sites

(3) Enemy troops are wearing or carrying protective equipment

(4) Enemy CB reconnaissance elements observed with front line units

(5) Enemy decontaminations units observed with front line units

(6) The opposing force use of meteorological radars associated with SSMs has been detected

d Recommended unit actions

(1) Deploy NBC detection device and alarms, initiate selective, periodic or continuous monitoring

(2) Integrate routine NBC reconnaissance assets (if assigned) into conventional reconnaissance plan

(3) Rehearse decontamination procedures

APPENDIX 3 (THREAT CONDITIONS) TO ANNEX F (FORCE PROTECTION) TO
800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) FSOP

(4) Analyze MOPP level and consider change based on to current situation and mission.

(5) Intensify training, rehearse MOPP gear exchange and automatic masking procedures

(6) Cover vehicles, supplies and equipment to the fullest extent possible

(7) Fill portable decontamination apparatuses and mount on vehicles (if applicable)

(8) Issues class VIII medical supplies

(9) Begin taking PB tables with DJFLCC commander's approval

4 THREATCONCharlie

a Probability of attack high

b Definition Applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating imminent terrorist action Implementation of THREATCON Charlie measures for more than a short period probably will create hardships for personnel and affect the peacetime activities of units and personnel

c In addition those listed for THREATCON Alpha, indicators may include

(1) NBC weapons have been used within the DJFLCC AO

(2) Enemy observed providing NBC warning to its forces

(3) Munitions delivered to firing units within range of friendly forces

d In addition to those listed for THREATCON Amber, recommended unit actions include

(1) Initiate continuous monitoring

(2) Begin operation of collective protective shelters and other systems

5 THREATCON Delta

a Probability of attack high

**APPENDIX 3 (THREAT CONDITIONS) TO ANNEX F (FORCE PROTECTION) TO
800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) FSOP**

b Definition Applies when a terrorist attack has occurred, or intelligence indicates likely terrorist action against a specific location. Normally declared as a localized warning and requires implementation of mandatory security measures.

ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PURPOSE

a To prescribe signal operation procedures within the 800th MP Bde (EPW/CI) and assigned, attached, and OPCON units

2 REFERENCES

- a FM 24-19, Radio Operator's Handbook Tactical
- b FM 24-20, Tactical Wire and Cable Techniques
- c FM 24-33, Communications Techniques Electronic Counter-Countermeasures
- d TB 11-5820-890-10-6, Operation of FAX, TK-101/G
- e TB 11-5820-890-12, Operation of ANCD, AN/CYZ-10
- f TM 11-5800-216-L, MSE List of Applicable Publications
- g TM 11-5805-201-12, Telephone Set, TA-312/PT
- h TM 11-5805-761-12&P, Digital Non-Secure Voice (DNVT)
- i TM 11-5810-394-14&P, Unit Level Maintenance for Automated Net Control Device (ANCD), AN/CYZ-10
- j TM 11-5820-890-1, Operator Manual for SINCGARS
- k TM 11-5985-357-13, Antenna Group, OE-254/GR

3 MISSION

a To provide signal support enabling the commander to command and control the brigade during any operation

4 RESPONSIBILITIES

- a Brigade Signal Officer
 - (1) Identifies and validate communication requirements
 - (2) Produces CE annexes for orders, plans and MOIs
 - (3) Assists Bde S-2 to prepare electronic warfare annex

ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

- (4) Coordinates commercial and strategic commo support
- (5) Accounts for and distributes Frequency Hop (FH) and frequency plan to subordinate units
- (6) Produces and provide SOI and telephone directory for subordinate units
- (7) Keeps commander and staff officers current on all signal matters
- (8) Coordinates with the BDE S-3 operations of pending operations to request signal support
 - (a) Brigade Staff Sections Install, operate, and maintain (IOM) radios and radio nets IAW appendix 1
 - (b) Subordinate units
 - (1) IOM stations as listed in Appendix 1
 - (2) Responsible for commo up to higher command
 - (3) Identify and validate communications requirements
 - (4) Locate TOCs to facilitate communications with brigade

5 SIGNAL OPERATIONS

a Concept of the Operation

- (1) Secure Voice Primary communications means to higher and from subordinate and adjacent units is through secure MSE FM to sub-units will be the secondary means of secure voice
- (2) Secure Message Primary message traffic to higher and from subordinate and adjacent units is through secure facsimile
- (3) Wire Wire is not used for communications between units
- (4) Jamming
 - (a) If jamming is suspected, operator will go through trouble-shooting procedures
 - (b) A MIJI report will be sent immediately to the signal officer and Bde S-2 by another means of communication

ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

b Radio Nets

(1) Brigade FM Command Net (Secure) This is the brigade's primary C2 radio net. The Brigade S-3 is the NCS and will install, operate and maintain (IOM) it.

(2) Brigade FM A/L Net (Secure) The brigade's admin/log radio net. The Bde ALOC is the NCS and IOMs the radio. (Appendix 1)

(3) Brigade AM Command Net (Secure). This is the brigade's secondary command and control radio net. Its purpose is to provide long haul voice communications for the commander. The Brigade S-3 is the NCS and will IOM the radio (Appendix 1)

c Coordinating Instructions

(1) Brigade Signal Officer coordinates with BDE S-3 on any communications problems.

(2) Subordinate signal officers will ensure the Brigade Signal Officer has a copy of their signal annex and is made aware of any change that would necessitate a change in signal support.

(3) Signal officers will provide the servicing communications center with a memorandum of authorized releasers of messages and those authorized to pick up messages.

(4) All signal officers will coordinate with higher, adjacent, and lower units to ensure an accurate exchange of SOIs, COMSEC, FH, frequency plans, telephone directory, and signal support from higher headquarters.

(5) All stations in the brigade nets operate in FH mode.

(6) Comsec

(a) All SOIs and SINCGARS keys are COMSEC and are treated as sensitive items. They should not be left unattended at anytime. COMSEC material must be stored in a NSA approved container. Everyone must ensure COMSEC is safeguarded.

(b) All COMSEC aids, key segments, SOIs, OPCODEs, Frequency Hops, etc. will be issued as needed. No more than a 30 day supply of keys or OPCODE books are issued below company level.

(c) Segments are changed IAW 77RSC COMSEC SOP.

(d) At end of operations all radios and automated net control devices (ANCD's) need to be zeroized and SOIs turned back to the Brigade Signal Officer.

(e) The common net variable (CNV) is loaded in channel 1-5.

ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

(f) Re-keying variable (RKV) is loaded in channel 6

(g) COMSEC aids will be destroyed upon supersession

(7) Procedures

(a) NCS's key the SINCGARS radio mikes in secure mode every 15 minutes to ensure internal radio clocks are current

(b) Only NCS has authority to open and close the net

(c) Only NCS operates in FH master mode. An NCS entering a net cannot be in FH master mode. There is one NCS per net.

(d) All outages or severe communications problems will be reported through the Bde S-3 to the Signal Officer/NCOIC.

APPENDICES

1 Brigade Radio Nets

2 Telephone Subscribers

3 UXC-7 Facsimile

4 MSE Operating Instructions

TAB A Subscriber Dial Procedures

TAB B MSE Telephone Operating tones

TAB C DNVVT Installation Procedures

TAB D DNVVT Affiliation/Disaffiliation Procedures

TAB E MSRT Operation Procedures

TAB F DSVT Affiliation/Disaffiliation Procedures

TAB G Placing a Call

APPENDIX 1 (BRIGADE RADIO NETS) TO ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 The purpose of this appendix is to describe all of the Brigade's radio net structures in a matrix format. Net structures are subject to change based on METT-T.

NET UNIT SECTION	MSE CMD	MSE A/L	FM CMD
BDE TOC (S-3)	B		B
BDE A/LOC (S-4)		B	
BDE CDR	C		
BDE DBC	C		
BDE S-1		C	
BDE S-2	C		
BDE S-3	C		
BDE S-4	C		
BDE SIGO	C		
HHC CDR	C		
BN TOC	A		A
BN A/LOC		A	
BN CDR	A,C		
BN S-3	A,C		

KEY

A - STATION EQUIPMENT PROVIDED BY USER (AS AVAILABLE)

B - NCS

C - MOBILE STATION

APPENDIX 2 (TELEPHONE SUBSCRIBERS) TO ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 The purpose of this appendix is to describe the telephone subscribers at Brigade Headquarters Requirements for subscribers support and wire installation will hinge on METT-T

UNIT SECTION	TELEPHONE	FACSIMILE
BDE CDR (S-3)	A	
DBC	A	
CSM	A	
S-1	A	
S-2	A	
S-3	A	
TOC	A	A
S-4	A	
SIGO	A	
CHAP	A	
SJA	A	
HHC CDR	A	
HHC MOTORPOOL	A	
BN CDR	B,C	
BN TOC	B,C	B,C

KEY

A - INSTRUMENT

B - AS TIME AND SITUATION PERMITS BDE WILL RUN WIRE

C - INSTRUMENT PROVIDED BY USER

APPENDIX 3 (UXC-7 FACSIMILE) TO ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 If using a DNVF ensure DNVF is affiliated or if using TA-312 ensure it is operational or if using FM radio ensure station is operational in the net Then connect it to the AN/UXC-7 lightweight digital facsimile (LDF)

2 Preset the switches on the FAX:

a Unlock the carriage lock handles

b Set MODE/DATA format switch to either

(1) Mode B - Comp Compress data transmission, this setting should almost always be utilized, used with noise free

(2) Mode B - Comp FEC Compress data transmission for forward error correction, used with noisy link

(3) Mode B - Uncomp Non-compress data transmission used with an extremely noisy link

c Set NATO STD/ALT/LDF switch to the LDF position

d Set ANALOG/DIGITAL switch to DIGITAL

e Turn on power, push in power button

(1) POWER ON indicator comes on

(2) ERROR indicator flashes, then goes out

3 General Operating Procedures

a Memory loading operation This loads a copy of your document into the memory of your FAX Prior to the transmission

b Press PAPER RELEASE lever firmly, and insert your document onto the drum

(1) Document is face-up

(2) Left-hand edge of the copy is in the drum

c Move STOP HANDLE to position flashing lamp just to the left of the last portion of the document to be sent

APPENDIX 3 (UXC-7 FACSIMILE) TO ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS)
TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

d Squeeze and move carriage START HANDLE to position flashing jump lamp just to the right of the first position of the document to be sent. When the margin lamps stop flashing, press and release the PAPER RELEASE lever to start them flashing again.

e Set "HI RES-LOP SP/HI SP-LO RES" switch to desired position.

(1) HI RES-LO SP High resolution - Low speed. Produces a high quality copy, takes longer to store and print.

(2) HI SP-LO RES High speed - Low resolution. Produces a lower quality copy, but it is quicker to store and ring data.

f Set "GRAY - B/W" switch to "B/W" unless gray shades are required.

g Press "MEMORY LOAD" button to read copy into memory. "MEMORY LOAD" indicator flashes while loading and remains solid when complete.

4 Send burst transmission Operation. The procedures outlined below will enable you to transmit the document in your memory to another FAX.

a "MODE/DATA" format switch should be set to "B MODE -COMP".

b "NATO STD/ALT/LDF" switch should be set to the "LDF" position.

c Transmit and receive.

(1) Make voice contact, ensure both ends have same communication equipment (radio to radio, TA-312 to TA 312, DNV T to DNV T).

(2) Ensure that the distant station, FAX, has the switches set to the same mode of operation as your FAX.

(3) Receiving station presses RCA button on LDF when ready to receive data.

(4) When RCA button is pressed, transmitting operator hears background noise, then a distinct reduction of that noise is heard on the handset.

(5) When background noise reduction is heard on handset, sending station transmits FAX data.

(6) See receive burst transmission and print-operation.

5 Receive, Burst Transmission, and Print Operation. The procedures outlined below will enable you to receive and print the document in your memory.

APPENDIX 3 (UXC-7 FACSIMILE) TO ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS)
TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

a Press "PAPER RELEASE" lever firmly, insert plain paper covered with carbon paper into drum clamp as far as possible (carbon paper on top, paper side down, carbon black against paper), then release "PAPER RELEASE" lever

b Set carriage "START" handle just inside the right edge of output copy-set

c. Set carriage "STOP" handle to the extreme left of its travel

d Document has been received when the "RCA" indicator remains solid

e Inform the sending station that you received the document

f After document has been received, to print out, press "RCA" push button a second time, the drum will roll and start printing Copy-set automatically unloads at the end of the printing operation and copy-set can be removed The "RCA" indicator remains solid until message has printed from received memory and then goes out

APPENDIX 4 (MSE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS) TO ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- 1 The purpose of this appendix is to provide information that ensures signal equipment is properly installed, operated and maintained
- 2 Equipment and reference material is current with I/R UNIT MTOEs

Enclosures

- TAB A Subscriber Dial Procedures
- TAB B MSE Telephone Operating tones
- TAB C DNVVT Installation Procedures
- TAB D DNVVT Affiliation/Disaffiliation Procedures
- TAB E MSRT Operation Procedures
- TAB F DSVT Affiliation/Disaffiliation Procedures
- TAB G Placing a Call

TAB A (SUBSCRIBER DIAL PROCEDURES) TO APPENDIX 4 (MSE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS) TO ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONIC) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

SUBSCRIBER DIAL PROCEDURES

The following quick reference guide will allow you to use MSE telephone features based upon your telephone number profile

AFFILIATE 8R+PC+YDN

DISAFFILIATE 8C+PC+YDN

CALL FORWARDING (P) +2C+SDN

CANCEL CALL FORWARDING (P) +2C+YDN

COMMERCIAL CALL (P) +5C OR O

FORCE AFFILIATION CODE 8FR

(MSRT ONLY)

LOAD FREQUENCY PLAN CODE 8CFR+8FFR

(MSRT ONLY)

OFF SITE SUBSCRIBER CALL (P) +SDN

NOTE

PC = PERSONAL CODE

(P) = PRECEDENCE

YDN = YOUR DIRECTORY NUMBER

SDN = SELECTED DIRECTORY NUMBER

TAB B (MSE TELEPHONE OPERATING TONES) TO APPENDIX 4 (MSE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS) TO ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 MSE TELEPHONE OPERATING TONES The following is a basic description of audible tones

a DIAL TONE A low tone normally heard by affiliated subscribers when off the hook number is not dialed within ten seconds, a busy tone is heard, and the subscriber must then re-initiate the call Dial tone is also heard as conference bridges are being filled

b WAIT TONE A low continuous tone heard while the call is being processed The subscriber must wait for the connection to be completed A subscriber off a Small Extension Node (SEN) will hear a longer wait tone

c RING BACK TONE A low interrupted tone that is heard for two seconds and then silent for four seconds when connection is in progress and the called phone is ringing After three minutes an error tone is heard The subscriber must re-initiate the call

d BUSY TONE A low interrupted tone that is heard when a called party of route is busy, an unassigned/invalid directory number is called, or subscriber uses wrong personal code (PC) when attempting to affiliate with his DNVT An invalid sequence of digits on the MSRT will cause a busy tone

e ERROR TONE A medium oscillating tone heard when disaffiliated or blacklisted

f PREEMPT TONE (DNVT ONLY) A medium continuous mixed tone heard when a call is being preempted The tone will last for 1.25 seconds Re-initiate call

g CALL FORWARDING TONE A high pitched continuous tone that is heard for ten seconds after the subscriber enters "2C + Directory Number" on the telephone keypad to initiate call forwarding at a Node Center Switch (NCS), Forward Entry Switch (FES), or Radio Access Unit (RAU) A subscriber can still make outgoing calls, and will hear the call forwarding tone when off hook at a NCS or FES After entering "2C + Directory Number" for telephones off a SEN, you will receive a busy error tone A subscriber can still make outgoing calls of a SEN and RAU and will hear a dial tone when off the hook

h NOTE If there is still not any tone, use another quad on the J-1077 or RMC

TAB C (DNVT INSTALLATION PROCEDURES) TO APPENDIX 4 (MSE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS) TO ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 Wire tagging procedures of WF-16 field wire

a Make sure WF-16 field wire is connected to DNVT and J-1077 distribution box/RMC. The wire needs to be tagged using a standard wire tag. If no tags are available, use tape that can be written upon or DA Form 2402 (Backside).

b The standard wire tag/tape should have the following information:

(1) J-1077#

(2) Quad #

(3) Unit

(4) Telephone #

TAB D (DNVT AFFILIATION/DISAFFILIATION PROCEDURES) TO APPENDIX 4 (MSE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS) TO ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 AFFILIATE

a. Enter 8R + 3 digit code + your seven digit directory number, dial tone should be heard

b If no dial tone is heard

(1) Hang up and attempt to affiliate again

(2) If after three attempts dial tone is still not heard dial 0 Operator will answer and assist you

c If dial tone is heard DNVT is ready for operation

2 DISAFFILIATE

a Go off hook, ensure dial tone is heard

b Enter 8C + 3 digit code + directory number Error tone should be heard If not, attempt to disaffiliate again If still unsuccessful dial 0 for assistance

c Disconnecting W-16 wires either by toggles or Jbox or both will not disaffiliate you Instead the switch may black list your telephone number, not allowing DNVT to operate

TAB F (DSVT AFFILIATION/DISAFFILIATION) TO APPENDIX 4 (MSE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS) TO ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONIC) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 Load "U" and "M" keys

a DSVT (KY-68)

(1) Load "U" keys

(a) Ensure the "U" key label on the KY-13 is the same as the "U" key label your number is assigned per your profile code

(b) Pulling up on the VAR/STOR switch to zero the DSVT, move it to the zero position, and release it back to the center

(c) Connect KY-13 to fill connector to the DSVT

(d) Set FUNCTION SEL switch to LDU position RING/BUSY and NSW indicators should be on

(e) Place KY-13 selector switch to the position containing your "U" variable

(f) Move VAR/STOR switch to LOAD, when a tone is heard, place the switch back in the center position. If a second tone is heard the load was successful

(2) Load "M" key

(a) Leave KY-13 connected to DSVT

(b) Place KY-13 selector to the "M" variable switch

(c) Set the FUNCTION SEL switch to the LDX position RING/BUSY and NSW indicators should be on

(d) Move VAR/STOR switch to load position, when a tone is heard, release the switch back to the center position, a second tone should be heard. Two tones indicate success

(e) Remove the KY-13

(f) Set the FUNCTION SEL switch to the OP position RING/BUSY and NSW indicators will go off

b RT-1539, Radio

(1) Turn OFF/BLACKOUT/ON switch to ON. The only light that should come on is the CRYPTO ALARM light

TAB F (DSVT AFFILIATION/DISAFFILIATION) TO APPENDIX 4 (MSE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS) TO ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONIC) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(2) RAU/MSRT/REMOTE CONTROL switch is in MSRT position

(3) Connect KY-13 to the FULL connector on the RT-1539.

(4) Load the "M" key

2 Load Frequency Plan using the Cable Down Method

a Connect the frequency fill cable to the REMOTE CONTROL connector on the RT-1539 that is to receive the frequency plan

b Connect the other end of the frequency fill cable to the REMOTE CONTROL connector on the RT-1539 which already has the frequency plan downloaded. If downloading the frequency plan directly from a RAU, use connector of the signal entry panel

c Go off hook

d Unlock the DEPRESS/LOCK cradle hook switch and turn to UP position if the cradle hook switch is in LOOK DOWN position

e Using the keypad, press 8CFR 8FFR

(1) Wait tone will be heard, then error tone

(2) LOADED FREQ PLAN light flashes when downloading

(3) Error tone is heard, LOADED FREQ PLAN light will be on, indicating the frequency plans have been loaded

(4) Hang up the handset

(5) Disconnect the fill cable from both radios

3 Automated Net Control Device (ANCD)

a Use of ANCD to transfer data, refer to operator's manual

b Switch settings for RT-1539 remains the same

1 AFFILIATE

a Before attempting to affiliate check the following

(1) All cables properly connected

(2) Load the "U" first then the "M" key in the DSVT

(3) Insure the "M" key is loaded in the RT-1539

(4) Insure correct frequency plan is loaded in RT-1539

b Go off hook (DSVT)

c Enter 8R + 3 digit personal code - 7 digit number

(1) Loaded Directory No Indicator will flash as each number is entered and become solid after the last number

TAB F (DSVT AFFILIATION/DISAFFILIATION) TO APPENDIX 4 (MSE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS) TO ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONIC) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- (2) Error tone is heard in handset
- d Hang up the handset
 - (1) Traffic/Scanning indicator light (RT -1539) starts flashing as the MSRT starts searching for a RAU marker
 - (2) Traffic/Scanning indicator light will be solid once a RAU marker is seized This does not mean you are affiliated
 - (3) Wait until Marker/Scanning is solid You are affiliated and can access the network If the MARKER/AFFILIATION does not come on in 6 min the LOADED FREQ PLAN light flashes This means it is not in range of RAU, the wrong number was entered or, the wrong frequency plan is loaded

2 DISAFFILIATE

- a Go off hook, ensure dial tone is heard
- b Enter 8C + 3 digit code + number Error tone is heard If not, attempt to disaffiliate again or dial 0 for assistance

TAB G (PLACE A PHONE CALL) TO APPENDIX 4 (MSE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS)
TO ANNEX H (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONIC) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

- 1 Listed below is the procedure for placing a phone call
 - a Go off hook, ensure dial tone is heard
 - b Dial 7-digit directory number of end user
 - c The call is completed when
 - (1) Ringback tone is heard
 - (2) Busy tone is heard.
 - (3) Computer voice is heard "number is not assigned or is out of service"

ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT) 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PURPOSE This annex, together with current operations plans and orders establishes uniform procedures and provides the minimum for Wartime service support

2 APPLICABILITY This annex is applicable to all 800th Military Police Brigade subordinate assigned units and activities. Commanders of units who receive logistical support from the 800th MP Brigade will comply with the policies and procedures of this annex.

3 COORDINATION Direct coordination is authorized between 800th MP Brigade subordinate battalion commanders and supported units in order to identify wartime requirements and to effect a smooth transition into a wartime posture.

4 GENERAL Units will follow the procedures set forth in this Annex and its appendices. Requirements for additional logistical guidance not addressed in this annex or other written orders will be addressed to ATTN AFRC-CNY-AI-LOG.

5 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED GRADE/RANK</u>	<u>BRANCH/MOS</u>
Section Chief (S-4)	O-4/MAJ	90A00
Engineer Officer	O-3/CPT	21D00
Movements Control Officer	O-3/CPT	88B00
Subsistence Officer	O-3/CPT	92G00
Food Service Officer	CW3	922A0
LOG Service Supervisor	E-8/MSG	92A50
Subsistence Supervisor	E-8/MSG	92A40
Administrative Sergeant	E-5/Sgt	71L20
Administrative Assistant	E-4/SPC	71C10
Administrative Specialist	E-4/SPC	71L10

6 FIELD REPORTS

ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT) 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

a Daily Supply Journal - DA Form 1594 Each unit will submit to the Brigade S-4, through their Battalion Internment Facility (BIF) S-4, a journal reflecting all actions/transactions affecting the Logistical situation of the BIF and their unit for the past 24 hrs, to include supplies received/requisitioned and equipment lost, destroyed, or damaged

b Material Readiness Report A DA Form 2406 will be submitted to the Brigade S-4 through the BIF S-4. A report is defined in TM 38-750, Annex C. Negative reports are also required. Both The front and back are required

c Ammunition Status Report Each unit will submit to the Brigade S-4 the status of ammunition covering the preceding 24 hrs. The report will show, by type, the quantity required, on hand, and expended. This report will also be submitted after each enemy contact

d The reporting period is from 0001hrs to 2400hrs. Samples of required logistics reports are in ANNEX T (REPORTS)

7 CLASS I (SUBSISTENCE/RATIONS)

a Units will be required to requisition and store a three (3) day basic supply of MREs. These rations will not be consumed when class A rations are available. Units will also be required to draw and store a three (3) day supply of potable water

b Daily menus will be issued to units from supply points in advance of issue dates. Units will submit requirements to supporting class I supply points. Units will pickup rations from designated issue facilities

c Contamination IAW FM 10-60

d will be made IAW AR 30-15 and AR 30-41

e In wartime food from local sources and captured enemy subsistence, when approved by medical personnel, should be utilized

8 CLASS II & IV (OC&E/CONSTRUCTION & FORTIFICATION MATERIALS)

a Requisitions will be submitted in accordance with directives from the local ASG. Except as circumstances warrant, no clothing except workclothing will be issued, as a replacement, to EPWs until the clothing in their possession has become unfit

b See Appendix 2 for class IV

9 CLASS III (POL)

ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT) 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

a All POL products will be issued from the supporting Class III supply points Units will forecast class III requirements 24 hrs in advance and will include type and quantity of product, and whether it is bulk or package

b Units will maintain the following prescribed load of class III supplies

(1) Sufficient fuel to move all TOE and attached vehicles 150 miles

(2) In addition, units will strive to maintain full vehicle OVM five-gallon cans

c Maintain sufficient lubricating oils and greases to change oil once every 2 week

d Prescribed loads may be used during any movement, however they will be replenished within 24 hrs after completion of movement

10 CLASS V (AMMO) Initially all subordinate units will request and establish their basic issue of ammunition This request must be approved by the Brigade S-4 All basic and prescribed loads will be carried to field locations unless otherwise directed by this HQ

b Turn in of excess or unserviceable ammo or components will be made to the nearest ASP

c Supply Officers will inspect the condition and verify the amount of basic loads of each using unit As per the units TO&E

11 CLASS VI (PERSONAL DEMAND ITEMS) Items will be obtained IAW procedures established by local SOPs EPW canteen operations will be established IAW Theater SOPs

12 CLASS VII (MAJOR END ITEMS) Major end items will be requisitioned IAW procedures established by AMC and ASG supporting supply activities SOPs

13 CLASS VIII (MEDICAL) Initially all subordinate units will request and establish their basic load of medical supplies Further medical supplies will be obtained IAW procedures established by the supporting MEDDAC and ASG SOPs

14 CLASS IX (REPAIR PARTS)

a Repair parts will be obtained from supporting Class IX units IAW the supporting ASG SOP

b Unit PLL will be maintained on a demand generated inventory basis in conjunction with mandatory parts list requirements Periodic reviews of PLL are required

ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT) 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

15 CLASS X (MILITARY ASSISTANCE ITEMS)

- a Class X and nonstandard type clothing will be issued to EPW/CI/IRs when captured supplies are not available or suitable
- b Requisitions will be submitted IAW procedures established by the supporting supply activity SOP

APPENDICES.

- 1 Internment Facility (IF) Logistical Requirements List

APPENDIX I (INTERMMENT FACILITY (IF) LOGISTICAL REQJ REMENTS LIST) TO ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT)
800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

CLASS OF SUPPLY	REQUIREMENT	UNIT OF ISSUE	4K EPW	8K EPW	AS OF MAR 2000
Class I WATER	140K OF WATER PER DAY INCLUDING STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM		70k	140k	
CLASS I RATIONS	MEALS PER DAY CULTURALLY SENSITIVE (NO PORK) 30 DAY SUPPLY REQUIRES 720,000 MEALS SUPPLEMENTED BY ULTRA HIGH TEMPERATURE MILK		12K	24K	
8910-01-161-4933	SHELF LIFE FOR (UHT) IS 10 MONTHS 480,000 00 PER MONTH		8k	16k	
CLASS II OCIE	TENT GP MEDIUM , COMPLETE		480	580	
8340-00-482-3963	FIRE EXTINGUISHER		180	180	
4210-00-43209331	LIGHT SET GEN ILLUMINATION (INTERNAL LIGHTING)		150	175	
6230-00-299-7077	LIGHT SET, GENERAL ILLUMINATION (EXTERNAL LIGHTING)		100	150	
6230-00-299-7080	BLANKETS	2 EACH	8k	16k	7406
7210-00-282-7950	COVERALLS	2 EACH	8k	16k	4440 SMALL
8415-00-782-2816	HEAD CAPS	1 EACH	4k	8K	
8415-01-134-3178	PAIRS OF SANDALS OR LIKE SUBSTITUTE	1 EACH	4k	8k	
8430-01-438-0707					

APPENDIX 1 (INTERMENT FACILITY (IF) LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS LIST) TO ANNEX 1 (SERVICE SUPPORT)
 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

7240-00-089-3827	5 GALLON PLASTIC WATER JUG		750	750	
5110-00-293-3435	CASSETTE,RECORDER LOCAL PURCHASE SAW , HAND		100	100	
7360-00-139-1063	WASH BASIN		40	40	
7240-00-160-0455	PAIL,METAL 5GAL		4k	8k	
7340-00-0222-1317	PLASTIC SPOONS		100	200	
8970-00-L01-0001	WATER BOTTLE,SMALL		120K	240K	
8105-00-142-9355	SANDBAGS		8K	16K	
8405-01-378-0041	COAT SEASONAL	1 EACH	250K	250K	
8465-01-109-3369	SLEEPING MAT	1 EACH	4k	8k	
7240-00161-1143	GARBAGE CAN 32 GALLON		400	800	
7240-00-160-0440	GARBAGE CAN COVER 32 Gallon		400	800	
9930-01-331-6244	POUCH,HUMAN REMAINS		200	200	
8415-00-926-1674	GLOVES, BARBED TAPE	EACH	150	150	
636-00-25001	GLOVES,LATEX DISPOSABLE		50case	100case	
4240-00-926-4199	MASK,CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL		S	1600SM	
4240-00-926-4199	MASK,CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL		800 SM	4800MED	
4240-00-926-4199	MASK,CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL		2400M ED	1600LG	
8415-00-407-1060	SUIT,CHEM PROTECTIVE		800LG	1600SM	

APPENDIX 1 (INTERMMENT FACILITY (IF) LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS LIST) TO ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT)
 800th MP BDE (FPW/CI) TACSOP

8415-00-177-5008	SUIT, CHEM PROTECTIVE	2400M ED	4800MED
8415-00-407-1062	SUIT, CHEM PROTECTIVE	800LG	1600LG
8415-01-275-6400	GLOVES, CHEMICAL	PAIR 4K	8K
5805-00-543-0012	TELEPHONE TA 312/P7	EACH 32	32
8465-00-174-0808	BAG, PERSONAL EFFECTS	EACH 4K	8K
8430-01-021-5978	FOOTWEAR CVR, CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE	PAIR 800SM	1600SM
8430-01-021-5978	FOOTWEAR CVR, CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE	PAIR 2400M ED	4800MED
8430-01-021-5978	FOOTWEAR CVR, CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE	PAIR 800LG	1600LG
4240-00-021-8695	HOOD, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL MASK	EACH 800SM	1600
4240-00-021-8695	HOOD, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL MASK	EACH 2400M ED	4800MED
4240-00-021-8695	HOOD, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL MASK	EACH 800LG	1600LG
CLASS OF SUPPLY			
CLASS III BULK			
	DIESEL 5400 GALS / DAILY		
	MOGAS 960 GALS / DAILY		
CLASS III PKG			
CLASS IV B.O.M			
CLASS V AMMO			
	(SEE BOM)		
	NON LETHAL USE OF FORCE KITS		
	1 KIT PER BATTALION TOTAL	6	6
	BASIC LOAD PER BATTALION		
CLASS VI HEALTH AND			
	HCP TYPE 1 FOR 30 DAY SUPPLY	8k	16k

APPENDIX I (IN INTERMENT FACILITY (IF) LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS LIST) TO ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT)
 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TAC SOP

COMFORT PACK	7810-00-4851519	RECREATION KIT	10	20
CLASS OF SUPPLY		REQUIREMENT	4K EPW	8K EPW
				AS OF MAR 2000
CLASS VII MAJOR END ITEMS		60 KW GENERATOR	5	5
		250 GALLON FIBERGLASS TANKS(SHOWER FACILITY)	24	48
		BOBCAT WITH ATTACHMENTS SHIPPING AND STORAGE CONTAINER	4	8
	8145-00-168-6848	2500 GALLON WATER BAG	10	20
			10	10
CLASS VIII MEDICAL				
	6840-01-431-3345	INSECTICIDE, DELTAMETHRIN 500LBS	1	2
	3740-00-132-5936	MANUAL DUSTER,PUMP	12	12
	6840-01-334-2666	INSECT REPELLENT (CLOTHING) PERMETHRIN	212	414
	6840-01-431-3357	INSECTICIDE,Lambda-cyhalothrin	30	60
	6810-598-7316	BLEACH	1,000	2,000
	3740-00-541-4719	SPRAYER,MANUAL ,CARRIED TWO GALLON	4	8
	4230-00-078-5455	DELOUSER 7000	4	6
	6665-00682-4765	WATER TESTING AND TREATMENT KITS COLIFORM BACTERIA TEST	1	3

APPENDIX I (INTERMENT FACILITY (IF) LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS LIST) TO ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT)
800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TAC SOP

6630-01-362-8299	COILERT SAMPLER	EACH	1	3	
6630 01-343-8495	CHLORINE PH TEST SET	EACH	1	3	
6530-00-299-8631	PIPET DROP PLAS	EACH	2	4	
6685-00-444-6500	FOOD SERVICE THERMOMETER	EACH	7	14	
7920-00-061-0038	BRUSH, SCRUB PLASTIC ALL PURPOSE	CASE	300	600	
7920-00-753-5242	PAD, SCOURING	CASE	300	600	
7930-00-205-0442	POWDER, SCOURING 14oz CAN	CASE	300	600	
7930-00-899-9534	DISHWASHING COMPOUND 5GAL BOTTLE	EACH	120	240	
6810-00-242-4770	CALCIUM HYPOCHLORITE 3-3/4 BOTTLE	EACH	120	240	
6850-00-270-6225	CHLORINATION KIT, WATER PURIFICATION	EACH	120	240	
6840-01-424-2495	INSECTICIDE, METHOPRENE	BOX	8	16	
6640-00-149-1196	ENTOMOLOGICAL DIPPER	EACH	3	6	
6840-01-183-7244	INSECTICIDE, FLY BAIT 1% METHOMYL	CAN	50cans	100cans	
6840-01-412-4634	INSECTICIDE, D-PHENOTHORIN 12OZ CAN	CAN	50cans	100cans	
6840-00-089-4664	RODENTICIDAL BAIT	BOX	8boxes	16boxes	
3740-01-240-6170	TRAP, GLUE, RODENT	BOX	8boxes	16boxes	
8415-01-013-7382	GLOVES, CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE, PESTICIDE APPLICATION	EACH	16	32	
4240-01-246-5404	RESPIRATOR, HALF FACE 7000SERIES	EACH	16	32	
6840-01-345-	INSECT REPELLANT, CLOTHING	BOX	8	16	

APPENDIX 1 (INTERNMEN FACILITY (IF) LOGISTICAL REQI REMENTS LIST) TO ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT)
800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

ANNEX J (NBC OPERATIONS) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 **PURPOSE** To standardize defense procedures against nuclear, biological and chemical attack for units in combat and field training environments

2 REFERENCES

- a FM 3-3 Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance
- b FM 3-3-1 Nuclear Contamination Avoidance
- c FM 3-4 NBC Protection
- d FM 3-4-1 Fixed Site Protection
- e FM 3-5 NBC Decontamination
- f FM 3-6 Field Behavior of NBC Agents
- g FM 3-7 NBC Field Handbook
- h FM 3-9 Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents
- i FM 3-11 Flame Field Expedients
- j FM 3-19 NBC Reconnaissance
- k FM 3-50 Smoke Operations
- l FM 3-100 NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, and Smoke
- m FM 3-101 Chemical Staffs and Units
- n AR 350-41 Training in Units
- o TB MED 507

3 ORGANIZATION

a The Brigade and battalions staff will establish an NBC Center consisting of an NBC Officer and a Chemical Staff NCO (MOS 54B)

b Companies establish NBC Defense Parties consisting of an NBC Defense (NBCD) Officer, Chemical NCO (MOS 54B), or appointed NBCD NCO, and one enlisted alternate (E4 or above) IAW AR 350-41

ANNEX J (NBC OPERATIONS) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

c Additional duty appointed OIC and NCOIC Nuclear Biological Chemical Defense (NBCD) personnel will successfully complete an 80-hour NBCD Course within three years from date appointed

d Additionally, each company will appoint and train

(1) One Radiological Survey and Monitoring Team (two soldiers) for each authorized AN/VDR-2 Radiacmeter

(2) One Chemical Agent Detection Team (two soldiers) for each authorized M256A1 Chemical Agent Detection Kit

(3) One Chemical Agent Alarm Team (two soldiers) for each M8A1 Chemical Agent Alarm System authorized

(4) One Chemical Agent Monitoring Team (two soldiers) for each Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) authorized

(5) One Decontamination Team consisting of one NCOIC and nine enlisted personnel

4 RESPONSIBILITIES

a Commanders are responsible for NBCD readiness in their units. These responsibilities include, but are not limited to

(1) Establishing the unit's MOPP level with advice from the unit NBCD Officer/NCO

(2) Making timely decisions regarding emergency movements, decontamination, decontamination priorities, and unit reconciliation with the advice of the NBCD Officer/NCO

(3) Responsible for all aspects of unit NBC operations

(4) Ensuring the unit is properly trained, organized, and equipped for NBC operation

(5) Ensuring that school trained personnel are appointed to the unit NBC defense party

(6) Ensuring the unit practices contamination avoidance

(7) Establishing non-electronic (EMP resistant) command and control methods

ANNEX J (NBC OPERATIONS) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

b Senior and Site Commander The senior commander is the highest ranking soldier of command that can be contacted. Normally this is the Brigade Commander, but includes a site commander and team chief if they have lost communication. The commander always has authority on matters of NBC defense and the responsibility to carry out all aspects of this SOP, to include

- (1) Performing the functions of the commander when contact with the commander is not possible or time will not permit it
- (2) Establishing MOPP level and degrees of risk equal to or more stringent than those set by the commander, as a particular mission dictates
- (3) Ensuring NBC operators are identified and are prepared to perform their assigned duties
- (4) Performing or directing unmasking procedures

c The Brigade Chemical Section's responsibilities include, but are not limited to

- (1) Assisting the Brigade Commander and S-3 in providing guidance to subordinate units. commanders in all aspects of NBCD with emphasis on operating in a contaminated environment
- (2) Establishing and maintaining the Nuclear Biological Chemical Center NBCC for the purpose of collecting, evaluating, correlating, preparing and distributing enemy NBC attack data to higher and lower headquarters through the NBC Warning and Reporting System (NBCWRS)
- (3) Maintaining the NBC staff journals, files, situation map, situation overlays, and reports
- (4) Planning and supervising measures to avoid or reduce effects of enemy NBC attack
- (5) Advising on the impact of NBC contamination on tactical, logistics, and civil-military operations
- (6) Advising on smoke and flame operations in coordination with the S-3
- (7) Assisting subordinate units in threat and vulnerability analysis and evaluate/disseminate information to key personnel
- (8) Coordinating with TUSA NBC for thorough decontamination support

**ANNEX J (NBC OPERATIONS) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP**

(9) Maintaining a list of sizes by quantity of required mask, overgarments, gloves, and boots.

(10) Assisting subordinate units determine authorization and forecast of NBC equipment to support training and war reserve stock

(11) Assisting in the control, coordination, and supervision of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) operations

(12) Consolidating battalion Radiation Exposure Status (RES) and reporting to TUSA as required

(13) Providing recommendations concerning MOPP levels appropriate for enemy threat and tactical situation

(14) Coordinating decontamination activities

(15) Providing technical advice to the Brigade S-2 for analysis of the NBC threat and ensuring that priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and threat information is reflected in unit OPLANs and SOPs

(16) Advising the Brigade S-4 on the known status of contamination of MSRs

(17) Preparing NBCD annexes for Brigade OPLANs and OPORDs

d The Battalion Chemical Section's responsibilities include, but are not limited to

(1) Assisting the Battalion Commander and S-3 in providing guidance to subordinate unit commanders in all aspects of NBCD with emphasis on operating in a contaminated environment

(2) Establish and maintain an NBCC for the purpose of collecting, evaluating, correlating, preparing, and distributing enemy NBC attack data to higher and lower headquarters through the NBCWRS

(3) Consolidating subordinate unit Radiation Exposure Status (RES) and reporting to higher headquarters as required

(4) Coordinating and supervising activities of radiological survey and monitoring operators and chemical detection operators

(5) Coordinating decontamination missions conducted with or without support-level decontamination assets

ANNEX J (NBC OPERATIONS) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- (6) Coordinating, training, evaluating, and assisting company NBC
- (7) Preparing NBCD annexes and appendices for battalion SOPs, OPLANs, and other coordinating instructions
- (8) Reporting NBCDE and personnel shortfalls to higher headquarters
- (9) Ensuring that ~~ky~~ personnel receive an appropriate, specific NBC threat brief about the mission
- (10) Maintaining a list of sizes by quantity of required mask, overgarments, gloves, and boots
- (11) Advising S-2 on NBC intelligence matters
- (12) Assisting the Bn S-4 cross-level NBCDE to obtain the optimal NBC readiness posture
- (13) Coordinating through Brigade NBC for thorough decontamination support
- (14) Assisting units to determine authorizations and forecast NBC equipment for training and war reserve
- (15) Planning and supervising measures to avoid or reduce effects of enemy NBC attack.

5 ACTIONS BEFORE AN NBC ATTACK

a These actions are consistent with those given in Chapter 3 through 8 of FM 3-4 and STPs 21-2-SMCT & 21-24

b Specific actions include

- (1) Covering non-essential equipment and food items
- (2) Having MOPP Gear available for immediate donning for CB attack
- (3) Ensuring thorough hygiene and sanitation efforts are employed to reduce exposure to biological risk/exposure
- (4) Ensuring field cover, tracked-vehicles and existing structures are used to protect/shield against nuclear attack

6 ACTIONS DURING AN NBC ATTACK Mask and Tak Cover

**ANNEX J (NBC OPERATIONS) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP**

a If responding to a chemical or biological attack

- (1) Seek protective shelter
- (2) Sound the alarm
- (3) Alert your buddy
- (4) Perform self decontamination and aid as necessary

b If responding to a nuclear attack

(1) The headquarters company of each battalion will perform duties as observer units

(2) Observers send strike information to battalion chemical section

(3) Unless instructed otherwise, only designated observer units will report

(4) Personnel must drop immediately and cover exposed skin to protect against blast and thermal effects

7 ACTIONS AFTER AN NBC ATTACK

a Perform emergency decontamination and first aid

b Submit initial NBC-1 report within 5 minutes of attack

c Perform simplified fallout and downwind hazard predictions and alert possible affected units (NBC-3) Weather is available from the S-2 section

d The closest contractible NBC control party will prepare detailed fallout reports and send them to all units

e Perform equipment check

(1) Observe M9 paper and check for contamination

(2) Check mission essential equipment serviceability IAW TMs only after removal of gross CB contamination, because operating the equipment under such conditions may damage it

**ANNEX J (NBC OPERATIONS) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP**

(3) Radio communications in the 3 to 30 MHz range may be blacked out by upper atmospheric ionization for up to several hours following any nuclear detonation (App A of FM 101-31-2)

(4) Most EMP damage will be to circuit breakers, fuses, computer memory, semiconductor diodes, microchips, and circuits

f Get overturned equipment containing batteries, radiators, and fuel tank upright within 30 minutes

g Reset automatic chemical agent alarms

h Repair equipment

(1) Equipment is decontaminated using hot soapy water, rags, and M11/M13 apparatuses to remove contamination only as needed to allow operation and repairs

(2) Clean debris from air filters

(3) Field strip and clean weapons

i If the NBC attack was with non-persistent agents or mock NBC weapons, prepare to defend against an immediate enemy attack

j Put out fires before they spread

k Check supplies for contamination. Salvage usable supplies from victims and requisition replacements as necessary and segregate contaminated equipment from the uncontaminated

l Order replacement supplies as needed

m Destroy all non-containerized food exposed to NBC solids, liquids, or vapors during or after the attack

8 PERFORM RECONNAISSANCE

a Battalion or higher headquarters will direct area or route surveys as needed IAW Chapter 3 thru 6 of FM 3-3

b Check the site for contamination with M256A1 chemical detection kits and VDR-2 radiacmeters

ANNEX J (NBC OPERATIONS) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI)

TACSOP

c Check record and report IM 93 dosimeter readings. Primary and secondary VDR-2 radiacmeter operators will wear IM 93 dosimeters in their left breast pocket to maximize exposure

d Begin continuous monitoring with VDR-2 radiacmeter and M8A1 alarm

e Collect samples as directed by Brigade or higher headquarters IAW Chapter 6 of FM 3-4

(1) Collect samples of new or unknown chemical agents

(2) Collect samples of animal, plant, water, and soil after each biological agent use

f Check alternate sites for contamination

(1) Mark the boundaries of contamination areas so that a warning sign is visible from all possible avenues of approach

(2) Specify date and time of detection and specific agents on all marking signs

(3) Update daily

(4) For radiation, mark all signs with dose rates normalized to H₁ if possible

g Move or continue to operate

(1) If mission will be affected move to an uncontaminated area

(2) If in zone I of a radiological fall out prediction, be prepared if directed to move

(3) Request permission to move if persistent hazards arrive (liquid or solid CB agents or fallout above 1 cGy/hr)

(4) Begin unmasking procedures

**ANNEX J (NBC OPERATIONS) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP**

- 1 Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP)
- 2 Automatic Masking Indicators
- 3 NBC Threat Warning System
- 4 NBC Attack Warning System
5. NBC Report Routing
- 6 Operating Exposure Guidance
- 7 Decontamination
- 8 NBC Principles

APPENDIX 1 (MISSION ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE) TO ANNEX J 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- 1 MASK AND MOPP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES Protective mask/or their carriers will be marked as follows
 - a Markings and/or tags will include the soldier's name and/or a unit code specified by unit SOP
 - b Markings or tags must not be permanent, but must be easily and quickly removable without special tools or supplies
 - c Markings and/or tags must not create noise nor reflect light
- 2 Filter installation dates will be marked IAW guidelines prescribed in FM 3-4
- 3 Personnel identification markings on the BDOs will include last name and rank using the following method
 - a Printed or embroidered onto the helmet camouflage cover band
 - b Name and rank printed on a 2x4" piece of OD cloth tape attached to the right breast pocket flap
- 4 Subdued ranks attached using following procedure
 - a Pinned or sewn onto the helmet camouflage cover
 - b Pinned to the right breast pocket flap
- 5 Unit, if used, may be added using one or more of the following
 - a Pinned to the right breast pocket flap
 - b Printed on the same piece of 2x4" piece of OD
- 6 MOPP Level Procedures
 - a No minimum MOPP requirements exist other than serviceability and accountability at NBC Threat Warning Conditions of White or Green (see Appendix 3 of Annex J) at the Commander's discretion
 - b The minimum MOPP level for all 800th MP BDE operations and exercises is MOPP level 0 (one BDO suit will be physically carried with the soldier at all

**APPENDIX 1 (MISSION ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE) TO ANNEX J 800TH
MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP**

times) when NBC Threat Warning Conditions of Amber exist (see Appendix 3 of Annex J). For combat operations carry two BDO suits per soldier and store them IAW TB 10-277 when Amber conditions exist

c Unit commanders set and adjust MOPP levels A discussion of MOPP may be found in FM 3-4

d MOPP levels increase heat stress on the body causing unnoticed dehydration and noticeable fatigue and workloss Any work will be extremely difficult at 90 degrees F. See TB MED 507

(1) A normal workrest cycle for continuous moderate work at MOPP level 4 over a range of temperatures in BDOs is an initial 90 minute workperiod followed by a repetitive cycle of 30 minutes rest and 60 minutes work

(2) The following general guidelines are given for a temperature of 70 degrees F to increase efficiency above that given by the normal workrest cycle

MOPP LEVEL	WORKLOAD	CUPS OF WATER (8 oz) /HR	WORK/REST CYCLE PER/HR (MINUTES)
0	Light	1	60/0
	Moderate	1.5	60/5
	Heavy	2	60/10
1	Light	1.5	60/5
	Moderate	2	60/10
	Heavy	4	50/20
2	Light	1.5	60/10
	Moderate	2.5	60/15
	Heavy	4	50/20
3	Light	2	60/20
	Moderate	3	50/25
	Heavy	4.5	40/20
4	Light	2	60/20
	Moderate	3.5	40/20
	Heavy	5	20/20

(3) For each 10 degrees F increase in temperature above 70 degrees

APPENDIX 1 (MISSION ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE) TO ANNEX J 800TH
MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- (a) Add about 0.5 cups of water (4 fluid ounces) per hour
- (b) Decrease work time by 10 minutes and increase rest 10 minutes
- (4) For each 10 degrees F decrease in temperature below 70 degrees F
- (a) Subtract about 0.5 cups of water per hour
- (b) Do not decrease below 2 quarts of water (8 cups) per day
- (c) Add 10 min of work and subtract 10 min of rest.
- (d) Individual water needs may vary with humidity, sunlight, and body density
Initiate forced hydration plan
- (e) Work/rest cycle merely maintains maximum work efficiency for a prolonged period of time. Dependent on the complexity of the task and training received, task will take 1- 1/2 to 4 times longer to perform at MO PP level 4 than it would take to perform at MOPP level 0. See Table A-12 of FM 3-4
- (f) Heat casualties will begin to occur after 12 hours in MOPP level 4 regardless of work conditions. Movement and unmasking should be completed by then if possible. Expect 10% of personnel to be heat casualties at 75 degrees F under moderate workloads
- (g) Lower level commanders may go to a more protective MOPP posture than that specified by higher headquarters but may not go to a lower protective MOPP posture unless specifically allowed to by the next higher commander. See Chapter 3 of FM 3-100
- (h) During periods of rain after a nuclear or persistent agent attack BDO and wet weather boots must be worn since the rain will concentrate remaining NBC contamination into puddles
- (i) MOPP gear may be worn open at level 1 thru 3 unless otherwise directed

**APPENDIX 2 (AUTOMATIC MASKING INDICATORS) TO ANNEX J 800 TH MP BDE
(EPW/CI) TACSOP**

1 In order to increase survivability, soldiers will automatically mask and assume MOPP IV when

a Artillery, mortar, or rocket fire explodes in an uncharacteristic manner (Pop' or Poof'sound)

b Hostile aircraft are seen spraying mists over unit areas

c Smoke, mists, or liquids of an unknown source are noticed in the air, or a strange odor is present

d Entering an area after receipt of intelligence indicating chemical or biological weapons have been used

e There is an unexplained death of animals or people

f There is an unexplained illness in the area, accompanied with heavy concentrations of mosquitoes, ticks, fleas, or other vectors

g Personnel are found dead of no apparent cause

h Approaching an area marked by standard NATO or WARSAW Pact warning signs

i Any of the alarms listed in Appendix 3 are given

2 Personnel will remain in MOPP IV until unmasking procedures determine the area to be "all clear" or another MOPP level is determined by the commander and chemical personnel

APPENDIX 3 (NBC THREAT WARNING SYSTEM) TO ANNEX J 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 The 800th MP BDE NBC Threat Warning System (NBCTWS) reflects the latest intelligence estimate regarding the enemy's NBC capability and activity. It consists of four elements: a threat condition (THREATCON), probability of attack, NBC related criteria and indicators of enemy capabilities and intentions, and recommended MSC actions. MOPP LEVELS ARE NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH THREAT CONDITION LEVELS!

2 The NBCTWS is to be used by the Brigade to assist in recommending NBC operations. The NBC Threat Warning System is:

CATEGORY	PROBABILITY OF ATTACK	THREATCON CRITERIA/INDICATORS
White	None	Enemy has no offensive capabilities
Green	Possible	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Enemy has offensive NBC capabilities 2 NBC munitions are not dispersed or deployed to forward locations
Amber	Probable	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Enemy intention to employ NBC munitions reported 2 NBC munitions deployed dispersed to field storage locations/firing/ delivery units 3 Enemy troops wearing NBC protective equipment 4 NBC recon elements observed with conventional recon 5 NBC decon elements observed with front line maneuver units 6 Enemy Uses of meteorology radars associated with surface- to-surface missiles
Red	Imminent	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Enemy NBC attack progress in AO (but outside Brigade sector) 2 Initiation of attack/counter attack on friendly forces 3 Enemy observed providing NBC warning/ signal to his forces 4 NBC munition deliveries observed being made to firing units in range of friendly forces

**APPENDIX 3 (NBC THREAT WARNING SYSTEM) TO ANNEX J 800TH MP BDE
(EPW/CI) TACSOP**

- 5 Movements of surface-to- surface missile launchers into or within the vicinity of a launch site
- 6 Enemy NBC attackn progress in the Brigade's sector
- 7 Surface-to-surface missile launch reported

Unit commanders act commensurate with the current NBC THREATCON

THREATCON	RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
White	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1 Continue training, concentrating on common task and survival skills2 Ensure required items of chemical defense equipment (CDE) are on hand
Green	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1 Increase MOPP as appropriate2 Train/rehearse individual and collective protection/skills
Amber	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1 Increase MOPP level based on METT-T2 Set out chemical detection devices Initiate selective monitoring3 Preposition decon assets4 Cover supplies and equipment not in use (Classes I, III, and V etc)5 Apply STB before donning chemical protective ensemble if mustard agent is likely6 Ensure canteens have M1 cap installed and are filled
RED	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1 Initiate use of Nerve Agent Antidote Kits (NAAK)2 Increase MOPP level based on METT-T3 Seek overhead cover

3 When soldiers are under NBC attack it is imperative others in the hazard area are warned immediately The warnings must be

- a Given as soon as the attack or hazard is suspected
- b Given by means not normally associated with combat signals or sounds
- c Repeated by all personnel in the area

**APPENDIX 3 (NBC THREAT WARNING SYSTEM) TO ANNEX J 800TH MP BDE
(EPW/CI) TACSOP**

- d Supplemented over radio, telephone, and PA systems
4. The four primary methods of warnings are
- a Vocal The word "GAS" is repeated three times by all individuals upon masking as a result of chemical or biological attack. "FALLOUT" is repeated upon detecting radiological fallout. Soldiers hearing this, repeat the alarm and seek cover.
 - b Sound Sound signals, vocal warnings, and consist of a series of short signals such as
 - (1) A succession of short blasts on a vehicle horn or similar device
 - (2) Rapid and continuous beating on any metal object
 - (3) A warbling siren sound
 - (4) If a public address system is available, the word "GAS," as a minimum, shall be repeated
 - c Visual After masking, soldiers should
 - (1) Extend both arms horizontally to their sides with fists facing up
 - (2) Move their fists to their heads and back three times while giving the vocal alarm
 - d Audiovisual Chemical agent alarms give off an audio and visual alarm when agents are detected. Soldiers that see or hear these alarms mask immediately then warn others.

APPENDIX 4 (NBC ATTACK WARNING SYSTEM) TO ANNEX J 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- 1 After an NBC attack the unit a radiological or chemical survey may be requested. This information will be necessary to determine the actual extent of contamination.
- 2 The types of surveys and techniques are found in FM 3-3.
- 3 The NBC Center will provide each survey team with an overlay of the area or route to be surveyed.
- 4 Maximum total dose for personnel conducting radiological surveys is 70 cGys with a turn back dose of 35 cGys.
- 5 Information collected is passed to Bde NBC Center using NBCWRS, and to the nearest MP traffic control point or unit headquarters.
- 6 NUCWARN messages. Upon receipt of a NUCWARN message, the commander must determine if subordinates should be warned of the following minimum safe distance (MSD).
 - a MSD 1 is the minimum distance to warned and protected personnel where those personnel closer to the attack than MSD 1 must evacuate. Personnel unable to leave within MSD 1 must take maximum protection from the blast.
 - b MSD 2 is the minimum safe distance to warned and unprotected personnel where those personnel within MSD 2 must take maximum precaution, but need not evacuate. Soldiers should find bunkers or foxholes with overhead cover.
 - c MSD 3 is the minimum safe distance to warned unprotected personnel where those personnel within MSD 3 take at least minimum precautions against blast data and electromagnetic pulse. Soldiers in the open should lie down and cover all exposed skin with the equivalent of two layers of cloth. Aircraft should remain outside of MSD 3.
- 7 Effective & Chemical Downwind Messages (ECDM) will be prepared and sent down by higher headquarters. If communications are lost, Battalion and Brigade control parties will seek out information from S-2 or the nearest meteorological or intelligence section of an Air Force or artillery unit and prepare their own from available data.

APPENDIX 5 (NBC REPORT ROUTING) TO ANNEX J 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 NBC-1 Report The first use of enemy NBC weapons in a unit's area will be sent forward to Brigade through the reporting unit's defense party using the appropriate NBC-1 report with a FLASH precedence. The report will not be delayed for any reason. All subsequent attack will be sent to the first collection center in the reporting unit's organization. The collection center will evaluate this data and forward it to the brigade as an NBC-2 report.

2 NBC-2 Report The NBC-2 report will be used to forward evaluated data on all NBC attack.

3 NBC-3 Report The NBC-3 report will be used to warn other units of areas of predicted contamination. The reports are normally sent down to the affected units only. All NBCCs are responsible for formulating NBC-3 (chemical) reports.

4 NBC-4 report The NBC-4 report is used to forward radiological monitoring and survey data and to confirm the presence of chemical agents. It will normally be sent to the first NBCC in the organization unless requested by higher headquarters.

5 NBC-5 Report The NBC-5 report details actual areas of contamination. It is sent to all affected units by the unit that computes the report.

6 NBC-6 Report The NBC-6 report provides additional information on NBC attack. It will normally be written by a NBCCs and forwarded on request.

7 Strik Serial Numbers (SSN) are initiated by the Brigade and completed at TUSA. When subordinate units report an attack to the Brigade, the report will be assigned an SSN. Once a SSN is assigned to a particular NBC attack it will be used to identify that attack in all communications and records.

APPENDIX 6 (OPERATIONAL EXPOSURE GUIDANCE) TO ANNEX J (NBC DEFENSE OPERATIONS) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- 1 The Operational Exposure Guidance (OEG) is established and used by the Commander to help in keeping radiation exposures to a minimum and still accomplish the mission
- 2 The 800th MP BDE OEG is 50 cGys. Emergency risk exposure (130 cGys) will only be allowed in cases of urgent tactical necessity in that there is insufficient time to obtain authority from the TUSA Commander. Subordinate units' OEG will be established before each mission by its higher headquarters via Operations or Fragmentary Order and will be based on a unit's prior exposure.
- 3 Radiation exposure status (RES) records must be kept by all units, down to platoon level. Subordinate units will use the forms from Tab A to this APPENDIX to consolidate information and pass it to higher headquarters.
- 4 Battalions will report their RES levels to Brigade daily at 1600Z when they are conducting periodic monitoring. Reports are due hourly when units are conducting continuous monitoring.
- 5 Brigade will be informed IMMEDIATELY when the OEG is exceeded. SEE TAB A Radiation Exposure Chart.

APPENDIX 6 (OPERATIONAL EXPOSURE GUIDANCE) TO ANNEX J (NBC DEFENSE OPERATIONS) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

J-6-1

TAB A (RADIATION EXPOSURE CHART) TO APPENDIX 6 (OPERATIONAL EXPOSURE GUIDANCE) TO ANNEX J (NBC DEFENSE OPERATIONS) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

RADIATION EXPOSURE CHART

UNIT ----- DATE-----

RES CATEGORY	NUMERICAL CRITERIA TOTAL CUMULATIVE DOSE
RES-0	0 cGys (no exposure)
RES-1	Greater than 0 cGy but less than or equal to 70 cGys
RES-2	Greater than 70 cGys but less than or equal to 150 cGys
RES-3	Greater than 150 cGys

COMPANY RADIATION EXPOSURE CHART

ELEMENT/
SECTION

PREVIOUS EXPOSURE

NEW EXPOSURE

TOTAL EXPOSURE

RES CATEGORY

CATEGORY TOTAL_

RES CATEGORY OF SUM OF RES OF ALL SUBORDINATE UNITS

Number of platoons in company or number of companies in battalion

2 3 4 5 6 7

Sum of RES numbers of all

Platoons or Companies

RES-0	0	0-1	0-1	0-2	0-2	0-3
RES-1	1-2	2-4	2-5	3-7	3-8	4-10
RES-2	3-4	5-7	6-9	8-12	9-14	11-17
RES-3	5-6	8-9	10-12	13-15	15-18	18-21

**APPENDIX 7 (DECONTAMINATION) TO ANNEX J 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP**

1 Units will apply the principles of decontamination found in FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination. Decontamination procedures for unique, unit-specific equipment will be included in unit TACSOPs.

2 Units will deploy with those decontaminants authorized in CTA 50-970. In the event of shortages, field expedients will be locally purchased (i.e. household bleach).

3 Units requiring decontamination will submit the following information to the Brigade NBCC before the start of operations in the form of a SITREP via landline or radio.

- a Location of proposed/actual decontamination point
- b Type of contamination
- c Number of personnel/equipment to be decontaminated
- d Status of casualties
- e Additional support needed
- f Remark.

4 Upon completion of decontamination procedures, units will provide the following information to the Brigade NBCC

- a Location of actual decontamination point
- b Date/time decontamination completed
- c Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE) resupply needs
- d Remark.

APPENDIX 8 (NBC PRINCIPLES) TO ANNEX J 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 **AVOIDANCE** The first fundamental of NBC defense is avoidance. Avoidance addresses individual and/or unit measures taken to avoid or minimize NBC attack and reduce the effects of NBC hazards.

2 **PROTECTION** The second fundamental is NBC protection. It is one of the four dynamics of combat power and consists of two primary components: actions to counter the enemy's firepower and actions to maintain the health and morale of soldiers. NBC protection encompasses both components. Its goal is conservation of the fighting potential of the force so it can be applied at the decisive time and place. We divide NBC protection into three broad areas—force, collective, and individual protection.

a **Force Protection** Force protection involves action taken to reduce the vulnerability of his force to an NBC attack. At battalion and below, this will require the unit to conduct a MOPP analysis. The result is a determination of protective equipment to be worn by soldiers. However, several other decisions concerning alarm placement and automatic masking criteria will be required as part of the analysis. The brigade will conduct a process called vulnerability assessment and risk reduction. The vulnerability assessment is an estimate of the impact of an enemy NBC attack. It occurs prior and after initiation of NBC warfare. This assessment will be used in conjunction with METT-T information to determine acceptable means of reducing force vulnerability.

b **Collective Protection** Collective protection addresses the uses of shelters to provide a contamination-free environment for selected portions of the force.

c **Individual protection** involves those actions taken by individual soldiers to survive and continue the mission under NBC conditions.

(1) **MOPP** A soldier's mission-oriented protection posture (MOPP) gear protects against NBC contamination. It consists of the overgarment, maskhood, overboots, protective gloves.

(2) **Individual decontaminants, detection equipment, and antidotes.**

3 **DECONTAMINATION** The third fundamental of NBC defense is decontamination. It is the reduction of the contamination hazard by removal or neutralization of hazardous levels of NBC contamination on personnel and material.

4 Before soldiers can protect themselves against NBC hazards, they must first know what individual protection equipment is available and its capabilities.

a **Battledress Overgarment (BDO)** The BDO is a woodland or desert camouflage, expendable overgarment consisting of a coat and trousers. The overgarment material consists of an outer layer of nylon-cotton and an inner layer of charcoal-impregnated polyurethane foam. Due to heavy impregnation of charcoal, some charcoal may be deposited on skin and clothing under the BDO, however, this will not detract from the BDO's chemical protection nor harm the wearer. The BDO comes sealed in a vapor-

APPENDIX 8 (NBC PRINCIPLES) TO ANNEX J 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

barrier bag that protects against rain, moisture, and sunlight. The BDO is water resistant, but not water proof and is normally worn as an outer garment. The BDO is normally worn over the duty uniform, however, in high temperatures it may be worn over underwear.

(1) Protection Capabilities. The BDO provides protection against vapors, liquid droplets, biological agents, toxins, and alpha and beta particles. When the BDO is worn and uncontaminated, its protective qualities last for 30 days. It is recommended that the BDO be replaced after 30 days but, the commander may extend the wear time when necessary. Wear time for the BDO begins when it is removed from its sealed bag, and stops when the BDO is sealed back in its vapor-barrier bag. If the original vapor-barrier bag is not available, return the BDO to a similar bag and seal with duct tape. Donning of the BDO regardless of the time, equals a day of wear. The BDO provides a minimum of 24 hrs of protection against exposure to liquid and vapor agents. Exchange the BDO within 24 hours of exposure to a liquid agent.

(2) Serviceability. The BDO becomes unserviceable if it is ripped, torn, fastener broken or missing, or petroleum, oils, or lubricants are spilled or splashed on the garment. For example, POL spills on a BDO sleeve or trouser legs soak through the BDO material, replace the BDO. Further, the BDO remains serviceable if the vapor-barrier bag suffers damage (i.e., pinholes, rips, tears), provided that the garment has not been physically damaged or exposed to water, POL spills, or chemical agents. When any packaging leak are discovered seal /repair them as soon as possible.

b. Chemical Protective Overgarment (CPOG). The CPOG is a woodland or desert camouflage, expendable overgarment consisting of a coat and trousers. The overgarment material consists of an outer layer of nylon cotton and an inner layer of charcoal impregnated polyurethane foam. Due to heavy impregnation of charcoal, some charcoal may be deposited on skin and clotting under the CPOG, however, this will not detract from the CPOG chemical protection nor harm the wearer. The CPOG comes sealed in a vapor-barrier bag that protects against rain, moisture, and sunlight. The CPOG is water resistant, but not water proof and is normally worn as an outer garment. The CPOG is normally worn over the duty uniform, however, in high temperatures it may be worn over underwear.

(1) Protection Capabilities. The CPOG provides protection against vapors, liquid droplets, biological agents, toxins, and alpha and beta particles. When the CPOG is worn and uncontaminated, its protective qualities last for 14 days. It is recommended that the CPOG be replaced after 14 days but, the commander may extend the wear time when necessary. Wear time for the CPOG begins when it is removed from its sealed bag, and stops when the CPOG is sealed back in its vapor-barrier bag. If the original vapor-barrier bag is not available, return the CPOG to a similar bag and seal with duct tape. Donning of the CPOG regardless of the time, equals a day of wear. The CPOG provides a minimum of 6 hrs of protection against exposure to liquid and vapor agents. Exchange the CPOG within 6 hours of exposure to a liquid agent.

APPENDIX 8 (NBC PRINCIPLES) TO ANNEX J 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(2) *Serviceability* The CPOG becomes unserviceable if it is ripped, torn, fastener broken or missing, or petroleum, oils, or lubricants are spilled or splashed on the garment. For example, POL spills on a CPOG sleeve or trouser legs soak through the CPOG material, replace the CPOG. Further, the CPOG remains serviceable if the vapor-barrier bag suffers damage (i.e., pinholes, rips, tears), provided that the garment has not been physically damaged or exposed to water, POL spills, or chemical agents. When any packaging leaks are discovered, seal/repair them as soon as possible.

c *Chemical Protective Glove Set* The glove set consists of an outer glove for protection and an inner glove for perspiration absorption. The outer gloves are made of an impermeable, black butyl rubber. The inner gloves are made of thin, white, cotton. These inner gloves can be worn on either hand. If either outer glove is punctured or torn, replace the pair of gloves. When engaged in heavy work during cold weather, soldiers should wear standard work gloves or black shells over the butyl rubber gloves to protect them from damage.

(1) *Protection Capabilities* The glove protects against liquid chemical agents and vapor hazards as long as they remain serviceable. Brigade soldiers typically wear 14 or 25 mil gloves which must be decontaminated or replaced within 24 hours after exposure. The contaminated glove may be decontaminated with a 5% bleach and water solution and reused indefinitely as long as they remain serviceable.

(2) *Serviceability* Exposure of the rubber to DS2, breakfree, anti-seize compound or any other petroleum-based products attack the gloves rubber polymers and makes them very sticky. Avoid contact with these materials if possible. Determine serviceability by submerging air-filled glove in water and while squeezing, examine for bubbles to escape or by examining water-filled glove to see if water escapes while squeezing. If contents escape, the glove is unserviceable.

d *Chemical Overboots and Green Vinyl Overboots* Either the black chemical overboots or the green vinyl overboots are available to protect soldiers from NBC agents, rain, and mud.

(1) *Protection Capabilities* Overboots will protect soldiers from contamination of all known agents, vectors, and radiological particles for a minimum of 14 days. Protection continues past fourteen days provided the overboot remains serviceable. Wearing the overboots with combat boots underneath provides 24 hours of protection against all known agents following contamination. Decontaminate the overboot with a 5% bleach and water solution.

(2) *Serviceability* Inspect overboots regularly to ensure their integrity is maintained, and replace if cracks, tears, or punctures are found. Continuous contact with DS2 (decontamination compound) or other petroleum based products will over time degrade its protection capability.

e *Protective Mask* Various models of protective mask exist. The primary

APPENDIX 8 (NBC PRINCIPLES) TO ANNEX J 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

protective mask used within the Brigade is the M40. Decontamination consists of hot soapy water. Canister filters were not designed for changes in a contaminated environment. Thus soldiers must perform maintenance in an "all clear" area.

ANNEX K (STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE) TO 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE TACSOP

1 REFERENCES

- a FM 3-19-40, Interment/Resettlement (I/R) Operations, 1 AUG 01
- b FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare
- c AR 190-8, OPNAVINST 3461 6, AFJI 31-304, MCO 3461.1, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 OCT 1997
- d FM 19-60, Confinement and Correctional Treatment of US Military Prisoners

2 GENERAL This appendix prescribes procedures for legal operations in field operations. These procedures pertain to all captured or detained persons in the custody of US forces within this command. Legal procedures for US military confinement operations are listed in item #7.

3 OPERATIONS The Staff Judge Advocate has the following responsibilities/duties while engaged in operations:

- a Provides the Brigade Commander with advise on legal matters pertaining to his command
- b Advises subordinate units on legal matters pertinent to their commands
- c Supervises the preparation of all court-martial and administrative discharges in the Brigade
- d Processes non-judicial punishment administered within the Brigade
- e Renders limited legal assistance to members of the Brigade

4 CLAIMS

a Unit Claims Officers Pursuant to para 2-4b, AR 27-2-, each unit will appoint a unit claims officer in order to process and investigate claims under AR 27-20.

b Administrative Supervision Unit claims officers will obtain advise of the SJA in the event an unusual type of claim is submitted or when difficulties are encountered in connection with claim investigation or reports of damage which may give rise to claims.

c Legal Assistance The Legal Assistance section of the supporting Staff Judge Advocate will provide legal assistance, advice and consultation for individuals and commanders in the 800th Military Police Brigade. Permission to consult with the SJA must be obtained through Command channels.

ANNEX K (STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE) TO 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE TACSOP

5 HANDLING OF CAPTURED PERSONS

a All captured persons will be treated as EPW and extended the full protections of GPW until a competent Tribunal can determine their status

b Upon designation from the Commander, USCENTCOM, the Commander, 800th MP Brigade shall appoint Tribunals pursuant to Article 5, Geneva Convention, EPW, to determine the status of all captured persons whose status is otherwise in doubt

c The Tribunal shall conduct a hearing to resolve the status issue IAW CENTCOM REG 27-13 The captured person shall receive notice of this hearing in his native language and shall have an opportunity to be heard The captured person may have a representative assist him at the hearing and may cross-examine witnesses or otherwise challenge evidence against him The decision of the Tribunal at the conclusion of this hearing is final, subject to a review for legal sufficiency per para 5 below

d Upon determining their status, the captured persons will be handled as described below

(1) EPW will be maintained in US custody until released from US custody or repatriated

(2) Civil defendants will be turned over to the appropriate civil authorities

(3) Civilian internees will be maintained in US custody until released or repatriated They will be segregated from EPW and interred in separate enclosures

(4) Innocent civilians will be released and returned to the place of their capture if requested

(5) The record of a Tribunal, which determined that a captured person is not to be accorded EPW status, shall be reviewed by the Brigade Judge Advocate's office If a record is found to be insufficient upon review, the individual concerned will be accorded EPW status, until such time as a competent Tribunal determines otherwise

6 ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW) & CIVILIAN INTERNEES (CI)

a The imposition of disciplinary sanctions and/or judicial proceedings against EPW or CI in the custody of US forces shall at all times comply with the express terms and implied tenor of Articles 82 - 108, GPW

b Disciplinary Sanctions

(1) Only Camp Commanders may impose disciplinary sanctions against EPW or CI

ANNEX K (STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE) TO 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
TACSOP

(2) Disciplinary sanctions against EPW or CI may be imposed for breaches of camp rules and minor violations of the UCMJ to maintain order and discipline in the camp

(3) Prior to imposing any disciplinary sanction against any EPW or CI, the Camp Commander concerned shall confer with the Chief, International Law at the Brigade Judge Advocate's office to insure that the proposed action and punishment is in compliance with Articles 88 and 89, GPW

(4) EPWs or CIs confined as part of their disciplinary punishment shall be housed in the camp confinement facility in the camp where they would otherwise reside

c Judicial Proceedings

(1) A court-martial convened against an EPW or CI shall follow the procedure described in Articles 99 - 108 GPW and the MCM. In the event that the operation of any procedure under both references are in direct conflict, the procedure outlined in GPW shall govern

(2) Only the Commander, 800th MP Bde shall convene a court-martial regarding any serious violation of the UCMJ alleged to have been committed by an EPW or CI. Only a Camp Commander may prefer court martial charges against EPW or CI who is in his custody

(3) Prior to preferring charges against an EPW or CI, the Internment Facility Commander shall confer with the Chief, Military Justice to insure the appropriateness of the contemplated action and charges. Upon the referral of charges to a court-martial, the Brigade Judge Advocate will notify the Protecting Power in accordance with Article 104, GPW

(4) EPW or CI sentenced to a term of confinement as part of their sentence upon conviction by court-martial shall be housed in the camp confinement facility, separated from others residing there due to disciplinary sanctions, until their sentence is approved by the Convening Authority. Thereafter, they shall be removed to the theater confinement facility

d War Crimes Committed by a Captured Person

(1) Allegations that a captured person committed a war crime shall be immediately referred to the intelligence assets at the camp where the person is located. Simultaneously, with this notification, contact shall be made with Corps Criminal Investigation Division (CID) assets

(2) Upon being named as a suspected war criminal, the captured person shall be identified as such in the Prisoner of War Information (PWIS) system and segregated from other detained persons until this issue is resolved. All suspected war criminals may be interred together

ANNEX K (STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE) TO 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE TACSOP

(3) After enhancement at the TEC/JIF and investigation by CID, if there is probable cause to believe that a war crime was committed by the subject, the IF Commander will be immediately notified. The Internment Facility Commander will thereafter contact the 800th MP BDE Staff Judge Advocate's office as soon as possible.

(4) The procedure for the administration of General court-martial in the MCM shall apply to the processing of all charges alleging the commission of a war crime.

(5) The Commander, 800th MP Brigade, as the GCMCA, shall refer all charges alleging the commission of a war crime to a War Crime Tribunal that he shall appoint. Prior to referring the charges to such a tribunal, he shall notify the theater commander.

(6) Upon the referral of an allegation of a war crime to a War Crime Tribunal, the Brigade Judge Advocate will notify the Protecting Power in accordance with Article 104, GPW.

7 US CONFINEMENT LEGAL PROCEDURES

a Non-Judicial Punishment

(1) The Commander, 800th MP Bde (I/R), has withheld the authority to impose non-judicial punishment pursuant to Article 15 UCMJ for all senior NCOs (E-8 and above) and all officers assigned/attached to the Brigade.

(2) All other US personnel against whom non-judicial punishment is being considered shall be administered to by the commander at the appropriate level of their chain of command (either company grade or field grade), depending upon the circumstances of the individual case.

(3) Prior to offering any soldier an Article 15, the Commander concerned shall confer with the Chief, Military Justice at the Brigade Judge Advocate's office to insure the appropriateness of the selected course of action and correctness of the proposed charges.

b Court-Martial

(1) The Commander, 800th MP Bde is the General court-martial Convening Authority (GCMCA). Each subordinate battalion commander is a Summary Courts - Martial Convening Authority (SCMCA). All matters deemed appropriate for trial by Special court-martial shall be so referred on the order of the GCMCA.

(2) The procedure for the administration of all courts-martial will be as described in the MCM.

ANNEX K (STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE) TO 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
TACSOP

(3) *Commanders contemplating the preferring of court-martial charges shall confer with the Chief, Military Justice, at the Brigade Judge Advocate's office as soon as possible. No charges will be preferred prior to this contact.*

(4) *Soldiers confined to a term of confinement as part of their sentence upon conviction by court-martial shall not be transported to the theater confinement facility until the Convening Authority approves the sentence.*

c War Crimes

(1) *Allegations that any US service member has committed a war crime shall be immediately referred to the Corps CID assets for investigation.*

(2) *Upon completion of the investigation by CID, if there is probable cause to believe that a war crime was committed by the accused, the accused service member's commander will be immediately notified. The affected commander shall thereafter confer with the Chief, International Law at the Brigade Judge Advocate's office as soon as possible.*

(3) *If judicial action is deemed appropriate, the allegation of the war crime will be prosecuted as any other serious violation of the UCMJ by way of a court-martial. Such a court-martial shall be convened by the procedures established in the MCM.*

ANNEX L (OPERATIONS SECURITY) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1. REFERENCES

- a AR 530-1, Operations Security
- b AR 530-4, Control of Compromising Emanations
- c TRADOC Pamphlet 526-6, Operational Security

2. GENERAL

a Purpose To define the concept of OPSEC and the responsibilities for implementing OPSEC within the 800th MP Bde (EPW/CI)

b Applicability These procedures and responsibilities are applicable to units assigned or attached to the 800th MP Bde (EPW/CI)

3. DEFINITIONS

a OPSEC is the protection of military operations. This results from the identification, elimination or control of intelligence indicators, that are susceptible to hostile exploitation. It denies the enemy knowledge of planned, on-going, or completed operations. The principle sub-elements of OPSEC are Physical Security, Information Security, Signal Security, Deception, and Counter-surveillance activities.

b Physical Security is the protection of military personnel, equipment, facilities, materials, and documents from unauthorized disclosure. This is done through safeguarding, and the use of barriers or devices, which deny, limit, or alert friendly personnel to hostile attempts at access. This protection is provided by limiting access to areas using guards, security forces, challenge and password, LP/OPs, patrols, laying wire obstacles, practicing convoy security, and other such methods.

c Information Security is the protection provided for military information to prevent unauthorized disclosure. This is enhanced by briefing all personnel on S AEDA, limiting operations information to persons with a need-to-know, special handling of classified documents and waste, briefing troops at the lowest possible level, enforcing noise and light discipline, and refraining from posting information where it can be seen.

d Signal Security is the protection of military information by practicing COMSEC and electronics security (ELSEC) techniques. SIGSEC relates to the measures used with communications emitters and includes the use of operations codes, secure equipment, proper radio-telephone procedures, enforcing radio net discipline. ELSEC relates to the protective measures used with non-communications emitters and includes keeping radar turned off when not in use as well as masking radar signals.

e Deception and Counter-surveillance

ANNEX L (OPERATIONS SECURITY) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(1) Deception includes tactics and techniques which either mislead or confuse hostile forces about current and future friendly activities; prevents friendly stereotyped (patterned) activities, causes a delay in hostile response to friendly actions, or which exploits hostile knowledge of friendly activities or capabilities

(2) Counter-surveillance is security techniques designed to prevent or decrease hostile observation of friendly operations. It includes techniques of camouflage and smoke, and the use of ruses, decoys, demonstrations, and security forces

4 RESPONSIBILITIES

a Commanders In discharging responsibilities for security, commanders will establish OPSEC programs, which will include

(1) Conducting OPSEC analysis, based on mission and established OPSEC files, and review the hostile intelligence threat

(2) Conducting threat and OPSEC awareness briefings. Conduct specific threat and countermeasures briefing prior to deployment

(3) Ensuring that OPSEC annexes are included in operations orders and plans

(4) Ensuring that OPSEC is planned and used in operations with an evaluation of OPSEC effectiveness conducted at the conclusion of each operation

b S-1

(1) Ensures OPSEC countermeasures are considered in all personnel actions.

(2) Coordinations with MI units for debriefing of recovered US and allied prisoners of war

(3) Screens unit information released to public information agencies to ensure adherence to information security

c S-2

(1) The unit's specialist on intelligence and counterintelligence

(2) Provides all source evaluations of the threat posed by hostile collection capabilities

(3) Defines the protection required to safeguard information concerning operations activities

ANNEX L (OPERATIONS SECURITY) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(4) Assists and advises in operations pertinent to all intelligence and tactical counterintelligence aspects of OPSEC

(5) Assists the S-3 prepare Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI), vulnerability studies, and countermeasures employed by the units in support of OPSEC plans

d S-3

(1) Exercises primary responsibility of OPSEC functions through coordination with other staff sections

(2) Disseminates guidance regarding OPSEC policy and procedures

(3) Integrates intelligence and counterintelligence aspects of OPSEC into planning and operations with the S-2

(4) Reviews operational plans, reports, and activities to ensure consideration of OPSEC implications

(5) Recommends EEFI Use Appendix 1 as a guide

(6) Coordinates the development of countermeasures, through the implementation of the OPSEC Program (Appendix 2)

(7) Prepares the OPSEC Annex to the OPORD based on the mission and activity in conjunction with the S-2

e S-4

(1) Ensures that the actions taken in support of an operation or activity do not compromise the mission

(2) Procures of counterintelligence materials

f Communications-Electronics (CE) Staff Officer

(1) Plans and implements OPSEC countermeasures for unit signal communications See Appendix 3

(2) Identifies all C-E equipment, which holds, processes or transmits classified or sensitive information

(3) Identifies and correct TEMPEST hazards

ANNEX L (OPERATIONS SECURITY) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(4) Provides COMSEC aids, call signs, and frequencies, specific procedures, modes of transmission, and type of traffic.

(5) Evaluates the probable consequences of electronic warfare (EW) directed against friendly communications

g Individuals All the information hostile collectors gather on friendly forces develops a profile with which he can more easily and accurately determine friendly intentions Every soldier is responsible for maintaining operations security

5 OPSEC SURVEY (Annex T, Appendix 4, Tab D)

a OPSEC surveys are conducted to identify patterns of operational event sequences and to assess their vulnerability to hostile exploitation The survey contributes to the OPSEC data base and yields recommendations on the use of countermeasures

b The survey addresses the application of OPSEC protective measures and recommends countermeasures for weaknesses and vulnerabilities General areas that can be evaluated include

- (1) Information/Personnel Security
- (2) Communications Security
- (3) Physical Security
- (4) Logistical Security
- (5) Personal Knowledge of OPSEC

c An OPSEC survey look at the activities in the unit from an enemy standpoint and reports vulnerabilities

APPENDIXES

1 - EEFI

2 - SIGSEC Program

APPENDIX 1 (ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION) TO ANNEX L (OPERATIONS SECURITY) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 Essential Elements of Friendly Information List of the specific aspects of the operation, which must be withheld from the enemy Most military operations can be subdivided into four phases, planning, preparation, execution, and operation (although in some cases, two or more phases may take place simultaneously). The preparation phase is a particularly important source of the enemy's prior knowledge EEFI, which cannot be denied the enemy, such as departure of ships, aircraft, and personnel from bases believed to be under enemy surveillance, should be immediately identified for possible deception exploitation Some Essential Elements of Friendly Information, which must be safeguarded, are

a PLANNING PREPARATION EXECUTION AAR PHASE

- (1) The Corps Mission and geographic area of operation
- (2) Task organizations and deployment date relating to the objective area.
- (3) Actual order of battle information of foreign countries
- (4) Reference to objective area maps in conjunction with exercise designation
- (5) Friendly operational plans, objective or intentions, to include all supporting operations
- (6) Grid coordinates or grid zone designators which can be associated with real world locations in the operational area of interest
- (7) Electronic warfare capabilities, effectiveness or plans
- (8) Locations of tactical coordination points such as checkpoints, boundaries, phase lines, and friendly lines
- (9) Status of tactical training, combat readiness or capabilities, or participating units/forces
- (10) Any information which would establish or tend to establish an XVIII - Corps contingency operational interest in the objective area
- (11) Rules of engagement or any other constraints on the operation, to include political considerations
- (12) Air transportation support for deployment and operations
- (13) Limitations to personnel and equipment, re-supply and support programs
- (14) Collection requirements and priority intelligence requirements

APPENDIX 1 (ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION) TO
ANNEX L (OPERATIONS SECURITY) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(15) All lines of communications that supply food, ammunition, and fuel

APPENDIX 2 (SIGSEC PROGRAM) TO ANNEX L (OPERATIONS SECURITY) TO
800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 REFERENCE FM 32-5, Signal Security

2 General SIGSEC is the protection afforded by the use of measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value which could be obtained from the possession or interception and analysis of communications and non-communications electromagnetic radiation systems, equipment or documents

3 OBJECTIVES

a To establish an effective SIGSEC program for units of the 800th MP Bde (EPW/CI)

b Define SIGSEC responsibilities throughout the command.

c Provide for training of communications equipment operators in the proper SIGSEC measures and technique

d To increase the level of awareness of SIGSEC by all personnel in this command and of the consequences of poor SIGSEC techniques

4 RESPONSIBILITIES SIGSEC is a command responsibility

a S-2

(1) In conjunction with the Brigade Communications Officer Electronics, keep the command apprised of the Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) threat posed by the opposing forces

(2) Conduct periodic inspections of areas vulnerable to SIGINT

b S-3 As the OPSEC proponent ensure that SIGINT is incorporated into all operations, plans, orders, and field training exercises

c Communications Electronics Officer

(1) Prepare command SIGSEC program

(2) Ensure that appropriate and sufficient COMSEC devices are on hand

(3) Develop and monitor a SIGSEC program for individuals that enhances

(a) Defense against radio intrusion and jamming

(b) Implement of emergency SOI materials

APPENDIX 2 (SIGSEC PROGRAM) TO ANNEX L (OPERATIONS SECURITY) TO
800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(c) Use of encryption/decryption tables and OPCODEs

d Individual Soldiers.

(1) Properly use radio telephone procedures

(2) Properly use SOI encryption and authentication tables, OPCODEs, and MIJI reporting format IAW the SOI supplement instructions.

(3) Report SIGSEC violations through chain of command

ANNEX M (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL The Brigade Public Affairs Office will be responsible for all matters pertaining to the dissemination of command information, the conduct of media relations, the handling of press inquiries and the escort of press representatives. The section is comprised of an officer in charge, and NCOIC and a photojournalist. The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) reports to the Brigade Deputy Commander and the Brigade Commander. PA section members will emphasize, in all phases, the minimizing of civilian and military media interference with military operations by strictly controlling media access to units and individuals within the AO. PA will also contribute to the morale and welfare of soldiers in the AO by gaining access to media outlets and promoting information that aids the soldier in living in their environment. The PA will coordinate with the G-2 to inform soldiers, DOD civilians and government contractors of their responsibilities for OPSEC and their responsibilities as representatives of their command when interacting with the media.

2 RESPONSIBILITIES

a The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) will

- (1) Be responsible for internal operations of the section
- (2) Report media request/activity to the Brigade Commander
- (3) Coordinate a media day for press personnel
- (4) Coordinate all press contacts and media visits
- (5) Clear and approve requests for coverage/observation of exercise operations
- (6) Approve and disseminate press releases
- (7) Ensure a brigade newsletter is prepared and distributed on a weekly basis
- (8) Establish and coordinate relations with the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) Combined Joint Information Bureau (CJIB) Media Center, Public Affairs Operations Center or other centralized Public Affairs operational entity
- (9) Compile a reading file for the commander
- (10) Prepare and present briefings as required
- (11) Is the official spokesperson for the brigade
- (12) Manage the Community Outreach Program for the Brigade
- (13) Manages Hometown News Release program for brigade

ANNEX M (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

b Public Affairs NCOIC will

- (1) Be responsible for the daily administrative functions of the Public Affairs office
- (2) Act as editor of all brigade newsletters, news releases, and feature stories
- (3) Assign and coordinate news releases, stories and establish deadlines
- (4) Responsible for training section subordinates
- (5) Responsible for gathering and disseminating Hometown News Releases

c The Photojournalist will

- (1) Prepare news releases, write feature stories, and other assignments as assigned
- (2) Maintain and operate photographic equipment
- (3) Produce photo essays

3 REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE Requests for assistance by the PAO will be prioritized based on visibility and urgency, and handled according to priority

4 The Brigade PAO will forward stories pertaining to brigade personnel to the Third US Army PAO at the discretion of the commander

5 SUBORDINATE UNIT REQUIREMENTS

- a Public affairs or Commander's representative will prepare an internment facility newsletter once a week for the local troop population, in cooperation with the S-2 staff, as required by the theater PAO
- b Support Hometown News Release program unit PA reps will collect and provide HNRs to brigade PAO as deemed necessary
- c NO interviews will be given to members of the media nor will access to the compound be grant without express consent of the Brigade Commander Prisoners will not be photographed or interviewed

6 STAFF SECTION REQUIREMENTS

a Section chiefs and special staff have the responsibility to ensure that all media inquiries and events are brought to the attention of the brigade PAO

b Command information will be made available by the section chiefs, and special staff to the brigade PAO as necessary

c Any media inquiries relating to brigade personnel will be coordinated with the brigade PAO

ANNEX O (CHAPLAIN/UNIT MINISTRY TEAM) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

1 REFERENCES

- a AR 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the United States Army
- b AR 165-20, Duties of Chaplains and Responsibilities of Commanders
- c FM 16-1, Religious Support
- d FM 16-5, The Chaplain & Chaplain Assistant in Combat Operations
- e FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations
- f Joint Pub 1-05, Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations
- g DA Pam 600-75, Accommodating Religious Practices
- h AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1 OCT 97
- i DA PAM 27-1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare, December 1956
- j Point Paper, 2 January 2002, Muslim Burial Procedures by CH (LTC) Gary Danielsen – ARCENT HQ

2 GENERAL

- a This Annex prescribes policies, procedures, and general guidance for the operation of the 800th MP Bde Chaplain Section for tactical operations
- b Concept of Personnel Support This SOP outlines basic administration, logistical, religious and professional procedures for the chaplain section
- c The 800th MP Bde Chaplains assist and advise the commander on all matters pertaining to religion, morals, and morale as affected by religion Also, serve as functional staff members who provide ministry to soldiers in combat environment
 - (1) The 800th MP Bde Chaplains will work within the Brigade's SOP so as not to impede the Brigade in accomplishing its mission
 - (2) The Chaplains must be aware of the overall plans for the unit in provision of ministry for that unit By knowing what a unit will be doing, where it will be and when it will be there, the Chaplain will integrate plans for ministry to soldiers of the 800th MP Bde into the unit's operations plan

ANNEX O (CHAPLAIN/UNIT MINISTRY TEAM) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(3) Chaplains will coordinate all religious coverage plans through the commander, and his staff. The chain of command will inform soldiers as to the availability of religious services and activities.

(4) The 800th MP Bde Staff Chaplain has the responsibility to assure the availability of personnel and equipment within the Brigade Chaplain Section and that they and the equipment are utilized to provide maximum religious coverage to the soldiers within the 800th MP Bde.

3 RELIGIOUS SERVICES

ε - Religious services will be conducted on Sundays and on weekdays as operations permit. Chaplains assigned to the 800th MP Bde will provide services for members of his or her religious denomination and will provide non-denominational services to accommodate the right of each soldier to free expression of religion in the event that Chaplains of other faiths are not available.

b The Brigade Chaplain will maintain liaison with the senior chaplain in the area of operations. Any changes in the Task Organization will be reported to him as soon as possible.

c Chaplains assigned to the 800th MP Bde will operate under the supervision of the Staff Chaplain, or his designated representative.

4 PASTORAL CARE

a Assigned Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) will spend time visiting troops.

b Assigned chaplains will be available for both individual and group counseling.

c Coverage for personnel who are hospitalized or in confinement will be provided as operations permit.

d When operations allow, the chaplain may organize study and discussion groups for all major faith groups.

e Letters to families of deceased or seriously wounded personnel should not be sent until the Brigade Chaplain has been notified by the Commander or Brigade S-1 that the proper casualty reporting procedures have been followed IAW AR 600-10.

f Assigned chaplains will be aware of and will respond to the religious and spiritual needs of all soldiers in their AOR.

g Pastoral coverage for EPW/CIs, detained personnel, refugees, and the local populace will be coordinated through the Brigade Chaplain, civilian religious leaders, the Brigade S-2 and S-3, and the TUSA G-5.

ANNEX O (CHAPLAIN/UNIT MINISTRY TEAM) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

h Provisions for religious retreats for all major faith groups will be made when the operation allows

5 SPECIAL STAFF ACTIVITIES FOR THE COMMANDER

a Administration The Brigade Chaplain will supervise the personnel in his section, attend staff meetings, and implement command orders and policies as they affect religious programs of the command

(1) Casualties and emergencies will be reported to the S-1 who should notify the Brigade Chaplain. The Brigade Chaplain will communicate the information to Chaplain of the next higher headquarters immediately

(2) Requests for baptism, marriage and funerals will be forwarded through the Brigade Chaplain. The Brigade Chaplain is responsible for tracking and maintaining all UMT Reports

b Operations The Brigade Chaplain will

(1) Provide the Commander a Religious Support Plan that supports all current missions

(2) Ensure all UMTs are mission capable, and comply with readiness procedures and load plans

c The Brigade Chaplain ensures all UMTs utilize all available communications to provide ministry to their units

d The Brigade Chaplain will ensure that assigned chaplains establish communications with chaplains of higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters, as well as, civilian churches and religious organizations. The Brigade Chaplains will also provide liaison with the Family Support Group (FSG) and rear detachment

6 DENOMINATIONAL ACTIVITIES Denominational services, pastoral care, and religious education programs will be provided on an area coverage basis as the operations allows

7 FUNDS A chaplain's fund will not be established in the AO. Therefore, taking offerings during operations is prohibited

APPENDIX 1 (DETAINEE BURIAL PROCEDURES) TO ANNEX O
(CHAPLAIN/UNIT MINISTRY TEAM) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL

a. Deceased detainees will be buried IAW AR 190-8, unless guidance from higher headquarters directs otherwise. Deceased detainees will be buried honorably in a cemetery established for them according to AR 638-30. They will be buried, if possible, according to the rites of their religion and customs of their military force.

b. Detainees will be buried individually and the use of mass graves is allowable only as a last resort.

c. A detainee's body may be cremated only due to imperative hygiene reasons, the detainee's religion, or the detainee's specific request. Ashes will be maintained by Graves Registration until proper disposal can be decided according to the wishes of the detainee's country of citizenship.

2 MUSLIM BURIAL PRACTICES

a. In general, US forces attempt to accommodate the religious practices of military personnel and those persons in the care of the US military personnel. This guidance is informational in nature. This document is not intended to be a definitive explanation of burial practices for Muslims of all sects.

b. A Muslim must be buried within 24 hours of death, in a grave that is 6 feet in depth with the head facing Mecca and marked with a stone above the head. A death certificate should be issued and the family notified as soon as possible.

c. A Muslim, should if at all possible, should perform the burial and associated tasks. Most Muslims know the practices and can perform the burial services. An Imam does not have to be involved.

d. Preparation of the Body

(1) Pressure is applied upon the abdomen to expel any gases.

(2) The body is completely washed and rinsed with soap and water in the following way: First, the right arm and side is washed downward, front and back, to the right leg and foot. Second, this procedure is then repeated for the left side. Third, the head is washed last. Shites will perform this washing three times.

(3) After the body is washed, it is rubbed with "Kafoud," a pleasant smelling substance.

(4) The body is then wrapped with three pieces of white cloth. The first cloth is a wrap from the waist down to and including the feet and tied off with the remaining end. This procedure is repeated with the second cloth from the waist up to, and including the neck area. The third cloth wraps the face and head.

APPENDIX 1 (DETAINEE BURIAL PROCEDURES) TO ANNEX O
(CHAPLAIN/UNIT MINISTRY TEAM) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

5

e The Koran is read, including special prayers for the dead

f The cloth wrapped body is placed directly in the ground with the head pointing to Mecca. No casket or body bag is to be used since the wrapped body must touch the earth. Dirt is then put on top of the body to fill the grave.

ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 REFERENCES

- a FM 19-4, Military Police Combat Operations
- b FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations
- c AR 190-8, OPNAVINST 3461 6, AFJI 31-304, MCO 3461.1, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees
- d FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare
- e Consolidated TOE Update (CTU) 2000-04, Military Police Organizations

2 PURPOSE The annex prescribes the procedures used by the 800th MP Bde (EPW/CI) for Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW/CI) operations

3 GENERAL

a The EPW/CI mission is of humane as well as tactical importance Theater MPs secure, handle, account for, process and care for EPW/CI

b RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) The brigade commander is responsible for providing command & control, staff planning and supervision of EPW/CI operations by assigned and attached MP elements for the operation of the theater EPW/CI lfs

(2) Commanders of units at any echelon are responsible for the proper treatment, protection, accountability and sustainment of EPW/CIs in their custody

(3) Various types of units support EPW/CI operations These specific types of units, their missions and capabilities are identified in CTU 2000-04, Military Police Organizations

c EVACUATION

(1) Military Police Escort Guards go forward to Corps Holding areas and escort EPW/CI to Internment Facilities

(2) They perform the following actions for efficient evacuation

(a) If available, prior dispatch of MP escort guard companies (MTOE 10-47) to each supported corps enhances TUSA evacuation efforts

(2) All EPW/CIs will be promptly evacuated to the rear

ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(3) Transportation of EPW/CIs should not interfere with tactical movements of US or allied troops

(4) Backhaul is the primary means of transport of EPW to the Theater IF

(5) Allow EPW/CIs to retain personnel property, to include chemical protective outer garments, chemical protective masks, OCIE, i.e. blankets, canteens, helmets, sleeping mats, and other items which do not pose a threat

(6) MPs ensure that the proper paperwork (DA Form 4137, DD Form 515 and DD Form 2708) is complete before captives are evacuated. These forms are available on the internet at www.usapa.army.mil. If necessary, a DD Form 2708 (annotated with the number of prisoners) and a manifest will suffice. Do not expose captives to unnecessary danger, and protect them while they are awaiting evacuation.

(7) EPW/CIs may be evacuated directly to an EPW/CI IF bypassing the Corps Holding Area if circumstances permit.

(8) EPW/CI litter patients are evacuated through medical channels.

d. PROCESSING/RECEIVING

(1) All EPW/CIs are

(a) Searched for concealed weapons, equipment and documents of intelligence value

(b) Segregated by officer, NCOs, sex, nationality and ideology

(c) Medically segregated as walking wounded/sick or non-walking wounded/sick

(2) All EPW/CIs are counted and receipted for upon arrival at the Corps EPW/CI Holding Area. See Appendix 1 for processing flowchart.

(3) A receipt for the EPW/CI (Receipt for Inmate or Detained Person-DD Form 2708, more than one prisoner may be listed on each form) and any accompanying documents, and equipment signed for on an Evidence/Property Custody document (DA Form 4137) by the commander of the escort guard company. See Appendix 2.

(4) The capturing unit completes DA Form 5976, Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag. DA Form 5976 should agree with DA Form 4137.

(5) Except for weapons and documents of intelligence value, EPW/CI are allowed, pending arrival at a EPW/CI camp in COMMZ, to retain personal property, protective gear, helmet, NBC gear, etc, and personal effects in their possession at capture.

ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(6) See FM 3-19-40, Chapters 3-5 for specifications on processing and receiving

e ADMINISTRATION The following guidelines are applicable to the administration of Internment Facilities

(1) EPW/CIs are used for the internal administration and operations, whenever possible.

(2) Maximum use is made of captured equipment and supplies

(3) Retained medical personnel and EPW/CIs with medical training are used in caring for their own sick and wounded

(4) See FM 3-19-40, Chapter 4 for specifications on administration

g INTERNMENT FACILITIES (IFs) IFs are constructed with the support of the Theater ENCOM and are

(1) Intended to hold EPW/CIs indefinitely, METT-T determines how long EPW/CIs will be held before repatriation

(2) Close to evacuation routes

(3) Close to supply facilities

(4) Near emergency medical care

(5) Protected from enemy activity

(6) In existing buildings, if available

(7) See Annex I, Service Support, for specifications on Camp Construction, Bill of Materials (BOM) and logistical requirements to support EPW/CI operations

APPENDIXES


1 - EPW/CI Flow Chart

2 - Sample Forms (DD Form 515, DD Form 2708, DD Form 2745, and DA Form 4137)

3 - Policy, Forms, and the Preparation of Forms for Evacuating, Processing, and Interning Captives

4 - Transfer EPW Procedures

APPENDIX 1 (EPW/CI FLOW CHART) TO ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR)
TO THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP



APPENDIX 2 (SAMPLE FORMS, DD FORM 515, DD FORM 2708, DD FORM 2745 & DA FORM 4137) TO ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

RECEIPT FOR INMATE OR DETAINED PERSON		
1 RECEIVED FROM (Unit or Agency and Station)	2 TIME	3 DATE (YYYYMMDD)
4 INMATE NAME (Last First Middle)	5 SSN	6 GRADE
7 ORGANIZATION	8 STATION	
9 OFFENSE		
10 PERSONAL PROPERTY		
11 REMARKS		
12 NAME AND TITLE OF PERSON RECEIVING ABOVE INDIVIDUAL	13 SSN	14 GRADE
15 RECEIVING UNIT OR AGENCY AND STATION	16 SIGNATURE	
DD FORM 2708, NOV 1999		USAPA V1 00

APPENDIX 2 (SAMPLE FORMS, DD FORM 515, DD FORM 2708, DD FORM 2745 & DA FORM 4137) TO ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

**ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW)
CAPTURE TAG (PART A)**

For use of this form, see AF 13D-8.
The proponent agency is OCSOPB.

Attach this part of tag to EPW. (Do not remove from EPW.)

1. Search - For weapons, military documents, or special equipment.
2. Silence - Prohibit talking among EPWs for ease of control.
3. Segregate - By rank, sex, and nationality.
4. Safeguard - To prevent harm or escape.
5. Speed - Evacuate from the combat zone.
6. Tag - Prisoners and documents or special equipment.

DD FORM 2745 (BACK), MAY 68

1. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE 111300		E. SERIAL NO. 0090829		A	
3. NAME DD		D		4. DATE OF BIRTH 1205	
5. GRADE D		6. SERVICE NO. 123-45-6789			
7. UNIT OF ORG. 122D		41D		8. CAPTURING UNIT	
9. LOCATION OF CAPTURE (grid coordinates) B82456					
10. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE D D		11. PHYSICAL CON- DITION OF EPW D D		12. WEAPONS, EQUIP- MENT, DOCUMENTS B7D D D	

DD FORM 2745, MAY 68

REPLACES DA FORM 507E, JAN 61
USABLE UNTIL EXHAUSTED.

UNIT RECORD CARD (PART B)

Forward to Unit.
(Capturing unit retains for records.)

Use string, wire, or other durable material to attach the appropriate section of this form to the EPW's equipment or property.

DD FORM 2745 (BACK), MAY 68

1. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE 111300		E. SERIAL NO. 0090829		B	
3. NAME DD		D		4. DATE OF BIRTH 1205	
5. GRADE D		6. SERVICE NO. 123-45-6789			
7. UNIT OF ORG. 122D		41D		8. CAPTURING UNIT	
9. LOCATION OF CAPTURE (grid coordinates) B82456					
10. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE D D		11. PHYSICAL CON- DITION OF EPW D D		12. WEAPONS, EQUIP- MENT, DOCUMENTS B7D D D	

DD FORM 2745, MAY 68

REPLACES DA FORM 507E, JAN 61
USABLE UNTIL EXHAUSTED.

**DOCUMENT/SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
WEAPONS CARD (PART C)**

Attach this part of tag to property taken. (Do not remove from property.)

As a minimum, the tag must include the following information:

- Item 1. Date and time of capture (YYYYMMDD).
- Item 8. Capturing unit.
- Item 9. Place of capture (grid coordinates).
- Item 10. Circumstances of capture (how the EPW was captured).

DD FORM 2745 (BACK), MAY 68

1. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE 111300		E. SERIAL NO. 0090829		C	
3. NAME DD		D		4. DATE OF BIRTH 1205	
5. GRADE D		6. SERVICE NO. 123-45-6789			
7. UNIT OF ORG. 122D		41D		8. CAPTURING UNIT	
9. LOCATION OF CAPTURE (grid coordinates) B82456					
10. DESCRIPTION OF WEAPONS, SPECIAL EQUIPMENT, DOCUMENTS B7D					

DD FORM 2745, MAY 68

REPLACES DA FORM 507E, JAN 61
USABLE UNTIL EXHAUSTED.

Figure 3-1. Sample DD Form 2745

APPENDIX 2 (SAMPLE FORMS, DD FORM 515, DD FORM 2708, DD FORM 2745 & DA FORM 4137) TO ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

EVIDENCE/PROPERTY CUSTODY DOCUMENT		MPR/CID SEQUENCE NUMBER		
For use of this form see AR 190-45 and AR 195-5 the proponent agency is US Army Criminal Investigation Command		CRD REPORT/CID ROI NUMBER		
RECEIVING ACTIVITY		LOCATION		
NAME GRADE AND TITLE OF PERSON FROM WHOM RECEIVED <input type="checkbox"/> OWNER <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER		ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)		
LOCATION FROM WHERE OBTAINED	REASON OBTAINED	TIME/DATE OBTAINED		
ITEM NO	QUANTITY	DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES <i>(Include model serial number condition and unusual marks or scratches)</i>		
CHAIN OF CUSTODY				
ITEM NO	DATE	RELEASED BY	RECEIVED BY	PURPOSE OF CHANGE OF CUSTODY
		SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	
		NAME GRADE OR TITLE	NAME GRADE OR TITLE	
		SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	
		NAME GRADE OR TITLE	NAME GRADE OR TITLE	
		SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	
		NAME GRADE OR TITLE	NAME GRADE OR TITLE	
		SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	
		NAME GRADE OR TITLE	NAME GRADE OR TITLE	
		SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	
		NAME GRADE OR TITLE	NAME GRADE OR TITLE	

DA FORM 4137, 1 JUL 76

Replaces DA FORM 4137, 1 Aug 74 and DA FORM 4137 B, Privacy Act Statement, 28 Sep 75 Which are Obsolete

USAPPC V1 00

LOCATION _____

DOCUMENT NUMBER _____

APPENDIX 3 (POLICY, FORMS, AND THE PREPARATION OF FORMS FOR EVACUATING, PROCESSING, AND INTERNING CAPTIVES) TO ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 References

AR 37-36 Pay, Allowance, and Deposit and Personal Funds Prisoner of War and Civilian Internees
AR 40-5 Health and Environment
AR 40-66 Medical Record and Quantity Assurance Administration
AR 40-400 Patient Administration
AR 40-501 Standards of Medical Fitness
AR 55-355 Military Traffic Management Regulation
AR 65-75 Unit Mail Service
AR 190-8, OPNAVINST 3461 6, AFJI 31-304, MCO 3461 1, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, Retained Personnel and Other Detainees
AR 190-40 Serious Incident Report
AR 190-47 The US Army Correctional System
AR 310-25 Dictionary of United States Army Terms
AR 340-3 Official Mail
AR 350-216 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Convention IV of 1907
AR 355-15 Management Information Control Systems
AR 380-5 Department of the Army Information Security Program
AR 380-235 Enemy Prisoner of War and Civilian Internee Communication Censorship
AR 385 Series Army Safety Program
AR 600-8-1 Army Casualty and Memorial Affairs and Line of Duty Investigations
AR 600-25 Salutes, Honors, and Visits of Courtesy
AR 600-85 Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program
AR 638-30 Graves Registration Organization and Functions and Support of Major Military Operations
AR 638-40 Care and Disposition of Remains
AR 670-1 Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia
AR 735-11 Accounting for Lost, Damaged and Destroyed Property
DA PAM 27-1 Treaties Governing Land Warfare
FM 22-5 Drill and Ceremonies
Dictionary of Occupational Titles
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States 1984
Uniform Code of Military Justice

2 STANAGs REQUIRED

STANAG 2033 Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW)
STANAG 2044 Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War
STANAG 2070 Emergency War Burial Procedures
STANAG 2084 Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment Documents

APPENDIX 3 (POLICY, FORMS, AND THE PREPARATION OF FORMS FOR EVACUATING, PROCESSING, AND INTERNING CAPTIVES) TO ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

3 FORMS REQUIRED

DA 1131-R Prisoner's Cash Account - Personal Deposit Fund
DA 1132-R Prisoner's Personal Property List -
Personal Deposit Fund
DA 1594 Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log
DA 2662-R US Army EPW/CI Identify Card
DA 2663-R Fingerprint Card
DA 2664-R Weight Register (PW)
DA 2665-R Capture Card for PW
DA 2666-R PW Notification of Address
DA 2667-R PW Mail (letter)
DA 2668-R PW Post Card
DA 2669-R Certificate of Death
DA 2670-R Mixed Medical Commission Certificate for EPW/CI
DA 2671-R Certification of Direct Repatriation of EPW/CI
DA 2672-R Classification Questionnaire for Officer Retained Personnel
DA 2673-R Classification Questionnaire for Enlisted Retained Personnel
DA 2674-R Enemy Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee Strength Report
DA 2675-R Certificate of Work Incurred Injury or Disability
DA 2677-R US Army Civilian Internee Identity Card
DA 2678-R Civilian Internee National-Internment Card
DA 2679-R Civilian Internee Letter
DA 2680-R Civilian Internee National Post Card
DA 3161 Request for Issue for Turn-In
DA 4137 Evidence/Property Custody Document
DA 4237-R Detainee Personnel Record
DA 5367-R Personnel Status Report
DA 5451-R Certification of Need for Employment of Enemy Prisoner of War
DA 5452-R Contract of Labor of EPW/CI
DA 5452-1-R Instruction to Contractor
DA 497 Confinement Order
DD 551 Record of Interment I
DD 629 Receipt of Prisoner of Detained Person E

E = Evacuating, P = Processing, I = Interning

* Also used for processing at medical facilities

APPENDIX 3 (POLICY, FORMS, AND THE PREPARATION OF FORMS FOR EVACUATING, PROCESSING, AND INTERNING CAPTIVES) TO ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

4 PREPARATION REQUIRED

a Use DD Form 2708 to accept custody of captives and DA Form 4137 to account for property taken from captives during evacuation. When evacuating captives to the rear or transferring them to MI control or medical channels give escorts copies of both forms. Retain or forward one copy to PM operations section. These forms established positive accountability of captives and their property and can be used later to substantiate proper care and treatment. Give captives copies of receipts for property that is seized.

b Prepare an original and one copy of DA Form 4237-R, Detainee Personnel Record, the primary source document for administrative information about captives. Original stays at facility where captive is interned until released or repatriated, copy is forwarded through MP channels to Branch PWIC.

c Enter on the DA Form 4237-R, the ISN, name, rank, enemy service number, sex, date and place where prepared, date of capture, place of capture, capturing unit's identification code, country served, physical condition, and any information from his ID card.

d Prepare ID card, even if they have one issued by their government. DA Form 2662-R for EPW/CIs, DA Form 2677-R for CIs, DA Form 2672-R for officer EPW/CI claiming status as retained person.

e Prepare original and two copies of DA Form 1132, See AR 37-36 for discussion, Prisoner's Personal Property List – Personal Deposit Fund. original goes in captive's personnel files, one copy goes with impounded property, one copy goes to captive.

f Prepare two copies of DA Form 2663-R, Fingerprint Card. forward one to internment facility, one goes to Branch PWIC for classification. USES ADP fingerprint reading if available. Fill out administrative information, such as name and rank.

g Prepare one copy of DA Form 2664-R, Weight Register.

h Make weight, fingerprint, and photo entries on DA Form 2663-R and identity card.

i Attach one photo to DA Form 4237-R.

j Attach one photo to ID card.

k Laminate ID card after photo is attached and all entries made.

l List on DA Form 1132-R property returned to captive or kept during internment. Do not list any confiscated property on form.

APPENDIX 3 (POLICY, FORMS, AND THE PREPARATION OF FORMS FOR EVACUATING, PROCESSING, AND INTERNING CAPTIVES) TO ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

m Use DA Form 3161 to account for confiscated property, arms, ammunition, and equipment with intelligence value

n File with captive's supply records copies of DA Form 4137 or DA Form 3161 used to account for property during evacuation

o Use DA Form 1131-R, Prisoner's Cash Account - Personal Deposit Fund, to account for US currency found in possession of captives Turn-in form to supporting finance and accounting office

p Use DA Form 1132-R, Prisoner Personal Property List and Personal Deposit Fund, to account for currency, treat as property

q Captives prepare notification of capture card, DA Form 2665-R

r Captives prepare notification of address cards, DA Form 2665-R for EPW/CIs, DA Forms 2678-R for CIs, where they are interned

APPENDIX 4 (TRANSFER EPW/CI PROCEDURES) TO ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1. PURPOSE To provide guidance in establishing responsibilities for EPW/CI liaison teams in the event of transfer of EPW/CI in the custody of the Armed Forces of the United States (US) to the custody of the Armed Forces of the Host Nation (H/N) consistent with the requirements of reference "e" below, and in establishing accountability both at start, and as other EPW/CI status changes occur due to transfers to medical channels, casualties, and repatriation

2 REFERENCES Required publications are listed below

- a DOD Directive 5100.59 "DOD Enemy PW/Detainee Program"
- b AR 190-8, OPNAVINST 3461.6, AFJI 31-304, MCO 3461.1 Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees
- c Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
- d Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
- e Agreement on the Transfer of Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees between the Government of the United States of America and the Host Nation Government

3 POLICY

- a The United States, as signatory, is bound by the treaty provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and other requirements of international law pertaining to the conduct of EPW/CI operations
- b *The Armed Forces of the United States will comply with the Geneva Conventions that govern the treatment and accountability of EPW/CI and other detained persons*
- c Article 12 of the Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War and article 45 of the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War allow the transfer of EPW/CI among parties to the Convention
- d Detained Personnel accorded an appropriate legal status under international law may be transferred to or from custody of the Armed Forces of the United States, as authorized by the Geneva Conventions, upon the approval of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
- e EPW/CI transfer operations are conducted in accordance with agreements established between the H/N and the US

APPENDIX 4 (TRANSFER EPW/CI PROCEDURES) TO ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

f EPW/CIs captured and in custody of Allied Forces will be accepted by the US Forces and will be transferred to the custody of the H/N in the same manner as US captured EPW/CI

g The transfer of EPW/CI in the custody of the US to the custody of the H/N does not absolve the US of responsibility for accountability, safeguarding, and protecting their rights under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Although this responsibility is shared by both nations, with primary responsibility with the H/N and the residual responsibility with the US, it remains a vital interest of the United States.

h The agreement between the US and the H/N on the transfer of EPW/CI provides that US liaison officers will be assigned and have access to each internment facility for the purposes of logistic and administrative cooperation and for the collection of information on facilities, personnel and records of US transferred EPW/CI. Further, they will be allowed to conduct interrogations of EPW/CI.

4 RESPONSIBILITIES Commanders will safeguard, maintain, and ensure humane treatment for all EPW/CI taken into their custody. Upon transfer of EPW/CI from US custody to the custody of the H/N, this responsibility is shared by both countries.

a Upon determination that the transfer of EPW/CI in US custody is to be made to the H/N, US Liaison Teams will be designated for all facilities used by the H/N to intern EPW/CI transferred from the custody of the US to the custody of the H/N.

b US EPW/CI Internment Facilities will complete the processing of all EPW/CI captured by US Forces before their transfer to the H/N. This processing will include the following:

(1) Administrative processing to include the preparation of personnel records, medical records (to include weight at time of capture and time of transfer), fingerprint cards, identity cards and assignment of Internee Serial Numbers (ISN).

(2) Classification according to the Geneva Convention as enemy prisoner of war (EPW/CI), civilian internee (CI), Retained Personnel (RP), Other Detainees (OD) or displaced civilian (DC).

(3) Preparation of interrogation records containing any information obtained from the EPW/CI that pertains to the national interest of the H/N.

c The Transfer Roster will be prepared and will be provided to the H/N at the time of transfer for transfers at EPW/CI facilities or in medical channels. The Transfer Roster (Manifest) will include classification, name, grade, and Internee Serial Number (ISN).

APPENDIX 4 (TRANSFER EPW/CI PROCEDURES) TO ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

d The H/N Internment Facility commander, or H/N Medical Facility Commander if the EPW/CI is in Medical Channels, will have the primary responsibility for accountability, safeguarding, maintaining and ensuring humane treatment of all EPW/CI following their transfer of custody from the US. These responsibilities include

(1) Ensuring EPW/CI will be interned in H/N EPW/CI facilities, or medical facilities if appropriate, and segregated in enclosures, or medical wards, according to the requirements of the Geneva Conventions

(2) Recognition of the classifications assigned by US Forces before the transfer. Reclassification of US transferred EPW/CI /CI shall require the concurrence of the Commander, 800th MP BDE. Requests for reclassification shall be given sympathetic consideration by the Commander, 800th MP BDE. Request and the decisions will be in writing

(3) Notification to the 800th MP BDE, S-1 through the US Liaison Team about significant changes in US transferred EPW/CI status, including location, physical condition, death, place of burial, escape or recapture

(4) Mutual agreement, unless otherwise required by the Geneva Convention, between the US and the H/N on any proposed release or repatriation of US transferred EPW/CI. Every EPW/CI to be released or repatriated must be identified by name, grade and Internee Serial Number (ISN). N

(5) Transferring of EPW/CI in medical channels from the custody of the H/N following the same procedures as stated above

(6) Retransferring to the US, within 72 hours of receipt of a request, for any US transferred EPW/CI

(7) Taking possession of the remains of dead EPW/CI for appropriate disposition

e Camp Liaison Team (CLT) units will execute responsibilities of the US for continued accountability of US transferred EPW/CI throughout the duration of the internment. CLTs will provide liaison support, and if requested, technical assistance to H/N Internment Facility Commanders in operating, processing and internment of EPW/CI and ensuring EPW/CI are properly safeguarded and treated humanely under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions

APPENDIX 4 (TRANSFER EPW/CI PROCEDURES) TO ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

5 ACCOUNTABILITY OF US TRANSFERRED EPW/CI

a Camp Liaison Teams will verify the transfer of EPW/CI from the custody of the US to the custody of the H/N. Transfer of EPW/CI is accomplished jointly by the senior member of the US escort guard and an officer member of the H/N transfer team. Verification will be made of the number of EPW/CI and of the accuracy of the Transfer Roster. H/N representative will sign the Transfer Roster, which will serve as a receipt for the prisoner(s).

b The Transfer Roster (Manifest) prepared by US forces will be by classification, name, grade, and internee serial number (ISN), which includes nationality. The transfer will not take place unless this document is completed.

c The US forces will provide each EPW/CI's personnel records, medical records (to include weight at time of capture and time of transfer), fingerprint cards, identity cards and any required interrogation records at time transfer of custody.

d Personal effects are issued back to the EPW/CI upon departure from the IF.

e A copy of the Transfer Roster (Manifest) will be coordinated with PWIC and SLT (US Liaison Team).

f Brigade S-3 and/or S-1 will receive from the H/N EPW/CI facility commander any notice of intent to relocate US transferred EPW/CI. This notice should be received 72 hours before the actual relocation. Relocation will not take place without notification and the concurrence of the commander, 800th MP BDE, who will notify the PWIC.

g Brigade S-3 and/or S-1 will receive from the H/N EPW/CI facility commander any notification of change in physical condition, death, place or change in burial, or place of storage of remains, of any US transferred EPW/CI. This notification should be received within 24 hours of the event. The brigade will forward this information to the PWIC.

h Brigade S-3 and/or S-1 will receive from the H/N EPW/CI facility commander and forward to the 800th MP BDE, and the PWIC any notification of escape or recapture of any US transferred EPW/CI. Notification should be received within 12 hours of the discovery of the escape and within 48 hours of recapture.

i Camp Liaison Teams will present to the H/N EPW/CI facility commander requests from the US for the retransfer of the US custody of any US transferred EPW/CI. Coordinate the retransfer and ensure that it is accomplished within 72 hours of the presentation of the request.

(1) Requests for the retransfer will include as a minimum

(a) EPW/CI's name, rank, classification, sex and ISN

APPENDIX 4 (TRANSFER EPW/CI PROCEDURES) TO ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(b) Place interned or last known to be interned

(c) Reason for retransfer request

(2) Forms for retransfer will be the same as those used for transfer

j Comply with the reporting requirements in AR 190-8 The Internee Strength Report (Form 2674-R) or similar report whose format will be specified, will be submitted daily to the PWIC

6 CAMP LIAISON TEAM RESPONSIBILITIES

a Control access to the H/N EPW/CI facility by the US personnel Validate both the need and the authority for access This validation will be based on properly presented military orders, military identity cards and credentials issued by police, investigators or intelligence organizations of the US government Coordinate access of US personnel in the H/N EPW/CI facility with the H/N EPW/CI Facility Liaison Team access

b Conduct Liaison as may be necessary to resolve administrative and logistics problems encountered by the H/N concerning US transferred EPW/CI

c Become thoroughly familiar with all provision of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relative to the rights of and responsibilities to EPW/CI

d Observe the condition of the separate structures and enclosures used to intern US transferred EPW/CI Confirm that the proper sanitary standards are being maintained

e Observe the apparent medical condition of US transferred EPW/CI to ensure that those in need of medical treatment receive proper attention

f Observe and collect such other information as may be necessary, under the Geneva Conventions, to satisfy the international obligations of the US for the welfare of US transferred EPW/CI

e Report through the chain of command 800th Military Police Brigade any departure from the standards of the Geneva Conventions by personnel of any nation coming to the attention of any Liaison Team Member

8 CLT RECORD KEEPING REQUIREMENTS CLTs must maintain

a Copies of all Transfer Rosters (Manifests)

b Copies of all Internee Strength Reports as required by the 800th MP BDE

APPENDIX 4 (TRANSFER EPW/CI PROCEDURES) TO ANNEX P (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- c Records of interrogation of US transferred EPW/CI by US or the H/N authorities

 - d Reports on the condition of facilities used to intern US transferred EPW/CI with notations about the state of repair, maintenance, and sanitary conditions

 - e Reports on the apparent medical condition of US transferred EPW/CI with comments noting medical conditions

 - f List identities of US personnel, representative of international organizations, and others granted access to the US transferred EPW/CI

 - g Copies of all H/N notices of intent to relocate US transferred EPW/CI

 - h Copies of any H/N notification of change in physical condition, death, place or change of place of burial or preservation of remains, escape and recapture

 - i Copies of US request for the retransfer of US captured EPW/CI

 - j Copies of reports of all known or suspected violations of the Geneva Conventions

 - k Records on each US transferred EPW/CI to include date of capture, date of transfer, weight at time of capture and transfer, and any of the above actions related to the individual EPW/CI
- 9 Proper treatment of all EPW/CI despite nationality, political or religious beliefs, capturing nation, internment nation is a matter of great concern to the United States Forces to protect the honor and international reputation of the United States in this regard.

ANNEX Q (MEDICAL SERVICES) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 REFERENCES

AR 5-9	Intra service Support Installation, Area Coordination
AR 40-2	Army Medical Treatment Facilities Gen Administration
AR 40-4	Army Medical Department Facilities/Activities
AR 40-5	Preventive Medicine
AR 40-26	Tuberculosis Detection and Control Program
AR 40-48	Non-physician Health Care Providers
AR 40-60	Policies and Procedure for the Acquisition of Medical Material
AR 40-66	Medical Record and Quality Assurance Administration
AR 40-400	Patient Administration
AR 40-454	Prevention and Control of Communicable Diseases of Man VD
AR 40-562	Immunization Requirements and Procedures
AR 115-20	Field Water Supply
AR 140-120	Medical Examinations
AR 190-50	Physical Security for Storage of Controlled Medical Substances
AR 200-1	Environmental Protection and Enhancement
AR 310-1	Publications, Blank Forms and Printing Management
AR 340-17	Release of Information and Records from Army files
AR 340-18-19	Maintenance and Disposition of Medical Function Files
AR 340-21	The Army Privacy Program
AR 638-40	Care and Disposition of Remains
FM 8-33	Control of Communicable Diseases in Man
FM 10-52	Field Water Supply
FM 10-63	Handling of Deceased Personnel in Theaters of Operation FM 21-10 Field Hygiene and Sanitation

2 PURPOSE This annex outlines medical operations regarding the care and treatment of detainees, including sick, wounded or injured captives

3 RESPONSIBILITIES

- a The Brigade Surgeon plans, supervises and is responsible for
 - (1) Overall operations of the medical section
 - (2) Sanitary Operations
 - (3) Preventive Medicine Services
 - (4) Emergency or routine treatment of captives as required
- b The Physicians Assistant is responsible for
 - (1) Assisting with preventive medicine inspections

ANNEX Q (MEDICAL SERVICES) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- (2) Assisting in medical examinations and treatment of captives
- (3) Supervision of the Emergency Treatment NCO (91B)
- (4) Supervision of the Preventive Medicine Specialist (91S)
- (5) Supervise immunizations
- (6) Responsible for the training and coordination of Retained Personnel
- (7) Assumes the leadership of the Medical Treatment Section in the absence of the Brigade Surgeon

c Emergency Treatment NCO (91B30) is responsible for

(1) The medical treatment of EPW/CI that cannot be treated by EPW/CI medical personnel (Retained Persons)

- (2) Coordinating evacuation of captives that cannot be medically treated at the facility
- (3) Supervising the Emergency Treatment Sergeant
- (4) Monitoring sick call operations at the compound level
- (5) Assisting PA with inventories/ accountability of medical supplies
- (6) Assisting the PA in inspecting EPW/CI personnel for medical fitness
- (7) Assumes the duties of the Physician Assistant during his absence
- (8) When not performing primary duties, assist the Physician Assistant as required
- (9) Supervision of the medical specialist (91A)
- (10) Training RP as required

d The Preventive Medicine Specialist (915) is responsible for

- (1) Inspection/efficient operation of personal hygiene facilities
- (2) Inspection of EPW/CI living areas
- (3) Ensuring that adequate water and laundry facilities are provided

ANNEX Q (MEDICAL SERVICES) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- (4) Supervision of entomological collection and testing
 - (5) Supervision of human waste removal
 - (6) Water quality testing
- e MEDICAL SPECIALIST (SGT), 91A is responsible for.
- (1) Weekly inspections of latrine facilities
 - (2) Weekly inspection of EPW/CI living areas
 - (3) Inspecting food service areas
 - (4) Assist the Preventive Medicine NCO as required
 - (5) Assist with medical in-processing of newly arrived EPW/CI
 - (6) Supervise the Medical Specialist (SPC)91A
 - (7) Assume duties of the Preventive Medicine (S PC) in his absence
- f EMERGENCY TREATMENT SERGEANT (SGT), 91B is responsible for
- (1) Conducting body cavity searches of EPW/CI during processing
 - (2) Supervise the Medical Specialist (PFC)91A Medical officers at all units are responsible for the implementation of the procedures as set forth in this annex
- ### 4 GENERAL
- a Personnel requiring medical attention will be evacuated to the supporting medical treatment facility. Captives will be furnished routine and limited emergency medical treatment, as required, by battalion medical staff.
 - b Medically qualified retained EPW/CI, classified as retained persons (RP), will be used as much as possible for the health and welfare of other individuals in their category. RPs shall belong to the same forces as the treated EPW/CI.
 - c Section administration, health and sanitary standards will be maintained in accordance with applicable Army regulations.
 - d The care and treatment of sick and injured civilians (non-US personnel) is a responsibility of civil or host nation authorities. They will be treated only in extreme emergency and when it is in the best interest of national US objectives, unless they are interned in a US facility at which time they

ANNEX Q (MEDICAL SERVICES) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

become the responsibility of the US

5 MEDICAL PROCESSING. Medical in processing is normally stations 2 & 3 in the in processing line Processing is conducted as follows

a Delousing All EPW/CI are to be deloused The delousing will be set-up and operated by the preventive medicine NCO IAW TM #6, Armed Forces Pest Management Board, Delousing Procedures for the Control of Louse-borne Disease During Contingency Operations This can be located at www.acq.osd.mil/afpmb/coweb/guidance_targets/tech_pest_guides/TIM6/TIM6.pdf Delousing may not be necessary in CONUS

(1) Lice are a common problem among detainees and displaced civilians Two of the kinds of lice, head lice and crab lice, are significant nuisances because of their bites and the consequent itching, but they do not transmit any infectious diseases These species easily move from infested to non-infested people during direct contact or when articles of clothing are exchanged The third species of human louse, the body louse, is much more dangerous It transmits three significant diseases epidemic typhus, relapsing fever and trench fever Epidemic typhus is often fatal if left untreated and has a history of occurring in explosive epidemic

(2) Unlike the other two species of human lice, the body louse spends most of its time in the patient's clothing It lays eggs in seams As a result, treatment of the human body does not end an infestation

b Shower Upon completion of the delousing station all the EPW/CI will be given a shower Shower support will be obtained organically, from either a supporting installation or from a shower and bath unit

c Medical Record A medical record will be initiated for each EPW/CI as they processed Entries to this record will be made monthly during health inspections The medical record should contain the following forms

- (1) DA Form 344, Treatment Record
- (2) Standard Form 88, Report of Medical Examination
- (3) Standard Form 600, Chronological Record of Medical Care
- (4) DA Form 2664-R, Weight Register (initial height and weight recorded)

d Weigh-In Each EPW/CI will be weighed monthly The date and weight will be recorded on DA Form 2664-R This form will be completed as follows

- (1) Enter name and ISN from data contained on DA Form 4237

ANNEX Q (MEDICAL SERVICES) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(2) Enter height (in inches) and weight (in pounds) in the weight column

(3) Enter 6 digit date (yymmdd) in the date column

e Physical Examination - Each EPW/CI will be given a physical examination prior to placement in the housing area of the compound. Report of Medical Examination, Form SF88 will be used to record the results. The physical examination will be used to determine the following:

(1) Determine the general state of health

(2) Detect communicable diseases

(3) Initiate medical care, as necessary

(4) Provide inoculations, as necessary. Guidance for inoculations will be directed by higher authority or IAW provisions of AR 40-562 (Immunization Requirements and Procedures)

(5) The Medical Section will provide radiological testing using a radac meter, if appropriate, based on tactical situation

6 SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS

a MEDICAL RECORDS

(1) Medical records will be maintained by the medical section. Access to medical records will be restricted and governed IAW AR 340-17 (Release of Information From Army Files) and AR 340-21 (The Army Privacy Program)

(2) All X-Rays & medical records for EPW/CI will be maintained in the DA Form's 3443 (Terminal Digit X-Ray Film Negative Preserver) and the 3444 (Alphabetical and Terminal Digit File for Treatment Record)

(3) All medical forms will be stamped with the letters EPW/CI, RP or DP at the top and bottom of each form

(4) The DA Form 3444 series consists of 10 different colored folders prepared as follows:

(a) Select the correctly colored folder. The color of the folder represents the last two digits (primary group) of the patient's internment serial number (ISN)

Primary Group	Color of Folder	DA Form
---------------	-----------------	---------

00 - 09	Orange	3444
10 - 19	Light Green	3444-1
20 - 29	Yellow	3444-2

ANNEX Q (MEDICAL SERVICES) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

30 – 39	Gray	3444-3
40 – 49	Tan	3444-4
50 – 59	Light Blue	3444-5
60 – 69	White	3444-6
70 – 79	Brown	3444-7
80 – 89	Pink	3444-8
90 – 99	Red	3444-9

(b) Place an identification label in the patient information block with the patient's last name, first name and middle initial

(c) Mark the front of the folder with EPW/CI in large block letters

(d) As additional forms and documents are added to the folder they will be placed on the appropriate side of the folder IAW AR 40-66 (Medical Record and Quality Assurance Administration)

b The following logs will be maintained

(1) Initial physical exam for incoming EPW/CI's

(2) Monthly exams of EPW/CI

(3) Daily sick call

(4) Immunizations

(5) EPW/CI blood donors by blood type

c RECURRING REPORTS The following reports will be forwarded to the 800TH MP Bde Brigade Surgeon

(1) Total # patients treated on sick call The report period will be the first through the last day of each calendar month This report is due to the Brigade Surgeon on the 5th calendar day of the month following the reporting period Reports will be written

(2) Medical evacuations This report is due once evacuation is imminent The BN S-3 must also be notified in order to coordinate appropriate security measures This report can be telephonic

(3) Serious accidents or injuries Due as soon as basic information is known about the serious accident or injury (who, what, when, where, why)

(4) Medical Summary Report (DA Form 2789-R) This report provides medical management data The reporting period is the first through the last day of each calendar month This report is due on the 5th calendar day following the reporting period See chapter 5, AR 40-400 (Patient Administration) for detailed guidance See TAB A for sample form

ANNEX Q (MEDICAL SERVICES) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(5) Special Telegraphic Report This report is designed to provide epidemiological data when selected diseases or conditions exceed the number normally expected. This report will be promptly prepared and dispatched when one or more cases occur that pertain to conditions listed in chapter 6, AR 40-400. This report is submitted on DD Form 173/3 (OCR) (Joint Message Form). See chapter 6, AR 40-400 for additional details.

7 OTHER PROCEDURES

a Medical Treatment

(1) All medical & surgical problems that cannot be handled at the internment facility will be transferred to the supporting medical treatment facility. The BN S-1 will be notified anytime and EPW/CI must be transferred for more than 24 hours. The information will then be forwarded to the brigade.

(2) Any EPW/CI who has received medical treatment will, upon request, will be given a copy of the SF 600 (Chronological Record of Medical Care) showing the type of treatment given. A copy of this certificate will also be forwarded to the PWIC.

b Repatriation

(1) IAW AR 190-8, 3-12, upon the out break of hostilities, Mixed Medical Commissions (MMC) shall be appointed to examine sick and wounded EPW/CI and determine whether they should be repatriated.

(2) Physicians will consider the following categories for examination by MMC:

(a) Fatally wounded or incurably sick whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely diminished.

(b) Wounded or sick who, according to medical opinion, are not likely to recover in one year, whose condition requires treatment and whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely diminished.

(c) Wounded or sick who have recovered, but whose mental or physical fitness seems to have greatly diminished.

(3) EPW/CI may also be recommended for repatriation by a doctor of the same armed force, a designated prisoner representative, or an agency responsible for aid and assistance to EPW/CI (ex Red Cross).

(4) The MMC will examine all EPW/CI who have applied for repatriation and will notify all EPW/CI, within 30 days after examination, of their decision.

ANNEX Q (MEDICAL SERVICES) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(5) EPW/CI who are declared eligible for repatriation by the MMC will be examined by the Brigade Physician. He will complete DA Form 2671-R in quadruplicate. The original and one copy will be forwarded to the PWIC. The other copies will accompany the EPW/CI upon transfer.

c. Death of EPW/CI

(1) Upon the death of an EPW/CI the IF Physician will furnish the IF CDR with a preliminary Certificate of Death (DA Fm 2669-R). This form will be executed by the attending physician and the IF Commander. Included on this certificate will be a statement that the death was or was not the result of the EPW/CI's own misconduct or carelessness.

(2) Copies of DA Form 2669-R will be provided to the following:

(a) PWIC (Original)

(b) Surgeon General

(c) File P201 of individual concerned

(3) Burial, Record of Internment and Cremation

(a) Deceased EPW/CI will be buried honorably in a cemetery set up for them according to AR 638-30 and the rites of their religion and the customs of their military forces when possible.

(b) The use of mass graves is discouraged.

(c) In case of cremation, ashes will be kept by graves registration personnel until proper disposal can be determined. Bodies should only be cremated for hygienic reasons, religion or the EPW/CI's expressed wish.

d. Preventive Medicine Operations. Preventive medicine operations are designed to prevent diseases, infestation and enhance the living environment within the internment facility. These operations include:

<u>TYPE INSPECTION</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
LATRINE/SHOWER	WEEKLY
EPW LIVING AREAS	WEEKLY
WATER SUPPLY	TBD (see TB MED 576 and 577)
PEST CONTROL	MONTHLY (see TM 5-632)
FOOD SERVICE	WEEKLY/MONTHLY

e. Medical Supply Operations. In Theater, the supporting Medical Supply, Optical, and Maintenance (MEDSOM) Battalion will provide support. Other supply operations for medical

ANNEX Q (MEDICAL SERVICES) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

material include TOE hospital units with a medical supply mission or medical units with an area supply mission. Direct coordination by Battalions and BLD's to the MEDSOM Battalion is authorized.

f Dental Care Only emergency dental care will be provided to EPW/CI. EPW/CI requiring emergency dental care will be treated at the supporting Dental Activity (DENTAC).

g Transfer of Sick and Wounded Captives

(1) Update and make available the records. For each EPW/CI, CI, RP and OD to be examined, DA Form 2670-R will be completed in four copies. DA Form 2670-R will be locally reproduced on 8 1/2 by 11 inch paper.

(2) The commanding officers of designated hospitals will complete DA Form 2671-R (Certificate of Direct Repatriation for EPW/CIs). DA Form 2671-R will be locally reproduced on 8 1/2 inch paper. The original and one copy of DA Form 2671-R will be forwarded to ODCSOPS, NPWIC. The other two copies will be attached to the clinical record. In all instances, these records will accompany the records of the EPW/CI, CI, RP and OD when transferred.

(3) When captives no longer require hospital care, they will not ordinarily be returned to the battalion facility. They may be assigned to an EPW/CI camp within the receiving command. If an EPW/CI camp to which the EPW/CI/OD is transferred is not located in the receiving command, the battalion will receive these captives back into the facility.

(a) Make the repatriation of sick and wounded EPW/CIs, CI/RP and ODs easier.

(b) Relieve the Mixed Medical Commission of the need to visit EPW/CI and patients who are unmistakably eligible for direct repatriation.

h Medical Evacuation

(1) The battalion, with the advice of military medical authority, is authorized to transfer injured, sick and wounded EPW/CI to other commands. Medical evacuation procedures will follow the same requirements as a transfer of captives to HN.

(2) Movement of EPW/CI in medical channels will be coordinated with the Bn S-3 Movement NCO and the Bn S-1.

(3) Transfer of personal effects.

(a) Each EPW/CI/OD and retained person will be permitted to hand carry personal effects and property not to exceed 55 pounds.

(b) Captives who have been serving as chaplains or clergyman during their internment will be permitted to transfer, at Government expense, an additional 110 pounds to take other religious materials with them.

ANNEX Q (MEDICAL SERVICES) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(4) Transportation assets available for use (Listed in priority order)

(a) Air (USAF, Army Aviation or Medical Aviation)

(b) Ambulance

(c) Other US Military vehicles, including ambulance train

(d) Local transportation

(e) If any evacuation units are attached, these units will evacuate on call. Alternate routes of evacuation and destinations are selected and announced by evacuation unit commanders.

(f) Ambulances will not be used to transport the dead and requests for removal of deceased personnel will be made to the nearest graves registration unit.

1 Publications and Forms The following publications and forms should be on hand in order to facilitate operations

MIL STD 904	Guidelines for Insect Infestation of Subsistence
SB 3-30	Herbicides, Pest Control Agents and Disinfectants
SB 8075	Army Medical Supply Information MEDCASE
TB 43-180	Calibration and Repair Requirements for the Maintenance of Army Material
TB MED 1	Storage, Preservation, Packaging, Packing, Maintenance and Surveillance of Material -Medical Activities
TB MED 14	Immunization
TB MED 230	Treatment and Management of Venereal Disease
TB MED 243	Interviewers Aid for Venereal Disease Contact Investigation
TB MED 530	Occupational and Environmental Health Food Service Sanitation
TB MED 577	Occupational and Environmental health Sanitary Control and Surveillance of Field Water Supplies
TM 5-632	Military Entomology Operational Hand Book
DA Form 2407	Maintenance Request
DA Form 2789-R	Medical Summary Report
DA Form 3444	Alphabetical and Terminal Digit File for Treatment Record
DA Form 3824	Urology Examination
DA Form 3862	Controlled Substances Stock Record
DA Form 4106	Report of Unusual Occurrence
DA Form 4221	Diabetic Record
DA Form 4256	Doctors Orders
DA Form 4700	Medical Record-Supplemental Medical Data
DA Form 5006-R	Medical Record-Authorization for disclosure of Information
DA Form 5007-R	Record of Hypo-sensitization
DA Form 5009-R	Medical Record-Release Against Medical Advice
DA Form 5128	Clinical Record-Visual Field Examination

ANNEX Q (MEDICAL SERVICES) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

DA Form 5181-R	Screening Note of Acute Medical Care
DA Form 5571	Master Problem List
DA Form 5161-R	Comprehensive Food Service Inspection
DA Form 5162-R	Routine Food Service Inspection
SF 505	Clinical Record-History Parts II and III
SF 506	Clinical Record-Physical Examination
SF 507	Clinical Record-Report on or Continuation of SF
SF 509	Medical Record-Doctors Progress Notes
SF 511	Medical Record-Vital Signs Record
SF 512	Clinical Record-Plotting Chart
SF 513	Medical Record-Consultation Sheet
SF 515	Medical Record-Tissue Examination
SF 516	Medical Record-Operation Report
SF 517	Clinical Record-Anesthesia
SF 518	Medical Record-Blood or Blood Component Transfusion
SF 519B	Radiologic Consultation Request/Report
SF 520	Clinical Record-Electrocardiographic
SF 522	Medical Record-Request for Administration of Anesthesia and for Performance of Operations and other Procedures
SF 523	Clinical Record-Authorization for Autopsy
SF 523A	Medical Record-Disposition of Body
SF 526	Medical Record-Interstitial/Intercavitary Therapy
SF 527	Group Muscle Strength, Joint R O M Girth and Length Measurements
SF 528	Clinical Record-Muscle and/or Nerve Evaluation- Manual and Electrical Upper Extremity
SF 529	Medical Record-Muscle Function by Nerve Distribution Trunk and Lower Extremity
SF 530	Clinical Record-Neurological Examination
SF 539	Medical Record-Abbreviated Medical Record
SF 549	(Hematology)
SF 600	Health Record-Chronological Record of Medical Care
SF 601	Health Record-Immunization Record

ANNEX R (TACTICAL SAFETY) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 REFERENCES

- a AR 385-10, Army Safety Program
- b AR 385-40,
- c DA PAM 385-1, Unit Safety Management
- d FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations

2 PURPOSE This annex defines the minimum safety measures that will be put into place for the 800th Military Police Brigade and all units that are attached to or OPCON to the BDE. Each unit commander is individually responsible for his/her unit's safety program and insuring that safety considerations will be a mandatory part of the MDMP and all operations.

1 GENERAL The Brigade Commander requires continuous information on all matters pertaining to the prevention of non-battle injuries resulting from accidents. Each commander, through channels, will report accidents and accidental injuries involving personnel or equipment, exclusive of injuries and damage caused by action of an enemy or hostile force, in accordance with AR 385-40. Exposure in military man-days will be compiled on the basis of the actual strength of units. Accidents and accidental injuries occurring in units during combat will be made a matter of record for use in the unit and for later analysis and application for improved training and orientation of military personnel.

2 SAFETY PROGRAM AT UNIT LEVEL DA Pam 385-1, Unit Safety Management, prescribes procedures and policies of the Army Safety Program to be implemented at unit level.

3 AREAS OF EMPHASIS Safety will be integrated in all phases of operations and planning. It is up to each individual and section to incorporate safety into their daily activities, SOPs and these TACSOPs. Considerations of these factors will include vehicle use, range operations, fire prevention, weapons, explosives, hearing conservation, tactical employment, bivouac activities, aircraft utilization, combat training, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Approaches to control the prevention of accidents will be based on:

- a Assignment of Responsibilities Commanders are responsible for safety training and supervision during all phases of operations and training.

- b Preventive Measures Preventive measures based on the constructive use of verified causes of past accidents will be instituted.

- c Indoctrination Personnel will be indoctrinated in the basic principles of accident prevention.

- d Safety Management Safety management and training of personnel, including the specific procedures and precautions required to prevent recurrence of accidents, will be stressed.

ANNEX R (TACTICAL SAFETY) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

4 ACCIDENT REPORTING

a Initial Report. Class "A" or "B" accidents will be reported immediately to the Brigade Commander. Class "C" accidents will be reported within 24 hours of occurrence to the Brigade Safety Officer. Reports will be transmitted IAW Annex T (Reports) to this TACSOP.

b A follow-up report will be submitted when complete information is available.

1 c Individuals observing an accident will take the following actions:

(1) Provide rescue and medical assistance within capabilities.

(2) In case of fire, take appropriate steps for fire protection.

(3) For injuries, contact MEDEVAC for medical aid and transportation.

(4) Report the accident up the chain of command.

5 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION. All accidents will be investigated for possible causes and lessons learned that may be used to prevent future accidents. The depth of the investigation depends on the accident classification and the operational situation. Accident investigations will be conducted and boards established IAW regulations, as permitted by the operational situation.

6 PRE-ACCIDENT PLANS. Commanders will establish pre-accident plans. Plans will be tailored to unit specific location and situation during the operation. At a minimum, the plan will include lifesaving and rescue information, notification procedures for contacting fire-fighting, MEDEVAC and ambulance assets, and notification of the chain of command and personnel responsible for accident investigation.

7 RISK MANAGEMENT. Commanders will conduct risk assessments for all operations. Unnecessary risks identified will be reduced to a level that the commander determines is acceptable. If the risk can not be reduced to an acceptable level, the decision to conduct the operation will be elevated up the chain of command. Risk management is addressed further in Annex F (Force Protection) of this TACSOP and Appendix J (Risk Management) to FM 101-5.

8 VEHICLE SAFETY

a Commanders will ensure that vehicle operators are properly trained to operate any vehicle assigned to them.

b Preventive maintenance checks will be a continuing process for all vehicles, tactical and administrative.

c Ground guides will be used when backing vehicles or moving them in confined spaces.

ANNEX R (TACTICAL SAFETY) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

d Speed limit in bivouac areas is 5 mph

e Convoy Operations

(1) Commanders will establish a safe speed based on the risk assessment. At a minimum, this assessment will include type/capabilities of vehicles, drivers' experience/abilities, road conditions, tactical situation, and any hazardous material being transported.

(2) Convoy commanders will conduct a convoy briefing, to include destination, route, speed, march order, vehicle spacing, designated rest halts, checkpoints (CPs), refueling points, convoy communications frequency, MEDEVAC frequency, reporting procedures (at SP, CPs, RP), actions upon breakdown or contact with the enemy, and any other safety considerations.

(3) If available, seat belts will be worn by all passengers. Troops will not be transported in vehicles carrying bulk quantities of POL, ammunition or other hazardous material.

(4) Subordinate units will report up the chain to the 800th MP Bde TOC (S-3) the passing of the Starting Point (SP), CPs and the Release Point (RP).

9 MAINTENANCE AREA/FUEL POINT OPERATIONS

a Vehicles will be parked with the parking brake engaged

b Fuel will be stored at least 50 meters from tents

c Fire extinguishers will be on hand, clearly identified and operational

d Personnel handling batteries will be provided the proper protective clothing

e Welders will use protective clothing

f "NO SMOKING" signs will be posted and strictly enforced around fuel points

10 GENERATORS

a Generators will be properly grounded

b Noise hazard signs will be displayed on generators

c Personnel working in/around high noise areas will wear ear protection

d "NO SMOKING" signs will be posted

e A fire point will be positioned between the generator and fuel storage point

ANNEX R (TACTICAL SAFETY) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- f Only certified operators will operate generators

11 MESS OPERATIONS

- a The fuel storage point will be at least 50 meters from the mess tent
- b Mess tent exits will be kept clear of obstructions
- c Immersion heater operators will be properly certified

12 CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

a Unit NBC Officers/NCOs have the primary responsibility for enforcing chemical equipment safety

b Nerve Agent Antidote (MARK I) is used only to counter the effects of nerve agent
Direct contact with skin will be avoided

c M256A1 Chemical Agent Vapor Detector Kit the green ampules create heat and toxic vapor hazards Always wear protective masks and gloves when using the M256A1 Detector Kit Do not use in an enclosed area or 10 meters from unprotected individuals

d M11 Decontaminating Apparatus Nitrogen cylinders must be free of rust and dents Defective cylinders may explode when used If not properly installed IAW paragraph 2-3 of TM 3-4230-204-12&P, nitrogen cylinders may become projectiles

(1) Never pressure the M11 with more than one nitrogen cylinder at a time An over pressurized container may explode

(2) Do not spray on personnel or hot engines

13 EXPLOSIVES SAFETY Commanders will take every reasonable measure to prevent explosives accidents

a Ammunition will be separated to prevent incompatible ammunition from causing a mass detonation Ammunition should be separated in a manner that will prevent one stack of ammunition from detonating another stack

b Protective structures should be built as time and resources permit, in order to reduce the distance requirement between stacks and to protect personnel and property from blast effects

14 FRATRICIDE PREVENTION

a Training All personnel must be well trained in combat vehicle and aircraft identification Personnel must be able to identify distinctive markings used for fratricide prevention

ANNEX R (TACTICAL SAFETY) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

b Communications Commanders must ensure that orders are clear, concise and understood

All personnel must know the rules of engagement

c Location Units/personnel must ensure that they are at the right place at the right time
We will maximize the use of available GPS equipment

d Identification. All friendly vehicles will be marked with pre-designated marking using GLINT tape or other acceptable infrared marking device

e Weapons Control Weapons will not be loaded with rounds chambered unless the probability of enemy contact is high (weapons red) When the probability of enemy contact is possible, weapons may have magazines inserted, but no round chambered (weapons yellow) During periods when enemy contact is unlikely, weapons will be cleared and loaded magazines will be carried in ammunition pouches Weapons will be cleared before entering any building or facility Clearing barrels will be available

f Unexploded Ordnance Units will train personnel in the recognition and avoidance of unexploded munitions If practical, units will avoid maneuver through known or suspected areas of high concentrations of unexploded ordnance

g Souvenirs Soldiers are not authorized to collect souvenirs, as they may be booby trapped by the enemy Commanders will provide amnesty points and conduct shakedown inspections as soon as operational conditions permit

ANNEX S (PERSONNEL/ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 REFERENCES

AR 19-40	AR 385-40
AR 37-105	AR 600-8-22
AR 60-10	AR 600-29
AR 60-20	AR 601-50
AR 135-100	AR 601-210
AR 135-210	AR 601-280
AR 190-8	AR 870-5
AR 220-5	FM 22-5
AR 380-5	
AR 380-10	

2 PURPOSE The purpose of this Annex is to

- a Define the personnel and administrative procedures that will be used throughout 800th MP Bde in the conduct of its mobilization missions
- b Reduce the requirement for personnel and administrative instructions in operation plans or orders by establishing standard operating procedures

3 DEFINITION Subordinate Commands - those units listed in Annex A of any OPLAN or OPORD

4 APPLICABILITY

- a This Annex applies to the headquarters and to all subordinate commands of the 800th MP Bde, and where indicated, to other persons serving with or accompanying elements of the 800th MP Bde
- b Subordinate commands and assigned units are responsible for coordinating and providing personnel and administrative support to their forces in accordance with this Annex, unless otherwise indicated

5 RESPONSIBILITIES

- a Implementation The provisions of this Annex, except those items which require special authorization, are effective for planning upon receipt and implementation upon mobilization, unless directed earlier by Commander, 800th MP Bde
- b Conformity Subordinate commanders will formulate plans and policies in conformance with this Annex

ANNEX S (PERSONNEL/ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

APPENDICES

- 1 - Personnel Strengths & Reports
- 2 - US Personnel Replacement Procedures/Admin
- 3 - Casualty System
- 4 - Personnel Procurement
- 5 - Personnel Actions
- 6 - Recovered US and Allied Personnel
- 7 - Awards and Decorations
- 8 - Stockage of Publications and Forms
- 9 - Postal
- 10 - Health, Morale, and Welfare Services
- 11 - Labor
- 12 - Historical
- 13 - Accounting for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW), Civilian Internees (CI) and Displaced Civilians (DC)
- 14 - Accounting for U S Prisoners in U S Confinement Facility

APPENDIX 1 (PERSONNEL STRENGTHS AND REPORTS) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1. PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY DEFINITIONS

a Authorized Strength War authorized strengths are structure/level 1 strengths of one or more of the following

(1) Table of Organization (TOE) (Full or Wartime)

(2) Modified TOE (MTOE)

(3) Augmentation to TOE

(4) Mobilization Table of Distribution and Allowance (MOBTDA)

b Assigned Strength Assigned strength is the total military assigned strength of a unit

c Attached/Detached Personnel carried as attached or detached on the personnel strength report

d Current Operating Strength Current operating strength is the total military assigned strength of a unit, plus attachments, less detachments

e Present for Duty Assigned and attached personnel who are available to assist in performance of the unit mission

2 DAILY PERSONNEL STATUS REPORT (PSR)

a The Personnel Status Report (PSR) combines the Personnel Summary (PS) and Personnel Requirements Report (PRR) on one report. The PSR reflects current personnel information for a specific 24-hour period. The report will be prepared using DA Form 5367-R.

b Submission

(1) Upon mobilization, and until otherwise notified by 800TH MP BDE, subordinate commands will submit a daily PSR to HQ, 800th MP Bde. ATTN: Brigade S-1

(2) The PSR will be submitted so as to arrive NLT 1900 hrs local with an "as of time" of 1600 hrs local

c Transmission The PSR will be sent by the fastest means possible to meet submission times (use of courier is encouraged)

d When appropriate, a remarks section will be added and include information such as significant personnel deficiencies and loss of key personnel

APPENDIX 1 (PERSONNEL STRENGTHS AND REPORTS) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

3 CHANGE OF COMMAND REPORTS Headquarters 800TH MP BDE will be notified of all command changes within all subordinate units. A copy of the assumption of command order will be provided within 24 hours of the change.

4 PERSONNEL DATA CHANGE REPORTS (RCS AG-546) AND SIDPERS INPUT AND CONTROL DATA PERSONNEL CHANGE REPORTS (DA Form 3728 and 3729)

a Personnel Data Change Reports will be prepared in accordance with Chap 7, AR 640-2, and SIDPERS Input and Control Data, Personnel Change Reports, will be prepared in accordance with SIDPERS user's guideline contained in DA Pam 600-8.

b Classification Reports will be classified in accordance with AR 380-5 (over classification will be avoided). Reference to a classified order as the authority for a remark does not require the report to be classified. Unclassified reports, when studied as a group, may provide classified information. When such groups are forwarded, the classification will be placed only on the letter of transmittal.

c Personnel Roster SIDPERS recurring reports will be verified, corrected, and authenticated in accordance with DA Pam 600-8. Rosters will be classified as directed by AR 380-5.

APPENDIX 2 (US PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT PROCEDURES/ADMINISTRATION) TO
ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 REPLACEMENT POLICY Third US Army (TUSA) will operate a replacement system in-theater according to current Theater Area OPLANS. Specific policies governing the flow of replacements will be published upon receipt from higher headquarters.

2 US PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT PROCEDURES

a S1, 800th MP Bde will

(1) Prepare replacement estimates and statistics necessary to maintain strength in the 800th MP Bde

(2) Respond to TUSA requirements for data needed to procure and move replacements in support of 800th MP Bde operations

(3) Furnish Cdr, 800th MP Bde, his staff, and subordinate headquarters information concerning the receipt, distribution, inventory, and location of replacements

(4) Assign individual replacements from CONUS through advanced information received from TUSA. Advance notification will contain

(a) Officers Grade and Specialty

(b) Warrant Officers Grade and Specialty

(c) Enlisted Grade and MOS

(d) Estimated Date of Arrival

(e) Mode of Transportation

(5) Allocate available replacements to supported units in accordance with priorities established by the Commander, 800th MP Bde

b Commander, supporting Personnel Services Battalion (PSB) will

(1) Receive replacements from the Theater PERSCOM GS Replacement Battalions and administratively process them

(2) Arrange transportation to PSC servicing unit of assignment

(3) Notify HQ, 800th MP Bde, ATTN, Brigade S-1, and replacement ETA

(4) Ensure PSC notifies unit to pick up replacements

APPENDIX 2 (US PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT PROCEDURES/ADMINISTRATION) TO
ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

c Replacement Assignment Procedures

(1) Hospital Returnees

(a) If totally qualified for the MOS/Specialty (PMOS) held at time of hospitalization, hospital returnees will be returned immediately through replacement channels to their former units

(b) If not qualified for their former MOS/Specialty (PMOS), hospital returnees will be reclassified to another MOS/Specialty for which they are qualified (SMOS) and assigned in accordance with existing requirements and priorities

(c) If not physically qualified for MOS/Specialty retention in PMOS or SMOS, hospital returnees will be assigned to a unit for on-the-job training in a potential Secondary MOS/Specialty

(2) Returnees from Confinement Normally, individuals will not be returned to their former units (i.e., battalion, separate company)

(3) Commanders of personnel who become excess to their units due to transition to mobilization manpower documents will be utilized within the unit until assignment instructions are received. Such personnel will be reported by grade and MOS in the "Remarks" section of the PSR.

(4) Stragglers Commanders acquiring straggler personnel who have lost contact with their units will make every effort, consistent with the tactical situation, to turn stragglers over to the Theater combat support military police brigade for disposition. Stragglers who cannot be turned over to the military police will be reported as such in the "Remarks" section of the PSR by name, grade, MOS, and unit of assignment from which contact was lost. Disposition instructions will be requested by acquiring unit.

d Pipeline Personnel Pipeline personnel in the replacement stream at the time hostilities begin will be processed as follows

(1) Pipeline Out

(a) Personnel eligible for separation under the criteria established in Appendix 5, of this ANNEX, paragraph 3 (Elimination, Separation, and Retirement) will be separated and returned to their home of record

(b) Personnel not eligible for separation under criteria established in Appendix 5, this ANNEX, will be referred to S1, 800th MP Bde for assignment in accordance with current requirements and priorities

APPENDIX 2 (US PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT PROCEDURES/ADMINISTRATION) TO
ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(2) Pipeline In Personnel will proceed as scheduled unless scheduled unit has been inactivated. If inactivated, reassign in accordance with established priorities.

3 REPLACEMENT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS Subordinate commanders will report to S1, 800th MP Bde, the name, grade, SSAN, unit of assignment, and effective date of active duty, of all personnel who have reported directly to the unit in compliance with emergency instructions

APPENDIX 3 (CASUALTY SYSTEM) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PURPOSE This Appendix establishes responsibilities, policies, and procedures governing the personnel casualty system for 800th MP Bde during wartime and contingency operations/ exercises simulating combat conditions

2 PERSONNEL LOSS ESTIMATES

a CGSC ST 101-6 (G1/G4 Battle Book) will be used as the basis for computation of personnel loss estimates. Loss estimates will be used to assist in planning for replacement requirements. These factors will be modified, if necessary, as actual experience factors are developed. Modification authority will be granted by S1, 800th MP Bde.

b Subordinate commanders will submit loss estimates as requested by, S1, 800th MP Bde.

3 CASUALTY REPORTS

a Applicability The reporting requirements in this Appendix apply to all subordinate units listed in Annex A of an OPLAN or OPORD with personnel who become casualties. Units will report all casualties to include DoD civilians, contract personnel, and military personnel from other services and allied nations. Reports on EPWs and Civilian Internees (CIs) who become casualties while under control of 800th MP Bde's units will be provided IAW AR 633-50 and AR 633-51.

b Standard Casualty reporting receives a high priority during all operations. Reporting must be timely to ensure each incident is reported through channels to DA PERSCOM within 24 hours of occurrence. Although speed is important, 100% accuracy of casualty information is the standard.

c DA Form 1156/1155 All soldiers and DoD civilians will carry two copies of DA Form 1156/1155 (Casualty Feeder Report/Witness Statement). One copy will be placed in the soldier's top right pocket of the BDU (any pocket of civilian's clothing if not in uniform). The second copy is placed inside the soldier's helmet (in different pocket for civilian not in BDU/helmet). Personnel will use the forms on the casualty first, then their own.

d Reporting Procedures Procedures and methods for reporting battle and non-battle casualties prescribed in Chap 3, AR 600-10 will apply with the following modifications:

(1) Casualty Feeder Reports Soldiers at company, detachment, or separate platoon level prepare Casualty Feeder Reports using DA Form 1156 (Casualty Feeder Report) and DA Form 1155 (Witness Statement of Individual). These reports are forwarded to battalion headquarters, which in turn are forwarded to HQ 800th MP Bde, ATTN: Brigade S-1. Do not batch casualty reports. Information based on spot reports can be submitted via radio or electronic means.

(2) Unit Feeder Reports

(a) The Brigade S-1 will prepare Unit Feeder Reports and forward to the Personnel Management Center (PMC). This hasty casualty report reflects daily cumulative losses for the unit.

APPENDIX 3 (CASUALTY SYSTEM) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

The report will include the following information for each casualty Battle Roster number, Name, SSN, and status (KIA, WIA, MIA)

(b) Control System Unit Feeder Reports will be assigned control numbers in a single, consecutive series for each calendar year. A separate series will be maintained for battle and non-battle reports. The series codes will be as follows

B (last 2 digits of year) - (No of Rpt) (For battle casualties)

NB (last 2 digits of year) - (No of Rpt) (For non-battle casualties)

d Master Files To provide a ready source of reference for all information concerning casualties, and facilitate verification of reports, each headquarters will maintain an alphabetical master casualty file (i.e., card file or folder)

e Verification For Killed In Action (KIA), report soldiers KIA only if remains are recovered and positively identified by unit personnel. Soldiers reported KIA must have died of wounds sustained from direct enemy contact. After 48-hours, if no conflicting data is received or when conflicts have been resolved, the casualty report will be considered to be verified. One copy of DA Forms 1156 and 1155 will be filed with the master file and one copy will be filed in the individual's personnel records.

f Reporting of Special Category Personnel with US Forces Special provisions apply for reporting personnel of other US Armed Forces, very important persons (VIPs), war correspondents, American National Red Cross personnel

(a) These personnel casualties will be reported to HQ 800th MP Bde, ATTN: Brigade S-1. Unless it is determined that a valid report has already been made, commanders in whose areas such a casualty occurs will submit the report, even though the casualty is not attached to their command. Line entries on Unit Feeder Reports will completely identify the casualty and include individual's SSAN and kind of document that could be used for his personal identification. The report will show the service or agency with which the individual is connected, if known. Modified form for electrically transmitted messages may be used by the headquarters reporting the casualties to HQ 800th MP Bde.

(b) Casualties among VIPs, war correspondents, and combatants who are dependents of prominent military personnel, legislators, and others of notable public standing, and persons of national or international prominence will also be forwarded to the Public Affairs Office of higher headquarters by the fastest available means as well as through the normal casualty channels described above.

(c) Reporting of DA Civilian and Dependents of Military Personnel These personnel will be reported as prescribed above unless other instructions have been furnished.

APPENDIX 3 (CASUALTY SYSTEM) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(d) Reporting Personnel of Allied Nations. Information concerning wounds, injuries, or death of members of the armed forces of allied nations will be reported by the US Commander having this knowledge. Casualty Feeder Reports may be used for this purpose. Separate control numbers will be established for allied Casualty Feeder Reports. (Control numbers will be preceded by the letter 'A') Casualty Reports will be forwarded through regular casualty reporting channels until they reach the US level of command which is designated to establish liaison with this force. These US headquarters will refer casualty information directly to the commander of the allied force concerned. Reports will be as complete as knowledge of the circumstances permit and for deceased cases, include information concerning disposition of remains.

g Mass Casualty Reporting. When loss of a complete organization or major part thereof, and the unit involved has lost the capacity to report its casualties, the commander nearest the affected unit will, until a commander is specifically designated, take action to report casualties to HQ800th MP Bde ATTN: Brigade S-1. The S-3, HQ800th MP Bde will designate the commander responsible for rescue and recovery operations.

h Sensitivity of Casualty Information. Commanders will ensure casualty information is not released to any third parties to include media and family members outside of the official casualty notification channel. All casualty matters will be marked 'For Official Use Only' (FOUO).

4 DETERMINATION OF LINE-OF-DUTY STATUS. All battle and non-battle casualty line-of-duty determinations will be completed in accordance with AR 600-33.

5 LETTER OF SYMPATHY. Letter of sympathy will be prepared by the commander of the individual within 24-hours of death or missing status, in accordance with Chap 6, AR 600-10, and forwarded through casualty reporting channels to the command (PSC) having custody of the individual's personnel records. Such letters will be signed by the commanding officer but will be undated. The PSC will forward the letter to Theater PERSCOM (ATTN: Casualty Branch) NLT 72-hours after notification of death or missing status.

6 CASUALTY FILES. Casualty files will be maintained and disposed of in accordance with AR 340-18-1 and AR 340-18-7.

7 BOARDS OF INQUIRY FOR MISSING PERSONS. Boards of Inquiry will be conducted in accordance with Chap 8, AR 600-10.

8 ASSEMBLY AREA SUPPORT (US CASUALTIES)

a Personnel Hospitalized. The records described in para 1-12, AR 640-10, will be forwarded to the hospital within 48-hours after receipt of the transfer order from the hospital concerned. If an individual is medically evacuated and a hospital transfer order is not received within 20 days after evacuation, the individual's military records will be forwarded through casualty reporting channels until they reach a headquarters having knowledge of the disposition of the individual.

APPENDIX 3 (CASUALTY SYSTEM) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

b Personnel Deceased, Missing, Missing in Action, Interned, or Captured

(1) Deceased The records described in Table 3-23, Rules 1-7, AR 640-10 will be forwarded as indicated therein. A copy of each transmittal document will be forwarded to Theater PERSCOM (ATTN: Casualty Branch)

(2) Missing, Missing in Action, Interned, or Captured The personnel and related records in AR 640-10 will be forwarded through casualty reporting channels to Theater PERSCOM (ATTN: Casualty Branch) 30 days after the casualty report has been submitted

(3) Financial Data Records Folders Financial Data Records Folders belonging to US military personnel reported missing, missing in action, interned in foreign country, or captured by a hostile force will be forwarded (without closing entries) to Settlements Operations, US Army Finance Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana 46249 (See para 3-27, AR 37-104-2) Pay accounts of US Civilian personnel in these categories will be handled in accordance with Chap 18, AR 37-105

(4) Casualty Mail Casualty Mail will be forwarded as prescribed by servicing APO

APPENDIX 4 (PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PROCUREMENT AND APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS AND WARRANT

OFFICERS The following instructions will govern the procurement and appointment of officers and warrant officers

a Appointment of Warrant Officers The current policies and procedures specified in AR 135-100 for the appointments of US Army Reserve WO, and AR 601-101 for Regular Army Warrant Officers apply

b Application for the United States Military Academy Applications for attendance at the United States Military Academy will continue to be processed in accordance with AR 351-12

c Authority to Announce Officer Appointments

(1) Recommendations for battlefield appointments will be forwarded to HQ 800th MP Bde ATTN Brigade S-1 by electronically transmitted message Recommendations will include age, citizenship, education level, moral character, security clearance, and medical qualification (See AR 601-50)

(2) Application and recommendations for direct appointment will be forwarded to HQ800th MP Bde ATTN Brigade S-1 in accordance with provisions of AR 135-100

(3) Orders appointing personnel applying or recommended for appointment under AR 601-50 will be issued by Theater PERSCOM

d Authority to Announce WO Appointments It is expected that the Department of the Army will grant Theater PERSCOM authority to appoint temporary Army of the United States (AUS) WO with concurrent active duty On receipt of these instructions, implementing policies and procedures will be announced

e Reserve Officers and WOs on Active Duty in an Enlisted Status WO and enlisted personnel who hold reserve commissions or warrants may apply or be recommended for orders to active duty in their reserve grade Applications or recommendation will be submitted to HQ800th MP Bde ATTN Brigade S-1 When ordered to active duty in their reserve grades, these individuals may be retained in their unit of previous assignment, provided suitable vacancies exist No commander will be displaced by an officer ordered to active duty by this authority until a change in command is ordered by the next senior commander

2 PROCUREMENT OF ENLISTED SOLDIERS Active duty personnel will continue to be re-enlisted in the Regular Army in accordance with AR 601-280

APPENDIX 5 (PERSONNEL ACTIONS) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PROMOTIONS Current policies and procedures will remain in effect until authority to effect the temporary promotion of commissioned officers, warrant officers and enlisted personnel and the criteria for these promotions are received from the Department of the Army

2 PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORT. Wartime functions will be phased as follows, as mission requirements permit

- a M-Day Casualty Reporting
 - In/Out Processing
 - Contact TM Assistance
 - Survivors Assistance
 - Promotions
 - Personnel Rel & Nuclear Surety
 - ID Tags/ID Cards

- b M30 all actions in a , as required, and
 - Publication of Orders
 - Special Actions
 - Field Commissioning
 - Status Change Transmission
 - Awards and Decorations

- c M45 all actions in b , as required, and
 - CMD Information Papers
 - Technical Visits

- d M90 all actions in c , as required, and
 - Port Calls
 - Morale Services
 - Reclassification Actions

- e M120 all actions in d , as required, and
 - OER

- f OUT all actions in e , as required, and
 - Dependent Services
 - Reenlistment
 - MOS, School, Skill Testing
 - Qualification Boards
 - EER

3 ELIMINATION, SEPARATIONS, AND RETIREMENTS Effective upon Mobilization, the following instructions will apply

APPENDIX 5 (PERSONNEL ACTIONS) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

a Elimination of Officers Actions to eliminate officers will continue to be processed under AR 635-100 The provisions of Section VI, AR 635-120, pertaining to the resignation of female officers and warrant officers by reason of marriage will be suspended

b Separation of Enlisted Personnel All administrative discharges under the provisions of AR 623-200 will be discontinued except

(1) Section IV, Chap 5, National Health, Safety, or Interest

(2) Section III, Chap 8, Pregnancy

(3) Section IV, Chap 8, Parenthood

c Application for Retirement Voluntary length of service retirement will be suspended Statutory retirements will continue to be processed

4 RECLASSIFICATION It is anticipated that reclassification actions will be suspended by HQ, DA Actions being initiated or received after announcement of hostilities will be held pending HQ, DA decision

APPENDIX 6 (RECOVERED US AND ALLIED PERSONNEL) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL

a The following procedures apply to US Army elements recovering members of the US Armed Forces, as defined in Article 2, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and allied personnel enjoying similar status of US personnel from enemy controlled territory. These procedures do not apply when recovering personnel who have been cut off in enemy controlled territory or held by the enemy for a short period of time prior to recovery.

b US and allied personnel recovered from enemy controlled territory will be processed through replacement channels, except returnees considered persons of intelligence value and returnees whose physical condition makes it mandatory that they be processed through medical channels.

c Recovering units will immediately interrogate recovered personnel for information of tactical value. More detailed interrogation will be accomplished as required at appropriate replacement facilities. When it is determined that a returnee is a person of intelligence value, that person will be instructed not to discuss his experiences in enemy controlled territory until he is debriefed by authorized intelligence personnel.

2 RECOVERY OF US/ALLIED PERSONNEL

a Reporting The recovery of US personnel from the enemy will be reported as a SPOT REPORT to the HQ, 800th MP Bde, ATTN: Brigade S-1. The SPOT REPORT will contain at least the following information: soldier's full name, SSN, rank, unit, location of recovery, and if allied, nationality of the soldier.

b Recovery Escort guard companies moving forward who recover US/Allied personnel will transport these personnel to the Corps Holding Area, and turn them over to the military police there. Escort guard companies moving to the rear who recover US/Allied personnel will transport these personnel to the Internment Facility. The brigade staff will coordinate for their transportation to the replacement detachment or intelligence debriefing center. Recovered US/Allied personnel will be provided with food, water, clothing and emergency medical care.

c Evacuation US/Allied personnel recovered from the enemy, except those of intelligence value, will be evacuated as soon as possible to our supporting replacement detachment. Recovered personnel of intelligence value will be moved expeditiously, under escort, to the nearest US Army debriefing center. The brigade staff will coordinate with the supporting Area Support Group (ASG) for transportation of recovered personnel to the appropriate location.

APPENDIX 7 (AWARDS AND DECORATIONS) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PURPOSE To establish policy, criteria, and administrative instructions concerning individual military awards during wartime, contingency operations, or exercises simulating combat conditions

2 APPLICABILITY This Appendix is applicable to the S1 staff section of HQ, 800th MP Bde, and to all personnel and units assigned to the command

3 POLICIES

a Wartime criteria will be as established in AR 600-8-22

b Modifications of the established procedures of AR 600-8-22 will be as directed in this Appendix or as deemed appropriate by the Commander, Third US Army (TUSA)

c All recommendations for awards for which the approval authority has not been delegated to the Commander, 800th MP Bde by AR 600-8-22, will be forwarded through HQ, 800th MP Bde, to TUSA for action

d Award recommendation will be prepared and submitted in accordance with AR 600-8-22 with modifications as outlined below

e Award of Army Commendation Medal (ARCOM)(achievement) after six months in-country and award of the Bronze Star (service) upon completion of a period of time to be announced by HQ, TUSA will be accomplished as outlined below

f All other policies and procedures concerning individual or unit awards and decorations will remain unchanged unless specifically addressed in this Appendix

4 UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES

a When it has been determined that an individual has participated in and/or completed a specific act, achievement, or service believed to warrant the award of a decoration, a formal recommendation will be submitted through command channels for consideration and action

b Recommendations will be submitted on a DA Form 638 and may be handwritten in a legible manner or typewritten when possible

c Part IV of the DA Form 638 will be used to fully justify the individual's performance and recognition. The peacetime restriction limiting item 15 to a nine-line entry no longer applies nor is the requirement for a one-page summary of the act, achievement, or service applicable. Exceptions to the above apply to acts of heroism (valor) and recommendations for the Distinguished Service Medal awards and above, which must meet the strict criteria outlined in AR 600-8-22.

APPENDIX 7 (AWARDS AND DECORATIONS) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

d Endorsements from an individual's chain of command on award recommendations may be waived in those instances when geographical dispersion or operational commitments make it impractical to obtain. In these cases, the individual's immediate commander will make a comment on his endorsement addressing the particular problem.

e Upon an individual's completion of six months in a hostile area and upon completion of a period of time to be announced, the commander may recommend a soldier for an ARCOM (achievement) or Bronze Star (service) respectively. This action will be accomplished by annotating a SIDPERS roster (when available) or by submission of a handwritten list by the immediate commander, when the roster is not available. Care must be taken to insure compliance with AR 600-31 and that the roster is updated on a monthly basis.

f Award recommendations for KIAs and MIAs will be processed 30 days after determination of the individual's status and in accordance with AR 600-8-22.

g Ceremonies will be conducted in accordance with local policies and FM 22-5.

5 S-1 SECTION RESPONSIBILITIES

a All recommendations will be processed in a timely and accurate manner. Verification of pertinent data not furnished on the DA Form 638 will be obtained from the custodian of military records. Return of award recommendations for corrective action will be held to a minimum.

b Peacetime practice of holding an Awards Review Board will be discontinued. Unless wartime conditions award approval authority is further delegated, the Brigade Commander is the designated approval authority for the Army Commendation Medal (ARCOM), Approval of the Meritorious Service Medal (MSM) and the Army Achievement Medal (AAM) in an area of combat operations. If rescinded, these are peacetime only awards. Approval authority for 800th MP Bde Certificates of Achievement is delegated to Commanders in the rank/grade of LTC/O5. All recommendations for awards for which the approval authority has not been delegated to the Commander, 800th MP Bde by AR 600-8-22, will be forwarded through HQ, 800th MP Bde, to TUSA for action.

c Eligibility criteria for all awards will be as directed in AR 600-8-22. Awards for valor and recommendations for the Distinguished Service Medal and above will be processed to ensure accuracy in format and will be typed by the S-1 section prior to forwarding to the approval authority. Achievement award and Service award certificates will use a standardized citation to facilitate expeditious processing.

d A SIDPERS by name/by unit roster will be distributed to all subordinate units on a regular basis. Service awards will be accomplished using the returned annotated rosters. Publishing, distribution, and posting of award orders and certificates will be the S-1 section responsibility.

APPENDIX 7 (AWARDS AND DECORATIONS) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

e Awards to Foreign (Allied) Military Personnel and awards to personnel of other US Military services will be accomplished in accordance with AR 600-8-22

APPENDIX 8 (STOCKAGE OF PUBLICATIONS AND FORMS) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 STOCKAGE OF PUBLICATIONS AND FORMS

a PUBLICATIONS Commander responsible for the activation of units will provide minimum essential publications from available resources

b FORMS Administrative headquarters, through battalion and separate company level, will stock blank forms required by this SOP and other mission essential directives in sufficient quantities to meet estimated requirements for the initial 60 days after outbreak of hostilities

2 REQUISITION OF PUBLICATIONS AND BLANK FORMS

a DOD and DA ITEMS Units will continue to requisition publications and DOD and DA blank forms from CONUS AG Publication Centers. Until forms are available through pinpoint distribution from CONUS, units with a reproduction capability will reproduce DOD and DA blank forms in quantities sufficient to meet their needs

3 DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLICATIONS Distribution of publications will be accomplished through command channel distribution

4 TRANSMITTAL OF REPORTS Commanders will provide courier service between all echelons of their commands to ensure the fastest possible collection and dispatch of reports that must be transmitted. When available, air courier service will be used to expedite collection and delivery of reports. Reports will be placed in pouches or otherwise securely packaged. They will be addressed plainly and contents identified to ensure prompt delivery

5 RECORDS DISPOSAL PROCEDURES

a Emergency Disposal Pursuant to the Records Disposal Act of 1943, records in the custody of the Army outside the territorial limits of the continental United States may be destroyed at any time during the existence of a state of war between the United States and any other nation, or when hostile action by a foreign power appears imminent, if their retention is prejudicial to the interest of the United States. When emergency disposal is effected, a list of files destroyed and the inclusive dates of each file will be compiled to the extent possible. This list will be forwarded through command channels to HQ Department of the Army, ATTN DAAG-AMR-P, Washington, D C 20314

b A standard system for the identification of categories of files for units is established as indicated below to provide uniform treatment of files under emergency conditions.

(1) Priority A Evacuated with Advance/Quartermaster Party Examples of these are plans, military personnel files, medical files, and regulations, both administrative and technical

APPENDIX 8 (STOCKAGE OF PUBLICATIONS AND FORMS) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(2) Priority B Retired or shipped to a records holding center if conditions permit. If conditions do not permit such action, destroy. Examples of these are special orders, civilian medical records, X-rays, pay records, budget, and legal records.

(3) Priority C Destroyed if state of war exists or hostile action by a foreign power appears imminent. This identification may be effective under wartime conditions if actions indicated in Priority A and B are not possible. These files are normally destroyed if emergency conditions arise and time permits.

(4) Priority D Abandoned in place. Unclassified files (e.g., reference paper files, short term records, etc.) that do not warrant actions in (1), (2), or (3) above. Examples of these are housekeeping files, duplicate sets of orders, etc.

c Non-Emergency Disposal Under wartime conditions, files, regardless of security classification, will be disposed of as prescribed in para 5 a and 5 b above.

d Accidental Disposal In cases of accidental loss or destruction of files by fire or other causes, the following actions will be taken:

(1) Reconstruction of as much of the lost or destroyed permanent files as possible. For example, Organizational Planning Files will be reconstructed by replacing the lost or destroyed documents with reference copies maintained in other offices or other agencies. Other permanent files will be reconstructed in the same manner if the lost or destroyed documents can be identified and copies can be obtained from other sources.

(2) When it is not possible to reconstruct permanent files, they will be identified on an SF 135/135A (Records Transmittal/Receipt) and forwarded to the Third US Army (TUSA) G-1.

APPENDIX 9 (POSTAL) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL Recipients of personal mail should not expect mail within the first 30 days of any contingency operation due to the constraints of operating through USPS and numerous governmental and DOD agencies when operating OCONUS First Class mail will receive high transportation priority once the sustainment phase is developed Special postal services will not be available until the sustainment phase of the operation is reached During initial phases of operations, Third US Army will determine if mail will be constrained

2 SUPPORT The Personnel Group assigned to Third Army will be responsible for the conduct of postal operations The 800th MP Bde will be supported by the GS Postal Company assigned to our Area Support Group (ASG)

3 RESPONSIBILITIES

a S-1, 800th MP Bde

(1) Upon arrival/departure in/from AOR, coordinate with servicing postal company for receipt of or discontinuance of postal support Provide pre-assigned contingency APO to the servicing postal company

(2) Coordinate with supporting postal company to pickup/deliver mail

(3) Breakdown mail received from postal company by unit (Battalion/separate company)

(4) Receive mail from subordinate units and forward to postal company

(5) Establish times for subordinate units to pickup/deliver mail at the ALOC

(6) Publish directives/guidance on mail operations in operations order

(7) Supervise mail operations within the brigade

b Subordinate units

(1) Pickup/deliver mail at ALOC at established time

(2) Distribute mail to individual soldier at unit mail call

(3) Ensure soldiers use correct/accurate address including pre-assigned contingency

APO

APPENDIX 10 (MORALE, WELFARE AND RECREATION ((MWR)) TO ANNEX S
(PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL Recognizing that effective MWR programs are a combat multiplier, the 800th MP Bde will have MWR plans for every phase of an operation, from pre-deployment to redeployment. MWR programs include: unit/intramural sports, fitness equipment, religious services, free mail services, quality of life support (latrines, showers, sleeping area), newspapers and reading materials, films and videos, live entertainment (USO shows), Health and Comfort Packets (HCPs), telephone service, AAFES Tactical Field Exchanges (TFEs), Armed Forces Radio/Television Service, Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Areas, and local tours to points of interest or events.

2 RESPONSIBILITIES

a Brigade Commander The morale of the 800th MP Bde is the commander's responsibility. The commander will provide his guidance and focus for the unit's MWR programs.

b Brigade S-1

(1) Primary staff proponent for the planning, coordination and implementation of 800th MP Bde MWR programs.

(2) Establish policy and procedures for unit MWR operations.

(3) Coordination with Third US Army for MWR support, to include use of telephone centers, TFEs, R & R areas, attendance at live entertainment, participation in cultural tours, etc.

(4) Ensure equitable allotment of quotas for all MWR programs to subordinate units.

(5) Coordinate distribution of MWR kits, supplies, and equipment.

(6) Point of contact with American Red Cross for family emergencies.

(7) Coordinate legal support.

(8) Coordinate religious services with Brigade Chaplain.

c Subordinate Units

(1) Deploy from home station with MWR kits.

(2) Implement unit-level MWR programs.

(3) Ensure equitable sub-allocation of MWR program quotas.

(4) Request MWR support through 800th MP Bde S-1.

APPENDIX 11 (LABOR) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL Local labor support will only be used after coordination and approval by Third US Army (TUSA) Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) will be considered in resolving shortfalls in all functional areas and providing an in-place capability until U.S. CS/CSS units can perform the mission We will attempt to maximize the use of Host Nation (HN) assets, especially transportation and contracted services

2 RESPONSIBILITIES

a 800th MP Bde

(1) Coordinate requests for WHNS through supporting Area Support Group to TUSA

(2) Ensure all Law of Land Warfare, SOFA and WHNS Umbrella Agreement considerations are adhered to in utilizing civilian labor augmentation

b Subordinate Units

(1) Forward request for HN support to ALOC, 800th MP Bde

(2) Ensure proper documentation for all work support provided

(3) Provide security for civilian labor work parties

APPENDIX 12 (HISTORICAL) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO
800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PURPOSE. This Appendix establishes the procedures for the collection, maintenance and preservation of historical data for operations in which this command is involved

2 FUNCTIONS Subordinate commanders engaged in contingency operations, exercises, and combat operations are responsible for the collection, maintenance, and retirement of historical data and source material This information will be included in a historical report covering the operation

3 REPORTS

a A historical report (HISREP) will be submitted by each subordinate battalion, separate company, or detachment of the command There is no specified format for this report, it will be submitted as needed

b The report will cover, in narrative form, the operations and mission related activities of the reporting period

c Journal and Journal Files (AR 220-5) will be used in writing and, as appropriate, will be attached as supporting documents along with copies of operations orders, maps, overlays, photographs, and interview tapes Applicable formats are found in DA Pam 870-2 and AR 870-5

APPENDIX 13 (ACCOUNTING OF EPW, CI AND DC) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL The Brigade Commander is responsible for the accountability and humane care of all Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW), Civilian Internees (CI) and Dislocated Civilians (DC) under the brigade's control. The Brigade S-1 is the commander's executive agent for the accountability of EPW/CI/DC.

2. STANDARD OF ACCOUNTABILITY The accountability of EPW/CI/DC will be accurate, following the same standard for the accountability of U S military personnel -100% accuracy

3 RESPONSIBILITIES

a Brigade S-1

(1) Responsible for the accountability of all EPW/CI/DC under the brigade's control

(2) Provide accurate accountability reports to Third US Army Provost Marshall (PM) as directed

b Internment Facility (IF) Commanders

(1) Responsible for the humane care of EPW/CI/DC under their control

(2) Responsible for accurate accountability of EPW/CI/DC

(3) Provide EPW/CI/DC Accountability Report

(4) Report any escape or deaths as a Serious Incident Report immediately to the
Brigade

Commander

4 REPORTING

a EPW/CI/DC Accountability Report will be submitted daily, as of 2400 hours, due to the HQ, 800th MP Bde no later than 0200 hours

b The senior IF Commander will submit a consolidated EPW/CI/DC Accountability Report including subordinate IF data. For example, the senior IF Commander of a 12K facility (3 battalions co-located) will provide one report

c Format is in Tab D to Appendix 2 (Personnel Reports) to Annex T (Reports)

APPENDIX 14 (ACCOUNTING OF U.S PRISONERS) TO ANNEX S (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION) TO 800TH MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL The Brigade Commander is responsible for the operation of any U.S Confinement Facility established by the brigade, the humane care of the prisoners and their accountability. The Brigade S-1 is the commander's executive agent for the accountability of U.S Prisoners

2 STANDARD OF ACCOUNTABILITY The accountability of U.S Prisoners will be 100% accurate

3 RESPONSIBILITIES

a Brigade S-1

(1) Responsible for the accountability of U S Prisoners under the brigade's control

(2) Provide accurate accountability reports to Third US Army Provost Marshall (PM) as directed

b U S Prisoner Confinement Facility Commander

(1) Responsible for the humane care of U S Prisoners in the confinement facility

(2) Responsible for accurate accountability of U S Prisoners

(3) Provide U S Prisoner Confinement Report

(4) Report any escape or deaths as a Serious Incident Report immediately to the Brigade Commander

4 REPORTING

a U S Prisoner Confinement Report will be submitted daily, as of 2400 hours, due to the HQ, 800th MP Bde no later than 0200 hours

b Format is in Tab E to Appendix 2 (Personnel Reports) to Annex T (Reports)

ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL This ANNEX prescribes the formats and times for all required reports that will be submitted by subordinate headquarters. All reports will contain the identification of the reporting unit and the DTG of the report.

2 Reports will be submitted IAW the reports matrix (See Appendix 1)

3 All reporting times shown are local times. Changes to reporting times will be transmitted by message from this headquarters or indicated in the OPLAN or OPORD.

4 Narrative amplification or problem areas is authorized on all reports.

5 Classification will be IAW the guidance provided in the OPLAN or OPORD.

APPENDICES

- 1 - Required Reports
- 2 - Personnel Reports
- 3 - Intelligence Reports
- 4 - Operations Reports
- 5 - Logistics Reports

APPENDIX 1 (REQUIRED REPORTS TO BRIGADE FROM SUBORDINATE UNITS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

REPORT	SUBMIT TO	TIME AS OF	DUE REPORT	VIA
PER STATUS REPORT (PS/PRR)	S-1	0600	0900	COMM CTR
PER SPOT REPORT	S-1	AS REQUIRED		COMM CTR
CHANGE OF COMMAND REPORT	S-1	AS REQUIRED		COMM
RECOVERY OF US/ALLIED PERS SPOT REPORT	S-1	AS REQUIRED		COMM CTR
EPW/CI/DC ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT	S-1	2400	0300	COMM CTR
U S PRISONER CONFINEMENT REPORT	S-1	2400	0400	COMM CTR
CASUALTY FEEDER REPORT (DA Form 1156/1155)	S-1	AS REQUIRED (within 1 hour of casualty)		COMM CTR
HISREP	S-1	AS DIRECTED (date TBD after completion of operation)		HARD COPY

APPENDIX 2 (PERSONNEL REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- 1 **PURPOSE** To provide a list of all personnel and administrative reports required by this headquarters during tactical operations
- 2 **SUBMITTED BY** All subordinate units assigned or attached to the 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
- 3 **SUBMITTED TO** The Brigade ALOC, ATTN S-1, who will consolidate all reports. Battalions will consolidate subordinate unit data, as well as having individual unit data available
- 4 **WHEN SUBMITTED** Specific reports have reporting times listed on each TAB
- 5 **METHOD AND PRECEDENCE OF SUBMISSION** Reports will be submitted by messenger or electronic transmission with minimum priority precedence. See each TAB for appropriate submission periods and security classification requirements.

TABS

- A - Personnel Summary (PS) Report Procedures
- B - Personnel Requirement Report (PRR) Procedures
- C - Personnel Spot Report
- D - EPW/CI/DC Accountability Report
- E - U S Prisoner Confinement Report

TAB A (PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT PROCEDURES) TO APPENDIX 2
(PERSONNEL REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

1 The initial PS report will be prepared to reflect status as of 1700 hours local on the first day of mobilization, submitted to HQ, 800th MP BDE NLT 2000 hours. A list of non-deployable personnel by unit (name, grade, MOS, and reason) will be attached. Additional PS and non-deployable rosters will be as of 0600 hours LOCAL time and will be submitted NLT 0900 hours daily. These reports will be submitted via secure means only, e.g. electronic message, secure voice, courier, etc. If electronic message is used, a precedence of at least priority will be used. Actual and exercise reports will be submitted separately.

2 On one PS report, Battalion size elements will submit a total rollup, and then will submit each company's information separately, using DA Form 5367-R.

3 PS Report Heading

a The REPORT NUMBER will begin with 001 and will continue to be numbered consecutively, i.e., 002, 003, etc. If a corrected copy (or copies) of PS is submitted, the REPORT NUMBER will be followed by A, B, C, etc., i.e., 001A, 001B, etc.

b Date-time group (DTG) PREPARED reflects the actual date and time group the report was prepared.

c PERIOD ENDING reflects the as of DTG. dd0600mmyy, in LOCAL time.

d UNIT identifies the name of the unit submitting the reporting.

e CLASSIFICATION of the PS, i.e., CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET.

4 PART I - Unit Strength. Lines in this part are:

a Column A. The UNIT column identifies the name of the unit(s) for the data in Columns B thru K. Units will identify subordinate elements.

b Column B. The REQ (required) column reflects the unit's required strength by MTOE.

c Column C. The ASGD (assigned) column reflects the total assigned strength by officers, warrant officers, enlisted and totals. ASGD is either the initial ASGD data (PS NO 001) or end data (Column J) from the previous PS report.

d Columns D. The Deploy STR (Deployed Strength) reflects the total number deployed by officers, warrant officers, enlisted, 95B, total and females.

e Column E. Totals the KIAs (Killed in Action) by officers, warrant officers, enlisted, 95B, total, and females. KIAs are soldiers killed as a result of combat.

TAB A (PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT PROCEDURES) TO APPENDIX 2
(PERSONNEL REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

f Column F Totals in WIA (Wounded In Action) by officers, warrant officers, enlisted, 95B, total, and females Wounded in action are those soldiers wounded as a result of combat in the area of operation or injured enroute to the area of operation (e.g , combat jump).

g Column G Totals in MIA (Missing In Action) by officers, warrant officers, enlisted, 95Bs, totals, and females MIAs are those soldiers that are captured by the enemy or cannot be accounted for after combat action

h Column H Totals in Non-BAT Losses (Non Battle Injury) by officers, warrant officers, enlisted, 95Bs, total, and females Non-Battle injuries are injuries that are a result of anything other than combat related (e g hospitalized more than 24 hours, administrative retrogrades, emergency leaves, command approved returns)

i Column I REPL (Replacements) reflects the number of replacements assigned by officers, warrant officers, enlisted, 95Bs, totals, and females Replacements are non-cumulative, i e , reflect data since the previous PDS submission only

j Column J OPR STR is the unit's operating strength reflecting assigned personnel with additions and deletions based on Columns D thru I by officers, warrant officers, enlisted, 95Bs, totals and females Operating Strength will become the deployed strength (Column D) for subsequent PDS report

k Column K % (percent) is reflected by dividing the OPR STR (Column J) by the REQ column (Column B) The percentage will be shown by officers, warrant officers, enlisted, 95Bs, totals and females

l The TOTAL at the bottom of the form will reflect the sum of all columns by officers, warrant officers, enlisted, 95Bs, totals, and females NOTE Attachments will be shown in Part I of the PDS as a subordinate unit reflecting all unit data in Columns A through K The data will be added by officers, warrant officers, enlisted, 95Bs, totals, and females into the personnel strength totals (paragraph 3j above) of the gaining unit Also, the attached unit's data will be reflected in Part II (ATTACHMENT) DETACHMENTS will not be shown in Part I of the PDS Detached unit data will be subtracted from personnel strength totals of the losing unit

4 Part II - Attachments Lines in this part are

a Column A UNIT identifies the name of the unit(s) attached to include the name of the higher headquarters

b Column B UNIT DETACHED FROM identifies the name of the losing unit to include the name of the subordinate unit, if so affected

c Column C UNIT ATTACHED TO identifies the name of the gaining unit

TAB A (PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT PROCEDURES) TO APPENDIX 2
(PERSONNEL REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

d Column D REQ (required) column reflects the attached unit's required strength

e Column E The DEPL STR (deployed strength) column reflects the total deployed strength of the attached unit by officers, warrant officers, enlisted, 95Bs, totals, and females
NOTE The gaining command should complete Part II (ATTACHMENT) prior to beginning the PDS report Part II will be submitted with the PDS report only when the attachment occurred during the reporting period The data will be included in Part I of the PDS report and reflected in the personnel strength totals of the gaining command The gaining command should contact the losing unit for information pertaining to casualties and replacements since the submission of the previous PDS report, i.e., as of 1800 hours

5 Part III - DETACHMENT Lines in this part are

a Column A UNIT identifies the names of the unit(s) detached to include the name of the higher headquarters

b Column B UNIT ATTACHED TO identifies the name of the gaining unit

c Column C UNIT ATTACHED FROM identifies the name of the losing unit to include the name of the subordinate unit if so affected

d Column D REQ column reflects the detached unit's required strength

e Column E The DEPL STR (deployed strength) column reflects the total deployed strength of the detached unit by officers, warrant officers, enlisted, 95Bs, totals, and females
NOTE The losing command should complete Part III (DETACHMENT) prior to beginning Part I of PDS report Part III will be submitted with the PDS report only when the detachment occurred during the reporting period The data will not be included in Part I of the PDS report and will not be reflected in the personnel strength totals of the losing command

6 PART IV - REMARKS The remarks column will be used to report additional critical MOS shortages that the Commander or S-1 feel affect the accuracy of the report, and serious incident information, with a final comment on the morale and esprit de corps of the unit

7 Experience has shown that units should maintain the following data for future reference/statistical records Reports will be required on an as needed basis

a Individual and unit arrival/departure dates (include attachments)

b Data on non-deployables (number and reasons)

c Data on awards (race, sex, and type award)

d Information on non-US citizens deployed (name, rank, SSN, unit)

TAB A (PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT PROCEDURES) TO APPENDIX 2
(PERSONNEL REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

- e. Data on administrative retrogrades and MEDIVACS out of theater.
- f. Information on non-combatant civilian casualties and circumstances

TAB B (PERSONNEL REQUIREMENT REPORT PROCEDURES) TO APPENDIX 2
(PERSONNEL REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

1 GENERAL This TAB provides instruction for requisitioning personnel for deployed units
Subordinate units will cross level personnel prior to submitting this report

2 SUBMITTED BY A single source from each subordinate command, normally the S-1

3 SUBMITTED TO The Brigade S-1 will consolidate all subordinate reports

4 WHEN SUBMITTED

a The initial PRR will be prepared to reflect status as of 1700 hours local on the first day of mobilization, submitted to HQ, 800th MP BDE NLT 1800 hours

b A Hasty PRR/ Emergency Fills are reported for the purpose of filling an MOS/RANK specific position or whenever there is a loss of a critical position (e g commander or sergeant major)

c PRR's will be compiled as part of the PSR with an as of time of 0600 hours local, submitted to HQ 800th MP BDE NLT 0900 hours local

5 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

a Classification CONFIDENTIAL or higher

b Method or Transmission Secure means only, e g , message copy Alternate methods by secure telephone or courier

c Precedence Priority or higher, if necessary by the originator

6 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

a Report Number - The PRR is submitted in numerical sequence (e g 001, 002 etc) If an emergency PRR is needed, label the PRR "EMERGENCY" and use an alpha-numeric designator, e g 001A, 002A, etc

b DTG Prepared - The Date - Time - Group is written to reflect the date and time the report is prepared (e g 281830Z Jan 94)

c For Period Ending (DTG) - The Date - Time - Group is to reflect the period ending at 0600 local for the day it is to be submitted This report will cover the losses of personnel from the previous day

d Units - is to ID the unit submitting the report

e PART I - PRR

TAB B (PERSONNEL REQUIREMENT REPORT PROCEDURES) TO APPENDIX 2
(PERSONNEL REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

(1) SSI/PMOS - IDs the *Primary Military Occupational Skill (PMOS)* that must be filled to successfully accomplish the unit's mission

(2) Grade - is the rank of that particular PMOS that has been identified as a critical shortage

(3) ASI - is for personnel who have a particular skill in their PMOS that is needed (e.g Q9/V5)

(4) REQ - the number of personnel required by MTOE for that PMOS and grade

(5) ASGN - number of personnel assigned to the unit in that PMOS and grade

(6) RQMT - the total number of personnel needed to bring the unit back to full strength within that PMOS and grade

f PART II - Remarks - This position is used to clarify or point out critical information

TAB C (PERSONNEL SPOT REPORT) TO APPENDIX 2 (PERSONNEL REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 The Personnel Spot Report provides critical personnel loss data in a hasty report format. The Personnel Spot Report should be submitted to Brigade S-1 by the quickest means available, when necessity exists (e.g. extremely high casualties, 25% or more of operating strength or losses of key personnel)

2 Report Format

a Part I - Losses Lines in this part are

(1) Column A Unit identifies the name of the unit submitting the report

(2) Columns B, C, D, and E Totals KIA (killed in action), WIA (wounded in action), MIA (missing in action), and NONBAT LOSSES (nonbattle losses) including DNBI (disease and nonbattle injury) and ADMIN (administrative) losses by officers, warrant officers, enlisted, 95Bs, totals, and females

(3) Columns F Totals losses (the sum total of Columns B, C, D, and E) by officers, warrant officers, 95Bs, totals, and females

b Part II - Remarks The remarks section may be used to report critical combat power MOS/SSI losses, description of non-battle losses (such as Commanders or Principal Staff), and when available, a brief narrative of what action occurred which necessitated the submission of a Personnel Spot Report

ENCLOSURE

Sample Personnel Spot Report

ENCLOSURE TO TAB C (PERSONNEL SPOT REPORT) TO APPENDIX 2 (PERSONNEL REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

PERSONNEL SPOT REPORT

PART I. LOSSES

- A UNIT XXTH MP Bn (EPW/CI)
- B KIA 1/0/21/23/1 (officer/warrant officer/enlisted/total/female)
- C WIA 2/0/40/42/0
- D MIA. 1/0/3/4/0
- E NONBAT LOSSES 0/0/8/8/0
- F TOTAL LOSSES 4/0/72/77/1

PART II REMARKS

- A Critical combat power MOS/SSI losses
- B Description of non-battle losses
- C Key personnel losses

TAB D (EPW/CI/DC ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT) TO APPENDIX 2 (PERSONNEL REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- 1 SUBMITTED BY Internment Facility Commander
- 2 SUBMITTED TO HQ, 800th MP BDE, ATTN S-1
- 3 AS OF 2400 hours
- 4 DUE 0300 hours
- 5 FORMAT

Part I – Number EPW/CI/DC processed since last report

a EPW

Officers	NCOs	Enlisted
Male _____	Male _____	Male _____
Female _____	Female _____	Female _____
Total _____		

b CI

Men _____	Women _____	Children _____ (under age 17)
Total _____		

c DC

Men _____	Women _____	Children _____ (under age 17)
Total _____		

d Special Category – Unaccompanied Minors (under age 18)

AGE	Male	Female	
0-3	_____	_____	
4-7	_____	_____	
8-12	_____	_____	
13-17	_____	_____	Total _____

TAB D (EPW/CI/DC ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT) TO APPENDIX 2 (PERSONNEL REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

Part II – Number EPW/CI/DC in transit (under control of escort guard companies going from Corps Holding Area to Internment Facility or awaiting processing)

a EPW

Officers	NCOs	Enlisted
Male _____	Male _____	Male _____
Female _____	Female _____	Female _____
Total _____		

b CI

Men _____	Women _____	Children _____ (under age 17)
Total _____		

c DC

Men _____	Women _____	Children _____ (under age 17)
Total _____		

d Special Category – Unaccompanied Minors (under age 18)

AGE	Male	Female	
0-3	_____	_____	
4-7	_____	_____	
8-12	_____	_____	
13-17	_____	_____	Total _____

Part III – Number transferred (over last 24 hours) to medical channel

a EPW

Officers	NCOs	Enlisted
Male _____	Male _____	Male _____
Female _____	Female _____	Female _____
Total _____		

TAB D (EPW/CI/DC ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT) TO APPENDIX 2 (PERSONNEL REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

b CI

Men _____ Women _____ Children _____
 (under age 17)
 Total _____

Part IV – Number transferred (over last 24 hours) to intelligence channel

a EPW

Officers	NCOs	Enlisted
Male _____	Male _____	Male _____
Female _____	Female _____	Female _____
Total _____		

b CI

Men _____ Women _____ Children _____
 (under age 17)
 Total _____

Part V – Number repatriated (over last 24 hours)

EPW

Officers	NCOs	Enlisted
Male _____	Male _____	Male _____
Female _____	Female _____	Female _____
Total _____		

b CI

Men _____ Women _____ Children _____
 (under age 17)
 Total _____

TAB D (EPW/CI/DC ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT) TO APPENDIX 2 (PERSONNEL REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

Part VI – Number of EPW/CI escapees (denoted with an "E"), returnees (denoted with an "R") or deaths (denoted with a "D") since last report

a EPW

Officers	NCOs	Enlisted
Male _____	Male _____	Male _____
Female _____	Female _____	Female _____
Total _____		

b CI

Men _____	Women _____	Children _____ (under age 17)
Total _____		

Part VII – Remarks

TAB E (U S. PRISONER CONFINEMENT REPORT) TO APPENDIX 2 (PERSONNEL REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

- 1 SUBMITTED BY U.S Prisoner Confinement Facility Commander
- 2 SUBMITTED TO HQ, 800th MP BDE, ATTN: S-1
- 3 AS OF. 2400 hours
- 4 DUE 0400 hours
- 5 FORMAT

Part I – Number of U S Prisoners Confined

Officers	NCOs	Enlisted
Male _____	Male _____	Male _____
Female _____	Female _____	Female _____
Total _____		

Part II – Prisoner List (confined in last 24 hours)

Name (last, first, MI)
SSN (000-00-0000)
Rank/Grade (SGT/E5)
Sex (Male or Female)
Service (USA/USAF/USN/USMC)
Offense (murder)
Status (pre-trial or post trial)

APPENDIX 3 (INTELLIGENCE) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

1 GENERAL Intelligence reports submitted by tactical and support units form the basis for the commander to analyze the enemy situation, his own situation and decide future plans and operations Over-emphasis cannot be given to the exactness, accuracy and completeness of intelligence reports

2. Spot Intelligence Report (SPOTREP)

a Spot Intelligence Reports are one-time reports used by all levels of command to transmit intelligence information of immediate value An example of the format is at Tab A and should include who, what, when, and where

b Spot Intelligence Reports will be confirmed in the Intelligence Summary (INTSUM).

3 Intelligence Summary (INTSUM)

a Intelligence summaries will cover 12-hour periods (as of 0800 and 2000 local) and will be submitted to the Brigade S-2 not later than 1000 and 2200 hours each day

b Intelligence summaries are used to report and summarize intelligence data gained by unit operations, identification enemy units operating in the area, civilian personnel sympathetic to the enemy cause, collaborating with or aiding the enemy, identification of areas where the enemy is receiving support

c Example of the intelligence summary is at Tab B

4 Patrol Debriefing Report

a Battalion S-2 will forward to the brigade S-2 a spot intelligence report providing the results of each patrol The patrol debriefing report will be maintained at the unit level.

b Example of the patrol debriefing report is at Tab C

TABS

A - Spot Intelligence Report (SPOTREP)

B - Intelligence Summary (INTSUM)

C - Patrol Debriefing

D - Intelligence Report (INTREP)

TAB A (SPOT INTELLIGENCE REPORT) TO APPENDIX 3 (INTELLIGENCE) TO ANNEX
T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PURPOSE To report information related to enemy activity

2 The timeliness of this report is critical This report should be transmitted via secure means
and be complete

3 Report

SPOT INTELLIGENCE REPORT (SPOTREP)

From Submitting headquarters

To Commander, 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) ATTN S-2

Line 1 SPOTREP Report #/DTG

Line 2 Size - of enemy unit or activity

Line 3 Activity - type or description

Line 4 Location - of activity or target

Line 5 Unit - identification of type

Line 6 Time - of incident or observation

Line 7 Equipment

Line 8 Remarks on the incident

Line 9 Friendly unit or element making observation

Line 10 Sender's evaluation of information validity

Source reliability A B C D E (complete/usually/fairly/not unreliable/can't usually be judged)

Info credibility 1 2 3 4 5 6 (confirmed/probable/possible/doubtful/improbable/can't be judged)

TAB B (INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY) TO APPENDIX 3 (INTELLIGENCE) TO ANNEX T
(REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1. **PURPOSE** To provide a summary of intelligence activities and information to the commander

2. **DISSEMINATION** Submitted to subordinate S-2s and next higher S-2 or G-2 One copy maintained in TOC and issued twice daily

3. Lines 1, 2, 11 and 12 are always included Other lines may be omitted

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (INTSUM)

Line 1 Issuing unit

Line 2 Time and date of issue

Line 3 Summary of enemy activity for a period

1 Ground activity

2 NBC activity

3 Trace of forward elements

Line 4 Enemy personnel and equipment losses

1 Personnel (KIA/MIA)

2 EPW/CIIs

3 Equipment destroyed

Line 5 New obstacles and barriers

Line 6 Administrative activities

Line 7 New identification

1 Units

2 Personalities

Line 8 Enemy movement

Line 9 Estimated number and type of vehicles

Line 10 Weather and terrain conditions

Line 11 Discussion of capabilities and vulnerabilities

Line 12 Conclusions

TAB C (PATROL DEBRIEFING) TO APPENDIX 3 (INTELLIGENCE) TO ANNEX T
(REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

PATROL DEBRIEFING REPORT

UNIT

PLACE DEBRIEFED

DEBRIEFER AND UNIT

- 1 Patrol mission
- 2 Results obtained
- 3 Composition of patrol
- 4 Was intelligence concerning the target correct and complete enough to perform mission?
- 5 What was the enemy reaction to your patrol?
- 6 Who initiated contact?
- 7 Describe enemy uniform and insignia
- 8 Describe enemy strength and disposition
- 9 Describe enemy weapons and equipment
- 10 Describe enemy equipment captured
- 11 Describe enemy tactics employed
- 12 What was the enemy's combat effectiveness?
- 13 Report enemy KIA and WIA
- 14 Were any enemy personnel captured? Report disposition
- 15 Describe relationship between enemy and civilian population
- 16 Report contact with civilian population, indicate attitude, assistance rendered, involvement in hostilities
- 17 Were any PW at target?
- 18 Were PW of other nationalities at target?
- 19 Were any PW KIA or WIA?
- 20 Were any PWs ill or wounded prior to patrol's actions?
- 21 Identity PW not recovered
- 22 Report accuracy of maps used by patrols
- 23 Indicate map corrections
- 24 What intelligence, which was not provided, would have been useful?
- 25 Recommendations

**TAB D (INTELLIGENCE REPORTS) TO APPENDIX 3 (INTELLIGENCE) TO ANNEX T
(REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP**

1 Purpose The intelligence report (INTREP) provides a little analysis or a summation of events occurring within the unit AO

2 General The INTREP can be explanatory in nature. It should discuss trends, analysis and events. The INTREP is used to pass information that is more detailed than a SALUTE report, but that cannot wait for the INTSUM.

3 Format There is no specific format for an INTREP, however it should be self-explanatory.

**APPENDIX 4 (OPERATIONS REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO THE 800th
MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP**

1 GENERAL. This annex prescribes the formats and times of all required operational reports that will be submitted by subordinate headquarters. All reports will contain the identification of the reporting unit and the DTG of the report.

2 All reports will be submitted IAW the reports in Annex T.

TABS

A-COMMANDER'S NARRATIVE SUMMARY

B-ORDERS

C-EPW/CI REPORT

D-OPSEC REPORT

TAB A (COMMANDER'S NARRATIVE SUMMARY) TO APPENDIX 4 (OPERATIONS REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 This report provides the brigade commander with information about the unit's activities, plans, and concerns This report will be submitted daily NLT 1200 hours local as of 1800 hours

2 FORMAT.

CLASSIFICATION

FROM

TO CDR, 800th MP Bde (EPW/CI)

INFO

DTG

SEQUENCE NUMBER (number in sequence 01, 02, etc)

1 Major Significant Activities Summary (Last 24 Hours) This summary contains the following information a statement of the situation at the end of the period, to include any special conditions, results of operations and activities, Battalion boundaries, primary objectives, and the commander's evaluation of significant information about intelligence, operations, air defense, fire support, personnel and logistics, as appropriate

2 Change To Existing Plans And Reasons This paragraph will explain and indicate the cause of changes to operations or plans

3 Plans Summary For Next 24 Hours This summary describes plans for operations during the next 24 hours Comments should be provided on task organization changes, missions, subordinate units' missions, objectives, general plans for attack or defense, support needed, coordination required. probable enemy reaction and proposed CP location

4 Significant Projected Activities Significant projected activities are those events of interest to the commander

5 Commander's Comments This portion is the Battalion Commander's opportunity to bring the attention of the Brigade Commander issues or actions that affect his unit or his mission

ENCLOSURE

Example Battalion Report

ENCLOSURE TO TAB A (COMMANDER'S NARRATIVE SUMMARY) TO APPENDIX 4
(OPERATIONS REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP

Example Battalion Report

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
SUBJECT Commander's Summary #

- 1 Period Covered 221800-231800 AUG 90
- 2 Significant Activities/Operations In The Last 24 Hours
 - a A MP CO
 - b B MP CO
 - c C MP CO
 - d D MP CO
- 3 Battalion Strength Figures
HHD, 1 MP Bn 00 FEMALES
A MP CO 00 HHD - OFF-----00
B MP CO 00 W/O-----00
C MP CO 00 ENL-----00
D MP CO 00
TOTAL 00
A MP-OFF-----00 B MP-OFF-----00
W/O-----00 W/O-----00
ENL-----00 ENL-----00
- 4 Current Missions
 - a 1 MP Bn, HHD
 - b A MP CO
 - c B MP CO
- 5 Current Task Organization And Locations
HHD. 1 MP Bn VK123456
A MP CO VK123456
B MP CO VK123456
- 6 Change To Existing Plans And Reasons
- 7 Plans Summary For Next 24 Hours
- 8 Plans Summary For Next 24-48 Hours
- 9 Commander's Comments

TAB B (ORDERS) TO APPENDIX 4 (OPERATIONS REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS)
TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PURPOSE This Annex, together with current OPLAN/OPORDS, provides guidance in operations, command and control for units attached or OPCON to the 800th MP Command

2 GENERAL ORDERS Orders will be issued as

a Warning Orders - to prepare to implement existing OPLAN(s) as OPORD(s) or to provide maximum possible advance notice prior to issuance of a new OPORD

b Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO) - to implement OPLAN as OPORD, to implement immediate changes to an existing OPORD, or to provide minimum essential information required to execute a new operation when time does not permit issuance of a complete OPORD

c Operations Orders (OPORDs) - to execute a new operation

d For all orders, only Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) will be used GMT will be referred to as the symbol "Z" (Zulu) immediately following the Date-Time-Group (DTG) For example 011234Z Aug 88

e Overlays issued with Warning Orders, FRAGOs or OPORDs will normally use Map Scale 1 50,000

TAB C (EPW/CI REPORT) TO APPENDIX 4 (OPERATIONS REPORTS) TO ANNEX T
(REPORTS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 The purpose of this report is to provide the Brigade S-3 with all current data on EPW/CI operations This report will be submitted daily NLT 1400 hours local as of 1200 hours local to the Brigade S-3

2 FORMAT

CLASSIFICATION

FROM

TO: CDR, 800th MP BDE, ATTN S-3

DTG

AS OF DTG

OFF NCO ENL CI OTHER FEMALES TOTAL

TOTAL EPW/CI's PROCESSED TODAY

TOTAL EPW/CI's EVACUATED TODAY

TOTAL EPW/CI's PROCESSED TO DATE

TOTAL EPW/CI's EVACUATED TO DATE

TOTAL EPW/CI's ON HAND

REMARKS

TAB D (OPSEC REPORT) TO APPENDIX 4 (OPERATIONS REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 **GENERAL** An OPSEC Report is a record of operational vulnerabilities, which forms part of the unit OPSEC database. It should be prepared at the conclusion of each operation.

2 **OPSEC REPORT FORMAT**

a **OVERVIEW**

(1) **BACKGROUND** State the reason, purpose, and scope of evaluation. Include a review of the enemy threat and vulnerabilities.

(2) **CONDUCT OF EVALUATION** Briefly discuss methodology, team composition, and when the evaluation occurred.

b **SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS.** Extract of major findings from paragraph 3.

c **ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS OR FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS** This is the body of the report.

3 Following is a suggested format:

a Heading

b Analysis and Discussion

c Findings

d Conclusions

e **Recommended Corrective Actions** Identified for possible deception exploitation. Some Essential Elements of Friendly Information, which must be safeguarded, are:

(1) What is the mission?

(2) What is the task organization?

(3) What are the locations, defense, and vulnerabilities of key US headquarters, communication facilities and forces?

(4) When will deployment begin, by what means and from what ports and airfields?

(5) When and where will the operation commence?

(6) What are the limitations of US forces?

(7) Are there any DEFCON or related activities?

(8) What are the exact areas of operation?

(9) What lines of communication (LOC) are to be used to supply food, ammunition, and fuel within the operational area?

APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE
(EPW/CI) TACSOP

- 1 General This appendix specifies the reports that are required to be submitted to this headquarters
- 2 Initial LOGSTAT (TAB A thru F) The initial LOGSTAT consists of
 - a Initial LOGSTAT (TAB A)
 - b The 2406 Shortages (Short) (TAB B) will include all DA Form 2406 reportable and non-reportable equipment
 - c The Critical Supply Shortages (SUPPLY) (TAB C) lists supply shortages by class (except class VII) that now have or, in future, will have an impact on mission accomplishment
 - d The ULLS generated NON-MISSION CAPABLE REPORT will include all reportable and non-reportable equipment that are NMC, i e vehicles, trailers, communications equipment When the ULLS system is not available the Backside DA Form 2406 (TAB G) will be completed IAW AR 700-138
 - e Battle Loss Report (TAB E)
 - f Logistics Incident Report (TAB F)
- 3 The Daily LOGSTAT consists of TABs B, C, and G, and is submitted as of 1200 and due NLT 1500
 - a Additional reports are in the same format as the initial
 - b Deletions will be identified as deletions by document number or job order number as appropriate
 - c Electronically transmitted reports will be identified by report short title with data keyed to column letters

TABS
A-LOGSTAT Report
B-2406 Shortages
C-Critical Supply Shortages
D-Equipment On-Hand Listing
E-Request for Food Service
F-Logistics Status Report
G-Backside DA Form 2406
H-Battle Loss Report
I-Logistics Incident Report

TAB A (INITIAL LOGSTAT REPORT) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

The following worksheet format data is provided to assist in preparing the LOGSTAT report
PART One-Supply

1 Class I (Rations) List separate status for each DSU/GSU by SSA DODDAC

Line A

- COL 1 DODDAC (DSU/GSU SSA)
- COL 2. DTG Operational
- COL 3. 6-Digit Grid
- COL 4 Population Supported
- COL 5. Current Ration Cycle
- COL 6 Meals on hand, MREs
- COL 7 Meals on hand, T-Rat's

Line B Narrative

2 Class I (Water) List separate status for each DSU/GSU

Line A

- COL 1 DSU Unit Designation
- COL 2 DTG Operational
- COL 3 6-Digit Grid
- COL 4 Storage Capacity
- COL 5 Gallons O/H
- COL 6 Current Production Capacity
- COL 7 Daily Demand

Line B Narrative Speak to estimated and host nation shortfalls, and explain types of equipment being employed wells, FAWPSS, SDS, SMFT, etc Specify if shortages exist in filters and chemicals

3 Class II, III (Pkg), and IV List critical high priority requisitions only

Line A

- COL 1 Customer DODDAC
- COL 2 Requisition Julian Date - Serial Number
- COL 3 National Stock Number
- COL 4 Unit of Issue
- COL 5 Quantity requested
- COL 6 Required delivery date (RDD)
- COL 7 Ship to address

Line B Narrative (List any critical item required with referenced quantities and document numbers)

TAB A (INITIAL LOGSTAT REPORT) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS) TO
ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

4 Class III (Bulk) Show statistics for each DSU/GSU.

Line A MOGAS.

- COL 1 SSA DODDAC
- COL 2 DTG Operational
- COL 3 6 Digit Grid
- COL 4 MOGAS Gal on hand
- COL 5 MOGAS Gal days of supply
- COL 6 MOGAS Gal storage capacity
- COL 7 MOGAS 5-day forecast

Line B Diesel

- COL 1 SSA DODDAC
- COL 2 DTG Operational
- COL 3 6 Digit Grid
- COL 4 Diesel Gal on hand
- COL 5 Diesel Gal days of supply
- COL 6 Diesel Gal storage capacity
- COL 7 Diesel 5-day forecast

Line C Narrative Class III (Bulk) Include host nation support problems, special aerial delivery requirements, pipeline problems, etc status - be specific

5 Class V Report ammunition listed below List quantities in rounds List separate status for each activity

Line A

- COL 1 Type activity reporting (ASP/ATP/Other - specify)
- COL 2 DTG Operational
- COL 3 6-Digit Grid
 - SUB COL 1 DODIC
 - SUB COL 2 Nomenclature
 - SUB COL 3 Stockage Objective
 - SUB COL 4 O/H
 - SUB COL 5 Approved RSR/CSR
 - SUB COL 6 O/H ammunition total (Include Unit Basic Loads --UBL,

Peacetime reporting requirements only Becomes N/A during hostilities)

Line B Narrative Describe problems Identify approved changes to RSR submitted through G-3 channels

6 Class VI

Line A

- COL 1 SSA DODAAC
- COL 2 DTG Operational
- COL 3 6 Digit Grid

Line B Narrative For example Comment only if sundry packs are not being forwarded in proper quantity or on time

TAB A (INITIAL LOGSTAT REPORT) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

7 Class VII - Report by line item number all command designated reportable items as listed below

Line A

COL 1. Reporting Unit/MTOE number

COL 2 Supporting CL VII activity DODAAC

SUB COL 1 LIN

SUB COL 2 QTY AUTH

SUB COL 3 QTY O/H

SUB COL 4 QTY FULLY MISSION CAPABLE (FMC)

SUB COL 5 QTY PMC (Avn Only).

SUB COL 6 QTY NMCS

SUB COL 7 NMCM

SUB COL 8 EMC RATE (Equipment Mission Capable percentage)

SUB COL 9 Requisition Numbers (For CL VII critical shortages against requirements only)

SUB COL 10 Remarks Explain maintenance deficiencies requiring higher headquarters assistance

Line B Narrative Describe shortfalls in Class VII systems

8 Report Class VIII through medical channels

9 Class IX List Class IX critical shortages

Line A

COL 1 Requisition Number

COL 2 NSN

COL 3 QTY

COL 4 Unit of Issue

COL 5 Remarks (e g Request follow-up These are NMCS M1 items) (Para 7 for NMCS Report)

Part Two - Services

1 Comment on any significant shortfalls in services (food service, laundry and bath, commissaries, PX) in narrative format Be specific in describing location, population to be supported, and requested schedules

2 Laundry and Bath units

Line A

COL 1 DTG operational

COL 2 6 Digit Grid

COL 3 Service capability

COL 4 Population supported

COL 5 Numbers supported last 24 hours

TAB A (INITIAL LOGSTAT REPORT) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS) TO
ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

3 Graves Registration

Line A Reporting GRREG activity

COL 1 6 Digit Grid

COL 2 Number remains received

COL 3 Number remains to be evacuated

COL 4 Number remains on hand

COL 5 Number transfer cases on hand

COL 6 Number unused remains pouched on hand

COL 7 Number personal effects bags on hand

Line B Narrative Comment on critical supply and equipment shortfalls, include requisitions numbers as required for follow up Comment on critical shortages of DD Form 567, Record of Recovery, DD Form 565, Statement of Recognition, and DD Form 1076, Inventory of Personal Effects

Part Three - Transportation

1 Ground Comment on significant shortfalls in transportation Explain schedule for upcoming convoys Be specific and quantitative List numbers of types by host nation truck assets available

2 Aerial Delivery Include in Initial LOGSTAT current DSU/GSU on hand balances of aerial delivery items (i.e. quantity/size or capacity of slings, nets, POL drums, and water blivets.) Report changes as they occur

3 Pipeline Include pipeline equipment employed or available by type and location

4 Air Comment on requirements for scheduled air (Army or Airforce)

TAB B (2406 SHORTAGES) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS) TO ANNEX T
(REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

2406 SHORTFALLS

SHORT TITLE· SHORT

BATTALION/SEPARATE COMPANY _____ AS OF _____

(COL A) (COL B) (COL C) (COL D) (COL E)

LINE UNIT LIN NOUN DOCUMENT # QTY

1	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
6	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
7	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
8	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
9	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
10	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
11	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
12	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
13	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
14	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
15	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
16	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
17	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
18	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
19	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

TAB C (CRITICAL SUPPLY SHORTAGES) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS) TO
ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

CRITICAL SUPPLY SHORTAGES

SHORT TITLE SUPPLY

BATTALION/SEPARATE COMPANY _____ AS OF _____

(COL A) (COL B) (COL C) (COL D) (COL E)

LINE UNIT LIN STOCK # REQ O/H DOCUMENT#

1	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
6	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
7	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
8	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
9	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
10	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
11	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
12	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
13	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
14	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
15	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
16	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
17	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
18	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

TAB D (EQUIPMENT ON-HAND LISTING) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

EQUIPMENT ON-HAND LISTING

SHORT TITLE (EOH)

BATTALION/SEP COMPANY AS OF _____

(col a)(col b)(col c)(col d)(col e)(col f)

LINE LIN NOUN O/H O/H O/H O/H O/H O/H

1 A03210 ACCY OUTFIT
2 A32355 ALARM CHEM
3 A56243 ANAL ST ENG
4 A72260 ANT GRP
5 A79381 ANT OE 254
6 B07126 AXLE CBL RL
7 B49004 BAYONET MP
8 B67766 BINOCULAR
9 C62375 CASE BTRY
10 C68719 CBL TEL WD1
11 C68856 CBL TEL WD1
12 C85596 CAM ST STIL
13 C86213 CAMERA STIL
14 C89145 CAM SCR SYS
15 C89213 CAM SCR SUP
16 E00533 CHGR RAD DT
17 E10835 HYMNBOOK
18 E70064 COMP UT RCP
19 E74037 COMP RCP
20 E98103 ELEC KEY
21 G02204 DTC ST MINE
22 G02341 DTC ST MINE
23 G22348 DISPER RIOT
24 G44569 DRAFT EQUIP
25 G84859 DUPLI MACH
26 G85202 DUPLI MACH
27 G02300 ELEC TLTYPE
28 H31136 FAX SET
29 J31622 INSTL KIT
30 J35813 GEN DSL 5KW
31 J43918 GEN GAS 1 5
32 J44055 GEN GAS 1 5
33 J45699 GEN GAS 3KW
34 J46110 GEN GAS 3KW

TAB D (EQUIPMENT ON-HAND LISTING) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(col a)(col b)(col c)(col d)(col e)(col f)
LINE LIN NOUN O/H O/H O/H O/H O/H O/H
35 J47343 GEN GAS 5KW
36 J47617 GEN TM 5KW
37 J71513 INSTAL KIT
38 J88275 INSTL KT EL
39 K28314 HEADSET MIC
40 J71513 INSTAL KIT
41 K25842 HEAT IMMERS
42 K39774 HOIST TRK
43 K87243 INSTL KIT
44 K87269 INSTL KIT
45 K87330 INSTL KIT
46 K87449 INSTL KIT
47 K87456 IN KIT MK18
48 K87536 IN KIT MK
49 K87537 KIT MK1839
50 K87538 KIT MK1840
51 K87561 KIT MK1863
52 K87563 KIT MK1865
53 L44595 LAUNCH GREN
54 L44999 LAUNCH RKT
55 L60158 LIGHT ASSY
56 L63994 LIGHT ST GN
57 L92386 MG 7 62MM
58 M09009 MG 5 56MM
59 M11895 MASK PROT
60 M38746 METER PHOTO
61 M60449 MULTIMETER
62 M74364 MNT GUN RNG
63 M75029 MNT MG PED
64 M75577 MNT TRIPOD
65 M75714 MNT TRIPOD
66 M80002 MULTIMETER
67 N02158 NET CTL DEV
68 N04456 NGT VIS GOG
69 N04596 NGT VIS SIG
75 N04732 NGT VIS SIG

TAB D (EQUIPMENT ON-HAND LISTING) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

76 N54691 CHARGE BATT
77 P06148 PLT EAR WAR
78 P40750 PWR PP6224
79 P84187 PA SET
80 P98152 PISTOL 9MM
81 Q19339 RAD PDR 27
82 Q20935 RADMET IM93
83 Q21483 RADMET IM174
84 Q38299 RDO PRC 77
85 Q53001 RDO VRC 46
86 Q54174 RDO VRC 47
87 Q78282 RDO ST CTRL
88 Q90120 RRDO TELETP
89 R14154 RNG O/F FLD
90 R21551 RADMET IM185
91 R47488 RECO REPRO
92 R56742 REEL EQP CEL
93 R59023 RE MACH CBL
94 R59160 RE MACH CBL
95 R84826 REPR ST SILK
96 R84904 REPR ST DIAZ
97 R93169 RDO TEST ST
98 R94977 RIFLE 5 56
99 S01373 SPCH SEC EQ
100 S78839 SVC KIT PRT
101 S83585 SML UN TRAN
102 T05028 TRK UTL TAC
103 T40405 TAPE READER
104 T59346 TRK M1008A
105 T59414 TRK M1028
106 T59482 TRK M1008
107 T61494 TRK HMMWV
108 T62101 SIREN ELEC
109 T63238 SKETCH SET
110 T92242 TRK ARMT CA
111 T92310 TRK ARMT CA
112 U81707 SWB TELEPHO
113 U82255 SWB TELEPHO
114 V03068 DRAFT TABLE

TAB D (EQUIPMENT ON-HAND LISTING) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS
REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

115 V19950 TNK UNIT DS
116 V31211 TELE TA312
117 V36146 COMM TML
118 V57914 TERM TELEG
119 V69258 TEST BATTER
120 V94740 MULTIMETER
121 V98788 PWR SUP VEH
122 W32593 EQUIP AUTO
123 W32867 EQUIP AUTO
124 W33004 MECH TOOLS
125 W34648 CARP TOOLS
126 W37483 ELEC TOOLS
127 W39237 GRNDS TOOLS
128 W51910 ARMS TOOLS
129 W60351 WIRELINE AD
130 W95400 TRL CGO 1/4T
131 W95537 TRL CGO 3/4T
132 W95811 TRL 1 1/2T
133 W98825 TRL TNK WATR
134 X39447 TRK CGO M882
135 X39453 TRK CGO M884
136 X40009 TRK 2 1/2T
137 X40146 TRK 2 1/2T
138 X40794 TRK CGO DS
139 X60833 TRK UTL 1/4T
140 Z15142 CLEAN STEAM
141 Z78448 TAC CSS COMP
142 CONEX TYP I
143 CONEX TYP II
144 V49126 TENT GP SML
145 V48989 TENT GP MED
146 V48510 TENT ARFAB

TAB E (REQUEST FOR FOOD SERVICE) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS
REPORTS) TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(missing form - see hard copy)

TAB F (LOGISTICS STATUS REPORT) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS)
TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

800th MP BDE LOGSTAT

AS OF _____ HRS _____

1 CLASS I

A (DOS) ON HAND

MREs _____

T-RATs _____

B-RATs _____

A-RATs _____

B POPULATION SUPPORTED _____

C CURRENT RATION CYCLE _____

D. SUNDRY PACKS ON HAND MALE _____ FEMALE _____

E SUPPORTING DSU _____

MRE T RATS B RATS

F MEALS SERVED TO DATE _____

G CLASS I (WATER)

(1) GALLONS ON HAND _____

(2) STORAGE CAPACITY _____

2 CLASS II & IV (CRITICAL)

A STATEMENT OF SHORTAGES / REQUIREMENTS

3 CLASS III

A LOCATION OF BULK REFUEL POINTS

B FUEL ON HAND GALLONS ON HAND STORAGE CAPACITY

DF2 _____

LSDF _____

MOGAS _____

4 CLASS V (AMMUNITION)

COL I - ASP / ATP COL II - DTG OPL COL III - SIX DIGIT GRID

APPROVED

DODIC NOMENCLATURE STOCKAGE OBJ O/H _____ RSR / CSR

TAB F (LOGISTICS STATUS REPORT) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS)
TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

5 CLASS VII - EQUIPMENT ON HAND / EQUIPMENT OPERATIONAL
LINE ITEM AUTH O/H FMC NMCS NMCM REQUISITION #

P98152 PISTOL, 9MM
R95035 RIFLE, M16A2
L44595, LNCHR, M203M
L92386 M249, SAW
M92362 MK 19
N04456 AN/PVS 5
N05482 AN/ PVS 7A
N04593 ANT/VS 5
N04732 AN/PVS 4
T 9414 TRK CGO
5/4 TON M1028
T 1494 TRK UTL
1 ¼ TON M998
T 2242 TRK UTL
ARM M1025
T 2310 TRK UTL
ARM W/E M1026
TRK CGO LMTV
M1078, 2 ½ TON
TRK CGO FMTV,
M1083, 5 TON
TRK WRK
M1089, 5 TON
X62237 TRK VAN EXP
M900
X40931 TRK CGO
5 TON M925A2
X633299 TRK WRK
5 TON M936A2
W98825 TRL TNK WTR
400 GAL M149A/C2
W95811 TRL CGO
1 ½ TON M105A2
W95537 TRL CGO
¾ TON M101A1/2
J35813 GEN SET DSL 5 KW MEP002A

TAB F (LOGISTICS STATUS REPORT) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS)
TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

LIN ITEM AUTH O/ H FMC NMCS NMCM REQUISITION #

G11966 GEN SET DSL 5 KW MEP802A
G42170 GEN SET 10 KW M16A2 PU 798
G54041 GEN SET DSL 3 KW MEP016B
G18358 GEN SET 3 KW MEP831
G 74711 GEN SET 10 KW MEP803A
J 45699 GEN SET GAS 3 KW
A79381 ANTENNA OE 254
C05541 CONTROLLER RECEIVER/TRANS
R44863 RADIO SET AN/VCR 89A
R5407 RADIO SET AN/VCR 87A
R67160 RADIO SET AN/VCR 92A
R67194 RADIO SET AN/VCR 88A
R67908 RADIO SET AN/VCR 90A
R45203 RADIO SET AN/VCR 90
R45271 RADIO SET AN/VCR 91
R45339 RADIO SET AN/VCR 92
E95031 FILL DEV
Z21128 DATA TRAN DEVICE AN/CYZ 10
R68010 RADIO SET AN/VCR 91A
R83005 RADIO SET AN/PRC 119A
S64488 SPCH SEC KY 68
T13413 TACT CMP PROC AN/UVQ 43V1
T 13481 TACT CMPT PROC AN/UVQ 43V2
T 25726 TONE SIG ADAPTER
T 31872 TELE WIRE W/REEL MX 10891
T 40405 TAPE READER KOI 18
T 45408 DNVT TA 1035
D 40553 DNVT TA 954
T 55957 TER RADIO TEL MBL SUB AN/VVRC 97
R 93169 RADIO TEST SET AN/PRM 34
N 02758 NET CTRL DEVICE KYX 15
C 05701 MONITOR CHEM AGENT
V 19950 TANK PUMP UNIT
V 36146 COMM TERM AN/UGC 74A (V) 3
Z Z9999 TACT TERM ADAPTER (TTA)
Q 78282 RADIO SET AN/GRA 39
V 31211 TELE SET TA 312
U 71707 SWITCH BRD TELEPHONE

TAB F (LOGISTICS STATUS REPORT) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS)
TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

LIN ITEM AUTH O/ H FMC NMCS NMCM REQUISITION #

U 82255 MANUAL SB 22-PT SB 86/P

R 30895 RADIO GRC 213

A 32355 ALARM CHEMICAL M8

Z 29998 PLUGGER AN/PSN 11

M12418 MASK CHEM FIELD M40

FILTER ELEM MASK

NERVE AGENT ANTIDOTE

CHEM PROT OVRGRMT(CPOG)

Remarks

6 CLASS VIII

A LOCATION OF FACILITIES

B AREAS OF CONCERN

7 MAINTENANCE

AREAS OF CONCERN

8 REMARKS

TAB G (BACKSIDE DA FORM 2406) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS) TO
ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(missing diagram - see hard copy)

TAB H (BATTLE LOSS REPORT) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS) TO ANNEX T
(REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 The Battle Loss Report (BATLOSREP) is used to report losses or potential losses of command reportable CL VII (see LOGSTAT, TAB A, for reportable items)

2 Reporting units will provide a control number for each LIN reported lost. This number will consist of the unit designation in the clear followed by a Julian date and serial number. For example 304TH MP BN 0214-0001. The control number serves to prevent duplication of reporting. This is important, especially when units are cross-attached.

3 This report is not a supply action. The LOGSTAT report (TAB A) is considered the supply action for requesting a replacement item during combat conditions.

4 FORMAT

Line A

Col 1 Control Number

Col 2 DTG of loss

Col 3 LIN

Col 4 Nomenclature

Col 5 Quantity

Line B Narrative Describe impact of losses on unit mission

**TAB I (LOGISTICS INCIDENT REPORT) TO APPENDIX 5 (LOGISTICS REPORTS)
TO ANNEX T (REPORTS) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP**

- 1 The Logistics Incident Report (LOGINCREP) is used to report significant incidents, which affect supply, storage, distribution, maintenance and critical services
2. The report is submitted to the Bde S-4 as incidents occur.
- 3 This report is not a supply action The LOGSTAT Report is considered the supply action for requesting replacement items during combat conditions

4 FORMAT

Line A

Col 1 Reporting Unit

Col 2 6-Digit Grid of Incident

Col 3 DTG of incident

Line B Description of incident

Line C Narrative Describe impact of incident on unit mission

**ANNEX U (CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI)
TACSOP**

1 PURPOSE This annex outlines the conduct of Civil Military Operations (CMO)

2 RESPONSIBILITIES

a Commanders will control all CMO activities in their AOR.

b The Brigade S-5 will have staff responsibility for all CMOs and coordination

APPENDIXES

1 - Civil Affairs (CA)

2 - Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

3 - Displaced Civilians

APPENDIX 1 (CIVIL AFFAIRS) TO ANNEX U (CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS)
TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 REFERENCES

- a ST 41-10, Civil Operations
- b FM 41-5, Joint Manual for Civil Affairs
- c Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Field Operations Guide Version 2.0

2 GENERAL.

a Oversight of civil government, police, fire, and medical facilities, to include names and addresses of local authorities and office location

b Estimate of displaced personnel situation and potential for displaced personnel care/administration in the area

c Availability of local resources, such as labor, food, POL, transportation, and maintenance facilities

d Urgent requirements of the civilian population for food, shelter and medical care, especially life-saving treatment

(1) Commanders will use available personnel and logistical resources to solve civil problems consistent with tactical requirements. Requests for additional resources of expertise will be submitted to S-3, 800th MP Bde (EPW/CI)

(2) Commanders at all levels will ensure that members of their commands are briefed on proper conduct towards the civil populace and the negative impact that incidents of misconduct and disrespect have upon mission accomplishment. Troop orientations, including local customs, language phrases, and "DO's and DON'Ts," will be conducted during post-mobilization briefings

APPENDIX 2 (PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX U (CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE TACSOP

1 REFERENCE FM 33-1, Psychological Operations

2 GENERAL

a This appendix prescribes procedures for the conduct of psychological operations (PSYOP) by the 800th MP Bde (EPW/CI) and for the coordination of PSYOP with other headquarters and agencies

b PSYOPs involves the planned use of propaganda and other measures designed to create opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of enemy, neutral, or friendly foreign groups favorable to the accomplishment of national objectives

3 RESPONSIBILITY

a The S-3 is assigned primary staff responsibility for the planning and conduct of PSYOP within the 800th MP Bde (EPW/CI) for liaison with other headquarters and agencies conducting PSYOP of interest to this headquarters

b If augmented with PSYOP teams, the OIC/NCOIC of the PSYOP team will control all operations and provide technical expertise to the Brigade S-3

c Subordinate commanders will assume responsibility for the conduct of PSYOPs within assigned areas of responsibility, as directed by the Brigade S-3

4 OPERATIONS

a PSYOPs conducted by subordinate units will be conducted only IAW national policies and guidance provided by S-3, 800th MP Bde (EPW/CI)

b PSYOP teams may be assigned to support the tactical mission

c Subordinate commanders will submit requests for preparation of specific PSYOP missions including PSYOP media products to the Brigade S-3

APPENDIX 3 (DISPLACED CIVILIAN) TO ANNEX U (CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 REFERENCES.

- a FM 3-19-40, *Internment/Resettlement Operations*, 1 August 2001
- b FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*
- c FM 41-5, *Joint Manual for Civil Affairs*

2 GENERAL

a This appendix prescribes the operational procedures for the conduct of Displaced Civilians (DC), Refugee and Evacuee Operations and provides guidance for the 800th MP Bde (EPW/CI) staff and subordinate commanders and the delineation of the 800th MP Bde (EPW/CI) responsibilities

b DC planning will be of high priority, and locations for assembly areas, camps, and routes must be initially disseminated in the 800th MP Bde (EPW/CI) OPORD

3 DEFINITIONS

a Displaced Person (DP) A displaced person has been dislocated because of war, a natural disaster, or political/economic turmoil. Consequently, the motivation for the civilians to flee and their status under international and domestic laws will vary, as will the degree of assistance required and the location for relief operations. Likewise, the political, geographical, environmental, and threat situations will vary in each situation

b Refugee A refugee, according to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, is a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country"

c Evacuee An evacuee is a civilian removed from his place of residence by military direction because of personal security or other requirements of the military situation

d Stateless person A stateless person is a civilian who has been denationalized, whose country of origin cannot be determined, or who cannot establish his right to nationality claimed

e War victim A war victim is a civilian who suffered an injury, a loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of his home because of war

f Migrant A migrant is a worker who moves from one region to another by chance, instinct, or plan

APPENDIX 3 (DISPLACED CIVILIAN) TO ANNEX U (CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

g Internally Displaced Person An IDP may have been forced to flee his home for the same reasons as a refugee, but he has not crossed an internationally recognized border

h Expellee An expellee is a civilian who is outside the boundaries of his country of nationality or ethnic origin and is being forcibly repatriated to that country or a third country for political or other purposes

i Collection Point/Assembly Area Temporary areas, located in Corps rear area, that are used for the assembly/collection of civilians. Only minimum emergency relief is provided and the civilians are evacuated as soon as possible to assembly areas, or allowed to return to their homes

j DC Facility Semi-permanent camp, normally located in Theater rear area, where DC's are located until their return to their residence, evacuation or resettlement Shelter, medical treatment, food and clothing are provided by US and host country agencies

4 RESPONSIBILITIES All commanders are under legal obligation, imposed by international law, to provide a minimum standard of humane care and treatment for DC Additional assistance will be provided whenever such assistance does not interfere with or degrade tactical operations Protection of Refugees will be conducted IAW FM 3-19 40, 1-13 and The Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees (1951) and its protocols (1967)

5 PROCESSING DISLOCATED CIVILIANS

a DC should clearly understand why they are being processed and know what to expect at each station This is accomplished by an entrance briefing provided to all DC upon their arrival

b While the EPW/CI processing procedures provide a foundation, MP must be aware that there are several unique aspects of processing DC Ref FM 19-40 Chap 7, Para 7-4

6 CLASSIFICATION & ASSIGNMENT

a Dislocated civilians are selectively assigned to appropriate internment facilities with those of violently opposed ideologies interned in separate facilities

b The initial, formal classification of DC is accomplished at the time of their processing However, expect a continuing need for the reclassification and reassignment of individual DC

7 DC IDENTIFICATION

APPENDIX 3 (DISPLACED CIVILIAN) TO ANNEX U (CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

a An identification band (ID band) permits the rapid and reliable identification of the individual and may be used in DC operations. While a DC cannot be prevented from removing or destroying the band, it may be expected that many of the DC will accept the use of the band for identification purposes. Such ready identification enhances internment facility administration and operation.

b An identification card (ID card) may also be used to facilitate identification of DC. The ID card will contain his name, photograph, and control number (the control number may be an ISN if using PWIS or a sequenced control number specific to the DC). Color-coding of ID Cards may be necessary to permit identification by categories, such as refugees, displaced civilians, evacuees, war victim, etc.

8 Records and Report Local records or reports may be required by the IR facility commander, as necessary, for the effective control, supervision, and disposition of DC. Such reports may be required on either a periodic or a "required" basis. They may cover the administrative, operational, logistical, intelligence, and personnel situations. Normal command and staff records and reports, such as staff section journals, duty officer logs, worksheets, and situation maps, may be required.

9 Discipline and Control Controlling people is the key to successful facility operations. Civilians housed in I/R facilities during Humanitarian Assistance are not prisoners. Treat all DC fairly at all times. Direction should be given in a language that they understand. Ensure that all directions are reasonable and capable of being obeyed. Refusal or failure to obey internment facility rules by DC is promptly reported through the chain of command. SEE I/R 3-19 40, CH 9.

10 Administration and Law & Order Due to the large number of civilians requiring control and care, use HN civilians as cadre for facility administration, and encourage DCs to become involved in facility administration. The I/R facility commander is also the safety and security officer responsible for the L & O mission for the camp. See I/R 3-19 40, ch 9.

TAB A (DISPLACED CIVILIAN IDENTIFICATION TAG) TO APPENDIX 3
(DISPLACED CIVILIAN) TO ANNEX U (CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO
THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

DISPLACED CIVILIAN (DC) IDENTIFICATION TAG/CARD

1 This TAB identifies the minimum information to be recorded on the displaced civilian identification tag/card

2 A tag or card will be assigned to each individual by the screening team at the Assembly Area or facility. A record of each card will be maintained by the displaced person team that supervises the screening.

3 The identification tags/cards are to be used to readily identify and account for the displaced person.

4 Displaced civilian control numbers will be assigned a numerical/letter prefix to identify the capturing unit, followed by sequence numbers determined by the number of individuals processed by the unit.

5 To aid in readily identifying the different categories, the tags will be color coded as follows:

- a US Citizen - WHITE
- b Refugee - YELLOW
- c Displaced Civilian - RED

(recommend using three colors for DCs – one for US, one for host nation DC's and one for other nation's DCs, or a separate color for each nation if more than one nation's DCs have crossed international borders seeking refuge)

6 The following information should be provided in the DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS:

- a VIP Status
- b Evacuation priority
- c Special skills
- d Further interrogation/interview required
- e Other members in the family group (with ID numbers)

TAB A (DISPLACED CIVILIAN IDENTIFICATION TAG) TO APPENDIX 3
(DISPLACED CIVILIAN) TO ANNEX U (CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO
THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

I DP CONTROL CARD (EXAMPLE)

DC CONTROL NUMBER
HOST COUNTRY ID NUMBER
NAME
DISPLACED CIVILIAN'S NATIONALITY
INTERROGATED/INTERVIEWED BY
IPW CI PSYOP HOST COUNTRY
DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS

TAB B (DISPLACED CIVILIAN PLAN FORMAT) TO APPENDIX 3 (DISPLACED CIVILIAN) TO ANNEX U (CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

DISPLACED CIVILIAN PLAN FORMAT

1 REFERENCES This should list any materials that are necessary to enable the reader to understand and implement the plan

- a Map - Name, Series, Scale, Quantity
- b Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) or Memorandum or Understanding/ Agreement in effect
- c Civil Affairs Agreements
- d Other OPLANs or INTSUMs
- e Time Zone used throughout Order Task organization for DC Operations, this should show any special organizations organized for the DC operation Example, liaison teams, control teams

2 SITUATION

a *General* This should include an overall description of the DC situation with a brief description of primary causes of the problem

b *Enemy* This should include an analysis of any enemy actions or capabilities as they affect the DC situation EXAMPLES

(1) Enemy has chemical/nuclear capability and decontamination units have been seen in a certain area

(2) Enemy infiltrators have been discovered in adjacent areas posing as DP's

c *Friendly* This will normally be an extensive paragraph describing the location, current activities, and capabilities of any friendly units or civil organization that is supporting or could support DP operations EXAMPLES

(1) Host Nation

(a) Police have control of all roads in area

(b) Civil defense organization is currently functioning to full capability and has total control in towns of , , , and

(c) Local hospitals include (Name of Facility)

TAB B (DISPLACED CIVILIAN PLAN FORMAT) TO APPENDIX 3 (DISPLACED CIVILIAN) TO ANNEX U (CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(1) w/180 beds at VIC (2) w/300 beds at VIC , (3) w/100 beds at VIC A shortage of Betadine is expected

(2) US Non-military

(a) Peace Corps headquartered at VIC has stored blankets and clothing for 5000 personnel

(b) American Red Cross has capability to assist with medical supplies and food

(3) US Military

(a) DP camp operation in higher headquarters at VIC is currently expanding to second camp at VIC

(b) A civil affairs unit operating additional assembly area at VIC , for processing prior to transporting to civilian run camps

(c) A transportation battalion provides transportation from division assembly area to civilian DP camp

d Assumptions This should include any pertinent assumption made during the estimate of the situation EXAMPLES

(1) Expected number of DC's

(2) Expected locations and direction of movement

(3) Expected problem areas

(4) Expected degree of military support required

(a) Medical

(b) Subsistence

(c) Transportation

(5) Can local government provide effective support?

(6) CA agreements will remain in effect

(7) Will there be a language communication gap?

TAB B (DISPLACED CIVILIAN PLAN FORMAT) TO APPENDIX 3 (DISPLACED CIVILIAN) TO ANNEX U (CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(8) What will the attitude of civilians be towards the US effort?

3 MISSION. This should state the objective of this specific DPRL plan. EXAMPLES, (one or more of the following)

- a Reduce interference with military operations
- b Relieve destitute conditions of DPs encountered in battle area
- c Evacuate an area pursuant to military operations.
- d Control disease or health problems
- e Be prepared to assume control of/establish more extensive DC operations in the absence of civilian participation. i.e. DC camp

4 EXECUTION

a Conception of Operation (See Encl 1 DPRL Overlay) Include here statement of how the plan will be accomplished. A description of the DPRL flow should include collection points, routes, primary/alternate, assembly areas and, if necessary, DPRL camps. Major subordinate units have missions that are key to the plan, they should be included.

b Subordinate unit paragraphs. These paragraphs should include assigned or be prepared missions enumerated for each subordinate unit. Included below are some examples of missions that could be considered for assignment to subordinate units.

- (1) X Bn. Establish collection points at VIC
- (2) Y Bn. Operate check point at RJ VIC
- (3) Z Bn. Welfare action at collection points. water, food, medical aid
- (4) Medical Support. Be prepared to provide emergency medical support for live-saving purposes only.
- (5) MP's
 - (a) Maintain liaison with civilian DC operations
 - (b) Establish liaison through CA unit with civil police
- (6) PSYOP. Assist CA units with printing, publishing, and language expertise

TAB B (DISPLACED CIVILIAN PLAN FORMAT) TO APPENDIX 3 (DISPLACED CIVILIAN) TO ANNEX U (CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

(7) Chaplain

c Coordination instructions This should include any specific reports or procedures that are not covered in the various SOP's or that need amplification

(1) Report will be submitted daily at 0800Z hours as of 2400Z hours

(2) Medical screening

(a) Emergency medical problems should be treated at all levels

(b) Report significant cases of epidemic type disease to _____

(3) Reports Report established and specific location of collection points and control points

(4) Intelligence screening Establish specific DC screening procedures to include search, security, separation of EPW/CIs/infiltrators, and disposition of collected intelligence Any additional instructions should be provided here. Listed below are examples

(a) Displaced person from should be routed to MI Det for questioning

(b) Persons identified as city officials of should be treated as VIP's and provided transportation to the Division CMOC ASAP

(5) Culture DO's/DON'Ts can be identified from area studies done on the specific area

(6) POW handling instructions (Treatment)

(7) Disarming of civilians

(8) Possessions allowed to transport

(9) Use of DC's as labor

5 SERVICE SUPPORT This section should include a summary of resources that have been identified as necessary and assigned Also, if any resources have been identified as critical or short, they should also be mentioned

a Supply Distribution of captured enemy supplies (food, medical)

b Transportation Medical consideration for wounded DC's

TAB B (DISPLACED CIVILIAN PLAN FORMAT) TO APPENDIX 3 (DISPLACED CIVILIAN) TO ANNEX U (CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

c Medical.

6 COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a Signal

(1) Radio Nets

b Command.

(1) Points of contact for various agencies, police department and civilian officials

(2) POC for major subordinate headquarters

ANNEX V (PRISONER OF WAR INFORMATION CENTER) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 PURPOSE This annex prescribes procedures and requirements for the conduct of prisoner of war information system (PWIS) operations conducted by the 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) and subordinate units

2 REFERENCES

- a. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War Administration, Employment and Compensation
- b. AR 190-57, Civilian Internee, Administration, Employment and Compensation
- c. AR 380-235, Enemy Prisoner of War and Civilian Internee Communication Censorship
- d. AR 633-51, Civilian Internees Administration, Employment and Compensation
- e. FM 19-1, Military Police Support for the Airland Battle
- f. FM 19-4, Military Police Combat Support
- g. FM 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Detained Persons
- h. FM 100-16, Support Operations Echelons above Corps
- i. ARTEP 19-256, Non-divisional EPW Operations
- j. DOD Directive 5100 69. DOD Program for Prisoners of War and other Detainees
- k. CJCS MOPS 72, Policy Pertaining to Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Detained Persons

3 SPECIFIC MISSION Deploys within 18 hours and serves as a theater unit responsible for the receipt, processing, maintenance, dissemination and transmittal of information relating to prisoner of war and civilian internees

4 CAPABILITIES

a. At level 1, on a 24-hour basis, the prisoner of war information center has the following capabilities

(1) To collect, process, and disseminate to authorized agencies required information received from military police enemy prisoners of war internment facilities within theater area of operations This information is regarding to enemy prisoners of war/civilian internee personnel, to include, information concerning prisoners that are

ANNEX V (PRISONER OF WAR INFORMATION CENTER) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

interned within the theater of operation that were released by the United States Army or from the custody of allied/host nation authorities

(2) To receive, document, and disseminate to the theater commander any information received from official and unofficial sources regarding American prisoners of war, civilian internees, and nationals who are captured, missing, or otherwise detained

(3) To receive, store and dispose of personal property belonging to enemy prisoners of war/civilian internees who have died, escaped, or have been repatriated, and any property received, property not disposed of through grave registration channels, belonging to enemy soldiers killed in action

(4) To maintain a central database for enemy prisoner of war/civilian internee personnel, to include, information concerning EPWs/CIs that are interned within a theater of operation that were released by the United States Army to the custody of allied/host nation authorities

(5) For Operations Other Than War (OOTW) or small contingency operations, PWIC is capable of performing an additional mission within the limits of its current MTOE authorized strength\equipment configuration. The mission is processing detainees during small-scale operations. The seven-step processing operation can be performed in conjunction with collecting and disseminating data in accordance with the Prisoner of War Information System (PWIS). However, a TOE 1977H Military Police Company or equivalent will have to be responsible for security and operations of a detention facility. Depending on the size/capacity of such facility to hold detainees, it may require an MP element larger than a company (i.e. battalion or brigade)

b This unit is dependent upon

(1) Appropriate elements of the TAACOM or supported unit for logistical and administrative services

(2) An AMC Area TMDE support team for repair and calibration of TMDE

6 BASIS OF ALLOCATION One prisoner of war information center per theater of operation

7 CATEGORY This unit is designated a Category III unit

8 MOBILITY

a This unit is capable of transporting 15,000 pounds, 150 cubic feet, of TOE equipment with organic vehicles

b This unit has 9,400 pounds, 100 cubic feet, of TOE equipment requiring transportation

**ANNEX V (PRISONER OF WAR INFORMATION CENTER) TO THE 800th MP BDE
(EPW/CI) TACSOP**

c This unit requires 85% of its TOE equipment and supplies are transported in a single lift using its authorized organic vehicles

ANNEX Z (DISTRIBUTION) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL

- a Distribution is indicated for subordinate units
- b Copies are provided to higher headquarters for Information.
- c Additional distribution will be made by the Brigade S-3 to units attached to the Brigade for an operation or exercise

2. DISTRIBUTION TO COMMANDS Cdr, 800th Military Police Brigade, 101 Oak Street, Uniondale, NY 11553-1002

3 UNIT DISTRIBUTION

138 MP CO (IRIC)
343RD BLD
381ST BLD
451ST BLD
452ND BLD
455TH BLD
494TH BLD
115TH MP BN
160TH MP BN
304TH MP BN
306TH MP BN
310TH MP BN
320TH MP BN
324TH MP BN
327TH MP BN
384TH MP BN
391ST MP BN
400TH MP BN
530TH MP BN
535TH MP BN
724TH MP BN
744TH MP BN
783RD MP BN
785TH MP BN

4 STAFF DISTRIBUTION

Bde Commander -----|
DBC -----|
XO-----|
CSM-----|
S-1 -----|

ANNEX Z (DISTRIBUTION) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

S-2	1
S-3	6
S-4	1
S-5	1
HHC CDR	1
Chaplain	1
C & E	1
JAG	1
PAO	1
ENG	1
IG	1
NBC	1
MEDIC	1
SAFETY	1

ANNEX AA (INSPECTOR GENERAL) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL This appendix prescribes procedures the Inspector General (IG) in field operations

2 BACKGROUND The IG is a member of the Commander's personal staff and is assigned as a detailed IG The IG may receive and process requests for assistance, conduct inquiries, investigations and inspections, and administer IG oaths For detailed information pertaining to IG activities and procedures refer to AR 20-1

3 OPERATIONS The Inspector General has the following duties/responsibilities while engaged in field operations

a Inform the Commander of IG observations, findings, and impressions on all aspects of the command including discipline, efficiency, economy, morale, training, and readiness.

b Provide assistance on an area basis to US military personnel, DA civilians, EPW/CI, CI, and others who seek help with problems related to the US Army

c Conduct investigations, inspections, surveys, and studies of units, including internment facilities, as directed by the Brigade Commander

d Receive allegations and conduct inquiries based upon reports and/or information obtained from EPW/CI, dislocated civilians, US military personnel, and/or multinational guard/police forces

e Provide intelligence oversight of intelligence activities and components within the command

4 ASSISTANCE Anyone, including US military personnel, EPW/CI, dislocated civilians, and/or multinational guard/police forces may submit a complaint, allegation, or request for assistance to any Army IG concerning matters of Army interest

a Complaints, allegations, or requests for assistance when received by the IG or his staff will be recorded on DA Form 1559-R (Inspector General Action Request)

b Inquiries initiated outside the theatre of operations will be routed to the appropriate supporting IG for resolution

c Complaints or allegations against US military personnel in the grade of COL(P) or above will be reported, within 24 hours of receipt, to DAIG Investigations Division No additional action will be taken on the complaint or allegation unless otherwise directed by DAIG Investigations Division

d Complaints or allegations against US military personnel in the grade of MAJ to COL will be reported, within 24 hours of receipt, to DAIG Assistance Division

ANNEX AA (INSPECTOR GENERAL) TO 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

5 INSPECTIONS As directed by the Brigade Commander, the IG will conduct inspections, surveys and studies of units and internment facilities in order to verify organizational readiness, identify mobilization issues for resolution and identify systemic issues

- a The IG is the proponent of the Brigade's Organizational Inspection Program (OIP)
- b During all inspections, the IG will utilize the "root cause" analysis to develop the underlying cause(s) of problems
- c The IG will develop an inspection schedule and distribute it to the subordinate units and internment facilities
- d Upon the completion of all IG inspections a written report will be provided to the Brigade Commander Subordinate unit commanders will receive a report of inspection pertaining to their subordinate units however, the unit designations will be omitted from the report and only systemic issues identified

6 INVESTIGATIONS As directed by the Brigade Commander, the IG will conduct investigations oriented towards, misuse of abuse of resources, standards of conduct, treatment of EPW/CI, CI, displaced persons, refugees

7 OTHER

- a Subordinate commanders will prominently post, at unit locations and within the internment facility compound, notice to all US soldiers, EPW/CI, or other individuals within the compound of their right to present complaints or request assistance from the IG
- b The IG or his staff will receive reports of law of war violations and will report them through the chain of command to the Staff Judge Advocate or US Criminal Investigations Division Command
- c Consults with international and US agencies in matters pertaining to the overall health and welfare of the protected population
- d The IG and his staff will safeguard all documents, records and reports obtained or created by the IG and, if directed, release them only in accordance with AR 20-1

ANNEX G (ENGINEER OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 GENERAL: This appendix outlines and develops responsibilities and procedures for Engineer operations in support of the 800th MP BDE (I/R) mission.

2 RESPONSIBILITIES

a Brigade Engineer Officer will

(1) Keep the Brigade Commander informed on all engineer efforts in support of the mission(s)

(2) Liaison with the engineer forces operating in the Brigade area

(3) Serve as the Brigade Point of contact with the 416th ENCOM

(4) Ensure all Bill of Materials (BOMs) for initial and temporary EPW/CI/IR camps are designed, reviewed, forecasted, ordered, and on hand

(5) Maintain current plans for EPW/CI/IR camps on hand, update materials, list and provide requested copies of same to subordinate units

(6) With the S-4, maintain a current list of all Class IV storage sites and materials on hand for contingency AORs

(7) Advise the Brigade Commander on the best utilization of limited Engineer resources in support of the mission

(8) Forecast the support requirements for engineer(s) conducting work in support of the Brigade and assist the S-4 in procurement of them

b Brigade S-4 will

(1) Assist the Brigade Engineer Officer with the procurement of materials needed for the construction of each camp and the maintenance thereof

(2) Provide all classes of supply needed to support the engineer forces supporting the Brigade

(3) Arrange for transportation of all class IV to the construction site(s)

3 PROCEDURES

a All Engineer work that needs design or construction is requested on DA form 1391 (TAB A or Form Flow) or FORSCOM Form 362-R. An accurate and detailed description of unit needs must be on the form with a dimensioned diagram. Engineer units do not stockpile materials

ANNEX G (ENGINEER OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

b. Work requests are first forwarded to the ASG engineer, supporting the area in order to resource the request. If the request is beyond the ASG Engineer's abilities or unit strength, forward the request to the Engineer Brigade or Group G-3 that supports the area.

c. The G-3 prioritizes this work within the sector to ensure its completion. If the G-3 is over tasked the request may be forwarded to the ENCOM for prioritization by the Regional Engineer Facility Management Board (REFMB) (Ref: FM 5-116) Engineer Operations Echelon Above Corps IAW the CINC priorities.


d. Units under the command and control of the 800th MP Brigade will submit their engineer work requirements to the Brigade S-4 for review and approval before submission is made to the supporting ASG. The Brigade S-4 will forward all Approved requests.

e. Risk assessment worksheet (MDW REG 385-3) Commanders are responsible for submission of this worksheet along with their work request.

APPENDICES

- 1 Engineer overlay
- 2 IF BOM

APPENDIX I (ENGINEER OVERLAY) TO ANNEX G (ENGINEER OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP



APPENDIX 2 (IF BOM) TO ANNEX G (ENGINEER OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

1 - FENCE-CONCERTINA PERIMETER

nsn	ui	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total noem cube
5660009215516	RL	7000	7000	34 68	242760 00	50	350000	0 500	3500 00 BARBED TAPE CONCERTINA 37 5-50FTLG
5660002248663	SL	580	580	44 71	25931 80	105 56	61224 8	1 761	1021 38 BARBED WIRE 100LB RL
5420003719897	EA	17400	17400	10 26	178524 00	15	261000	0 233	4054 20 PICKET, STEEL

2 - SINGLE LEAF GATE 3068 (150 REQ'D)

nsn	section ui	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total noem cube
4010002728794	09	0 1	15	286 08	4291 20	144	2160	1 2	18 WIRE ROPE STEEL 3/8 IN X 600 FT
5340001880330	09	2	300	10 76	3228 00	1 04	312	0 1	30 TURNBUCKLE, STL, 3/8" X 12" C&C
5610002504677	09	3 3	495	5 96	2950 20	94	46530	1 5	742 5 PORTLAND CEMENT, HIGH EARLY STRNTI
561000Z010001	09	125	18750	0	0	0	0	0	0 AGGREGATE COARSE LOCAL PROCUREMENT
561000Z010002	09	0 6	90	0	0	0	0	0	0 AGGREGATE, FINE, LOCAL PROCUREMENT
5660002697803	09	0 1	15	157 03	2355 45	315	4725	26	390 WIRE, FENCE, GALV, 7 FT, 2" MESH
5660009131527	09	16	2400	1 02	2448 00	0 03	72	0 013	31 2 BAND, TENSION, 3"
566000Z640002	09	4	600	1 00	600 00	1	600	0 001	0 6 CLAMPS, TRUSS WIRE
566000Z640003	09	4	600	1 00	600 00	1	600	0 001	0 6 GATE CORNER CONNECTORS, 2"
566000Z640009	09	2	300	3 00	900 00	2	600	0 1	30 CAP, GATE POST, 3"
566000Z640010	09	2	300	5 00	1500 00	2	600	0 1	30 GATE HINGE ASSEMBLY, 3"
566000Z640011	09	1	150	5 00	750 00	3	450	0 1	15 GATE LATCH ASSEMBLY, 3" & 2"
566000Z640020	09	2	300	55 00	16500 00	50	15000	0 7	210 POST, FENCE, RND, GALV, 3", 13 FT
566000Z640021	09	8	1200	2 00	2400 00	1	1200	0 001	1 2 BRACE RAIL CLAMPS & BOLTS, 2 5"
566000Z640022	09	2	300	4 00	1200 00	1	300	0 001	0 3 STRETCHER BAR, 10', GALV STEEL
566000Z640023	09	2	300	1 00	300 00	1	300	0 001	0 3 10' SCH 40 2 5" DIA GALV STL BRACE
566000Z640024	09	2	300	1 00	300 00	1	300	0 001	0 3 2 5" 3 FOOT STEEL BRACE
5660012486719	09	1	150	27 19	4078 50	24 5	3675	0 1	15 POST, FENCE, MTL, 2", 6 FT LNPTH
5660012502947	09	2	300	20 69	6207 00	22 8	6840	0 3	90 POST, FENCE, METAL, 2", 10 FT LNPTH
5660012644767	09	0 1	15	116 32	1744 80	48 6	729	1 43	2: 45 TIE WIRES, FENCE FAB, ALUM 9 GA

3 - GATE 12 WIDE, SINGLE LEAF (12 REQ'D)

APPENDIX 2 (IF BOM) TO ANNEX G (ENGINEER OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

#87210AG

nsn	section	ui	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total cube	nomen
4010002728794	09	RL	0.1	1	286.01	286.01	144	144	1.2	1.2	1 2 WIRE ROPE STEEL 3/8 IN X 600 FT
5340001880330	09	EA	2	20	10.76	215.2	1.04	20.8	0.1	0.1	2 TURNBUCKLE, STL, 3/8" X 12" C&C
5610002504677	09	BG	3.3	33	5.96	196.68	94	3102	1.5	49.5	5 PORTLAND CEMENT, HIGH EARLY STRNTI
5610002010001	09	CD	125	1250	0	0.00	0	0	0	0	0 AGGREGATE COARSE LOCAL PROCUREMENT
5610002010002	09	CD	0.6	6	0	0.00	0	0	0	0	0 AGGREGATE, FINE, LOCAL PROCUREMENT
5660002646655	09	EA	2	20	55.25	1105.00	35	700	0.754	15.08	15.08 POST, FENCE, RND, MTL, 2", 12 FT

3 - GATE 12 WIDE, SINGLE LEAF (12 REQ'D) #87210AG - CONT

nsn	section	ui	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total cube	nomen
5660007204530	09	RO	0.3	3	299.02	897.06	351.7	1055.1	26.33	78.999	78.999 WIRE, FENCE, STL, 10 FT, 2" MESH
5660009695266	09	EA	16	160	1.82	291.20	0.5	80	0.02	3.2	3.2 BAND, TENSION, 4" POST
566000Z640002	09	EA	4	40	1	40.00	1	40	0.001	0.04	0.04 CLAMPS, TRUSS WIRE
566000Z640003	09	EA	4	40	1	40.00	1	40	0.001	0.04	0.04 GATE CORNER CONNECTORS, 2"
566000Z640004	09	EA	2	20	1	20.00	1	20	0.001	0.02	0.02 CAP, GATE POST, 4"
566000Z640005	09	EA	2	20	3	60.00	2	40	0.1	2	2 GATE HINGE ASSEMBLY, 4"
566000Z640006	09	EA	1	10	4	40.00	2	20	0.1	1	1 GATE LATCH ASSEMBLY, 4" & 2"
566000Z640007	09	EA	1	10	4	40.00	2	20	0.1	1	1 GATE KEEPER ASSEMBLY
566000Z640021	09	EA	4	40	2	80.00	1	40	0.001	0.04	0.04 BRACE RAIL CLAMPS & BOLTS, 2 5"
566000Z640022	09	EA	2	20	4	80.00	3	60	0.001	0.02	0.02 STRETCHER BAR, 10', GALV STEEL
566000Z640023	09	EA	2	20	1	20.00	1	20	0.001	0.02	0.02 10' SCH 40 2 5" DIA GALV STL BRACE
5660010159800	09	EA	2	20	80.48	1609.60	26	520	1.446	28.92	28.92 POST, FENCE, MTL, 4", 13 FT LNGLTH
5660012502947	09	EA	2	20	20.69	413.80	22.8	456	0.3	6	6 POST, FENCE, METAL, 2", 10 FT LNGLTH
5660012644767	09	PG	0.1	1	116.32	116.32	48.6	48.6	1.43	1.43	1.43 TIE WIRES, FENCE FAB, ALUM 9 GA

4 - GUARD TOWER 34 REQ'D)

nsn	section	ui	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total cube	nomen
5510002206202	09	EA	9	306	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, DIM, 2 COM, 2 X 12 X 8FT
5510002206202	09	EA	1	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, DIM, 2 COM, 2 X 12

APPENDIX 2 (IF BOM) TO ANNEX G (ENGINEER OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

nsn	section	ui	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total cube	nomen
5510005506825	EA	4	136	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	X 6FT 0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, DIM, 2 COM, 6 X 6 X 16FT
5510005506825	EA	4	136	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, DIM, 2 COM, 6 X 6 X 12FT
5510002206196	EA	46	1564	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, DIM, 2 COM, 2 X 6 X 12FT
5510002206196	EA	3	102	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, DIM, 2 COM, 2 X 6 X 10FT
5510002206196	EA	1	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, DIM, 2 COM, 2 X 6 X 8FT
5510002206194	EA	2	68	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, DIM, 2 COM, 2 X 4 X 16FT
5510002206194	EA	9	306	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, DIM, 2 COM, 2 X 4 X 12FT
5510002206194	EA	1	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, DIM, 2 COM, 2 X 4 X 10FT
5510002206194	EA	12	408	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, DIM, 2 COM, 2 X 4 X 8FT
5510002206178	EA	6	204	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, DIM, 2 COM, 4 X 4 X 8FT
5510002206178	EA	26	884	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, DIM, 2 COM, 4 X 4 X 10FT
5510002206178	EA	2	68	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, DIM, 2 COM, 1 X 4 X 8FT
5650005144474	RL	2	68	16 51	1122 68	47	3196	0 6	0 6	40 8	ROOFING FELT, 108 SQUARE FEET, 45LBS
5530001284981	SH	8	272	26 25	7140	80	21760	2 4	2 4	652 8	PLYWOOD B-C EXT 5 PLY 3/4X48X96IN
5306005503697	EA	36	1224	23 08	28249 92	1 68	2056 32	0 007	0 007	8 568	BOLT, MACHINE, 3/4 X 12IN W/NUT
5310002366478	EA	72	2448	6 23	15251 04	0 03	73 44	0 001	0 001	2 448	WASHER, FLAT,CAD STL, 13/16 ID 2" OD
4 - GUARD TOWER 34 REQ'D) - CONT											
5315000104659	BX	0 25	8 5	29 51	250 835	50	425	0 5	0 5	4 25	NAIL, COMMON, WIRE, STEEL 8D
5315000104663	BX	0 25	8 5	19 8	168 3	50	425	0 5	0 5	4 25	NAIL, COMMON, WIRE, STEEL 3IN, 10D
5315007533885	PG	0 25	8 5	3 7	31 45	5	42 5	0 1	0 1	0 85	NAIL, COMMON, 3 5IN, 16D
5315007533886	LB	5	170	0 36	61 2	1 03	175 1	0 012	0 012	2 04	NAIL, COMMON, 20D

APPENDIX 2 (IF BOM) TO ANNEX G (ENGINEER OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) T ACSOP

5315001618758 LB 0.5 17 1.36 23.12 1.03 17.51 0.012 0.204 NAIL, ROOFING 7/8 LONGIN

5 - WASTEWATER

nsn	section	ur	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total cube	nomen
471000Z190524	FT		1000		13	13000.00	0.002	2	0.012	12	12 PIPE PVC 8IN DIA
471000Z400003	FT		2700		0.75	2025.00	0.0003	0.81	0.005	13.5	13.5 PIPE PVC SCH 40 6IN FT
471000Z650075	FT		1400		18.53	25942.00	7.41	10374	0.803	1124.2	1124.2 PIPE PVC 10IN DIA
473000Z230087	EA		9		50.53	454.77	4.77	42.93	0.564	5.076	5.076 PIPE PVC 6 X 6 X 6 WYE
471000Z680001	EA		12		33.3	399.60	15	180	1.759	21	108 PIPE PVC 8 X 8 X 6 WYE
	EA		15		0.00	0.00		0		0	0 PIPE PVC 10 X 10 X 6 WYE
	EA		3		0.00	0.00		0		0	0 PRECAST CONC MANHOLE W/ COVER 4FT DIA
	EA		4		0.00	0.00		0		0	0 PRECAST CONC MANHOLE W/ COVER 6FT DIA
	EA		7		0.00	0.00		0		0	0 CLEAN OUT 6"
	EA		7		0.00	0.00		0		0	0 EJECTOR PUMP, 1HP W/ FLOAT SWITCH
473000Z40007	EA		7		71.75	502.25	4.47	31.29	1.05	7.35	35 BEND PVC SCH 40 45DEG 6IN
473000Z400065	EA		7		16.1	112.70	2.02	14.14	0.03	0.21	CLEAN OUT ADPT 4IN PVC DWV
473000Z400066	EA		7		3.9	27.30	0.56	3.92	0.01	0.07	CLEAN OUT PLUG PIPE MPT 4IN
	EA		4		0.00	0.00		0		0	0 REDUCER 10IN TO 8IN PVC DWV
	EA		7		0.00	0.00		0		0	0 CLEAN OUT ADPT PIPE 8" PVC DWV
	EA		7		0.00	0.00		0		0	0 REDUCER 6IN TO 4IN PVC DWV
473000Z650087	EA		7		22.91	160.37	6.31	44.17	0.664	4.648	REDUCER 8IN TO 4IN PVC DWV
473000Z650082	EA		7		68.28	477.96	4.26	29.82	0.429	3.003	CLEAN OUT ADPT PIPE 8" PVC DWV
473000Z650083	EA		7		44.28	309.96	2.25	15.75	0.203	1.421	CLEAN OUT ADPT PIPE 6" PVC DWV
473000Z650085	EA		7		24.22	169.54	1	7	0.082	0.574	CLEAN OUT PLUG PIPE MPT 6IN
473000Z650086	EA		7		31	217.00	5.27	36.89	0.398	2.786	CLEAN OUT PLUG PIPE MPT 8IN

6 - WATER DIST FOR EPW 4000 TEMP STD

nsn	section	ur	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total cube	nomen
4710004765870	10	FT	1000		0.79	790.00	0.003	3	0.009	0.9	PIPE PVC DWV SCHEDULE 40 2 INCH
4710004765874	10	LG	400		5.85	2340.00	0.0002	0.08	0.003	0.12	PIPE WTR PVC SCH 40 1 IN/20FT LNTH
471000Z520122	10	EA	200		0.33	66.00	0.17	34	0.05	10	COUPLING PVC 2 IN SXS

APPENDIX 2 (IF BOM) TO ANNEX G (ENGINEER OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CD) TACSOP

6 - WATER DIST FOR EPW 4000 TEMP STD - CONT

nsn	section	ui	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total cube	nomen
471000Z520126	10	EA	200	200	6 65	1330 00	1	200	1	200	200 SOLVENT CEMENT
471000Z650007	10	QT	200	200	3 75	750 00	1	200	1	200	200 PVC CLEANER PRIMER
473000Z725056	10	EA	200	200	0 31	62 00	0 25	50	0 01	50	0 2 COUPLING PLASTIC PIPE PVC 1 INCH
473000Z650001	10	EA	60	60	0 32	19 20	0 3	18	0 06	18	0 36 ELBOW PVC SCH 40, 90 DEG, 1 IN SXS
473000Z680005	10	EA	40	40	0 90	36 00	0 16	6 4	0 01	6 4	0 4 5PLUG,PVC SCH 40 2" SLIP TYPE
482000Z5951847	10	EA	12	12	24 62	295 44	34	408	0 15	408	1 8 VALVE GATE CI SCR 2 IN CLASS 125
473000Z650018		EA	20	20	3 45	69 00	2 37	47 4	65	13	TEE REDUCING 4 X 4 X 2
		EA	12	12							CAP SLIP TYPE, 1IN PVC
473000Z400016		EA	250	250	0 4	100 00	0 4	100	1	25	COUPLING PVC SCH 40 4IN
471000Z4765874		EA	200	200	5 85	1170 00	0 3	60	0 13	2 6	PIPE WTR PVC SCH 40 4IN 20FT LNTH
473000Z400016		EA	1	1	28 94	28 94	20 56	20 56	361	0 361	COUPLING HALF QK DIS 4IN FEM-KAMLOC
471000Z4765874		EA	40	40							VALVE GATE CI SCR 1IN
4610010234537		SE	16	16	8067	129072 00	400	6400	15	240	SHOWER WASTEWATER TREATMENT
4710001395946		LG	500	500	4 29	2145 00	4 2	2100	0 16	80	PIPE WATER PVC SCH 40 3/4IN (20FT)
4710005494651		EA	200	200	23 47	4694 00	8 36	1672	1 25	250	PIPE PVC 1-1/4IN X 20 W/O COUPLING
471000Z520126		EA	12	12	6 65	79 80	1	12	1	12	SOLVENT CEMENT
471000Z520129		EA	16	16	80	1280 00	21	336	4	64	BOOSTER PUMP IN LINE 1/12HP
471000Z650007		QT	12	12	3 75	45 00	1	12	1	12	PVC CLEANER PRIMER
473000Z4767136		EA	50	50	0 28	14 00	0 12	6	0 008	0 4	ELBOW PLASTIC PIPE PVC 90 DEG 3/4IN
473000Z4767143		EA	50	50	2 19	109 50	0 5	25	0 023	1 15	ELBOW PLASTIC PIPE PVC 90 DEG 1 50IN
543000Z3554486		EA	12	12							ONION TANK, 3,000GAL
			200	200	0	0	0	0	0	0	ELBOW PIPE STEEL 45 DEG 1/2IN

7 - BURN-OUT LATRINE (160 REQ'D)

nsn	section	ui	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total cube	nomen
551000Z206220		EA	18	2880	0	0	0	0	0	0	LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, DIM, 2 COM, 2 X 4 X 8FT
5530001284981		SH	4	640	0	0	0	0	0	0	PLYWOOD, BC, EXT 5-PLY 3/4 X 48 X 96
5315000104659		BX	1	160	29 51	4721 6	50	8000	0 5	80	NAIL, COMMON, WIRE, STEEL 8D
		EA	160	160							BARREL, METAL

APPENDIX 2 (IF BOM) TO ANNEX G (ENGINEER OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/C) TACSOP

nsn	section	unit	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total cube	nomen	
8 - SHOWER (16 REQ'D)												
5510002206220	EA		15	240	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, 2 COM, DIM, 2 X 4 X 8FT	
5510002206220	EA		13	208	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, 2 COM, DIM, 2 X 4 X 6FT	
5510002206150	EA		3	48	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 LUMBER, SOFTWOOD, 2 COM, DIM, 2 X 8 X 8FT	
5530001284981	SH		6	96	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 PLYWOOD, BC, EXT, 5 PLY 3/4 X 48 X 96IN	
5315000104659	BX		1	16	29 51	472 16	50	800	0 5	8	8 NAIL, COMMON WIRE STEEL 8D	
5315007533885	PG		3	48	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 NAIL, COMMON, 3 5IN, 16D	
	SF		192	3072	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 ROLLED RUBBER MATTING 1/8" THK (4' OF 8' WIDE)	
4710002266289	LG		4	64	59 41	3802 24	1 2	76 8	0 2	12 8	12 8 PIPE, PVC SCH 40, 6IN	
4710001395946	LG		2	32	4 29	137 28	4 2	134 4	0 16	5 12	5 12 PIPE, PVC SCH 40, 3/4IN	
4730000825973	EA		12	192	0 95	182 4	0 19	36 48	0 003	0 576	0 576 PIPE, PVC SCH 40, TEE, 3/4	
4730001961551	EA		12	192	0 64	122 88	0 05	9 6	0 001	0 192	0 192 PIPE, GALV IRON NIPPLE 1/2 X 6IN LG	
			12	192	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 PIPE, GALV IRON 45DEG ELBOW 1/2IN	
			12	192	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 PIPE, GALV IRON NIPPLE 1/2 X 4IN LG	
			2	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 PVC PIPE SCH 40 CAP 3/4"	
			2	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 PIPE PVC SCH 40 CAP 6IN	
4710004765874	LG		2	32	5 85	187 2	0 3	9 6	0 013	0 416	0 416 PIPE PVC SCH 40 1IN X 20LG	
	EA		2	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 PIPE PVC SCH 40 CAP 1IN	
			4	64	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 PIPE PVC SCH 40 COUPLING 3/4IN	
471000Z650007	QT		1	16	3 75	60	1	16	1	16	16 PVC CLEANER PRIMER	
471000Z520126	EA		1	16	6 65	106 4	1	16	1	16	16 SOLVENT CEMENT	
4510002027703	EA		12	192	1 95	374 4	0 42	80 64	0 011	2 112	2 112 SHOWER HEAD	
4510002731286	EA		12	192	145 52	27939 84	1 68	322 56	0 022	4 224	4 224 VALVE SHOWER SLF CLOSING 1/2IN NPT	
	EA		12	192	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 REDUCER 3/4 X 1/2IN (PVC TO GALV IRON	

9 - ELECT DIST 4000 MAN EPW PERIMETER

APPENDIX 2 (IF BOM) TO ANNEX G (ENGINEER OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

nsn	section	u	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total cube	nomen
4010002212709	08	RL	8.2	8.2	572.89	4697.70	5.58	45.756	3.075	25.215	WIRE STRAND STEEL 3/8IN GALV 2500FT
4030001719014	08	EA	54	54	22.84	1233.36	0.34	18.36	0.149	8.046	ROD ANCHOR STL GALV 3/4IN X 9FT
4030001849830	08	EA	30	30	2.55	76.50	0.18	5.4	0.248	7.44	SHACKLE STEEL 2-7/8 IN LENGTH
4030002422673	08	EA	54	54	8.67	468.18	0.13	7.02	0.122	6.588	ANCHOR EXP STL 70 SQ IN FOR 75 ROD
4030002975873	08	EA	92	92	6.80	625.60	0.01	0.92	0.002	0.184	GUY ATTACH THRU BOLT TYPE 11/16HOLE
4030008649037	08	EA	184	184	8.93	1643.12	0.21	38.64	0.322	59.248	CLAMP GUY 3-BOLT 3/8 OR 7/16 IN STR
4030009065868	08	EA	51	51	2.50	127.50	0.03	1.53	0.008	0.408	GROUND WIRE MOULDING TRTD WD 10 F
4030012476946	08	EA	1	1	138.23	138.23	36	36	0.158	0.158	SHACKLE STEEL, 3 25 IN, 7 75 IN LG
4730001877613	08	EA	62	62	1.04	64.48	0.28	17.36	0.001	0.062	COUPLING PIPE MALL IRN 3/4IN STD WT
9 - ELECT DIST 4000 MAN EPW PERIMETER - CONT											
nsn	section	u	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total cube	nomen
5306000891422	08	EA	202	202	0.27	54.54	0.15	30.3	0.002	0.404	BOLT,SQ NECK, 375-16UNC,4 531IN,STL
5306002400819	08	EA	61	61	0.96	58.56	2.09	127.49	0.024	1.464	BOLT EYE, 750-10UNC,4IN,STL
5306002637653	08	EA	2	2	4.32	8.64	0.4	0.8	0.001	0.002	BOLT MACH, 500-13UNC,6IN W/NUT,STL
5306002637677	08	EA	62	62	1.87	115.94	0.56	34.72	0.002	0.124	BOLT MACH, 625-11UNC,5 062IN W/NUT
5306002739373	08	EA	150	150	3.69	553.50	3	450	0.01	1.5	ROD,CONT THRD, 625-11UNC,20IN,GALV
5306002813721	08	EA	236	236	3.07	724.52	1.13	266.68	0.006	1.416	BOLT MACH, 625-11UNC,12IN W/NUT,GAL
5306002813722	08	EA	87	87	2.34	203.58	1.3	113.1	0.005	0.435	BOLT MACH, 625-11UNC,14IN W/NUT,GAL
5306004129789	08	EA	144	144	0.33	47.52	0.33	47.52	0.008	1.152	BOLT LAG, 50WD,4IN,GALV
5306008659573	08	EA	62	62	3.82	236.84	0.36	22.32	0.001	0.062	BOLT MACHINE 1/2 X 5 IN W/NUT
5310001973334	08	EA	82	82	1.05	86.10	0.58	47.56	0.001	0.082	WASHER FLAT SQ 3 00"X 2500X 81250ID
5310002749021	08	EA	79	79	3.87	305.73	0.2	15.8	0.001	0.079	NUT EYE STEEL THD 5/8 EYE78X1-1/2
5310005284185	08	EA	1048.6	1048.6	0.99	1038.11	2.25	2359.35	0.02	20.972	WASHER FLAT SQ 2 25"X 1875X 81250ID
5310007638920	08	HD	7.7	7.7	9.95	76.62	0.12	0.924	0.001	0.0077	NUT PLAIN HEX 5/8-11 UNC 2B
5310008093079	08	PG	3.2	3.2	11.07	35.42	9.63	30.816	0.016	0.0512	WASHER FLAT FOR 1/2 IN BOLT
5310009519564	08	EA	618	618	7.07	4369.26	0.14	86.52	0.001	0.618	NUT SELF LOCKING HEX 5/8-11 THREAD
5315006647034	08	BX	5.1	5.1	37.5	191.25	0.54	2.754	0.009	0.0459	STAPLE CABLE 3/8 IN SPREAD 1 IN LG
5340002811444	08	EA	153	153	1.23	188.19	0.11	16.83	0.004	0.612	STRAP RTNG 3/4 IN HVY WALL STL CND
5510001612912	08	EA	126	126	124.58	15697.08	650	81900	15	1890	POLE WOOD PRESSURE TRTD 35 FT CL 6
5510001613302	08	EA	14	14	510.69	7149.66	1260	17640	28	392	POLE WOOD PRESSURE TRTD 45 FT CL 4
5510009885250	08	EA	105	105	57.92	6081.60	38	3990	1.3	136.5	CROSSARM WD 11/16HOLES 3 75X4 75X96
5510009885251	08	EA	1	1	53.22	53.22	62.12	62.12	1.931	1.931	CROSSARM WD 11/16HOLES3 75X4 75X121

APPENDIX 2 (IF BOM) TO ANNEX G (ENGINEER OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

5920002504731	08	EA	8	8	155.94	1247.52	24.9	199.2	0.706	5 648 FUSE CUTOUT 5 KV 50 A CROSSARM MTC
5920005323207	08	EA	16	16	0.99	15.84	0.2	3.2	0.004	0 064 FUSE LINK 6 A UNIVERSAL TYPE T
5920005349776	08	EA	8	8	34.56	276.48	6	48	0.08	0 64 ARRESTER LIGHTNING 6KV W/MTG BRKT
5925009999320	08	EA	51	51	8.85	451.35	11	561	0.463	23 613 LOAD CENTER RAIN TIGHT W/2-20A BRKRE
5940002287912	08	PG	102	102	6.92	705.84	0.01	1.02	0.001	0 102 CONN SPLITBOLT NO 8 OR 6 AWG 10/PG
5940002399033	08	EA	174	174	4.44	772.56	0.1	17.4	0.01	1 74 CONNECTOR SPLITBOLT NO 0000 AWG C
5940009144510	08	EA	52	52	39.07	2031.64	1.3	67.6	0.006	0 312 SPLICE CONDUCTOR UNINSULATED 500MCM
5940009161006	08	EA	162	162	38.75	6277.50	0.5	81	0.005	0 81 CONN GRVD CLAMP NO 6 AWG TO 00 AWG
5970002636885	08	EA	204	204	3.79	773.16	2.32	473.28	0.086	17 544 INSULATOR PIN PORCELAIN MEDIUM VOL
5970002845450	08	EA	51	51	22.00	1122.00	16	816	0.533	27 183 INSULATOR ASSY W/4 SPOOL TYPE INSUL
5970002845451	08	EA	4	4	21.33	85.32	1	4	0.25	1 INSULATOR ASSY,3-WIRE A7 SPLS W/R
5970004194291	08	RO	51	51	1.90	96.90	0.42	21.42	0.037	1 887 TAPE ELECTRIC PLASTIC 3/4 INCH WIDE
5970007687516	08	EA	174	174	27.63	4807.62	11.08	1927.92	0.05	8 7 INSULATOR SUSPEN PORC STYLE P2 BRWN
5975000564377	08	EA	210	210	5.92	1243.20	7	1470	0.104	21 84 BRACE CROSSARM WD DBL ARM TYPE 30IN

9 - ELECT DIST 4000 MAN EPW PERIMETER - CONT

nsn	section	ui	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total cube	nomen
5975001328288	08	EA	138	138	6.78	935.64	1.86	256.68	0.04	5 52 PIN INSULATOR STEEL FOR WD CROSSARM	
5975001521094	08	EA	51	51	0.27	13.77	0.04	2.04	0.001	0 051 BUSHING 3/4 IN HVY WALL STL CONDUIT	
5975002286004	08	LG	102	102	10.16	1036.32	2.15	219.3	0.031	3 162 CONDUIT 3/4 INCH RIGID HVY WALL STL	
5975002803743	08	EA	51	51	0.56	28.56	0.59	30.09	0.004	0 204 ENTRANCE CAP 75 IN HVY STL CONDUIT	
5975002965324	08	EA	55	55	11.01	605.55	0.63	34.65	0.01	0 55 ROD GROUND CWLD 5/8IN X 8FT W/CLAMP	
5975005033622	08	EA	8	8	0.99	7.92	6.37	50.96	0.28	2 24 BRACKET CUTOUT & ARRESTOR MOUNTINGS	
5975005078882	08	PR	32	32	2.50	80.00	0.25	8	0.3	9 6 BRACE CROSSARM WD 60" SPAN 18" DROP	
5975005078884	08	EA	62	62	1.50	93.00	5.1	316.2	0.02	1 24 PIN INSUL STEEL CROSSARM CLAMP TYP	
5975006427261	08	PG	51	51	2.26	11.53	1.26	6.426	0.06	0 306 LOCKNUT 3/4 INCH HVY STL CND 50/PG	
5975008648232	08	EA	66	66	5.67	374.22	2.8	184.8	0.001	0 066 PIN INSUL STEEL POLE TOP 15" FLG CH	
5975008784868	08	EA	51	51	14.42	735.42	5	255	0.6	30 6 GROUND ROD 3/4INX10FT STL W/CU COAT	
5975009021420	08	EA	84	84	1.45	121.80	1.25	105	0.01	0 84 CLAMP STRAIN ENV TYPE F/CU	

APPENDIX 2 (IF BOM) TO ANNEX G (ENGINEER OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

CONDUCTR												
nsn	section	u1	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total weight	cube	total nomen cube
612000Z020006	08	EA	4	4	320.00	1280.00	335	1340	12	1340	12	48 XFMR 1PH 4160-120/240V 15 KVA CONV
6145001979001	08	FT	5100	5100	0.05	255.00	0.03	153	0.002	153	0.002	10.2 WIRE WP NO 12 SOLID CU POLYETHYLENE
6145002994456	08	FT	1550	1550	0.34	527.00	0.08	124	0.001	124	0.001	1.55 CABLE 1/C #6 AWG 7-STR CU BARE MHD
6145002996213	08	FT	1380	1380	0.32	441.60	1	1380	0.018	1380	0.018	24.84 CABLE 1/C #2 AWG 7-STR CU BARE MHD
6145005191031	08	FT	80	80	0.33	26.40	0.2	16	0.004	16	0.004	0.32 WIRE WP NO 4 7-STR CU POLYETHYLENE
614500Z190607	08	LF	320	320	0.79	252.80	0.37	118.4	0.002	118.4	0.002	0.64 WIRE,COPPER,1/C#1 AWG RHW
614500Z190611	08	LF	20	20	2.80	56.00	1.45	29	0.005	29	0.005	0.1 WIRE,COPPER,1/C350 MCM AWG RHW
6230004239562	08	EA	226	226	372.35	84151.10	12	2712	0.2	2712	0.2	45.2 FLOODLIGHT ELEC GLASS REFL
6240001863229	08	BX	226	226	151.06	34139.56	0.77	174.02	0.178	174.02	0.178	40.228 LAMP INCANDESCENT 120V 500W MOGUL

10 - ELEC DIST POLE KIT FOR EPW CAMP

nsn	section	u1	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total weight	cube	total nomen cube
5510001612912	08	EA	6	6	124.58	747.48	650	3900	15	3900	15	90 POLE WOOD PRESSURE TRTD 35 FT CL 6
5510001613302	08	EA	1	1	510.69	510.69	1260	1260	28	1260	28	28 POLE WOOD PRESSURE TRTD 45 FT CL 4
614500Z190607	08	LF	32	32	0.79	25.28	0.37	11.84	0.002	11.84	0.002	0.064 WIRE,COPPER,1/C#1 AWG RHW
614500Z190611	08	LF	2	2	2.80	5.60	1.45	2.9	0.005	2.9	0.005	0.01 WIRE,COPPER,1/C350 MCM AWG RHW

11 - ELEC DIST 4000 EPW CAMP

nsn	section	u1	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total weight	cube	total nomen cube
5925009999320	08	EA	259	259	8.85	2292.15	11	2849	0.463	2849	0.463	119.917 LOAD CENTER RAIN TIGHT W/2-20A BRKRS
5940002287912	08	PG	518	518	6.92	3584.56	0.01	5.18	0.001	5.18	0.001	0.518 CONN SPLITBOLT NO 8 OR 6 AWG 10/PG
5940002399033	08	EA	246	246	4.44	1092.24	0.1	24.6	0.01	24.6	0.01	2.46 CONNECTOR SPLITBOLT NO 0000 AWG C
5940009144510	08	EA	312	312	39.07	12189.84	1.3	405.6	0.006	405.6	0.006	1.872 SPLICE CONDUCTOR UNINSULATED 500MCM

11 - ELEC DIST 4000 EPW CAMP - CONT

nsn	section	u1	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total weight	cube	total nomen cube
5940009161006	08	EA	733.2	733.2	38.75	28411.50	0.5	366.6	0.005	366.6	0.005	3.666 CONN GRVD CLAMP NO 6 AWG TO 00 AWG
5970002636885	08	EA	303	303	3.79	1148.37	2.32	702.96	0.086	702.96	0.086	26.058 INSULATOR PIN PORCELAIN MEDIUM VOL
5970002845450	08	EA	283	283	22	6226.00	16	4528	0.533	4528	0.533	150.839 INSULATOR PIN PORCELAIN MEDIUM VOL
5970002845451	08	EA	119.4	119.4	21.33	2546.80	1	119.4	0.25	119.4	0.25	29.85 INSULATOR PIN PORCELAIN MEDIUM VOL

APPENDIX 2 (IF BOM) TO ANNEX G (ENGINEER OPERATIONS) TO THE 800th MP BDE (EPW/CI) TACSOP

5970004194291	08	RO	259	259	1 9	492 10	0 42	108 78	0 037	9 583	TAPE ELECTRIC PLASTIC 3/4 INCH WIDE
5975002286004	08	LG	518	518	10 16	5262 88	2 15	1113 7	0 031	16 058	CONDUIT 3/4 INCH RIGID HVY WALL STL
5975002965324	08	EA	288	288	11 01	3170 88	0 63	181 44	0 01	2 88	ROD GROUND CWLD 5/8IN X 8FT W/CLAMP
5975004669284	08	EA	3	3	0 50	1 50	16 5	49 5	0 19	0 57	CLAMP STRAIN FIACSR CONDUCTOR W/ALU
5975008784868	08	EA	259	259	14 42	3734 78	5	1295	0 6	155 4	GROUND ROD 3/4INX10FT STL W/CU COA1
5975009021420	08	EA	108	108	1 45	156 60	1 25	135	0 01	1 08	CLAMP STRAIN ENV TYPE F/CU CONDUCTR
612000Z020006	08	EA	53	53	320 00	16960 00	335	17755	12	636	XFMR 1PH 4160-120/240V 15 KVA CONV
6145001979001	08	FT	25900	25900	0 05	1295 00	0 03	777	0 002	51 8	WIRE WP NO 12 SOLID CU POLYETHYLENE
6145001990222	08	FT	320	320	0 46	147 20	0 27	86 4	0 006	1 92	WIRE WP NO 2 7-STR CU POLYETHYLENE
6145002994456	08	FT	5672	5672	0 34	1928 48	0 08	453 76	0 001	5 672	CABLE 1/C #6 AWG 7-STR CU BARE MHD
6145002996213	08	FT	2460	2460	0 32	787 20	1	2460	0 018	44 28	CABLE 1/C #2 AWG 7-STR CU BARE MHD
6145005191031	08	FT	100	100	0 33	33 00	0 2	20	0 004	0 4	WIRE WP NO 4 7-STR CU POLYETHYLENE
614500Z190607	08	LF	1952	1952	0 79	1542 08	0 37	722 24	0 002	3 904	WIRE,COPPER,1/C#1 AWG RHW
614500Z190611	08	LF	122	122	2 80	341 60	1 45	176 9	0 005	0 61	WIRE,COPPER,1/C350 MCM AWG RHW
6145012124355	08	FT	160	160	2 41	385 60	2 66	425 6	0 1	16	CABLE 1/C 500MCM37-STR CU THW BLACK

12 - ELEC KIT GEN PURP TENT, MED

nsn	section	u	quantity	total quantity	price	total price	weight	total weight	cube	total cube	nomen
5925009305558	08	EA	1	448 00	17 21	7710 08	12	5376	0 463	207 424	LOAD CTR PNL 120/240V W/2-20A BRKRS
5975001536395	08	EA	7	3136 00	0 65	2038 40	0 02	8 96	0 02	8 96	JUNCTION BOX,TYPE I,SIZE B,STYLE 7
5975001536775	08	EA	7	3136 00	0 27	846 72	0 01	4 48	0 001	0 448	COVER JUNCTION BOX 4 IN ROUND
6145005191332	08	FT	33	14784 00	0 36	5322 24	0 16	71 68	0 004	1 792	CABLE 3/C&GND 12 AWG SOL CU NMC TT.
6145005192718	08	CL	0 6	268 80	36 77	9883 78	0 09	40 32	0 014	6 272	CABLE 2/C&GND 12 AWG SOL CU NMC TT.
6210008658451	08	EA	5	2240 00	36 49	81737 60	14	6272	2 27	1016 96	FXTR LTG FLUOR INDL RS 2-40 W STL
6240001522987	08	EA	11	4928 00	1 06	5223 68	2	896	1	448 000	LAMP FLUORESCENT F40T12 COOL WHITE

1 ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW

2
3 At Camp Doha, Kuwait, on 15 February 2004:

4 MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, U.S. Army, CFLCC Deputy Commanding
5 General deposing.

6 MASTER SERGEANT [REDACTED] U.S. Army, CFLCC-SJA, Senior Court
7 Reporter, has been detailed reporter for this interview and has been
8 previously sworn.

9 BRIGADIER GENERAL JANIS L. KARPINSKI, U.S. Army, was sworn, and
10 interviewed as follows:

11 Q Has anybody mentioned to you the context of the
12 investigation, or scope of anything in that nature?

13 A No As a matter of fact I was kind of frustrated because I
14 tried to get something from General Diamond and General Kratzer, and
15 nobody would tell me

16 Q. Okay Well, rightly so, I think because of the sensitivity
17 of the investigation----

18 A Yes, sir

19 Q ----and based on some allegations that were made, but let
20 me go ahead then and start off and go to the proceedings here, some
21 administrative requirements I'm Major General Taguba I'm The
22 Deputy Commanding General of the Coalition Land Forces Component
23 Command, as you know headquartered here at Camp Doha. The Commanding

1 General, Lieutenant General David McKiernan, has appointed me as the
2 Investigating Officer under the provisions of AR 15-6 Also, at the
3 direction of General John Abizaid who is the Commander of CENTCOM
4 Our investigation is to gather all facts-- relevant facts and
5 circumstances surrounding recent allegations of maltreatment of
6 detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison also known as the Baghdad Central
7 Confinement [sic] Facility As well as detainee escapes and
8 accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7 Our investigation is to
9 further look into the training, the standards, employment, command
10 policies, and internal policies concerning the detainees held at the
11 Abu Ghraib Prison. And finally, we were directed to assess the
12 command climate, the supervisory presence of the 800th Military Police
13 Brigade chain of command That includes everybody that's organic to
14 you, to your unit, and those that were tasked organized to you-- your
15 Brigade during the period of time when you were in command You've
16 already met the members of the investigation team I want to advise
17 you that you have been sworn in by Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] All of
18 our comments and your responses will be recorded for accuracy. Of
19 course you'll get a chance to look at them before once again that you
20 sign . . . of the statements So before we begin I ask you if you have
21 any questions on the scope or nature of this inquiry?

22 A An aggressive undertaking and-- but I don't have any
23 questions, sir.

1 Q Okay, wonderful. For the record would you please state
2 your name, your rank, social security number, and duty position?

3 A My name is Janis Lee Karpinski. I'm a Brigadier General,
4 and the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade, and my social security
5 number is [REDACTED]

6 Q. Thank you And you're currently the Commanding General of
7 the 800th MP Brigade?

8 A Yes, sir

9 Q Okay, good The allegations were-- related to events that
10 happened roughly between October, December timeframe, since that's
11 still under investigation by the CID, when would-- when were you
12 first made aware of those circumstances and the events that happened
13 there at Tier 1A at the hard site at Abu Ghraib?

14 A I was up at Ashraf at the MEK compound and I received an
15 email from [REDACTED] the commander of the CID, and he said, "I
16 just want you to be aware I'm getting ready to go in and brief
17 General Sanchez I want you to be aware that there have been-- that
18 we're doing an investigation at Abu Ghraib Prison for detainee abuse
19 involved," uh-- I don't even remember if there was two or three
20 sentences And that was about January 24th, 23rd----

21 Q Thereabouts?

22 A. Thereabouts

1 Q. What action did you take after that, upon that
2 notification?

3 A. I sent an email back to him, I said, "I don't know what to
4 say " There wasn't enough specifics in that statement. I called
5 him. I left a message for him. I was down in-- the next morning I
6 was down in-- at Victory, and two days later [REDACTED] came
7 over to see me, and told me that he was briefing General Wojdakowski
8 in an-- I think it was an interim briefing, and he wanted me to see
9 what they had accumulated thus far

10 Q Sure.

11 A Showed me some of the pictures.

12 Q Sure

13 Q And I still didn't know what to say to him It was I
14 called out to-- it was worse than I had-- could ever imagine It's
15 still too difficult for me to think that soldiers would have done
16 some of things that were photographed

17 Q Okay

18 A. I called out to [REDACTED] He'd been over the
19 same day that I got the email from [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED] called me up at Ashraf and h said----

21 Q Your XO?

22 A My XO And he said, "I have Colonel [REDACTED] and Colonel
23 [REDACTED] in the office, I'm afraid this isn't good news. There's been

1 some-- there's an investigation going on at Baghdad Central " I
2 said, "I'm aware of it, and it's an investigation so I don't want you
3 to talk about it on the phone, but what's [REDACTED] say?
4 So, he said he didn't know anything about it It wasn't that he was
5 not giving you information, but it's-- as far as what he could tell
6 me it's really bad and I said okay I got an email from [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED] the CID commander so I know that it's still an open
8 investigation "

9 Q Did General Sanchez call you, or did you call him?

10 A He did not

11 Q He did not. Did you inform General Diamond of this events?

12 A I did not

13 Q You did not?

14 A And I did not because [REDACTED] made it very clear
15 that it was an open investigation and that General Sanchez was
16 briefed about it and General Wojdakowski was briefed about it

17 Q Who directed you or if you took the initiative of
18 suspending [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]?

19 A General Sanchez called me into his office that afternoon
20 I saw [REDACTED] outside and he said General Sanc ez is really
21 upset about the investigation And he said, "I don't really know
22 what action he's going to take." And I said, "Well I was scheduled
23 to go out there, so I'll just hold off until he tells me what he

1 wants me to do " So, when I went in to see him he said, "I want you
2 to do an assessment of their leadership abilities and make a
3 determination if they're able to hold leadership positions " And and
4 I-- I said, "I can go out to Baghdad Central first thing in the
5 morning I can spend the day out there, or three days out there. As
6 you know sir, you're FRAGO sent my up to Ashraf and I don't know if
7 General Surgeon has any plans for any kind of activities up there I
8 don't' want to throw anything off track inadvertently " And he said,
9 "Do you want me to tell you what your priorities are?" And I said,
10 "No, sir I understand priorities, but I didn't want to disrupt any
11 of those-- since that-- that direction is coming from the SECDEF's
12 office, I didn't want to disrupt any of those plans "

13 Q Sure

14 A So he said, "No, there's nothing scheduled. Just go out to
15 Baghdad Central " So, I did. Spent the day out there and the next
16 morning out there, and spoke to the people that were running the
17 cellblock then-- and I've been out there many times and we discussed
18 some of our concerns Sat down and discussed with Colonel Pappas in
19 November and about some of the concerns and the procedures and the
20 manpower drain of running the interrogation cells the way he wanted
21 them run

22 Q. Sure

1 A. And the reason I remember it very specifically was because
2 we sat down and spoke. It was [REDACTED] his deputy, one of the
3 captains, [REDACTED] - there was two Captains, Colonel Pappas, and
4 I had maybe my Operations Officer with me and two are three people
5 And he wanted to speak to me about the four people that the MI
6 Brigade was being tasked to provide to cover a tower for force
7 protection

8 Q Okay

9 A And he said, "Those four people will have a tremendous
10 impact on the interrogation operation " And I said, "Well, it's not
11 like you're running through this thing rapid speed anyway, so-- I
12 mean slowing it down you're gonna stop it " He said, "Exactly," and
13 I said, "This is a tower that affects your soldiers It's for
14 soldiers I mean I've got more than 85 that are involved in internal
15 security." He said, "It's very difficult to provide those four
16 soldiers," and I said, "I'll think about it " But----

17 Q Those were four MI soldiers?

18 A Four-- it didn't have to be MI soldiers, no sir

19 Q Okay

20 . It could be four soldiers Could be clerks, cooks,
21 drivers, whatever.

22 Q Anybody, okay.

1 A So, umm, and I-- I actually said that to him, you know,
2 "Give us your cooks," and he said, "Well then the mess hall won't
3 operate as well " So, I left and when I came back not only was
4 Colonel Pappas the FOB Commander, but somehow all of these assets for
5 him to operate Abu Ghraib prison as an FOB fell from the sky. He had
6 a LRS Battalion, he had two Infantry Platoons, he had an Engineer
7 Company minus one platoon, and I saw him out there maybe four days
8 after I came back and he said and I said, "Gee it seems like those
9 four weren't a problem after all " And I said, "But you're going to
10 get a request from us to be exempted from the internal taskings,
11 because I counted and I got 83 " And he said, "Ma'am, I counted and
12 I got a 121 " And I said, "That's a whole MP company doing nothing
13 but force protection, and escorting contractors around so, we're
14 gonna have to get out of the business of doing some of the other
15 things for your interrogation operation specifically "

16 And he wrote a memo up in December that said, "I'm very
17 concerned about the security posture out here the MP's have-- are no
18 longer escorting detainees going through the interrogation process.
19 We've had to take that on We tried to implement all the measures to
20 make cellblock 1A, an 1B specifically an MI operation " Those kind
21 of things And it really was a memorandum for record as much as it
22 was a request for additional help out there at Abu Ghraib. So when--
23 when this whole situation came to light consistently out at Baghdad

1 Central I was hearing, "Well we couldn't by and check that cellblock
2 anymore because the MI people said that it wasn't "our" operation "
3 [REDACTED] had exclusive rights of escorting us if we wanted to
4 go in. We had to take permission from [REDACTED] And it was
5 consistent with an incident that occurred in November, I believe when
6 a handgun found its way into the cellblock, and as soon as it
7 happened and we heard about it I called out to [REDACTED] out at
8 the 320th and I said, "Get us an SIR Get us one immediately while
9 the information is fresh " And he said, "Ma'am, [REDACTED] has
10 issued a "gag" order for the MP's They can't even give me a
11 statement." And I said, "Bullcrap that's not-- I mean there still my
12 MP's Get a statement so we can publish an SIR This is a serious
13 infraction " So [REDACTED] called me back and said, "Ma'am, I
14 just want to make sure " I said, "MP's don't operate that way. I
15 want the information. I want the facts, and you don't have any right
16 to impose a "gag" order." And he said to me, "Well they're-- they're
17 TACON to us so, we really own the MP's " And I said, "I'm not
18 debating now but I'm going to get the SIR if I have to come out there
19 and get it myself " So they sent an SIR shortly after that, but it
20 gave very broad statements Very generic because they weren't
21 certain on actually how it happened And then when I was out there
22 the next day [REDACTED] specifically looked for me and told me
23 his version of what happened And I'm not questioning [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED] honestly or validity or anything. I'm sure what he was
2 doing at that time was something that he was either being told to do,
3 or thought was the right thing to do. But the version that he gave
4 me was when he said, "I was there when it happened, so I know this,
5 this, and this took place," was not exactly what the CID
6 investigation eventually showed. So, there was disparity between the
7 two reports.

8 Q Now that-- that happened sometime in November, and I
9 believe Colonel Pappas had received a FRAGO appointing him as the
10 Forward Operating Base Commander

11 A Right

12 Q And I believe the specific instruction was that all tenant
13 units would be TACON to him for security detainees and force
14 protection. Was that conveyed to you previously, or did you----

15 A No, sir

16 Q Your S-3 mentions that to you-- so you had no knowledge of
17 that particular directive or fragmentary order from CJTF-7?

18 A No, sir.

19 Q Had no warning.

20 Q Okay. So when you found that out did you go back to
21 General Wojdakowski or General Miller to question that FRAGO?

22 A I did, and General Wojdakowski was on Emergency Leave at
23 the time. I believe his father was either in the hospital, or had

1 passed away at that point, and I went to General Miller. General
2 Miller was not there for two days, and I don't know why I don't
3 really recall, but somebody said, "General Fast is the one who had
4 that FRAGO cut. You might want to go and talk to her " So I did
5 And I said, "Ma'am you have a second? I just want to know about
6 the-- Colonel Pappas being appointed as the FOB Commander " She
7 said, "It's done " And that was as far as the conversation went

8 Q Did you go back to General Sanchez to seek clarification on
9 anything that constrained-- or limits of TACON, because as you know
10 TACON doctrinally says that the gaining unit, being that of the 205th
11 MI Brigade, will establish priorities over all of the tenet units
12 that associated with that?

13 A I went to Colonel Pappas first to get clarification. I
14 still at that point had not seen the FRAGO.

15 Q Okay

16 A. That is what I asked for when I went to General Miller's
17 office

18 Q Okay

19 A And they didn't have a copy of it Wasn't that they were
20 unaware of it they heard something about. I don't know if its been
21 published yet. It still might be in draft, and they had it. I
22 believe that [REDACTED] picked it up off of her desk She picked a
23 piece of paper up and I don't know if it was the FRAGO or not.

1 Q. Do you have any knowledge of what might have precipitated
2 that?

3 A Have no idea

4 Q Okay. Could have been that when General Sanchez had
5 visited the facility; I think with you back October sometime that he
6 might have discussed with you about the force protection posture at
7 the facility?

8 A No sir, he did not He-- what he said to me then during
9 the briefing he said, "Where's the Civil Affairs in this?" And I
10 said, "Sir, the Civil Affairs commander told me himself that his guys
11 where not going outside the wall " "Why not?" He said, "It's to
12 dangerous " He said, "Who's the Civil Affairs commander?" I said,
13 "That's [REDACTED] " And he said to his aide, "Get him on the
14 phone." And he left the briefing when [REDACTED] was on the
15 phone and he walked out of the room went to the phone and we could
16 hear him And he was saying, "Do you understand? You have this-- is
17 this clear? You get your Civil Affairs out-- you're supposed to be
18 working in the community this is a Civil Affairs function " And we
19 all heard his side of the conversation. But I saw [REDACTED]
20 that ight at the CJTF-7 Headquarters and he said, "We're not going "

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. And he-- he-- he had made-- had his aide make two-phone
23 calls One was to the Civil Affairs commander, and the other one was

1 to General West who was the C-4 And he said, "What the hell is
2 going on out here? Why haven't you given any support? Why aren't
3 you-- have you been out here? I want you to get out here as soon as
4 you can " And I saw General West either that night, or very early
5 the next day, and he said that they were going to go out there and
6 that they were going-- and that was delayed because General
7 Wojdakowski formed that-- like a "Task Force."

8 Q Okay

9 A And had the Engineer-- the C-4, the C-3, everybody in there
10 from the staff and said, and he told me-- and he said in front of
11 them, "As I've told you before we can't give you anything because
12 you're TACON "

13 Q Okay

14 A "But we're going to change all that. We're going to make
15 Abu Ghraib an enduring camp, and we're going-- that'll open up the
16 doors " So after that meeting General West said to me, "We'll be
17 able to do-- I mean there's going to be more activity out there than
18 you can imagine. There's going to be contractors who are going to
19 do-- get a DFAC out there We're going to go out there-- if your S-4
20 can give me a call, w 'll set up a time when we can go out there, and
21 we'll walk the ground " And they did.

22 Q Prior to-- prior to that-- that mission was given to the
23 800th MP then relegated to the 320th MP Battalion to conduct operations

1 I believe after you assumed command of the Brigade on or about July
2 What was the intent then that you understood of why you were provided
3 that mission set at the Abu Ghraib prison site?

4 A. We needed a location to build another internment facility,
5 a north internment facility because at that time it was no longer an
6 EPW, Third Country National, IR mission, Internment Resettlement
7 Operation. It was a Iraqi Civilian Criminal Confinement mission.
8 So, the original idea was that they would relocate the remaining
9 several hundred prisoners up to Baghdad because they were General
10 Officers, and Freedom-- Foreign Fighters, and Third Country
11 Nationals, and there was really only about 300 of them. And the idea
12 was that they would be relocated north because that was the focus of the
13 operation at the time. And Bucca was 12 hours away at its earliest.
14 We were using Bucca almost at that point almost primarily as a place
15 to push detainees from Cropper because Cropper was overcrowded, but
16 Baghdad Central was intended and discussed and approved as an interim
17 facility only for many reasons. It was extremely controversial
18 because of the hanging, and the torture chambers that were there. It
19 was well known for its horrible procedures for its overcrowding
20 conditions, and of course for, you know, reports of----

21 Q Sure.

1 A ----60,000 people being hung there. It was very heavily
2 looted. The only place that really was untouched unfortunately was
3 the hanging chamber, and the torture facilities. The rest of it
4 was--the infrastructure was pulled out. There was rubble that was
5 literally knee deep. Concrete, glass, wire, rubble, re-barb,
6 everything. And the 72nd MP Company, which is a Las Vegas National
7 Guard Company, moved into that facility at the direction of the 18th
8 MP Brigade who was their headquarters at the time. When we got there
9 in July, I saw a Company Commander and his First Sergeant who
10 relieved to see somebody come to visit them. Come to tell them,
11 "We're going to take care of you." Because up until that time they
12 hadn't seen the 18th MP Brigade Commander, and there only recollection
13 of seeing the Command Sergeant Major was when he stopped by and
14 managed to tell a soldier that his sleeves were too short on his
15 uniform.

16 Q. Okay

17 A And we walked through that facility and I said, "There's no
18 way that you can make this into a prison. And he said, "Ma'am, if
19 you'll give us support, come back in two weeks and you'll see what
20 the soldiers have done. We already have a plan." So I said, "I'll
21 give you all the support you need, but I'm not even sure we're going
22 to be able to use this facility." And I think at that time they were
23 holding a few of the Division 1st AD, or-- I think it was 1st AD that

1 was there at the time, or maybe 3rd ID, a few of their soldiers, not
2 more than 20-- uh prisoners, not more than 20. So, what they did was
3 clean up a couple of the cells, and they were holding them there I
4 went down to CPA, met with the subject matter experts down there at
5 CPA, and I said, "What is the plan?" And [REDACTED]
6 was the senior guy there at the time, [REDACTED] was one American,
7 and [REDACTED] was the other one And they said, "Well, we're
8 probably not going to be able to use it because of that "Hanging
9 Chamber," and the reputation." And I said, "Well who's going to make
10 a decision because I have an MP Company out there and another
11 battalion coming up.

12 Q Was the 72nd assigned to you at that time? They were still-
13 - they were assigned to the 18th?

14 A They were assigned to the 18th, yes sir, and so was the 400th
15 MP Battalion.

16 Q Okay

17 A And then at the TOA when we moved up to Baghdad they were
18 reassigned under the 18th-- 800th MP Brigade So, we worked through
19 this process through this CPA and it was like I said it was extremely
20 controversial, and at one point the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
21 Wolfowitz, said, "I can't be convinced," and Secretary Rumsfeld said
22 the same thing, "Find another place. And this isn't going to work."
23 And what [REDACTED] did was go to Ambassador Bremer and I was in the

1 briefing when he provided it to Ambassador Bremer and he said, "It's
2 only an interim facility. It is the only maximum security facility
3 we have in Iraq, and really we can't even consider it a maximum
4 security prison, but it's the only place we have to hold large number
5 of people until we get the new building built." And he said--
6 Ambassador Bremer said, "When do you plan to build a new one?" And
7 he said, "We already have the location it's Kenbodesatt and we might
8 be able to save some of that building that's over there on those
9 grounds, but there's squatters there now huma, huma, we have to take
10 care of that " And he said, "Well [REDACTED] was from the MOJ
11 wasn't-- he was on board but he wasn't-- he was still kind of sitting
12 on the fence because he wasn't sure how the-- the tide of approval
13 was going to go So, they-- [REDACTED] and I believe [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], or [REDACTED]
15 from-- USAID Actually she works for State Department, but she does
16 humane programs and things They went out there because a press
17 conference was scheduled for whatever day it was-- and it was
18 scheduled for Wednesday. They went out there on-- they were planning
19 to go out there Tuesday afternoon because she was never convinced--
20 she as adamantly opposed to it, and she was holding a key vote So,
21 they said, "The last time you saw it it really looked horrible. It
22 looked like everything you would imagine a torture chamber to look
23 like, but it's better now. And there's an MP unit out there, and

1 just come back out and take a look " And we-- one of the
2 requirements that they, she and here group of people had was that it
3 would somehow be isolated from the rest of the prison before they
4 would even go out there and discuss using Abu Ghraib as a facility
5 So, we had this wall constructed that was cinderblock and it was 20
6 feet it covered the other sides of this torture chamber location and
7 sectioned it off. It is almost like a small museum area The didn't
8 go out on Tuesday afternoon, they went out on the morning of the
9 press conference, and she took one look at it and she said,
10 "Absolutely not I do not want to be painted with the same brush as
11 all you " And she left, so they all left. So [REDACTED] came
12 back and he said, "We're going to have the press conference, and
13 we're going to go ahead and use the facility, but it is an interim
14 facility Not more than three years. We've got to get-- we've got to
15 break ground, and we have to get under way with the new facility at
16 Kenbodesatt, or wherever else it's going to be " So I said, "What
17 happened?" and he told me that story So, he said, "But we're still
18 going to have the press conference and I don't think Sandy is going
19 to come, but you're going to sit next to me." And I mean-- and-- and
20 there was a-- an Australian SJA that was there also because he
21 understood the circumstances They did this-- he-- [REDACTED]
22 did most of the talking They-- he said, "We're going to use it as
23 an interim facility. We have the approval from Ambassador Bremer,

1 and you know, all the way up to the State Department " And that was
2 the end of the press conference So-- and [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] anytime they talked about Baghdad Central-
4 - Abu Ghraib, because it was still Abu Ghraib at the time, it was the
5 interim facility at Abu Ghraib.

6 Q With that-- based on that circumstances then, fast
7 forwarding here, did you receive and order then from CJTF-7 to
8 establish your presence at Baghdad Central by tasking the 320th MP
9 Battalion to assume command and control of that facility?

10 A No, sir What we got was a TOA Order that said the 800th MP
11 Brigade will come to Baghdad and relocate to Baghdad and be
12 responsible for confinement and corrections operations for Iraq.

13 Q How did-- how did the 320th come about assuming the mission
14 there at Baghdad Central?

15 A They were-- that was a decision that was made before I even
16 took command when they were talking because General Hill knew that
17 the unit-- the 800th was going to become responsible for the
18 corrections mission

19 Q Okay

20 A So they put a plan together on which battalions would move
21 north, one to secure the MEK, one to go up to Mosul, one to go up to
22 Baghdad, etcetera At the facilities that we knew existed at the
23 time

1 Q Those were already determined prior to your arrival to take
2 command?

3 A Yes, sir.

4 Q. Okay Then given that-- those circumstances again, were
5 there any specific instructions given to you by CJTF-7 to assume
6 command and control, and start building that into a an interim, as
7 you say, facility that would-- could handle additional detainees?

8 A No sir, but what they said was they wanted-- General
9 Wojdakowski said what he wanted was a confinement and internment
10 facility Concertina wire And if Baghdad Central provided a "wall"
11 and a place where we could do that that was fine "How much can you
12 get?" So, [REDACTED] who was my Deputy at the time, he went
13 out there and uh, you know, said that we could probably get about
14 4000, and it would require----

15 Q Four thousand what-- 4000 detainees?

16 A Four thousand detainees, in the regular blueprint if you
17 will, of a design for an internment resettlement camp So, that
18 meant we had to get engineer support We had to get building
19 equipment We had to get all those things And it was originally--
20 I wasn't here for this, but I heard all of the stories of how long it
21 took to get those building materials to Bucca. So, now we were going
22 even farther north and rails were-- CONEX's on rail were being
23 looted. Transportation was a problem All of those things, as

1 you're well aware. So, [REDACTED] was at Abu Ghraib and managing
2 that project, but I had a different opinion on what [REDACTED]
3 should be doing at an internment resettlement operation. He was
4 running Camp Bucca, and he-- he was going-- it was doctrine according
5 to [REDACTED]. So the processing line, which should have been part
6 of the battalion's responsibility, was not. They-- I mean he was the
7 Battalion Commander because that was a comfort zone apparently for
8 him. So, when he came up to Baghdad Central-- when he came up to
9 Baghdad, I sat down with him and I told him, "You're going to be the
10 Deputy. That means you do logistics. You do coordination. I want
11 you involved with the staff. I do not want you to camp out at
12 Baghdad Central because the 320th MP Battalion is going to be in
13 charge." But-- but-- I mean I heard all of the arguments from him
14 and he continued. And every time I saw him trying to drift back to
15 taking control of that operation I'd pull him back into the TOC and
16 remind him again what his responsibilities were. Then he said he
17 thought that he could do a lot of good down at CPA working with
18 reconstruction of the jails and the prisons. So I said, "We can talk
19 about that because that's a good idea." And I said, "Because
20 Tasferat Rusafa nobody has power. Nobody has plumbing. Nobody has
21 the logistical supplies, and you do all of those things well. So,
22 occasionally you can go by and check on how progress is coming along
23 at Baghdad Central." So, that worked out well, and [REDACTED] if I

1 was going to fault him for anything during that time it was that he
2 probably campaigning for a civilian job with the Prisons Department
3 down there, but not the distraction of what he doing. So, I'd have
4 to say that he was out on the road at 7.30 every morning, and he
5 usually didn't come back until 1700 or so, and they were full days
6 And I made him give me a status report And I made him give me an
7 update, so I knew that he was out there doing the things that he was
8 supposed to be doing or at least he was reporting the things that he
9 was doing that he was supposed to be doing And-- and-- and [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED] I had too-- I really had to kind of keep him in a narrow
11 corridor because soldiers were-- their morale was not effective
12 positively by him Early on he told everybody that-- you know he was
13 going to stay as long as he could and so they might as well get used
14 to fact that they might be here longer than a year. And "I been at
15 this for a year already, and this is my second year and if I can turn
16 in " You know, those are the kind of things are the kind of things
17 he said and it scared soldiers, and I know that because everywhere I
18 went, soldiers told me they were scared by that prospect

19 Q. But did you understand though that there was that potential
20 that they were going to be extended anyway?

21 A At that time we did not Because I went to General Kratzer
22 and I said-- the first thing I said to General Kratzer after I said,
23 "I'm glad to be here," and everything else, but right after the

1 change of command ceremony I went into him and I said, "This is not
2 what the battalion's are set up to do. I mean this is a confinement
3 operation so we're gonna need help " And he said, "I know that this
4 is not what your mission is It's not your doctrine, but it's closer
5 than anybody else, and the 18th MP Brigade doesn't want anything to do
6 with it, so you guys got it And we'll give you all the help that we
7 can, but CJTF-7 is gonna-- you know, kinda carry the ball for you "
8 And we talked about a couple of other things About the length of
9 the deployment, and I heard at that time that the-- the "mark on the
10 wall" was 10 months and 8 days. And it was repeated again you know
11 in so many different locations that, "10 months and 8 days What's
12 the 8 days? The 8 days is the out processing once you get down--
13 back to your mobilization station." So, I went to all of the
14 locations and took-- talked to all of the units and told them Again
15 I heard from the soldiers, "We were briefed at the mob station it was
16 gonna be six months or less We didn't come prepared " And I said,
17 "What are-- what do your orders say?" And there was a variety of
18 orders Some said, "Not to exceed 179 days." Some said, " Not to
19 exceed 365 days." Some said, "Until relieved till-- to come back "
20 Some of the units had been deployed already to Bosnia, or Afghanistan
21 with that count, and I mean my Command Sergeant Major at the time was
22 [REDACTED] We were making lots of notes with full intentions of getting
23 answers And we went to CJTF-7, and [REDACTED]

1 came back to Arifjan to get answers to those questions and others,
2 but for clarification on this move to Baghdad. And people kept
3 repeating 10 months, 8 days, 10 months 8 days. No, it will be more
4 than that. And then we heard 365 days, "Boots on the ground. Plan
5 for a year. Will some units have to stay longer? Absolutely." And
6 I would say to them, "There is no unit listed right now to stay past
7 365 days, however, let me make you aware, and case you are not, there
8 is a shortage of military police units in the system. With the
9 deployments to Afghanistan and Bosnia, and over here, they are
10 critically short. So, if units are going to be selected there is a
11 chance, equal to every other unit over here, that you'll be extended
12 past 365 days." People-- soldiers cried. They weren't prepared for
13 this. They-- and-- and I had a-- an NCO at Bucca who stood up and he
14 said, "Ma'am don't worry because it's really only 2 more months than
15 the 10 months we were planning to stay so, if everybody here just
16 keeps that in perspective." And I really wanted to hug him because I
17 said-- and I told him, "You know what, that's a great perspective,
18 and I appreciate that and I'm going to use that when I talk to
19 soldiers because you're right 60 more days is a small chunk compared
20 to what you've already been here for." And I said, "That's really a
21 brilliant perspective." So, what the objective was to talk to all of
22 them. To tell them to put their fears to rest as much as we could.
23 Well, unfortunately the inevitable happened and people discovered the

1 medical channels. They discovered that they could go report a back
2 pain and get medivaced to Lungsthal and from there they fell into a
3 black hole. And I remember the report it was on 9 September my
4 surgeon at the time asked for the printout of how many soldiers we
5 had in all of our units that had been-- were removed from the theatre
6 for medical reasons and it was 2 and ½ pages long on lines that look
7 like one of those messages. I mean there were so many lines on each
8 page and I said, "You have-- I looked at him and I said you have got
9 to be kidding me." And he said, "Well if you go down the whole list
10 you'll find out that three of them came back, but the rest of them
11 are losses. And I said, "This is September I don't know if we can
12 keep doing this."

13 Q Well I think it's understood though General Karpinski, that
14 there's a war that's going on and I know there's major concerns, but
15 then at the same time the concerns of your soldiers was no-- any
16 different from the concerns of the other soldiers who were here
17 longer.

18 A Yes, sir.

19 Q Let me kind of focus a little bit. What instructions did
20 you give [REDACTED] with regards to his mission at Abu
21 Ghraib, Detention Operations, improving quality of life facilities,
22 things of that nature, his rights and left limits, did you give him
23 any specific instructions in that regard, and you've also got MI

1 units there This is all prior to Colonel Pappus taking over and how
2 that seemed to be accomplished?

3 Q The MI units that were there at the time were really teams
4 They were interrogation teams and we had the 72nd MP Company out there
5 and they were living in the warehouse and the 320th MP Battalion And
6 [REDACTED] was-- he was a reluctant participant. He didn't
7 want to move up from Bucca. They were still in the throws of the
8 investigation with the prisoner abuse down there. And I said, "Time
9 is past for that discussion That is when you were notified that
10 your Battalion was going to move north, so this is what we need to
11 talk about, and when you get there establish the LSA There's a
12 couple of opportunities there's a room where the warehouse is
13 There's a separate building You walked the ground up there do you
14 recall any of this?" And he said, "Well, I'm going to wait until I
15 get up there with the Sergeant Major " And I said, "I'll meet you
16 out there give me a call " He met [REDACTED]-----

17 Q He was still at Camp Bucca at the time?

18 A. He was at Bucca

19 Q So, there was no members of the 220th MP Battalion up at Abu
20 Ghraib?

21 A There was an advance party, and I don't really know who
22 they were sir, but there was about six of them and they went up there

1 as an advance party. And [REDACTED] met with them. Walked to
2 grounds with them.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A The 72nd MP Company Commander took them around. Got them
5 inside the warehouse They were setup, and [REDACTED] was working
6 on getting not only the building materials, but everything setup for
7 them supply of MRE's, the water, whatever they needed that they could
8 provide Then the MP Battalion moved north in July, or maybe the
9 first week of August timeframe, and setup at Abu Ghraib, went out
10 there two days after they arrived, [REDACTED] came into the
11 TOC as soon as he arrived, and he said----

12 Q Your TOC?

13 A Into my TOC He said----

14 Q At Camp Victory?

15 A At Victory At Gotham Island. I don't believe we're going
16 to move into the warehouse We're going to use one of those other
17 LSA's And I said, "You might want to move into the warehouse, and
18 clean up the LSA's " He said, "Soldiers want to be separate and
19 apart from 72nd MP Company " I said, "You know there's no running
20 water anywhere up there for latrines "We've got it under control.
21 [REDACTED] is going to get latrines on a the leading edge of the
22 ones we're going to need for the compounds anyway." And I said, "I'd
23 like a back brief on where you're gonna put soldiers, where you're

1 gonna setup your TOC," and-- and he did that I went out to Baghdad
2 Central and he had some chairs setup in the other warehouse, the
3 adjacent warehouse. Have you been up there, sir?

4 Q. Yes, several times

5 A So, you know where the 320th is now and the other warehouse
6 for the 82nd, and it now has the partitions up, that's where the 72nd
7 was at the time So, in this warehouse just inside the door, he had
8 some chairs setup there, and he did the briefing. And the schematic
9 that he had of how he was going to lay out the TOC looked really
10 good-- looked-- I mean it looked certainly acceptable I asked him--
11 you know-- did they prefer to be inside as opposed to outside,
12 because at that time it was about 140 degrees just in that warehouse.
13 Said he did because of the mortars and the RPG's, and small arms
14 fire. I said, "Okay " And then actually when they got setup, it was
15 different from how they had originally planned. And several times
16 subsequent to that I said to [REDACTED] "You're sitting in
17 the middle of your orderly room You need a separate office." And
18 he said, "Well, they're working on the area over here and I don't
19 want to disrupt the progress " And I said, "Well the MI folks look
20 like they're making progress over there " And he said, "Well they
21 decided you know-- we were pushing all the re-barb and everything and
22 they decided to clear it all out so, they had really done all the
23 work, that's going to be their area."

1 Q So, there are two separate elements building up there own--
2 and-- and you reasonably assume that really nobody was in charge of
3 setting up the base operations there and that your-- the
4 responsibility was just to create a detention facility compound and
5 to include that in the hard site as well?

6 A The hard site was not open at the time

7 Q Okay.

8 A It was----

9 Q That was later?

10 A It was much later, sir

11 Q Okay

12 A There-- there was-- those detainees that they had, the 72nd
13 had a few detainees from the division there weren't even detainees
14 there at this time

15 Q. Okay.

16 A So, they were getting setup to be able to execute
17 confinement operations when they started And there was nobody--
18 there was no work-- I think they may have started cell block 1A, and
19 1B, under contract at the time, but there was no other work going on
20 there And [REDACTED] was responsible working focusing on the LSA
21 and getting these "huge" mounds of rubble at least pushed out. And
22 practically daily having to escort people that wanted to come out

1 there and see the facility and wanted to see that Hanging Chamber
2 and----

3 Q But-- but he was doing detention operations?

4 A There was no detention operations being conducted

5 Q Just cleaning up the mess, okay. When did he assume on or
6 about, detainee operations?

7 A Well, he was going to be responsible for detainee
8 operations, but they had to build the internment facility so there
9 focus was, "Let's get the building equipment up here so we can build
10 the interment camp

11 Q Okay

12 A So the engineers got there. They brought all their
13 equipment They did all the grading and everything, and I think it
14 was the 94th Engineers, and they came out and they had three weeks to
15 do it We visited the grounds with [REDACTED] who's the-- the
16 gentleman in the United Nations who lost his life when that was
17 bombed originally, Ambassador Bremer, General Haun, who is the Chief
18 of Staff at the time, Ambassador Slocumb, and we walked the grounds
19 and they saw what the engineers were doing They saw what the plan
20 was, and [REDACTED] asked when we were going to take the first
21 prisoner, and we told him probably the beginning of October So, he
22 said, "Fine." He understood how difficult this was out there and
23 everything, and how controversial, but it really was the only

1 facility that we could use Had they started building Kenbodesatt?
2 And I said, "No sir, they haven't because it's really a CPA mission,
3 and they haven't removed the squatters yet " "You still have
4 squatters there?" And I said, "Well they had 300 originally and now
5 I understand there's more than that " So, he said, "Let me see if we
6 can help."

7 Q. Did you understand the mission at Abu Ghraib to be a
8 priority mission for CJTF-7 as directed by CPA? Was that understood
9 by General Sanchez?

10 A Mister----

11 Q. Because what I'm trying to get is you were getting either
12 some direction from CPA, or some direction for CJTF-7, so I'm trying
13 to discern your relation whether you were reporting to CPA, or you
14 were reporting to CJTF-7?

15 A. We were getting no instructions from CJTF-7 at that time.

16 Q Okay

17 A We were down at CPA because [REDACTED],
18 from the 18th MP Brigade on regular MP patrols, because they were
19 responsible for Baghdad and to 1st AD, so when they were out doing MP
20 patrols, they would see a building that used to be a prison or a
21 jail, and they would get [REDACTED]
22 out there to look at it and they'd say, "This is another facility

1 we've found." And I-- we-- we sat down and prepared " a road ahead,"
2 because I said----

3 Q For CPA?

4 A. For the civilian prisons that we were----

5 Q Okay

6 A ----jails, and the confinement operations that we were
7 opening, because the internment facility we still didn't have the
8 building materials out there and that was going to be the military
9 facility

10 Q See I'm trying-- again-- maybe I didn't phrase the
11 question Somehow you were directed to go up to----

12 A Baghdad

13 Q The direction was to go up to Baghdad to establish
14 internment facilities, or correct facilities, or whatever the case
15 may be, as directed by whom?

16 A It was not directed by CPA It was----

17 Q Okay, so that's a command directive from CJT----

18 A. ----CFLCC

19 Q ----CFLCC okay So, when you got up to Abu Ghraib to
20 estab^lish that as an interim facility, where you given any specific
21 guidance either by General McKiernan, or General Sanchez at the time,
22 but that time it would have been July, of where your priorities lie,
23 and who you would report those developments to whom, because your--

1 is your-- is your-- had remarked that you've got all these CPA
2 officials there, and not one member of the Command Group or CJTF-7
3 So, how did-- we're you able to discern at least where your
4 priorities lie, I mean I know it's prison. I know it's detention
5 facility and all that stuff, but who were you getting your directions
6 from?

7 A Before the change of command ceremony, General Hill went up to
8 Baghdad And he went to CPA and said, "Where are the facilities
9 we're going to be able to start with; because right now we have the
10 HVD Facility at Cropper, and we have a Corp Holding Area " And they
11 said, they being the prisons experts, [REDACTED] and the Chief of
12 Staff, [REDACTED] at the CPA, said, "Do you have any room out at
13 Baghdad Central to hold prisoners, yet?" And the answer to that
14 question was, "No " I wasn't there, but the answer to that question
15 would be "No." So, he said then, "Take your-- use the time to
16 rebuild the jails, or to supervise this-- so, we at least have
17 capacity to hold some of the "bad guys." So, General Hill came back,
18 that must have been in early June because he came back, and I arrived
19 in Kuwait and the next day we were out on the road We were going to
20 Bucca We were going to Talil We were moving up and the change of
21 command ceremony hadn't even taken place yet. So, we got to Baghdad
22 and we-- General Hill said that he had not met General Wojdakowski,
23 or General Sanchez, so we would do that. And then we would go down

1 to the CPA and I could meet the prisons experts down there Umm, the
2 schedule reversed itself and we went down to CPA first, and [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] said, "We're so glad you're here We need
4 the MP's in our facilities. They have to be running the corrections
5 operations. Ambassador Bremer is depending on you guys to----

6 Q Up until that time you had not gotten any instructions?

7 A. No

8 Q Don't you think that was rather strange that somebody is
9 welcoming you knowing full well that you've got a command
10 responsibility someplace else as opposed to being either directed or
11 being influenced by prison officials from CPA?

12 A Umm----

13 Q Because remember you belong to a military outfit

14 A Correct

15 Q And there was an assumption, based on what you mentioned
16 with General Hill meeting with these people, but I'm trying to see if
17 there's any comment that basically says, "Thank you, but I've got to
18 go report to my boss first to see what he want me to do "

19 A I-- I believe General Hill said to [REDACTED], and to
20 [REDACTED] that we were scheduled to see General Wojdakowski,
21 and General Sanchez before we came to see them

22 Q Okay

1 A We were going to see them in the afternoon and then we
2 would be able to sort it out, you know, what steps we were taking

3 Q Okay

4 A. We went to see General Sanchez. We went to see General--
5 Sanchez first, I think, and I introduced myself and he said, "So, you
6 guys are going to start rebuilding the Baghdad prisons." And he
7 didn't say anything about Abu Ghraib or about the internment
8 operations

9 Q Just to hear your system

10 A Just he said, "You're going to start rebuilding the
11 prisons, and you're going to be taking some of the criminals off of--
12 out of Cropper "

13 Q Right

14 A And General Hill said, "That was the plan. We still need
15 to find a place to live " You know, just the basics He said
16 General Wojdakowski would give us specific instructions, which he
17 didn't, but he did say, "You're gonna move that location from Umm
18 Qasar, or from "Bucca", is that what you call it? And he said,
19 "You're gonna move that up to Baghdad because this the focus of the
20 fight," and he said, "Tell me what the problems are ~~the~~ the
21 limitations are, and I think I've already met your guy ~~and~~ and he's
22 already out at Baghdad Central-- at Abu Ghraib rebuilding, or waiting
23 for building materials or something Is that correct?"

1 A. And I said, "Yes, sir." And he said, "Are you in command
2 yet." And I said, "No, sir, about another week." And he said,
3 "We'll I don't want the answers from you, I want them from him." So,
4 that was, "Okay, I've got it. And there's another five days that we
5 have to go through this process."

6 Q Okay.

7 A So after the change of command ceremony the next morning we
8 left and went up to Baghdad and I went over to CJTF-7, and we had a
9 list of the facilities, and I said to General Wojdakowski, "Sir,
10 there's about 30 locations on here, and I don't have the MP's to
11 cover these facilities. Some of them are isolated locations or
12 they're not-- there's no force protection available, and I can't
13 cover force protection." He said, "How many can you cover?" And I
14 said, "I don't know because I haven't been to all of them, but about
15 15 if we take it, an average size." He said----

16 Q Would your staff at that time know of this list? Would
17 they make any kind-- any kind of staff estimates between Hill's
18 presence and your presence? Was there any concerted effort that--
19 you know you're going to get overwhelmed it's just a matter of
20 prioritizing all of that. Was that-- did your staff give you any
21 indication of what your priorities and what your capabilities were? **

22 A. Well we hadn't been to the facilities. Nobody had except
23 for Ecke

1 Q. But-- but certainly there was kind of a warning order----

2 A. There was and as a matter of fact [REDACTED] my 3
3 said, Ma'am we're never going to be able to cover all these
4 facilities, and the force protection piece." And-- and I said, "I
5 understand. But first we have to go out and-- I mean we either have
6 to put them on a map or we have to see where they are and what kind
7 of coverage." And really ended up with 15 facilities that we would
8 be able to occupy and run that weren't out there on the edges of the
9 earth, or anywhere else. There were-- some of them were in close
10 proximity in Baghdad, but [REDACTED] would then-- one of the subject
11 matter experts down in CPA, he would say, "We found another facility
12 and it will hold about 60 people." And I said, "Which one do you
13 want me to close?" And he said, "We're not going to close any of
14 them." And I said, "I can't put MP's in each of those facilities."
15 So, I go back over to CJTF-7, I'd sit down with General Wojdakowski,
16 and I said, "I'm concerned about this because [REDACTED]
17 from the 18th MP Brigade is uncovering all these locations, and he's
18 putting them on my shoulders to man I don't have the resources "

19 Q I would have said, "Time out I don't work for you. I
20 work for this guy." And it's a matter of the way you were describing
21 it now is that you now have a set of circumstances where this guy is
22 giving you information, and this guy is asking you for information
23 and your capabilities At that point in time wouldn't you think that

1 you would have taken an action to establish your priorities since
2 you're the commander, to say, "I will get my priorities past that to
3 CJTF-7, and I'll get it from CJTF-7," as opposed to going back and
4 forth to this particular Sergeant Major that was giving you that
5 information?

6 A Well [REDACTED] wasn't dealing with me He was
7 giving me information to the prisons people and they were making this
8 determination and I said to [REDACTED] "I'm not going to cover
9 them I don't have the MP recourses and nobody is going to give me
10 extra help I'm not going to cover them." He goes, "Well then
11 you're never going to get out of here." So I said to General
12 Wojdakowski, he asked me point blank, "Did you say 15 facilities,
13 then cover 15 facilities Figure it out!"

14 Q This is General Wojdakowski?

15 A General Wojdakowski

16 Q Okay

17 A So I said, "Yes sir " And and he said, "How is the
18 construction coming out at Abu Ghraib?" And I said, "They are still
19 waiting on the basic building materials." He said, "I thought the
20 CONEXES were on their way up?" "They were, they got into BIAP and
21 they disappeared Somebody broke into them, or stole them "

22 Q Did you get the feeling that since you are one of two
23 Internment and Resettlement Theatre Brigade-- MP Brigade, the other

1 one being at GITMO, that they were relying on your command presence,
2 your command skills, your skill set so to speak, to give them that
3 since the command is in dire straits of building infrastructure to
4 detain and maintain a huge amount of civilian internees, or maybe
5 even EPW's, or all those other detainees. Did you feel overwhelmed
6 at that time?

7 A No, sir I didn't feel overwhelmed, but I knew that they
8 were taking their instructions from [REDACTED]

9 Q Okay Who's [REDACTED]

10 A He was the 18th MP Brigade Commander.

11 Q Okay

12 A And he told me in July, "He didn't want anything to do with
13 confinement operations As a matter of fact it was time for the 18th
14 MP Brigade to leave because the 800th and the 220th was here and we
15 could take over since we were Reserve and National Guard We could
16 take over all police operations so they could come back in February "
17 And I said, "[REDACTED], it's the come back part that concerns me,
18 because we can't do the confinement mission and your mission." And
19 he said, "How's school?" And that was at the MP Summit. So, he had
20 the weigh in He's the Corp He was h⁵th Corp Provost Marshal,
21 and he had the weigh in And I told [REDACTED]
22 down at CPA, and I told [REDACTED], because they kept firing off
23 this you know, "We found another facility, we found another

1 facility." And I said, "Well unless you found some additional MP's,
2 I'm not covering it, and I don't work for [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED] does not work for me, and [REDACTED] has no
4 business being in the detention operations unless he's coming to work
5 for me as well. So, I can appreciate him locating all of these
6 places, but let him run them, because we've settled on 15 General
7 Wojdakowski has settled on 15 and that's what we're doing .

8 Q Okay Can we move quick-- October thereabouts there was an
9 incident that had caused you to either advise [REDACTED] to
10 take leave or to take some sort of time off for whatever reason
11 Could you explain the circumstances of that?

12 A There was a-- there was an incident. There was several
13 incidents at Baghdad Central One was-- one was an escape and it--
14 it may have been followed immediately by another escape

15 Q That was reported through channels to you?

16 A Right. Right I mean he reported It was an SIR And
17 there-- there was an accidental discharge of a firearm I think. A
18 negligent discharge of a firearm, and my policy was that if-- if
19 there was a negligent discharge, or soldiers were seen or stopped in
20 there vehicles without their Kevlar's or their vests or their shirts
21 on, I mean there was several things, that the entire chain of command
22 was going to get a letter of concern So, I had [REDACTED]
23 and [REDACTED] and I believe [REDACTED] came over with

1 them. And I said to [REDACTED] -- I talked to all of them.
2 told them, "This was unacceptable How do you let people walk out of
3 a jail?" They tried to give excuses. I said, "I'm going to do a
4 commanders inquiry. Somebody is going to be out there and walk
5 through the process When I'm out there everybody seems to be in the
6 right uniform, in the towers, I don't-- I don't get it " So, I just
7 kept [REDACTED] with me and I said, "Are you okay? I'm
8 concerned about you Now we talked about your reluctance to come up
9 here to Baghdad several months ago. We got over it, didn't we?
10 You're up here " He said, "I'm okay." And I said, "It doesn't look
11 like you're okay " And uh----

12 Q Was there any kind of indications that he didn't look right
13 to you?

14 A He-- he- he didn't look-- I mean I was talking to him and
15 he didn't look like it was registering I mean I got a kind of a
16 like a, "Yes, ma'am " I just felt like he was sleep deprived, or
17 overwhelmed, or afraid, or all of those things, and I asked him that
18 And I told him there was nothing wrong if he was, but we could help
19 him He said, "He was okay We know the soldiers were willing to
20 do this. They were working really hard The internment facility was
21 okay, but there was still some confusion about the MI people we were
22 holding now, you know this is changing to quickly." Okay And then
23 there was another incident and I-- it may have been-- it may have

1 been when the MP's were out with the 82nd and the vehicle went into
2 the canal and one of the MP's, and one of the NCO's from the 82nd lost
3 their lives, and I saw him the next day and I knew he was in trouble
4 emotionally and mentally. And I told him, "I want to take you out of
5 your position. I'm going to send somebody else over here The
6 battalion will be in good hands, but if you won't take leave then I'm
7 gonna do this for you " And he said, "I don't have leave to take, I
8 went home for my son's graduation. I'm okay " And I said, "No, your
9 not Look, this is more for-- then one person can handle if you
10 don't have a support network, and your [REDACTED] is not
11 doing you any favors You don't need to worry about him right now,
12 you need to worry about you I'm worried about you, so I want you to
13 pick up your stuff and come over to the TOC tomorrow morning and
14 you'll spend a couple of days there and I'm going to send you down to
15 Arifjan, but you need-- you need a break "

16 Q Did you notify General Wojdakowski, or Sanchez, or Diamond,
17 or Kratzer that you were doing this?

18 A I-- well General Kratzer I think by that time was gone I
19 told General Diamond that, "I was sending [REDACTED] down. [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED] was the Battalion Commander that had the problem at Bucca,
21 and I was you know sending him down for a break. That if he didn't
22 get to go into see the mental hygiene office in Baghdad, then you

1 know I'd-- [REDACTED] would be making arrangements for him to
2 see somebody down there at Arifjan."

3 Q Sure

4 A. Okay. I tell General Wojdakowski at the SUU, the Separate
5 Unit Update, that I took [REDACTED] out of his
6 position and he said, "Did you relieve him?" And I said, "No sir, I
7 didn't relieve him, but he needs a break. He needs to be away from
8 that. Now, that might be an eventual outcome, but his not-- he has
9 not been relieved " And the Rider Team was there at the time
10 visiting, assisting us, and the next day, or two days later,
11 somewhere when they were still there, I believe it was their SJA on
12 the team said to me, "Who you gonna replace [REDACTED] with? You
13 have any plans?" And I said, "I don't have to replace [REDACTED]
14 He said, "Well you relieved him " I said, "I didn't relieve him."
15 And he said, "Well that's not what the rumor is out there "

16 Q Did you tell the Battalion chain of command that a lot of
17 things had happened?

18 A Absolutely I-- I talked to [REDACTED] and I put uh-- [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED] from the 115th, and he was aware. And I said, "Do you want me to
20 come out and talk to the Battalion?" And he said, "I can take care
21 of it " And when I went out there, I asked soldiers, "You understand
22 about [REDACTED] Do you understand that.." and they did,
23 because [REDACTED] went around and talked to each one of the

1 Companies or talked to them in the towers and got the word out that
2 [REDACTED] was just on a break and I had some special work
3 for him to be doing, I think is how he addressed it.

4 Q Is it common policy or practice or your leadership style to
5 a serving Battalion Commander from one Battalion to assume some level
6 of responsibility to another Battalion without any orders?

7 A Sir, I didn't have any other options I had-- I went to
8 CJTF-7 so many times and I asked them for a deputy, I asked them for
9 a replacement command sergeant major. I asked General Diamond, I
10 asked General Speaks I couldn't get help from anybody

11 Q. Did you consider putting a senior major in command of that
12 Battalion?

13 A I did not because it was-- they were troubled

14 Q Okay Troubled in a sense for what?

15 A The soldiers were still reeling from the death of one of
16 their soldiers, umm-- there was a lot of activity going on The
17 whole facility was becoming bigger and overwhelming They saw an
18 extension of their one-year tour looming on the horizon. They were
19 being pushed around. Their LSA that they had built and cleaned up
20 themselves was being affected What title they had they were being
21 asked all of a sudden to share with uh-- for each soldier to share it
22 with three others And they felt like every bad mission was going to
23 them

1 Q So you had no confidence whatsoever in the stable of
2 available lieutenant colonels or even senior majors in your command,
3 whether to be S-3's or XO's or whatever the case may be to put
4 somebody in command of a troubled battalion. To put a battalion
5 commander who was not in your initial assessment was either not fit
6 to continue to command or in that particular sense?

7 A No sir I had tremendous confidence in my majors

8 Q Then why did you not put one in there?

9 A What I did was take a major out of the 324, [REDACTED] and
10 I put him in the 400th.

11 Q To command?

12 A To command, the Battalion I took the 400th Commander and
13 put him in as my Deputy

14 Q Who was that?

15 A [REDACTED] promotable, [REDACTED] A

16 Q And how long did you have him as your Deputy?

17 A Uh-- probably two and a half months.

18 Q Okay

19 A I had [REDACTED] who was the Battalion Commander over at
20 the HVD facility and Cropper, and Cropper portion closed, so it was
21 the HVD facility And I had a very strong XO over there and uh--
22 [REDACTED] was there, who is an active component guy, uh-- and
23 [REDACTED] was there, who was a strong operations officer and--

1 and-- and-- he had a deputy So I took [REDACTED] and I put him out
2 at Baghdad Central because I-- I, like I said, I needed somebody that
3 knew the process of commanding a battalion that could get in there
4 and keep that battalion functioning And-- and he did. He did from
5 the minute he hit the ground, and----

6 Q That was for a temporary process?

7 A It was a temporary process, because [REDACTED] at that
8 time, my plan was for him to come back.

9 Q. You say you still had confidence in [REDACTED] ability to
10 command, predicted on some background with having to reel back from
11 Bucca, and the fact of the matter was that all these incidents that
12 were building up, escapes, two deaths, things of that nature, an
13 overwhelming mission So, based on your assessment that-- giving him
14 some time off would in fact restore his motivation?

15 A It wasn't just the time off We reorganized his staff, his
16 operations sergeant major, which was a big problem, was----

17 Q This [REDACTED] ----

18 A ----That's [REDACTED] And-- and he was given very specific
19 instructions to remain in his lane, and that his lane was very
20 specific and limited.

21 Q. Was there a command sergeant major at the time?

22 A At the 320th? No sir, there wasn't

23 Q Then, who was the acting command sergeant major?

1 A. - They didn't have one And----

2 Q So they operated without an XO, they operated without a
3 command sergeant major. They were put in a position of great
4 important to get something done, you've asked for assistance, you've
5 recognized that there are some problems associated with either
6 discipline or lack of uh-- you had some leadership problem. And so,
7 you took the option of placing a Battalion Commander who you thought
8 was not well and putting a temporary Battalion Commander there, and
9 giving him the same mission even though he was a serving Battalion
10 Commander somewhere else

11 A But his mission had been reduced.

12 Q Why didn't you just put him in there and say, "You're now
13 the Commander." and you got a strong XO as you said. Take over 115th
14 and I'll take care of [REDACTED] later?

15 A I could have, but I did not I brought on----

16 Q In retrospect now, would you have?

17 A Perhaps But, [REDACTED] was----

18 Q Perhaps?

19 A. ----perhaps because [REDACTED] was leaving, he was the
20 first Battalion out.

21 Q. Alright But did you have any indication now with all
22 these allegations that you would have relieved him and perhaps it
23 would have prevented the incidents?

1 A. No sir

2 Q. None of that would have mattered anyway?

3 A I don't know

4 Q Okay

5 A. I can't speculate, but I do know that [pause] I do know now
6 that one of the main people in this situation with the detainee abuse
7 has a history of this in his civilian job.

8 Q That's not [REDACTED] - was not-- you did not put those
9 people on there

10 A. He did not know, those Companies, he never worked with
11 those Companies before He didn't know them.

12 Q But he's the commander

13 A He is

14 Q I mean, you've never worked with any of these Battalions
15 before either

16 A That's correct

17 Q Correct? But you take it upon yourself to get to know
18 them

19 A Yes sir.

20 Q. Take charge And the fact of the matter is that you're the
21 senior trainer, with your experience as a Commander for all these
22 Battalion Commanders So, in retrospect, would you have just simply
23 ask that he not command anymore and put somebody else strong in

1 there Given the gravity of the mission set that was placed on your
2 at Abu Ghraib?

3 A If I had had a lieutenant colonel available to me to take
4 over that Battalion I would have taken [REDACTED] out of
5 command and put a replacement commander in there.

6 Q But you just said you had one, cause you put Chu in there

7 A But [REDACTED] was temporary, sir. He was leaving in December

8 Q Alright

9 A And, actually he left in November-- and I knew that I
10 came down here to 377th I spoke to General Gagin about [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED] and uh-- about putting him in the Battalion command position

12 Q Sure.

13 A He said that he would talk to him about it and [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] said that he was the Article 32 Officer, so it was probably
15 not a good thing

16 Q Okay

17 A I asked if there was another lieutenant colonel I asked
18 General Diamond if there was another lieutenant colonel. And he said
19 he had so many people that were removed from positions that he just
20 didn't have a lieutenant colonel that I could give me.

21 Q None available. You said-- mentioned General Speaks was
22 also notified? This was in October?

1 A In October I went back up to CJTF-7 I went over
2 General Wodjakowski and he was not there for that SUA I talked to
3 the PMO and I said I need a lieutenant colonel; I need a strong
4 lieutenant colonel And-- to take command. Of Abu Ghraib? Yes
5 Not a chance. Umm-- and it was consistent with everything I had
6 tried to get before and we got no support

7 Q. Did you consider [REDACTED] in that
8 equation?

9 A I did not I-- I did because he was a lieutenant colonel,
10 but he was not a good fit He was not.

11 Q. What about [REDACTED]?

12 A [REDACTED] was down at CPA and uh-- I said to him-- he
13 was an LNO down there and like everything else that [REDACTED]
14 did, you know, in fine style He had the experience and I said to
15 him, "I'd like to put you out at Baghdad Central because there's no
16 XO and you might have to serve as the Commander " And he said, "I
17 serve at the pleasure of the President, tell me where you need me to
18 go But I'm taking leave " And he said, "My kids are expecting me
19 home for leave I came in with the early entry module." I said,
20 "You know that the Battalion is struggling out there , mean,
21 [REDACTED] hasn't done anybody any favors [REDACTED] is, you know, in bed
22 with [REDACTED] And he said, "As soon as I get back I'll----

1 Q. So you had no confidence in [REDACTED] either, the S-3?
2 Essentially you had a troubled Battalion.

3 A. I did I talked to Colonel Pappas I said, "Do you have a
4 lieutenant colonel that you can give me to run the Battalion that's
5 under-- you know, the security detainee operation is in MI

6 Q Did you have anybody at the rear detachment beside [REDACTED]

7 A I had [REDACTED] That was the only lieutenant
8 colonel I had

9 Q. Okay. So all those troubles seemed to percolate----

10 A I told [REDACTED], I said to him, "This is not my
11 first choice, but you are ready to do this " And-- and he said, "You
12 know, if you ask me to go out there, I'll go and take command of the
13 Battalion, but the operations piece will suffer "

14 Q From what I understand, General Karpinski, you were in a
15 dilemma here, but, in other words, are you indicating at least
16 insinuating that you have a bunch of officers that are either not
17 competent, or incompetent, or not qualified, or unwilling to take
18 command?

19 A In the----

20 Q In support of the mission----

21 A In the Battalion----

22 Q ----for the Battalion

23 A. ----or overall?

1 Q Overall. You have all these Battalions, and obviously
2 you're-- you are in dire straits here and you mentioned that nobody
3 was hearing your plea----

4 A Nobody was

5 Q ----for assistance So that was the last great measure was
6 to put [REDACTED] in temporary command while [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED] was recovering from whatever he was struggling
8 with

9 A The stress, whatever, but it was. And it was clear.

10 Q So, you put him back in command after he came back. Not
11 really-- nothing out of the ordinary. Did you talk to him, or at
12 least give him further guidance?

13 A Yes, sir, I did

14 Q And in what respect?

15 A When he came back up, because I had not made a decision,
16 when he came back up from Arifjan He was like a different person
17 He spoke with confidence, he-- we talked about [REDACTED] we talked
18 about him taking control of his staff, we talked about-- I told him I
19 would get him a CSM, and I did We talked about using the people in
20 the P [REDACTED] to help him when he was in trouble, like my Sergeant
21 Major. And-- and

22 Q Who was also in trouble at the time

23 A At that time, I think he was down at Arifjan,----

1 Q. Was it [REDACTED] that was gone?

2 A. It was [REDACTED] right

3 Q. Who had another circumstance, of course, which placed

4 [REDACTED] ---

5 A. As the Brigade Command Sergeant Major

6 Q. It would appear-- didn't it appear to you then, General
7 Karpinski, that you got all these other tidbits of your command, that
8 you had people that had either a troubled past or didn't know how to
9 lead. And as a Brigade Commander, I would think that identifying all
10 those troubled spots was whether you would have taken the risk of
11 instantaneously removing them, and operating without them, or
12 operating with them, and continue for them to be turbulent. You
13 mentioned [REDACTED] What was his problem?

14 A. He's uh-- operating as if he were in the Army 20 years ago.
15 [Pause] He wanted to be a gunslinger. He wanted to be a specialist
16 or a private again. And I used those words to him. And, uh, I
17 wasn't here, but there were incidents down at Bucca with him, and
18 they were reported and nobody did anything. He got up to Baghdad
19 Central and I was out there once the internment camp was set up and
20 it was operational and we couldn't get force protection from anybody.
21 I was out there in the afternoon and here's [REDACTED] up in the tower.
22 And I said, "What are you doing up in the tower?" And he said, "Well
23 it means a soldier doesn't have to be up here." I said, "Sergeant

1 Major, you're the Battalion Senior NCO. You're supposed to be
2 checking on the other soldiers." And when I got back down to the
3 ground I said to [REDACTED] "Why is your Sergeant Major up in the
4 tower?" That's how the conversations went. And I walked with him, I
5 sat with him, I talked with him

6 Q This is [REDACTED]

7 A With [REDACTED] I-- I spoke to him with [REDACTED] there
8 And [REDACTED] told me, "We're going to take care of it,
9 we're going to keep in his-- I'm gonna keep him under control." And
10 every time I went out there, I would get another indication that he
11 was out of control

12 Q Did you sense he was not following your instructions, did
13 it cross your mind perhaps that disciplinary action was called for at
14 that time, that you were going to take, would you?

15 A And he got a letter of----

16 Q Was that about the extent of his disciplinary action?

17 A [REDACTED] said he did not want to take him out of
18 the position.

19 Q Okay.

20 A. He had confidence in him --

21 Q Except he can't accept-- he's not accepting your authority
22 based on your instructions to stay in his lane.

1 A Yes, sir And he wasn't accepting [REDACTED]
2 authority either, because [REDACTED] was-- told me that he
3 was giving him instructions and we had a conversation along those
4 lines that he is putting you on the line by disobeying your
5 instructions because those are my instructions And he said, [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED], he said that [REDACTED] was the full-time
7 support in the unit. The soldiers responded to him And I said,
8 "But they don't respond in a disciplined fashion They-- they
9 respond to him because they think this is the wild, wild, west And
10 uh-- and he said, "If I took him out it would hurt the Battalion."
11 And I said, "Look, I can give him another letter of reprimand, I can
12 take on this responsibility of commanding your Battalion if you want
13 me to And if you don't want me to But you need to start getting
14 him under control " And then there was about 30 days, a month, or 45
15 days where he actually was under control. He was in the right
16 uniform

17 Q He was out of uniform?

18 A He was in the BDU, but he wasn't in the DCU And somebody
19 said to me, and again I wasn't there, but when they were down at
20 Bucca, they said he gave his DCUs to a couple of the f--ws when they
21 were uh-- paroled And, of course, I asked was there any truth to
22 that Of course not, he sent them to the laundry and they never came

1 back So he had his BDUs BDUs were acceptable, but he-- he was a
2 standout from his Battalion

3 Q. He was one of the individuals, I believe, that was
4 suspended from their positions?

5 A. That's correct That's correct.

6 Q Was there a written suspension?

7 A Suspension? Absolutely, yes sir.

8 Q So you removed him Who else was suspended out of there,
9 besides [REDACTED]

10 A [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED]

12 Q Who's [REDACTED]

13 A [REDACTED] is the First Sergeant for the uh-- tbe 372nd MP
14 Company.

15 Q. Why not the S-3? Since he's got daily operational
16 oversight of all the Battalion operations

17 A. I don't know, sir

18 Q Okay. So those were your choices?

19 A They were not [REDACTED]

20 were General Sanchez's choices

21 Q Okay So basically----

22 A I added [REDACTED].

1 Q. Your prerogative Okay There were other incidents that
2 happened in the time when, it was November I believe it was The
3 205th MI Brigade Commander has already assumed TACON and had moved in
4 to the facility And there was a riot, I believe at Camp Ganci, one
5 of the compounds there resulting in injury to both detainees and MPs
6 And there were the death of six detainees if I'm not mistaken.

7 A Three

8 Q Three, okay And there was also, coincidentally enough, an
9 escape attempt somewhere in the hard site. It was either during the
10 same timeframe or the same night, whatever the case may be What
11 actions did you take immediately after those incidents, and could you
12 describe at least if you were present during that time or reports
13 that were being conveyed to you?

14 A There was a riot, [REDACTED] called after it was
15 under control

16 Q After it was under control?

17 A After it was under control

18 Q Not during?

19 A No it was not

20 There was no report radio wise, nothing?

21 A No, sir.

22 Q So you had no knowledge of it----

23 A. No, sir

1 Q. ----until after it was under control

2 A. Until after it was under control.

3 Q. Okay Did you kind of find that rather strange?

4 A I did. And they told me that Colonel Pappas said that he

5 wanted the reports coming to him and he would inform me

6 Q Okay

7 A And they followed those instructions.

8 Q Alright So you-- the reports went to Pappas Pappas was

9 supposed to pass it-- pass it to you. Did you hear anything from

10 Colonel Pappas at all?

11 A I did not

12 Q Alright

13 A I called Colonel [REDACTED] It was about 2200 No, it

14 was not that late, it was dark, it was probably 2000, 2100, it was

15 late and I said, "Tell me what's going " He said, "Did Colonel

16 Pappas call you?" "No he did not " And before he told me what

17 happened he said Colonel Pappas said that he wanted the report and he

18 would get in touch with you And I said, "Tell me what happened "

19 He said, "It started in one compound One compound started throwing

20 rocks," you know the [REDACTED] story, so And I said, "When did you--

21 tell me what actions you took " And he said, "I went down to the

22 facility when it started, uh-- they were using, gave the order to use

23 non-lethal----

1 Q Who gave the order?

2 A He did.

3 Q [REDACTED]

4 A He did, yes That's what he told me And uh-- and it made
5 sense that he was in the TOC, went down to the compound, gave the
6 order use non-lethal, engaged The prisoners since it was the winter
7 time had taken their blankets and put them inside their jackets, and
8 the non-lethal had little effect on them One compound when it
9 started, and that compound responded and there was only one compound
10 that stayed out of it.

11 Q. It was a domino effect

12 A It was. And then when it-- according to [REDACTED]
13 they would get it under control then it would start again They'd
14 get it under control then it would start again He said we did that
15 three times and then I gave the order to go to lethal.

16 Q Was the Rules of Engagement done indicated as such to--
17 what did the Rules of Engagement at that point in time, because they
18 were subsequently changed after that?

19 A. Yes, sir The Rules of Engagement at that time were that
20 you would use escalating means up to and including, at the command of
21 the Camp Commander, [REDACTED] non-lethal And then, if you
22 were still not able to bring it under control, on order from the Camp
23 Commander, you would go to lethal. And-- and they followed those

1 procedures They-- they tried to get it under control, uh-- it was
2 getting out of control very rapidly They went to non-lethal, the
3 non-lethal was ineffective, and then they went to lethal. And they
4 were the Rules of Engagement Uh-- when I spoke to General Sanchez
5 that night, I told him that they used the established Rules of
6 Engagements.

7 Q. Whose Rules of Engagement were those?

8 A They were CJTF-7 Rules of Engagement, they were theater-
9 wide Rules of Engagement, and they were the 800th MP Brigade Rules of
10 Engagement and they were all a duplication republished And in their
11 SOP, it was the 320th MP Battalion Rules of Engagement, which was just
12 their repetition of all of the Rules of Engagement that were
13 published And I had in my hand, the copy of the CJTF-7 Rules of
14 Engagement and the 800th MP Brigade Rules of Engagement. And General
15 Sanchez told me that he didn't care what the Rules of Engagement
16 said, that he wanted them to use lethal first and then go to non-
17 lethal when it was under control

18 Q Okay

19 A And I said, "Sir that's a violation of the Rules of
20 Engagement " And he said, "I don't care about your Rules of
21 Engagement " I said, "Sir, these are your Rules of Engagement " And
22 the JAG was sitting there and he said, "Then change them." He turned
23 to me and said, "Don't make any changes until you get the new Rules

1 of Engagement, but you're going to get new Rules of Engagement Dc
2 you understand?" I said, "Yes, sir, I understand " "These are
3 unarmed combatants " He said, "I don't care. They're armed
4 somehow " And General Miller was in there with me, and he said to me
5 out in the hall, "It doesn't make any difference if they're rocks or
6 MREs, just----

7 Q They're armed, somehow.

8 A That's his interpretation Let the SJA people handle it
9 now

10 Q This is the C-3 Miller?

11 A The C-3, General Miller

12 Q Of course, the Rules of Engagement were changed after that.

13 A Right.

14 Q Because-- let me go back to the TACON relationship that you
15 had Uh-- TACON happened on the 19th of November This happened on
16 sometime around-- before Ramadan ended 24, 25th of November. During
17 the span of about five, six days there was still no clarity with
18 regards to your concerns of what TACON meant?

19 A No-- no clarification at all. Several attempts I went to
20 Major Williams, who was Colonel Pappas' Deputy, he said uh-- that
21 their-- the interpretation from General Wodjakowski was that TACON
22 meant that Colonel Pappas was in charge of those units And I said
23 to Major Williams, "If Colonel Pappas is going to take charge of the

1 MP Battalion, I still want them to send me SIRs, I still want them to
2 send me information, I want to know what's going on with my MPs
3 Because I'm the one that's going to be asked the questions " And he
4 said, "Ma'am I don't think so, I think Colonel Pappas is ready to do
5 this " And-- and I said, "Colonel Pappas and I need to go see
6 General Wodjakowski "

7 Q Did you all see General Wodjakowski?

8 A We did not

9 Q Would the issue have been more resolved if in fact you
10 relinquished TACON to Colonel Pappas?

11 A No sir, I don't believe so.

12 Q You still were-- your Battalion there was still in charge
13 of detention operations?

14 A They were And they were running all the facility, the
15 hard facility was open at the time We were housing-- we had two,
16 three, cell block two, three and four open, and five partly open, and
17 one, cell block 1A was the isolation cells and that was an MI
18 operation. And then they asked for more capacity because they had
19 females and juveniles that they still needed to put in isolation, so
20 CPA gave them cell block 1B and they said that they would run those
21 facilities Except for the MPs who would be guarding the prisoners.

22 Q So, the instructions you gave, or if any that you gave to
23 [REDACTED] was, though you are TACON to Colonel Pappas, that

1 you were still responsible to report to me with regards to detention
2 operations?

3 A He still had to give us numbers, we're still entering the
4 data on our----

5 Q. So was that your expectation then, was that they were going
6 to do TACON-- I'm sorry, they were going to do detention operations?

7 A In response to Colonel Pappas, yes sir.

8 Q Alright But did you know that-- or did it trouble you at
9 all-- or had any concerns that the gaining unit could establish
10 priorities to that unit as TACON to him?

11 A That may have been a concern, but Colonel Pappas told me
12 that uh-- that he didn't know anything about detention operations so
13 he was going to be relying very heavily on, you know if he had a
14 question or if he had-- and I told him that I wanted [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED] to still-- we still needed to report the numbers, and if
16 there was any issues with the soldiers I had asked [REDACTED]
17 to make me aware of them I was still going to be signing REFRADs
18 and those kind of orders Colonel Pappas said, fine, that was-- I
19 mean, the administrative responsibilities would still rest with the
20 800th MP Brigade

21 Q Do you think a memorandum of agreement of understanding
22 would have resolved that and put clarity to that relationship?

23 A. Yes, sir I think it would have given great clarity.

1 Q Was there any thought given to that?

2 A. There was thought given to it, and we didn't do one

3 Q. Okay. Alright.

4 A. We were-- it's not an excuse, it certainly is not an
5 excuse, but we were running detention operations all over Iraq And
6 I was moving personnel around to be able to meet these requirements
7 and these missions and it was a piece of paperwork that in hindsight,
8 certainly could have given clarify, but we didn't do it

9 Q Let me go back to when you assumed command. Upon
10 assumption of command, when was that?

11 A The 29th or the 30th of June

12 Q 29th, 30th of June Did you establish clear command
13 philosophy guidelines that you wanted each of the Battalions, all the
14 way down to the lowest ranking individual in your Brigade to
15 understand what your objectives were to be and how you want to
16 command and what you wanted to accomplish?

17 A. Yes, sir I had all the Commanders, after the change of
18 command ceremony, I spoke to all of them at the same time They all
19 had their command sergeant major with them And-- uh-- I told them
20 that I knew that they were-- the number one question that they were
21 being confronted with by their soldiers was, were we going to be here
22 for, ya know, two years? I told them that I expected to be informed
23 if they were-- I didn't know if there were company grade disciplinary

1 actions taking place, but for serious incidents, I wanted to know
2 about them with a phone call immediately. I used the example of the
3 detention. I expected the officers within their Battalions to behave
4 appropriately, and I used the example of the violation of General
5 Order Number One that had already taken place at Bucca.

6 Q. [REDACTED]

7 A Yes sir. And-- uh-- I-- I did give them my philosophy,
8 that command was a responsibility, a tremendous responsibility This
9 was a nation at war, we were a nation at war This was the
10 battlefield and we were moving up to Baghdad, but we still had lines
11 of responsibility to Bucca, we were going to leave a rear detachment.
12 That we would always be reachable and commanders could pick up the
13 phone and call me at any time Of course I had to modify that because
14 we didn't have effective coms in Baghdad for the first month and a
15 half that we were there

16 Q Did you follow this up in writing?

17 A Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I think they were given my
18 command philosophy the day of my change of command.

19 Q Would it surprise you that several of those leaders and
20 commanders that I interviewed said they had never seen your written
21 command philosophy?

22 A That would surprise me But, I would say that if their
23 confusing my written philosophy with my support form, then I would

1 understand that. Because I told them that day, they asked me--
2 several of them asked me, "Do you have your support form?" And I
3 said, "No, I don't."

4 Q This-- what I asked them was not in the context of a
5 support form I said, basically, a memo that stipulated what your
6 command philosophy was. They do remember you speaking following the
7 change of command. They did not recall at least a preponderance of
8 the-those that I interviewed, ever remember or even recalling, or
9 even providing me with a copy of your command philosophy

10 A I-- I uh-- believe that for a long time that command
11 philosophy was attached to the other documents that were from that
12 day The program from the change of command ceremony, the couple of
13 photographs So I didn't write it for myself.

14 Q A portion of other documents

15 A. It was-- we were sitting in the conference room at Arifjan
16 and they were each given a-- I don't think----

17 Q. Handouts----

18 A Yes sir I don't think the memo said philosophy of
19 command, it said, maybe my-- my-- my direction or my leadership style
20 and there was attached a list of 10 or 12 bullets uh-- that was uh--
21 may have been Karpinski's Philosophy.

22 Q. Sure.

23 A. And they were all provided those things

1 Q Okay. Fair enough Given the magnitude of your detention
2 operations or others that was associated with it, to include building
3 facilities. What were the fundamental, since you've been in this--
4 you've been a military policeman now for the past 15, 20 years,
5 prisoners association What are some of the basic tenets that you
6 would harp on, or provide emphasis to, when you re visiting the
7 facilities of your commanders? And in concert with all of those
8 incidents of suspected or either reported detainee abuses what are
9 some of the basic fundamental things that governs your mission
10 requirements?

11 A Sir, each one of the facilities were a little bit
12 different But, when I went to each of the facilities, I talked to
13 the commanders about their soldiers I talked to them about the
14 stress associated with being around prisoners all day long. I talked
15 about how the facilities offered challenges and that civilian
16 criminals, their mindset was different than EPWs, and so you have to
17 keep reminding your MPs that this is not internment resettlement
18 operations, that this is criminal detention operations Asked the
19 commanders and the command sergeant majors at each location, how many
20 soldiers do you have who have criminal-- their either wardens or
21 they're in criminal corrections on the outside A lot of them have
22 police officers A lot of them had warden experience The
23 facilities were built for one purpose, like for example, Cropper

1 Not held more than 72 hours capacity of 250. The were held there
2 sometimes for weeks, and the capacity was well over 700 at its
3 highest point. The MEK mission, although we were securing the MEK,
4 they were not criminals, they were not-- or they weren't being called
5 criminals. The downtown jails, you could literally kick out the bars
6 of the windows or the doors. They were really meant and used for the
7 training grounds for the new Iraqi corrections officers that were
8 coming out of the training courses that we were conducting. Mosul
9 was a division holding area while they were rebuilding the
10 corrections facility up there. Uh-- so it was different at each
11 location. But we focused generally, I would focus when I visited all
12 those locations, safety, the health, the welfare, how they were
13 handling the detainees, were the detainees getting food, were they
14 getting clothes, what were the logistical supplies. And every one of
15 those, and every one of the-- we handled and my S-4 insured that we
16 handled and equipped and supplied Cropper, Talil, Bucca, Baghdad
17 Central. CPA was responsible for funding and supplying all of the
18 other facilities.

19 Q. Outside of your--

20 A. Outside of the military internment operations. And they
21 didn't do it. They, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were, [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED] especially was reckless and he was more interested in how many
23 AK-47s he could keep in the bathroom, than he was about prisoners.

1 eating or how they were being transported or their safety or
2 security, or anything else. So, I instructed my S-4 to, for 30 days,
3 to supply the prisoners in our facilities, because they were under my
4 MPs control. So we were responsible for them. And I went to CJTF-7
5 and I asked General Wodjakowski if I could have an increase in my SIR
6 funds because I was going through them 200 thousand dollars every
7 other day. And he said, "Give me the requirements and I'll contract
8 it." And we sent the requirements up there and he turned it back,
9 and said see me. And I went to see him and he said, "We don't do
10 this for the soldiers." And I said, "Sir, there's different
11 requirements for prisoners." "But their prisoners, [REDACTED] So I
12 talked about with the commanders and the staff, the company
13 commanders, I talked about their frustrations and ways to resolve
14 them. I talked about, did they understand the Geneva-Hague
15 Conventions. Did they understand how stress could have an impact on
16 the MPs, to rotate them around between tower guards and compound
17 guards and-- and they did all of those things. And they did them
18 very well.

19 [Interview recessed at 1734]

20 [Interview reconvened at 1748]

21 Q We talked a little bit about your expectations when you
22 visited. Were there any set standards that you established or you

1 reinforced that were not negotiable and had to be carried out that
2 you expected your commanders and your soldiers to carry-- to follow?

3 A. I expected them to be honest; I expected them to represent
4 the-- the 800th MP Brigade. I expected them to be-- to set the
5 example all the way down the chain of command I expected them to
6 get information that I gave to them out to the soldiers. And I
7 expected them to treat the detainees appropriately, be in compliance
8 with Geneva-Hague Conventions, to be cooperative and honest with the
9 ICRC Along those lines, I mean there was a-- there was a high
10 standard established for the Brigade and I saw it in the MPs
11 everywhere I went

12 Q For example, did your staff or yourself were aware that the
13 provisions, not the entire Convention, the provisions of the Geneva
14 Convention had to be written in the language of which the detainees--
15 nationality was from, in this case, Arabic and posted where they
16 could be visible to both the detainees and the MP guards?

17 A Yes, sir And those copies in both languages were
18 provided. And in fact we had copies of the Geneva-Hague Conventions
19 available in Farsi as well because of the MEK.

20 Q. The MEK, okay

21 A I think it was Arabic, Farsi, English, and somebody told me
22 there was some available down at Bucca in Urdu.

1 Q Would it surprise you that when I visited these facilities
2 last week and the week previous that none of those were posted?

3 A That surprises me. Sir, I'll tell you, when I was out
4 there, after I got the information from the CID-- [REDACTED]
5 when I was out there, I looked for all of those things I looked
6 for-- for blue crystals-- to see if there were-- I mean, the files
7 were under control I-- I was-- I can't say I left no stone
8 unturned, but I was looking for the details And I saw them. I saw
9 Korans, I saw Geneva-Hague Conventions in at least Arabic and
10 English I-- I don't think I could tell you it was available in
11 Farsi there, because I saw that up at the MEK and I don't remember if
12 I saw it in both locations But I was-- at Abu Ghraib, I looked for
13 those things, and they were not only posted on the wall, but they
14 were available, along with an ample supply of Korans and Bibles for
15 the outside facility and the inside facility.

16 Q Would it surprise to tell you that on my personal visit, I
17 personally visit each of those facilities. And the tier 1A were
18 those incidents happened, as of Wednesday I believe it was, this past
19 Wednesday, that the only sign I saw in those two tier, was a notice
20 form your IG that basically said that if you have any complaints or
21 see any signs of detainees abuse that you report it to the IG. And
22 none of the other things.

23 A That would surprise me, yes sir

1 Q Also at the MEK, when I talked to the Command Group there;
2 one, they were not aware that you had to post them on the facilities
3 itself, or anywhere in the Command Group Headquarters, until I told
4 them that they had a requirements under the provisions of 190-8, that
5 that was a directive since the Army is the executive agent for
6 detainee operations

7 A. Sir, in the hallway, in their TOC, as soon as you come in
8 the door, where the 530th is, it was posted on the wall. It was
9 posted in the latrine facility. It was posted in the-- and the MEK
10 leaders had copies of the Geneva-Hague Conventions.

11 Q Okay.

12 A. So-- and it was posted in the mess hall, in the DFAC. So,
13 I am surprised.

14 Q Okay Well, I even had to recommend almost to the point of
15 directing a Battalion Commander, in fact it was [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED] that he had to post that at the HVD, twice So----

17 A Sir, at the HVD facility, in Baghdad, each one of those
18 detainees had a copy of the Geneva-Hague Convention in their language
19 and some of them asked for English And around Ramadan, when I was
20 at the HVD facility, I spoke to a large number of those HVD detainees
21 and I asked them if they had any questions, they asked very good
22 questions about-- in compliance with Geneva-Hague Conventions I'm

1 supposed to see an attorney, I'm supposed to have access to my
2 attorney. They know all of those things, sir

3 Q Okay. I'm only conferring to you what I personally
4 observed with the two recommendation I gave to Lieutenant [REDACTED]
5 [REDACTED] to post in English and in Arabic, the fundamental provisions
6 of that as I walked around the rooms I did not see any of that. But
7 they did have-- the admin office did have a copy of the Geneva
8 Convention in Arabic and it was loaned out, one copy. And if you
9 want the name of the specialist who told me that in the presence of
10 his Battalion Commander, [REDACTED] That he had one copy, it
11 was loaned out

12 A When did you see them?

13 Q I saw them, I believe it was either Wednesday or Thursday
14 of last week I went to visit them twice, in fact. The only
15 facility I've only seen once is Camp Bucca and I had to tell [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED] down there that that was a requirement And at the MEK
17 facility, I told them, I believe Lieutenant Colonel-- I'm sorry,
18 [REDACTED]-----

19 A [REDACTED]

20 Q. ----who was on duty But, they may know it, they might
21 have posted it, but I didn't see it at least in that command
22 facility, nor did I see it in any of the bathrooms I did go to the
23 bathroom So I commend that to you, that if that was a requirement

1 that was an understood requirement, and you made that as a non-
2 negotiable standard, then I would imagine that either your Battalion
3 Commanders, or any of that for the matter, were not following your
4 policy, nor your direction

5 A Sir, I-- I don't want to try and second guess anybody If-
6 - I had several of my Battalions and I will say, my strongest
7 Battalion Commanders, leave already, [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED] and each one of them performed a RIP with the
9 Battalion Commanders who came in. [REDACTED] whines and if he received
10 his OER before you got there, this may be intentional [REDACTED]
11 wanted to go home four months ago and this-- I-- I don't know I
12 can't answer for them when [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were
13 down at Bucca, those items were available and posted

14 Q Okay

15 A I-- I-- I don't even-- I can't even guess

16 Q Well, I only mention that to you because it's not you, per
17 se, just you alone, that has to enforce standards Your Commanders
18 have to at least comply to that and you've got a staff that has to
19 remind them.

20 A Yes, sir.

21 Q So I just want to mention that to you.

22 A Well, let me use the Rules of Engagement because that's
23 another one that when they-- when the new Rules of Engagement came

1 out, we had training vignettes already prepared with changes so they
2 could make comparisons. [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED] went to every one of the units and sometimes several times to
4 the units to make sure the soldiers understood They had copies of
5 it They-- it was all there The tower guards have copies of the
6 Geneva-Hague Conventions And to me when a soldier goes on duty and
7 [REDACTED] and I talked about this. When they go on
8 duty, it's not like there's a fight going on every day that they go
9 on duty Take out the SOP book, read from cover to cover and refresh
10 your minds-- I'm not saying you have to read the Geneva-Hague
11 Conventions every day But, take the book out and read it The
12 books were there in the tower They were in the facilities The
13 cell block 1A and B, those-- some of those items were removed because
14 in isolation or when soldiers-- when detainees are going through
15 interrogation, they're not entitled to have those things.

16 Q. Is that the rules?

17 A. Apparently the rules change

18 Q. Whose rules were they?

19 A. They were the MI rules

20 Q. Okay Let's talk about-- a little bit about the Rules of
21 Engagement. Did [REDACTED], or anybody
22 else for that matter, confer with you about a specific line in the
23 Rules of Engagement that stipulated, this is all following the riots,

1 that stipulated that they could carry, that you authorized for them
2 to carry their weapons, their sidearms, inside the compound?

3 A Absolutely not

4 Q Were you aware that there were comments or allegations that
5 those MPs were indeed wearing their sidearms, but were concealing
6 them in their cargo pockets?

7 A I-- I----

8 Q. Were you aware that a member of your Command Group knew of
9 that?

10 A. I-- I am not That they were carrying sidearms----

11 Q Sidearms, concealed in their cargo pockets----

12 A ----inside the compound?

13 Q Absolutely

14 A They never shared it with me

15 Q. They never asked you for permission of that, because of the
16 dangers that were imposed to them during the riots?

17 A No, sir. What they got permission from me to do was-- the
18 weapons racks were removed from anywhere near the compounds And
19 they were given permission instead of keeping them inside in the TOC,
20 they were moved to the tent, still outside the compound, but where
21 the QRF was, in a weapons rack They got permission for that. They
22 were storing non-lethal and lethal ammunition in the same shotgun.
23 That was changed.

1 Q Was that put in a written form, or a verbal directive?

2 A No, it was-- that's part of their-- I mean you never store
3 lethal and non-lethal-- except if you're regulation according to

4 [REDACTED]

5 Q So that was already established is what you're saying?

6 A Yes, sir

7 Q Just a matter of reinforcing?

8 A Yes, sir

9 Q Okay

10 A And I-- on Christmas Day when I was out there and I was up
11 in the towers, I spoke to the MPs. And I said, "What do you have in
12 your shotgun?" "Non-lethal and lethal " And, I said, "In the same
13 shotgun?" "We don't have enough shotguns " "When you came on duty
14 today did you check?" "No ma'am, I didn't." "So if somebody fired
15 non-lethal last night, you wouldn't know." "No ma'am I wouldn't " I
16 said, "Do you check when you come on duty?" "No ma'am I don't."

17 Q Did you discuss that with Colonel----

18 A I spoke about that with [REDACTED] I-- [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED] was on his way back because his
20 mother-in-law or father-in-law passed away and he had to go home on
21 emergency leave

22 Q That was-- [REDACTED] was still in command at that time?

23 A He was not

1 Q. So when he left for the second time, who was in command of
2 the Battalion?

3 A [REDACTED] was out there

4 Q So [REDACTED] was the acting Commander

5 A I also brought [REDACTED] down from the MEK compound

6 Q And he was doing the mayoral stuff?

7 A He was doing the base defense plan.

8 Q With relative-- with regards to policy memos, command
9 policies, are you aware, have knowledge of two command policies that
10 were signed by General Sanchez with regards to respect and dignity
11 and treatment towards detainees or Iraqi people?

12 A Right I saw that It was widely published.

13 Q How was that articulated to you and what actions were you
14 supposed to take when you received those memos?

15 A It was-- we made sure it was distributed The Commanders
16 all had it and in most cases it was delivered and when I made a visit
17 to the compound or whatever facility it was, we talked about it And
18 I will tell you, sir, that at Abu Ghraib the soldiers in the mess
19 hall-- or in the dining facility inside the hard facility that's
20 really a cafeteria that's not being used yet They were the ones who
21 sat there, or I should say, stood up and said, "How can anybody talk
22 about dignity and respect out here when the detainees, all of their
23 rights are being violated They're living in mud, we can't give them

1 a hot shower The food sucks You know, we don't give them answers
2 to the questions that they have. The contractor that is coming out
3 here is smuggling in beer and taking out notes and we can't answer
4 anything that the prisoners are asking us about They have compound
5 representatives, we're just lucky " Those are the things we heard
6 And when you have soldiers who recognize that the person, who signed
7 that policy letter about dignity and respect, has about as much
8 interest in dignity and respect for prisoners as he does about the
9 cleanliness of bathrooms It wasn't consistent. And when I spoke to
10 them, I said, "Don't worry about the piece of paper, as long as
11 you're doing the right thing. Don't worry about if the person who
12 signed that piece of paper has been out here to visit you or has seen
13 the conditions of the camp, you know the right things to do And I
14 understand the stress and I understand the pressures." We went-- I
15 wasn't out to all of the facilities nearly as often as I should have
16 been to be able to respond to those kind of questions But I made
17 certain, my sergeant major made certain, we always gathered them
18 together and addressed those concerns. Nobody said [pause] well
19 we're going to treat them the same way that the divisions are
20 treating them when they bring them into their holding areas. My MPs
21 take the handling and the care of prisoners very seriously.

22 Q Okay Did you follow those two memos up with a command
23 policy of your own?

1 A Not that I remember specifically

2 Q Was there a requirement on those two policies that it be
3 read to everybody

4 A That is be disseminated to the lowest level And it was

5 Q And it was?

6 A It was

7 Q Did you get an acknowledgement from each of the Battalion
8 Commanders that that happened?

9 A I did not

10 Q Was that a requirement?

11 A I don't recall without seeing the memo, it might be I
12 don't know what the other memorandum was though

13 Q There were two memcrandums There was a memorandum on the
14 5th, I believe, of October that stipulated respect and dignity towards
15 Iraqi people And there was a memorandum on the 13th of December I
16 believe it was, that re-stipulated, or at least re-emphasized dignity
17 and respect for-- during detainee detention operations

18 A Sir, I'll tell you that when we were talking about the memo
19 of December 13th, that the Provost Marshal for CJTF-7 at that time was
20 a guy by the name of [REDACTED] who learned a lot about detention
21 operations, by force, by hook or by crook, not willingly But when
22 we were over capacity at Baghdad Central, his solution, and with full
23 ops and General Wodjakowski's solution was cram more tents into the

1 compounds And I said-- I said, "It doesn't sound like dignity and
2 respect to me " "These are prisoners ' I heard that a hundred
3 times, sir "These are prisoners " The soldiers don't have those
4 kinds of things In the middle of the summertime when we were still
5 rationing water up in Baghdad, I understand I understand how you
6 could be in conflict when you have to give three bottles of water to
7 prisoners and you only have to give two to each soldier But, then
8 you're in compliance with Geneva-Hague, with the road ahead the plan
9 for the road ahead And----

10 Q But that was a directive, General Karpinski, it was a
11 directive not to be questioned, that it was to be followed

12 A It was followed But soldiers have the right to question
13 it Not whether it will be implemented or not, but they have a right
14 to cheer opinions

15 Q Absolutely, but I think it is your responsibility to insure
16 that one, that there's an understanding for them to be able to
17 ameliorate themselves of a particular situation that they would be in
18 compliance with, as you said, the Geneva Convention, treatment for
19 them as opposed to treatment for all others

20 A Sir, I said to General Wodjakowski many times, I can't say
21 if it was six or sixty, many times I said it to General Fast, I
22 said it to Hitwell, who was the previous Provost Marshal We have
23 responsibilities, we have to treat these prisoners-- when I submitted

1 the first contract request for food, for feeding just at one
2 facility, I thought General Wodjakowski was going to take my head off
3 because it was for \$25 million

4 Q That's rather voluminous I would think, 25-- to feed how
5 many? Your soldiers, the MIs that were there----

6 A No sir, these were the prisoners that were there Three
7 meals a day from a DOD approved facility and we had almost 7,000
8 prisoners there at the time

9 Q So there was some either appropriate supported, non-
10 supported means Did you know that there were dogs in the facility?

11 A Working dogs?

12 Q Working dogs

13 A Yes, sir

14 Q Did you know why they were there?

15 A Yes, sir, we requested them

16 Q Was that a formal request----

17 A Yes, sir

18 Q ----from you? Did you know how they were being utilized or
19 employed?

20 A They were being used at the entry control points and they
21 were explosive bomb dogs, I believe, and patrol dogs

22 Q Patrol dogs

23 A They had them down at Bucca and then they moved them----

1 Q Do you know the composition of those? All Army? All Navy
2 or?

3 A I-- I do not, but I think we got one Navy dog handling team
4 in I-- I-- I don't know But I know that they were Army primarily

5 Q Would it surprise for you to hear that those dogs were used
6 for unauthorized use either for interrogation or for photo
7 opportunities that were done by soldiers and members of your command?

8 A Yes, it would surprise me to hear that

9 Q Were any of those reported to you?

10 A They were not The first I heard of them getting a
11 military working dog-- I read it in the CID report Uh-- because I
12 saw them at the ECPs, I saw them at the entry control points I saw
13 the dog handlers when they were-- and it was a-- it was a force
14 multiplier, if you will They were walking around the compounds, on
15 the outsides of the compounds The prisoners could see the dogs
16 The dogs were serious business I never saw them by 1A or 1B The
17 first time I heard of it was when I saw the report that they'd called
18 the dog over there to be used in an interrogation and they had the
19 dog biting the detainees legs

20 Q Okay Were there any reports given to you that those
21 detainees that were being held in tier 1A, or for that matter, tier
22 1B were being stripped of their clothing?

23 A Yes, sir

1 Q When was that made aware to you?

2 A The ICRC team went out to Baghdad Central to-- because they
3 really have unrestricted access, they give us the courtesy of letting
4 us know that they are going to come around a certain time. But-- and
5 we always open the doors for them. They said that they wanted to--
6 and they talked to a couple of prisoners, they looked at the cells,
7 they noted improvements, they turned the water on to see if it was
8 running, if it was clean, those kinds of things. They looked at the
9 food, they talked to the compound detainee representatives and they
10 asked to go in to the interrogation cells. And they did. And they
11 opened one of the facilities and there was a naked prisoner in there.
12 So, they did not want to appear-- they didn't want to overreact to
13 it, I think is the words that they used. And they interviewed the
14 detainee and the detainee reported that not only was he made to sit
15 there without his clothes on when he was taken in for interrogation
16 they took his clothes away from him and then made him walk back to
17 the cell naked. And [REDACTED] confirmed it for me and he said
18 that they were no longer-- and he had talked to Colonel Pappas about
19 it and he was no longer going to be in the business of escorting the
20 detainees once they were through interrogation, because that was not
21 something that the MPs were trained to do, nor did they agree with
22 it. And the ICRC report was rendered and it mentioned that there was
23 a naked person in a cell with no means of cover. I believe in--

1 after sometime they go a blanket or some kind of covering for the
2 guy And there was a report-- in that same ICRC report it was also
3 told to the ICRC representative that the prisoner was made to wear
4 women's underwear on his head and parade around in front of the other
5 detainees, that they often paraded up and down in front of the other
6 prisoners And I talked to [REDACTED] to Colonel Pappas, to
7 [REDACTED] and to [REDACTED] They were all together over at
8 CJTF-7 headquarters I spoke to them, and I said, "I saw the
9 report " And they made a joke of it And the joke was, I told
10 Colonel Pappas to stop sending those prisoners Victoria Secret's
11 catalogs And I said, "Are you going to respond that way in the ICRC
12 report this isn't funny And [REDACTED] looked me in the face
13 and said, "They're just joking " And I said, "I don't think the ICRC
14 is joking " And he said "These are detainees " You know, they're
15 not always the most honest people on the street And, all of that
16 has come true I didn't make a joke of it The intel people made a
17 joke of it, joined by [REDACTED] who was generally pretty
18 reliable

19 Q Did you bring that-- did you bring it to the attention of
20 General Wodjakowski?

21 A I did

22 Q Or General Sanchez as well?

23 A I brought it to General Wodjakowski's attention

1 Q And his guidance was?

2 A We'll see what the ICRC report-- the response is I said
3 "Colonel Pappas is preparing the response, sir "

4 Q Are you aware of an interrogation ROE?

5 A I am not

6 Q Have you seen one like this, since the interrogation
7 operations have been conducted in conjunction with your detention
8 operations?

9 [MG Taguba passes document to BG Karpinski]

10 A I have never seen this Interrogation Rules of Engagement
11 before

12 Q But you were aware that interrogations were being done of
13 the detainees that is under the detention operations of the 320th

14 A No, sir The detainees under the control of the MPs were
15 escorted to an interrogation booth, or room, and it was under the
16 complete control of the MI people

17 Q But then policy was explained to me that somebody picks a
18 detainees by ISN either from Ganca or Vigilant for the hard site and
19 escorted by your personnel to the interrogation Was that often?

20 A Originally that's true-- that was true They were
21 escorted

22 Q When did that stop?

1 A That stopped, in mid-November or later because it was
2 actually stopped when ██████████ got out there to Abu Ghraib,
3 because it fell in line with the internal taskings. And it stopped
4 because a female and a male MP were tasked to escort a detainee back
5 from interrogation and he was naked. And I said, "I agree." ██████████
6 ██████████ called me, he said this is what took place, I said, "Stop
7 We're not going to do it."

8 Q Okay

9 A I have never seen this

10 Q You've never seen that. Okay, thank you. So from then on
11 in, did you ask ██████████ at the time to report to you, or
12 record for you, any incidents of detainees being escorted back to
13 their cells in the nude?

14 A I did

15 Q How many reports?

16 A There were no reports because the MPs were no longer
17 involved in it

18 Q Okay. Since they were no longer involved in that, none of
19 the MPs when they were remanded back to their custody, those
20 detainees were fully clothed?

21 A The reports would indicate that they were fully clothed.

1 Q Because, let me understand this When a detainee is asked
2 or been directed to be interrogated, they are taken out of the
3 compound You don't allow the MI personnel inside the compound?

4 A That's correct They are----

5 Q Escorted to a gate of some sort, and then they are
6 transferred, the custody is transferred to whoever is interrogating--
7 --

8 A The MI or the ISG or whoever----

9 Q How is that done? Is that done with a piece of paper, here
10 you are?

11 A There's a sign out sheet, put their signature there, they
12 put the ISN number of the detainee, it's a printed form They sign
13 for them, they take them into custody If they are going to leave
14 Abu Ghraib it requires basically a hand receipt, a prisoners hand
15 receipt

16 Q And following interrogation, they're returned back to MP
17 custody

18 A Right

19 Q Okay And there's a special set of instructions for a
20 detainee that had to have some sort of a special treatment Special
21 treatment like sleep deprivation, meal plan, that sort of things,
22 segregation How, under your knowledge, how was that communicated or
23 articulated to the MP?

1 A The-- I asked that question specifically, specifically sir
2 And it was different We had a visit earlier on last year, I mean
3 probably around August or something from General Miller, Major
4 General Miller from GITMO And his direction was that he was going
5 to GITMOize the confinement operation And he was going to use Abu
6 Ghraib And when he made that decision, I said to him, "Abu Ghraib is
7 not mine to give to you It belongs-- it is a CPA facility I own
8 the wire and those aren't the people that you----

9 Q You're talking about the prison complex itself?

10 A The hard facility, And he said that was what he was going
11 to take And I said, "It is not mine to give to you. That has been
12 CPA funded That belongs to the CPA " "They're your MPs inside " I
13 said, "Yes sir, they are But we don't own the facility " "Are you
14 supplying it " I mean, I kept emphasizing to him that I didn't own
15 the facility and it was only an interim facility and so he had
16 everybody leave the room and he said, "Look, we're going to do this
17 my way, or we're going to do this the hard way I have permission
18 from General Sanchez to take any facility I want And we're going to
19 put MI procedures in place in that facility because the MI isn't
20 getting the information from these detainees like they should be "
21 And I said, "Sir, if I am directed to give you that facility, I will
22 give you that facility " And he said, "We're going to send MPs in
23 here who know how to handle interrogation We're going to leave a CD

1 and a POI with the MI people and they're going to conduct training so
2 your MPs know how to handle certain requirements " And I said, "Sir,
3 if the decision is made to handle it that way and that cell block is
4 going to be given to the MI people " They never conducted training
5 sir They never left a CD, they never left a printed POI, they never
6 gave my MPs any specific training

7 Q Were you out-briefed after his visit?

8 A Yes, sir, I was, by him

9 Q Individually, or as-- in a group setting?

10 A Both

11 Q Okay

12 A And he told me specifically that he left that POI with
13 [REDACTED] and with Colonel Pappas That they were going to
14 conduct classes, that they were going to bring a team of MPs that
15 worked-- had experience down in GITMO that knew his procedures and he
16 was going to use the hard facilities out at Abu Ghraib I didn't get
17 any of that from CPA-- as a matter of fact, they were adamantly
18 opposed to it And the one cell block that they had given to the
19 MIs, at that point they wanted to take back And [REDACTED] was
20 the intermediate between me saying we're going to take it, and you
21 know, like 99 percent of the law is possession and we're in
22 possession of it right now And he said, "Let me talk to them " So
23 he was the go-between Nonetheless, I think in answer to your

1 question, the-- the interrogation people, the MI would sign them out
2 they would bring them back and they would tell them, I'll be back in
3 an hour, and they're not going to get any food, don't give them a
4 meal. We're going to be back in an hour, we're going to, ya know,
5 talk to them for another 15 minutes, you won't have to take them out
6 of the interrogation cell. I might come back at two o'clock in the
7 morning and take them out. That was the sleep deprivation. They--
8 they didn't-- Colonel-- [REDACTED], who was the, I think she was
9 the ops for the MI brigade, said to me, "The reason we don't want the
10 ICRC to go in there anymore is because it interrupts the isolation
11 process. If we have them in isolation for a week, if they have a
12 chance to interface with a person who is speaking their language,
13 that interrupts the isolation process and we have to start all over
14 again in order to put the pressure on them. So if we can just have
15 the cooperation of not letting the ICRC." I said, "We need to put it
16 in writing and explain to them, this is why."

17 Q This is the reason why I showed you this. On the right
18 hand column on there are specific rules that General Sanchez had
19 approved.

20 A He most likely approved this for the MI people to apply,
21 but I have never seen this.

22 Q None of your staff had seen it?

1 A. I can't speak for them, but if they had seen it, I think
2 they would have told me, you know there is a rules of engagement for
3 interrogation, but----

4 Q None of that ----

5 A ----when I was out there at cell block 1A specifically, I
6 took their notebooks off the shelf and I looked for anything I
7 looked for a history of the sign out sheets or anything Now the NCO
8 that was there at the time told me that the CID had taken most of
9 their books But, there was no evidence of anything except the
10 Geneva-Hague Conventions, the ICRC rules and my rules about treatment
11 of detainees

12 Q Okay

13 A And we have vet to GITMOize the operation

14 Q I'm sure I've read the report So, I don't know when
15 they're going to implement that Detainee accountability What is
16 the Brigade's standard in accounting for every detainee that enters a
17 compound or a facility?

18 A They-- when it was down at Bucca, of course, they used the
19 NDRS And at Ad Diwanlyah and Hialal the Marines were there, that was
20 the 1st MEF region, and they were using the BAT system, the Biometric
21 Automated Tracking system

22 Q Sure

1 A And in those facilities down there, they allowed the MPs to
2 the BAT system to maintain accountability and pictures and-- we're
3 actually testing it out and their plan was that we would buy those
4 systems off of them when they left because they were fielding it for
5 Lockheed-Martin, I think owns it. And, we liked the BAT system.
6 There were-- the NDRS system, down at Bucca, when it was just EPWs,
7 third country nationals and displaced civilians it worked. Because
8 it was one location, they were being processed, then they started to
9 come out with new, like change one, change six, I think they're on
10 change nine or eleven right now. But every patch that they sent out
11 sometimes it would corrupt what was already there, sometimes it would
12 freeze the database from functioning. And we had no means of
13 communication, so we couldn't network the system. So each facility
14 became responsible for accounting for their own prisoners. And if we
15 looked-- if we knew the ISN number we could go into the database and
16 locate the prisoner. The problem was, they didn't often have the ISN
17 number. So----

18 Q Why is that?

19 A Well, because in a lot of cases, the family members didn't
20 know that the prisoner was ever being held. So, they would use the
21 name. Janis Karpinski. Well, there's lots of different spellings for
22 Janis, there's certainly a lot of different spellings for Karpinski,
23 and depending on who input the data, you-- if you didn't get an exact

1 match, you didn't find the person So you'd have to go down the list
2 looking for anybody that was a Janis, or a J-A-N or whatever they--
3 they-- we got them eventually, but we couldn't get them instantly,
4 and that's what people were expecting It was an unrealistic
5 expectation I told Ambassador Bremer that, I told General Sanchez
6 that

7 Q How was the database from the BATS, the Biometric Automated
8 Tracking System integrated into the National Database Recording
9 System?

10 A It wasn't It was a separate system because they weren't
11 compatible

12 Q So there's a matter of manually inputting everything back
13 into the NDRS?

14 A Yes, sir

15 Q So they were not talking to, or not interconnected?

16 A No, sir But it was my understanding now they've worked
17 the link out And the other problem is that its BATS because they--
18 I mean that was another issue, when we got it up in Baghdad the
19 people that-- the C-6 who was supposed to be responsible for it at
20 General Sanchez's instruction, transferred it to the C-2 They
21 linked it to CHIMS which was a classified system, so that broke the
22 firewall on BATS, so it was no longer an unclassified system So,
23 they couldn't link the data from BATS to the NDRS until they worked

1 out this connectivity or this patch or this firewall, whatever it
2 was.

3 Q Was there a common policy across the Brigade or was it
4 decentralized for how and when each of the detainees would be
5 accounted for on a daily basis? Besides BATS and----

6 A They were in-processed----

7 Q Understand ----

8 A ----and they were BATd then and they NDRS So every day
9 the compound NCOs would count the prisoners, account for them, record
10 it----

11 Q How was this supposed to be?----

12 A ----and I will say, consistently, and the easiest means to
13 do accountability checks during the daylight hours was when-- at
14 mealtime And that worked very effectively Naturally, in an
15 outside facility, most of our escapes occurred during the hours of
16 darkness So you have to, on the night shift you have fewer people,
17 but you have to develop----

18 Q Why is that?----

19 A It was a matter of resources, sir So, there's most of the
20 activity with the prisoners during the day or the problems will come
21 up during the day, and at night, the majority of them are sleeping
22 So, if you have to make adjustments----

23 Q But the escapes were being done during the night.

1 A Correct, but with light sets, with the power on and the
2 light sets turned in, I mean, you adjust because then you take the
3 steps necessary to-- to limit those opportunities that you can
4 exploit So, yes, most of the escapes occurred at night But, when
5 the light sets were operational, you have good light sources and
6 everything The problem was, at Abu Ghraib, the light sets, which
7 they were depending on, would often fail at night, of course, that's
8 when the lights are on So, the prisoners had a plan, when the
9 lights fail the next time, we're out of here, and two of them would
10 be, or three of them would be When the lights fail, you know, if it
11 happens that often because they kept looting the power lines for the
12 copper, so then you have to have a fallback plan You have to be
13 able to come down out of the towers, or go up in the towers, or have
14 an alternate light set-- alternate light source, a generator,
15 whatever it was Sir, we couldn't get generators-- when we got
16 generators out there, they didn't work They contracted it and the
17 contractors brought the generators and then they left and they didn't
18 come back and the generators didn't work I didn't have engineers
19 to-- except building construction engineers I mean, it was just one
20 challenge after another

21 Q How many-- how many reported escapes were you made aware
22 of?

23 A For the whole duration?

1 Q Yes, from the time you took command

2 A I think there was about 32 total

3 Q Reported?

4 A Reported Actual

5 Q And how many detainees, of those 32, how many total

6 detainees escaped?

7 A Completely escaped?

8 Q Yes

9 A I don't know, I would guess about 15 because there was 11

10 from Bucca at one shot

11 Q This past January before the 310th TOA'd with the 724th, they

12 told us there were two recorded cases of escapes prior to the 310th

13 and there was one after the 310th, so that's three They did say that

14 those escapes happened during periods of limited visibility

15 Typically it happens when the fog rolled in And, of course, from

16 the same location predominantly, the same pattern, and I basically

17 asked them how would you improve on that and typically what kind of

18 guidance they would get from Brigade to improve based on the report

19 Would it surprise you that they never got any response from Brigade?

20 A That's not true, sir I spoke to [REDACTED] within

21 hours of the first escape That was when one----

22 Q This is the previous Battalion Commander?

1 A He is previous to [REDACTED] That's just simply not true
2 Because I spoke to [REDACTED] myself within hours of it
3 happening and it was one individual who was in a compound and the
4 guards were not on the money, and he escaped. And they immediately
5 sent a QRF, they saw footprints, they tried to track him. They were
6 tracking him all day long until about, when it was no longer
7 practical until about noontime, the rain started and then they lost
8 the trail and everything else. But I spoke to [REDACTED] all
9 day long about it.

10 Q So what instructions did you give him?

11 A I gave him, I-- I said, "Tell me what happened." He sent
12 the report then he sent a more substantial report. I told him that,
13 "you can't prevent the fog from coming in." He understood, he was--
14 they were implement-- they were developing the fog plan. they were
15 going to implement it because the fog was typical for that time of
16 year and they did. And you-- the fog is thick down there, it's not
17 that far from the port, there's no visibility, these prisoners are in
18 a wire outside, and they take advantage of it. But, that case, the
19 subsequent case and the one escape under the 310th, I spoke to the
20 commanders. Now Colonel [REDACTED] wasn't there when that escape took
21 place. He did this RIP and the TOA and I did not speak to him.

22 Q Was it your policy that every time there was an escape that
23 a staff assessment, either led by you or your S-3 would go down and

1 make a quick determination on how it happened and what procedures to
2 be done?

3 A Yes, sir

4 Q Each and every case?

5 A Every case, with the exception of the case by [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED] because the investigation was so thorough by him, that the
7 report was concise I sent [REDACTED] over to Bucca and she did
8 the assessment for me

9 Q Okay Your staff basically said there were about 34, 32,
10 34 reported escapes and also indicated there's roughly around 34, 35
11 that actually escaped This is a matter of record How would you---
12 -

13 A That can't be correct because they captured some of them
14 and brought them back, and those were the escapes that were reported

15 Q Okay, I'm just mentioning to you what your staff mentioned
16 to me These are folks that I interviewed and they told me with a
17 degree of accuracy, they even quoted to me the percentage of that,
18 based on the number of detainees that were either held or transported
19 by your command

20 A Yes, sir

21 Q So----

22 A I'm-- I'm not questioning them

23 Q Okay

1 A They must be focused on-- on other things now

2 Q. How would you assess, based on your experience, when you
3 took command of the Brigade What was your assessment of command
4 climate, your assessment of the operational readiness of your outfit,
5 and your leadership assessment of those leaders that are commanding
6 those major subordinate commands?

7 A When I came into the Brigade, it was, and I'd come from the
8 largest RSC in the Reserves, in the United States, that was the 81st
9 And I'd had several months to go through this process of, not only
10 mobilization and concerns from commanders in that command, but seeing
11 it on the ground, knowing full well what happens if a commander stays
12 in command for too long and how complacency sets in and all of those
13 things where a person's been in the same unit all of their career, I
14 mean, or and on and on. I sat on promotion boards and selection
15 boards, battalion command selection boards where they do a letter to
16 the president and they say this is the only battalion I want to
17 command because I'm the UA in this unit and so I don't have to travel
18 for drill So I knew all of those signs, I knew all the signals and
19 I saw every one of them and more in the 800th And I was very
20 concerned I used a couple of examples with General Hill And I did
21 not-- I was a Battalion Commander under the 800th under a different
22 Commander I didn't know-- I knew [REDACTED] from years before and
23 I wanted him out of the position as the deputy because he hadn't

1 changed from when I knew him from years before He was commander of
2 he was running his position and influencing the soldiers from-- as if
3 he were functioning from Desert Storm. He was at best, a warrant
4 officer I use the example of the detainee abuse at Bucca and
5 General Hill kind of minimized it, not kind of, he minimized it and
6 he said, "These things happen " No they don't happen They're
7 investigating it, these were MPs that reported other MPs, okay so
8 they, did the right things, but it happened because there was a lot of
9 wrong things going on [REDACTED] is a West Point graduate,
10 he's certainly intelligent and he's been in the MP community for
11 years and I said-- and he said, he wasn't there when it happened We
12 really, got it crossed-channels on the situation with the violation of
13 General Order Number One with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] And
14 we not only got it cross-hairs over that because I said I don't care
15 how you slice it, it's a violation of General Order Number One and
16 this is a major and a senior NCC That's fraternization and
17 everything else that's cooking there And he said, "They were
18 friends from a long time ago and this was a couple of drinks " And I
19 said, "A drink is a violation of General Order Number One " It was a
20 discussion that General Hill I think, dug in his heels

21 Q Did you take action to that?

22 A I-- I did not It was a completed action and the only
23 reason it continued to be an item of interest was because [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED] we moved [REDACTED] up to Baghdad with us [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] continued to hinge every discussion on how she had made a
3 mistake and she was going to pay for it for the rest of her career
4 I talked to her for more than an hour, sir, one-on-one up in Baghdad,
5 and I said, "Look, it's going to be an issue for the rest of your
6 career if you keep prefacing every conversation with a reference to
7 it. Okay? Get over it. You made a mistake, it was a serious
8 mistake, you paid the price, but you can get over it, if you stop
9 mentioning it as the reason for why you're not doing all the things
10 you're supposed to be doing." I said, [REDACTED] you're smart,
11 you're able, and you're doing all the of the things that people want
12 you to do because you're a female. Do you understand that? Do you
13 understand you come off as a silly, goofy woman, instead of an
14 intelligent major." And she said, "That's my personality. I'm in
15 marketing." And, I mean, it just goes contrary to everything I was
16 trying to say to her. But she never did get over it. As a matter of
17 fact when she came in to see me in my office about four days ago,
18 it's the first thing she said to me, was that "I know you're still
19 angry about that violation of General Order Number One." "We've come
20 full circle now, a year later and you're still mentioning it to me.
21 I wasn't here when it happened. I have formed my opinion of you on
22 what you've done since then." And she said, "And what is it?" And I
23 said, "Be careful what you ask for. Because if you ask again, I'll

1 tell you " And she said, "I'd like to know " And I said, and I told
2 her what my opinion was And besides that, I mentioned that [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED] had come up to the TOC, had done a great job, moved on He
4 had been so good that we moved him out to Baghdad Central to be the
5 HHC first sergeant when the first sergeant reached his expiration and
6 was going on By that time, they got the command sergeant major, who
7 was part of the 320th into the 320th He got cleared from the medical
8 station-- or the medical hold in the states He knew the situation
9 with [REDACTED] so he kept him in his lane, worked out very
10 well Sir, guess what happens, we move [REDACTED] up to Baghdad
11 Central to train the-- to give her skills to the people that are
12 gonna-- Sergeant-- [REDACTED] and another sergeant that were
13 gonna take or the NDRE and she's right back there linked to [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] I had to talk to [REDACTED] and I had to talk to her
15 about it, again And I said, "You know you've come too far to undo
16 everything you did Now I'm gonna tell you the same thing I've had
17 to tell several other people in this-- senior people in this six
18 months If you don't stop, I'm gonna put it in writing, okay?"

19 Q Who else were troublesome to you?

20 A My command sergeant major

21 Q Understand

22 A [REDACTED] out at Abu Ghraib, who under-- when they were
23 at Bucca, she got, there was a detainee down there, an EPW by the

1 name of-- he took a Christian name, his name was [REDACTED] He was
2 detained because he was picked up during the war as a member of the
3 Iraqi Republican Guard and he was fighting us He was detained as a
4 combatant, as an EPW, and [REDACTED] took a liking to him and to
5 another guy by the name of [REDACTED] Now that was before
6 I took command, again But it became a problem afterwards so I had
7 to track the history back and find out what the heck had happened
8 there Well, anyway, to make a long story short, if it's possible,
9 Michael ends up at Baghdad Central as a translator He was released
10 from-- he was paroled, didn't leave because they kept him around and
11 this Specialist-- at that time [REDACTED] and him were in love
12 and I said to [REDACTED] "And this makes sense to you?" She said, "I
13 had nothing to do with it " And I said, "Did you employ [REDACTED]
14 And she said, "Well, I paid him once or twice because he was helping
15 around the mess hall " I had [REDACTED] the IG go out there and
16 check that out because I said, "This is moving into a different
17 area " And he went and checked it out and he came back and he said,
18 [REDACTED] is working there. he no longer is, because with
19 your authority, I told him you know, you can't work here anymore,
20 you're not supposed to be in around-- once you've been an EPW you're
21 not supposed to be around " Okay, so now I go off to Baghdad Central
22 and I go out there one day and this translator comes up to me who is
23 speaking beautiful English and he says, "Oh, General Karpinski, I was

1 looking forward to meeting you My name is [REDACTED] now I am a
2 Christian, I was down at Bucca " I'm thinking that this guy was a
3 translator down at Bucca and he got transferred up to Baghdad Central
4 when the 320th moved And [REDACTED] says to me afterwards,
5 "That's the guy that's involved with Specialist Duke " I said, "What
6 is he doing in DCU uniform?" And he says, "He's a translator here
7 Titan hired him " I went back and I said to [REDACTED] "You
8 find out what he put on his application for Titan and I want to find
9 out what, if you listed that he was an EPW He's not supposed to be
10 working out there I mean, he's working the processing line, he's
11 allegedly involved with this female out there This is out of
12 control do you und-- " He calls Titan and Titan doesn't have a file
13 on him

14 Q No background check?

15 A No background check and I reported him, sir, to Colonel
16 Pappas, to [REDACTED] to Titan Corporation, to the ISG guy that
17 was out there working with the prisoners and putting them on the box
18 and everything else I talked to Wodjakowski about it I talked to
19 [REDACTED], who was the Deputy D, uh C-2 at the time I talked to
20 General Fast about it several times Nobody seemed to care that this
21 guy was out there and had full access to everywhere on the compound
22 which was, you know, at level two or something Nobody knew if he
23 was a level one or a level thirteen or anything else I-- when I

1 sent [REDACTED] out there, I said, "You put eyeballs on this
2 guy and you keep your eyeballs on this guy, because I don't trust
3 him " I was out there one time and the guy comes up to me this way,
4 walks straight up to me, I thought he was going to say hello and all
5 of a sudden he puts his arms around me to hug me My PSD is pulling
6 him off and I said to my aide and the PSD afterwards, "You know that
7 wasn't a hug, that guy wanted to know if I had a weapon on me, he
8 wanted to know if I was wearing a vest under my shirt You guys have
9 to stay between me and any of these infiltrators I don't like that
10 guy I don't trust him and I don't want him around any of the
11 detainees " And I told [REDACTED] that, I told [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED] that, and it seemed like every time I went out there the guy
13 was somewhere else around that processing line Now, as far as
14 anybody could tell me he was never involved over in the cell block
15 1A and B But sir, that was just one of so many examples where it
16 was clear that there was people with the opportunity to come in and
17 leave that could make it dangerous for my MPs to operate out at Abu
18 Ghraib or up at the MEK compound or any of the other facilities

19 Q Those are examples where either you took control of the
20 situation and either referred them back to your Battalions, or
21 whatever That's why I was asking before, standards It would
22 appear to me that the examples you are giving me where even to the
23 point where these people are hugging you and whatever have you, it

1 appears to me that you were the only one that was taking action to do
2 any kind of correction. Did you do any delegation of anything at all
3 to any of the Battalion Commanders about that?

4 A Absolutely, sir

5 Q How would you assess each of your Battalion Commanders that
6 were attached to you? Just give me a couple---

7 A Snapshot?

8 Q Yes

9 A 115th, [REDACTED] he had a horrible facility in Cropper
10 and a great facility in the HVD. He was-- he knew what the rules
11 were and he was a team player. A strong commander, had a good chain
12 of command and had a handle on it. Occasionally he would get out of
13 line, I mean with some kind of comment or something, but he knew the
14 rules and they followed them. [REDACTED] who was securing the
15 MEF was a great performer, great commander, knew the rules. Had an
16 opinion about what the MEF were, if they were really terrorists or a
17 threat. Had to kind of keep him under control of that sometimes in
18 conversations like, look this is the direction of the SECDEF, so
19 that's the direction we're taking, and he understood. Very strong,
20 had a great chain of command. [REDACTED] with the 400th had the
21 initial operation transferred to them by the 18th MP Brigade. They
22 were treated very badly when they were under their C-2 and he took
23 his resources, put them in the right place. He understood the rules

1 and he had a good command sergeant major, and also good supervisor
2 great chain of command [REDACTED] had command of the Battalion
3 for a long time and was the first one at Baghdad Central-- sorry,
4 Bucca and set it up [REDACTED] got in there and was allowed to take
5 control of that operation, with General Hill's blessing [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED] was-- was probably-- not probably, [REDACTED] was
7 disgusted with the situation because she didn't feel like she had a
8 voice and General Hill wouldn't listen to her When General Hill
9 left and I took over, that changed a little bit, but it really wasn't
10 enough time for her to get spun back up again So I had the new
11 Battalion-- Lieutenant Colonel who was selected for battalion command
12 by a board for that Battalion And I talked to [REDACTED] and
13 I talked to General Stolts who was [REDACTED] boss in the 143rd and
14 I said this would be a great opportunity for him to take care of the
15 Battalion, have the experience with the Battalion in the field, in
16 this situation Everybody agreed That's how Colonel Coulter became
17 my rear detachment XO

18 Q Besides [REDACTED] who else?

19 A I had [REDACTED] and I had [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was down at
20 Bucca originally, then moved up to the MEF compound and took on that
21 mission [REDACTED] is a-- definitely a team player, has good control
22 of the chain of command There probably was some discourse between
23 him and [REDACTED] because [REDACTED] was the new guy on the block and

1 [REDACTED] guys had done a lot of the work and he didn't think [REDACTED]
2 appreciated it. Thought that [REDACTED] was a prima Donna. But they
3 worked it, they sorted it out, recognized their own differences but
4 [REDACTED] was a good Battalion Commander. Strong, solid, knew the
5 direction he was taking. [REDACTED] a whiner and a complainer and he
6 had an easy mission down there in the MEF region with the multi-
7 nationals. They had a DFAC, they had at least electricity with
8 moving air and he continued to whine. He had more REFRADs than any
9 other Battalion because he thought that if he got down under sixty
10 percent strength, he would have to send-- we'd have to send the
11 Battalion home. And we stopped that drain when I told him, "We'll
12 break up the Battalion and you will come up here to my staff and
13 your staff will either go out to fill vacancies, but I will break up
14 the Battalion." And suddenly the REFRAD requirements dropped
15 considerably. And I said, "You have an easy mission there, you're
16 gonna establish a training facility." And they did, and they did it
17 well, but [REDACTED] is a whiner. [REDACTED] is something else. He's
18 somewhere in-between. He's conscientious, but he complains about a
19 lot of things. He doesn't have the resources to do the HVD mission,
20 he doesn't want to go downtown. He had the mission at Tallil first.
21 And I-- I, sir, I said to him, "You whine about everything. Here you
22 are in Tallil. Your average strength in your compound is three. And
23 you have all these MPs to do this mission. And yet, you're still

1 complaining you can't do the mission You're going to run this jail
2 downtown You're taking on more things, that's called mission creep
3 and you gotta stop it Because if you don't stop it, I'm not gonna
4 listen to you anymore Because I know what the mission is that I've
5 given you and you're doing these other things, which means you have
6 too much time on your hands " He still whines He got the HVD
7 mission, he got the jail mission in downtown Baghdad, and he trusted
8 a few people that were probably not trustworthy, but he has a good
9 chair of command that kind of makes up for his whining And then
10 there's [REDACTED]

11 Q Do you think that your Brigade was a cohesive team? That
12 they were coalescing, were they segmented, fragmented? Do you think
13 that your Brigade exuded a lot of pride?

14 A I think, let me answer that question first because that's
15 really easy I think the Brigade did exude a lot of pride I think
16 that the MPs were embarrassed when the situation took place in Bucca
17 I know that they're embarrassed by what's happened up at Baghdad
18 Central They take pride in their accomplishments and deservedly so
19 Because, sir, I can tell you that they made the impossible possible
20 And they ran those facilities, and they took care of those prisoners,
21 and they did more with less Cohesive, no I think the Battalions
22 in and of themselves were When I gathered them all together on
23 several occasions for quasi commanders conferences or they all came

1 up for the MP summit or the out-brief from General Rider's team. They
2 talked to each other, they got along with each other. They had
3 differences, sure, but they exchanged ideas, we talked as Battalion
4 Commander and they talked about what their Company Commanders were
5 asking or saying. But they were so far spread, they were not-- they
6 didn't-- they hadn't worked together before. These weren't
7 battalions that knew each other, they weren't familiar with each
8 other. One from Florida, a company from Florida, company from Las
9 Vegas, a battalion from California, a battalion from-- a BLD from
10 Indiana, from Pennsylvania cross-leveled from the 220th, the companies
11 cross-leveled into the 320th that had never worked with the 800th
12 before or any of the people in the 800th. The only unit that we
13 deployed with that was familiar with the mission of the 800th was the
14 310th. And [REDACTED], to my understanding because I asked, was a
15 whiner before. He's been very focused on whether or not he's going
16 to be on the O-6 list because he wants to stay in the military, and
17 if not, then his mandatory retirement date is this summer. So they
18 all had different agendas. We moved so quickly to Baghdad and the
19 mission was so fast and furious then because, again, the 18th MP
20 Brigade and all the divisions were handing prisoners over to us and
21 we didn't have facilities to hold them. So we put them in Cropper.
22 Cropper became overcrowded. Renewing the interest and the
23 requirements out at Baghdad Central, we were shipping them down to

1 Bucca We weren't a transportation unit, we didn't have
2 transportation assets available to us CJTF-7 made a very slight
3 attempt to give us transportation assets and it didn't work We went
4 back to doing it ourselves I mean, it was just on and on and on
5 And we were trying to stay ahead of an absolute failure

6 Q Did you try to address some of your logistical requirements
7 to your parent unit, which is way back down in Arifjan?

8 A Yes, sir, I did

9 Q And you said none of that happened?

10 A None of it happened Because the supply lines were so long
11 and what does CJTF-7 doing for you? And talking to [REDACTED] he's
12 saying that they're going to do what they can Sir, we couldn't even
13 get a spare part for a vehicle

14 Q Even though that there was core support command, and you
15 had no interaction with the core support command?

16 A With-- at the COSCOM up at Anaconda? We did We went up
17 there and they couldn't support us because we weren't on their list
18 of units that they were required to support

19 Q How did you utilized since you didn't have a deputy
20 commander, he was doing something else? And your XO, met your XO
21 today I'm getting kind of an inkling that a lot of this stuff you
22 either take it on yourself or you did not direct your staff, which
23 should not be your job, a XO or what have you to say, "Okay do this,

1 do that " Since everything seems to be gravitating to the
2 operational side, called your S-3.

3 A Colonel [REDACTED] is a great guy He's a civil affairs
4 officer. He thinks himself a leader, and he's not.

5 Q So you had a falling there?

6 A I-- I did, and I recognized it

7 Q How would you, did you direct your S-4 and say, "Get me the
8 tools that I need so I can resource this Battalion?"

9 A No, sir What I did was get Colonel [REDACTED] in my office
10 and tell him the words to use to get the S-4 to do it. And if
11 Colonel [REDACTED] and went to the S-4 himself and said, you need to do
12 this or tell me what you're doing with this, most of the time Major
13 [REDACTED] would just kind of blow him off I had dismal response from my
14 AGRs They didn't want to be there, they didn't think that this was
15 in their equation, or whatever The first thing that Major [REDACTED]
16 and Major [REDACTED] did when I took command was come in and tell me why
17 they needed to stay at Arifjan and not go to Baghdad So I had to
18 clear through that And [REDACTED] was more obviously angry with me than
19 [REDACTED] was But they were both ticked off because I made them go to
20 Baghdad And they dug in their heels, and I told them both
21 individually, "You know what, it's not gonna work, because I'm gonna
22 win So, you're going to do the PERSTATS and you're gonna do the G-4

1 functions " And [REDACTED] got it, but it took coaching and choosing
2 words and telling him why

3 Q Why was he selected? Was he the only available one?

4 A He was the XO at-- General Hill made him the XO down at
5 Arifjan----

6 Q Did you ever-- I guess this goes back to, you didn't have
7 any of the other choices because there were no other?

8 A I really didn't I had no depth I had a battalion
9 commander, by the way I forgot to mention him, Colonel-- Lieutenant
10 Colonel [REDACTED] who in the first week of July went back to the
11 states He was medivac'd to Germany for a [REDACTED] and then
12 they sent him back to the states and he never came back I had a
13 Captain, [REDACTED] who stepped up to the plate and took charge of that
14 BLD, and he did a great job

15 Q You had another Captain, a Captain [REDACTED]

16 A Captain [REDACTED]

17 Q Could you elaborate on his conduct?

18 A Also out at Baghdad Central and I found out about the
19 incident after it had been investigated informally by [REDACTED] and---

20 -

21 Q So none of these officer misconducts were reported to you
22 initially until after an investigation was conducted?

1 A The only-- the only infraction that was reported to me was,
2 and I might think of another one, but I-- I-- the one on Lieutenant
3 Colonel by the name of [REDACTED] who was a BLD commander, and he was
4 out of Indiana and a Specialist was being harassed by him. And he
5 had exchanged emails or sent her emails of a very suggestive nature
6 She provided them to me. I initiated an investigation. Colonel [REDACTED]
7 did the investigation and Colonel [REDACTED] was removed from the
8 position. I can't say he was relieved because it's not a command
9 position, although they call themselves commanders. And he was
10 reassigned to a different position and Major [REDACTED] who was the XO
11 of that BLD took charge of the BLD. He was very weak, but----

12 Q What disciplinary action did you take on Colonel [REDACTED]?

13 A I removed him from the position, gave him a letter of
14 reprimand, and OER that was appropriate for his behavior.

15 Q You assigned him somewhere else?

16 A We did. Sent him back here to 377th, General Stoltz put him
17 in the 143rd in a position that Colonel [REDACTED] was holding before he
18 gave him up to take command of the 724th. And Colonel [REDACTED] was
19 not responsible for supervising anyone. He's filling a position down
20 at the port and all reports say he's doing a good job.

21 Q What's Captain [REDACTED] disposition now?

22 A Now? He is assigned to the 377th.

23 Q Has he been relieved?

1 A He has been. He was relieved immediately

2 Q What was the allegation against him?

3 A The allegation was taking photographs of a soldier while
4 she was in the shower facility

5 Q Seems to me that there's a tracking All the stuff that
6 you've indicated so far That you had serious disciplinary problem
7 with both enlisted and officer in your Brigade

8 A And especially in the 320th, yes, sir

9 Q And given those circumstances there, wouldn't that have
10 been, in retrospect, more palatable to induce new leadership if they
11 were available into that Battalion?

12 A Yes, sir But I didn't have anybody available

13 Q Despite the fact that you could have taken some risk and
14 moved some people outside of current positions, like the three or
15 somebody else There's another major that was working in the three
16 shop at that time

17 A Major [REDACTED]

18 Q Right Because I believe one of your staff members
19 intimated that their infusion of sorts of support requirements into
20 the Brigade, especially for the 320th because they were short handed
21 because of their mission requirements Let me ask you're assessment
22 here What you indicated to me that you would highlight problems or

1 issues to Sanchez or Wodjakowski or Miller or anybody else at CJTF-7,
2 did you feel like they were blowing you off----

3 A Yes, sir.----

4 Q ----Or, you know, did you, based on that feeling, did you
5 convey to General Speaks or even General Diamond at that point?

6 A I did. I-- several times I said to General Speaks when I
7 came down to talk to him about Command Sergeant Major [REDACTED] He
8 said,----

9 Q Did you tell-- did you tell General Diamond about it?

10 A I did. And I not only told him about that, but I said,
11 several times when I was down at Arifjan and General Diamond was
12 there. I-- I may have had one conversation with General Kratzer
13 before he left, but it-- it happened fairly quickly after I took
14 command. I did talk to General Kratzer and Command Sergeant Major
15 [REDACTED] about Command Sergeant Major [REDACTED] and I did a letter of
16 reprimand--I talked to him verbally, counseled him and I told him
17 that it wasn't going to be a conversation next time and he just
18 completely disregarded that and uh----

19 Q Who was this again?

20 A Command Sergeant Major [REDACTED] I talked to General
21 Diamond about him, I talked to General Kratzer about him, I talked to
22 General Speaks about him. I talked to General Wodjakowski about him.
23 I told him I was coming down to see General Speaks about it because I

1 needed a command sergeant major before I could take him out of that
2 position. And he said, "What has he done?" And I said, "This is
3 what I-- the action I took thus far and he's continuing to do that "
4 And he said, "Well we're probably going to have to do an
5 investigation and if he's guilty and then we're going to have to fire
6 him " And I said, "Can you start to look now?" I talked to the
7 Command Sergeant Major at CJTF-7 and Command Sergeant Major [REDACTED]
8 said that uh--let him know and he would find a CSM for me Sir, I--
9 the reason it seems and it was likely that I took a lot of the
10 actions that I did and took charge of situations myself was because
11 nobody was helping I got Colonel, this Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED]
12 came to see me and said, "I understand you're looking for a a Sheriff
13 out at Baghdad Central, an FOB-- or-- base defense planner." And I
14 said, "Well, where did you come from?" And he said, "Well I was on
15 179 day orders I spent two months down at CFLCC, and now I'm up
16 here and I'm really looking for a job " And I said, "Well, what do
17 you bring to the table " And he said, "Well, ya don't have anybody,
18 Ma'am, so I might be all you get " And I said, "Well, I'll be in
19 touch with you." I just didn't need another problem, and there were
20 lots of people that were up there offering to help that were
21 straphangers They didn't want to work they just wanted to stay in
22 Iraq And I had radar detectors going off all over the place with
23 those people. I didn't need any more problems The Battalions were

1 functioning and the MPs were doing a great job because they were
2 dedicated, because they were professional And because they knew
3 they could do this job But, sir I gotta tell ya, it was-- as
4 General Hahn said one time, he was asking me some questions, and he
5 said, "And how many battalions do you have, four or five." I said,
6 "Nine " And uh, "How are the prison rebuilding systems coming?" I
7 said, "Sir, there's a lot of problems with it, there's-- there's all
8 the obvious indicators of theft of those millions of dollars that
9 they were supposed to be putting into rebuilding the prison And he
10 threw his pen down on the desk and he said, "We're running a prison
11 system for an entire country by the seat of our pants. What's CPA
12 doing?" And I said, "There's two experts there and they're leaving
13 in about 30 days " And the guy who was running the prisons
14 department was a budget officer

15 Q Let me go back to your sergeant major Sergeant Major
16 [REDACTED] came out of your ops, okay And obviously a trusted agent
17 because you picked an ops sergeant major as opposed to picking a
18 serving Battalion Command Sergeant Major to come up and given the
19 fact that it probably put him in a tenuous situation of being a
20 junior guy that's going-- now going to do that Did you know he was
21 also dividing his time between what you had directed him to do and
22 the other time was that he was working in--as the Ops Sergeant Major?

23 A He was in the TOC where I was. And he was----

1 Q. Understand, but then did he tell you that he was also
2 working to keep up in helping the S-3 shop?

3 A The-- there may have been some projects that he had
4 initiated or was involved with, but we got a master sergeant
5 promotable from the 317th and we got a-- a sergeant, another senior
6 NCO that came in and they were taking that responsibility away from
7 the Ops Sergeant Major I-- I know, sir, and I talked to Sergeant
8 Major [REDACTED] about putting him in that position. But, as opposed
9 to taking a Command Sergeant Major from one of the Battalions and
10 putting him in the Brigade because there was nobody after the Command
11 Sergeant Major, with the exception of First Sergeants in some cases,
12 I made that decision because I felt that the Battalions needed the
13 chain of command as it was And sergeant-- Command Sergeant Major
14 [REDACTED] wanted to be the Brigade Command Sergeant Major His
15 Battalion Commander, Colonel [REDACTED] said, "I really need him up here
16 at Ashraf " And I knew what that mission was and it was becoming
17 more intense and I made that decision I-- I did an evaluation of
18 who would be hurt the most and I preferred that it be the Brigade uh-
19 -because I knew that Sergeant Major [REDACTED] was strong enough to
20 talk to the other CSMs and-- and it had been disruptive enough, sir.

21 Q Well, in retrospect, given that you're not getting much of
22 an assistance from higher command, that your own staff was

1 overwhelmed in providing all sorts of assistance to the Battalions
2 you still took that risk.

3 A Yes, sir, I did

4 Q Okay You didn't know that he was pulling double-time so
5 to speak

6 A I-- I didn't-- oh I wasn't aware that it was a problem

7 Q Okay What did what priorities did you give him?

8 A I wanted him to get out to the Battalions, each ones
9 separate locations to make sure that the soldiers were being taken
10 care of, that the Battalion Command Sergeant Majors understood the
11 direction we were taking Any of the new changes of information,
12 that the rules were going to be standardized from facility to
13 facility to facility and they were And that he had my authority to--
14 - I mean as the acting CSM-- I'll tell you the only thing I might
15 have done differently in retrospect was that the 310th had a Command
16 Sergeant Major [REDACTED] and a Master Sergeant [REDACTED] And Master
17 Sergeant [REDACTED] since then came out on the CSM list, the promotion
18 list So, I could have taken one of them and probably been done
19 little disruption, but at the time, Sergeant Major [REDACTED] was
20 there and it was a fix And he was strong

21 Q Would it surprise you that somehow it overwhelmed it?

22 A It would surprise me Cause----

1 Q Would it surprise you to figure out that because he divided
2 his time, he lost-- lost focus of his priorities as your senior
3 enlisted advisor that could have assisted you in your quest to get
4 all sorts of things fixed in the whole Brigade?

5 A It surprises me because he was out there doing that

6 Q That's what he told you? Did he travel with you?

7 A Occasionally he did travel with me

8 Q. How often did both of you share some of the information,
9 both in your travels and your observations down to the Battalions?

10 A All the time When I came back from any trip, or wherever
11 I was, if he wasn't with me, we sat down and talked about it.

12 Q Okay

13 A Uh-this is when I saw these soldiers doing-- Sergeant Major
14 [REDACTED] is still trying to color outside the lines, is I-- the
15 expression I used When I----

16 Q Why didn't you just move [REDACTED] knowing full well that he
17 had--was a problem to you? Why didn't you just yank him off instead
18 of perpetrating all of that?

19 A. I did I did, but it was too late

20 Q First time I mean, you took charge. You keep telling me
21 you were taking charge ----

22 A. Yes, sir.-----

1 Q ----But if you were taking charge, you would have fixed the
2 problem with them.

3 A Sir, when I went to CJTF-7 from whatever the first incident
4 was at Baghdad Central, and I believe it was when the mortars started
5 to come in and killed six of the prisoners and injured forty-seven
6 We stepped up the campaign It was several times a day then, as
7 opposed to just once a day asking for force protection and
8 emphasizing in the 3, in the CJTF-7, they didn't want to be bothered
9 with it They did not want to be bothered by me And-- were they
10 blowing me off because I was a Reservist? Yes. They used the excuse
11 that I was TACON? Yes And for a lot of other reasons? Absolutely.
12 But, we asked, and we got nothing We had to find a way to do it,
13 because they wouldn't help Sanchez didn't care until two MI
14 soldiers were killed When those prisoners were killed, General
15 Wodjakowski said to me, but they're prisoners Janis Did you lose
16 any soldiers? And I said, "I could have " And my soldiers take the
17 care of those prisoners seriously They didn't care And I was
18 told, "I don't care if we're holding 15,000 innocent Iraqis, we're
19 winning the war " And you're making enemies out of everyone of those
20 people you're holding without a reason I said, "I'm on the security
21 detainee release board and reviewed these records Not a piece of
22 evidence in the file " Put him back in the booth because his name is
23 Omar, or because his name is something related to Al Queda This

1 isn't a fair carriage of justice. This isn't dignity and respect
2 This isn't the road ahead you are allegedly preaching all of the
3 time This is corruption at its finest This is smoke and mirrors,
4 a façade of security in Baghdad. There was no such thing And the
5 Divisions kept giving us more prisoners. Well, increase capacity
6 Where would you like me to increase capacity? Cram some more tents
7 into the compound The guy who's in charge of the FOB, on Christmas
8 Day, the LRS team that fell from the sky when those four people were
9 more than he could handle They're going to do a capabilities
10 demonstration that day We went out to visit soldiers, to see them.
11 [REDACTED] wasn't there, he'd gone home on emergency leave and he was
12 trying to get back to Baghdad I saw those guys getting ready to go
13 out on an operation, I said, "Where you guys going?" They said, "Oh
14 Ma'am, we're going to do a capabilities demonstration " I said,
15 "Really? What--what time?" They said, "Well you know these reports
16 about them trying to overrun the prison out here, we just want to
17 make sure that they understand that we're right here " Two
18 helicopters-- he gave me a real quick briefing on what they were
19 going to do And I said, "What time?" And he said, "Around twelve
20 o'clock " "Okay Where?" "In the big compound around Ganci, no
21 Vigilant " So I said, "Is it going to be over the security
22 detainees?" "It's going to be over the big compound." That's Ganci
23 actually and most of them are security detainees. But-- so we're out

1 visiting, we're in the-- we're in the towers talking to the MPs and
2 all of a sudden the helicopters come in and they had planned this and
3 orchestrated it They had the marks on the ground, away from the
4 tents and one helicopter comes in and hovers right over one of the
5 tents--right over one of the compounds. And nobody's jumping out of
6 the airplane, nobody's repelling out of the helicopter. And all
7 these tents are blowing everywhere, and the clothes that they just
8 hung up to dry that they'd washed in wash basins and everything else,
9 and then they act as if this is a surprise and they go over to the
10 spot where the other helicopter is, which was right on the mark And
11 I called Colonel [REDACTED] and I said, "Your guys did this
12 intentionally " "I can assure they didn't do this intentionally " I
13 said, "If they practiced, then how did they get it wrong, because my
14 MPs are the ones who have to bring that under control this afternoon
15 when they get pissed off about what just happened." And I said,
16 "Don't tell me it wasn't intentional. Don't screw with me I don't
17 have any patience for this kind of stuff " And he said, "I can
18 assure you Ma'am, I talked to them already, it was a mistake " And I
19 said, "Tell me how you make a mistake " "There's no compounds."
20 "There is a compound And you decide to hover over the compound?"
21 He said, "I'll take care of it " And--and we didn't have an issue
22 because the detainees knew that it was a holiday and chose not to
23 make an issue out of it General----

1 Q. Did you report--did you report that to the General?

2 A Yes, sir I did Yes, sir I did Nothing happened Or-- I

3 mean-- not that General Wodjakowski has to come back and tell me what

4 he did, but he--he didn't And nothing happened General Sanchez

5 cut a FRAGO to send me up to the MEK because he was getting beat up

6 by Secretary Rumsfeld and he wanted a general officer up there that

7 could give 'em ground troops So they cut a FRAGO to send me up to

8 Ashraf I went to General Miller, I asked him twice He said--I

9 went up as soon as I got the FRAGO I think it was even in a draft

10 And I went up to see General Miller and I said, "You know, I have a

11 Brigade to run, I just don't-- and Ashraf is not convenient." He

12 said, "If there's any opportunity to get him to change his mind, it

13 will be today Let me see if there's a chance this afternoon " I

14 talked to him that night and he said, "You gotta go because this is

15 high visibility, it's gonna get more so and they want to close the

16 radio station He just needs you up there." "Okay " I went to

17 Wodjakowski at the SUC and I said, "You know I'm moving up to Ashraf.

18 I have a Brigade to run, it's not running as smoothly as I'd like it

19 to be Bucca's not closing, it's staying open, we have a new

20 contract for 48 million dollars I mean, the last place I need to be

21 is up at the MEK compound I can go up there, there's a Battalion

22 Commander up there that knows what he's doing " "You have to go." I

23 go up there and-- okay-- we made a couple of changes and everything,

1 they delivered this message and they closed the radio station down
2 and I never got a call from Secretary Rumsfeld and everything seemed
3 to be okay

4 Q. Was that a-- a directive to move your TOC or just you?

5 A Just me

6 Q Did you stay there for a period of time?

7 A Yes, sir

8 Q How long?

9 A Until relieved from that mission.

10 Q So who did you turn the Brigade over to?

11 A I didn't turn the Brigade over to anybody I just
12 commanded the Brigade from up at Ashraf

13 Q Was that information conveyed to all your Battalion
14 Commanders that you'll be----

15 A It was

16 Q Let me talk a little bit about what happened with the 372nd.
17 What do you think caused that to happen?

18 A I think there were several important things that caused it
19 to happen Because I don't have all the details of when or if it was
20 more than one time, but---

21 Q Over a period of time----

1 A. ----I think there were some--I think there were some bad
2 people, bad MPs, bad soldiers, just bad people. And one of them,
3 unfortunately has a history of this in his civilian job.

4 Q Did you know that before?

5 A. I did not. But General Gagin did, and didn't decide to
6 share the information with me until after this thing broke loose.

7 Q Who's General Gagin?

8 A He was the 220th MP Brigade Commander. And one of his NCOs
9 works with Grainer in his civilian job, and Grainer was apparently
10 suspended several times for prisoner abuse. And he told General
11 Gagin, "You know there's a guy in the 800, and that was back in
12 September or something," and he said, "Do you think I should tell
13 General Karpinski?" And-- well-- let's see what happens. I don't
14 know what he said, but he told me afterwards and he said he knew
15 before and unfortunately he didn't tell me. And we uh-- the MI said
16 that they-- at the time, since you're familiar with the cell block
17 there, there's a door on the end of the facility as soon as you come
18 in there's cell block 1A and 1B and then the hallway. The offices
19 outside of that cell block, there were separate offices, and they
20 were used by the Iraqi corrections officers, the--the warden and then
21 they used it for a break room and that's where the female Iraqi
22 corrections officers would be. So the MI wanted a privacy panel put
23 in place at the-- on the cell door----

1 Q You mean a partition?-----

2 A ----a partition to-- to prevent anybody from seeing into
3 the cell block and uh--he said, "What we really want are those
4 offices outside, and CPA said no." And--and I did talk to-- at that
5 time it was a guy by the name of uh-- [REDACTED] anyway he's in
6 charge, and they said no You know, that was their facility, and as
7 a matter of fact, the MI was going to have to find a new place to use
8 for interrogation-- or for isolation cells. So, they didn't push it,
9 and-- and they put this-- they had the engineers put this plywood
10 panel partition so you couldn't see down the cell block. And they
11 implemented-- they being Colonel [REDACTED] they implemented procedures
12 where nobody from the Battalion, without permission-----

13 Q This is [REDACTED]

14 A This is [REDACTED] --- could go into the cell block unescorted.
15 There was an MI operation, except for the MPs who were only taking
16 them out of the cells, putting them back in the cells, taking them to
17 showers or whatever and giving their meals, making sure the medical
18 piece was taken care of

19 Q Was that already cleared with you that MI would take
20 control of that tier, or did [REDACTED] take it upon himself to assume
21 control of that tier?

22 A I actually helped them to procure or secure that facility.
23 I went to-----

1 Q. [inaudible]----

2 A. ----Yes it was I went to the CPA and I said, "Some of
3 these are bad people, and they don't have an interrogation facility,
4 and if we could use that 1A, umm--that would be a great benefit "
5 And they agreed to it Umm----

6 Q Did you-- did that relinquish control of that tier to the
7 MI or did you?

8 A I-- I-- I did I mean, I----

9 Q Because comments were made that there were never any MI
10 controls since there were still MPs guarding that

11 A There were MPs guarding it. But it was under MI control,
12 Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] who's no longer there, is the one who ran
13 cell block 1A He would-- every time I was out there, he would
14 appear And I said to him one time, "Do you ever sleep?" Uh. And
15 he said, "No, this is my responsibility " So, and it was-- no there
16 was MPs there because MI-- they don't do guard duty. So it was the
17 MPs who were doing the-- the guarding role, but it was MI-- the MIs
18 people were responsible for who went in there, when they came out,
19 how long they stayed in isolation, when they were interrogated,
20 everything

21 Q What was the established interaction between them and the
22 MPs that umm--that the MPs, you thought, understood that-- that the
23 MI would control access to those facilities?

1 A. Right And the M-- the MPs up until the time that Pappas
2 took over as the FOB Commander, the MPs understood that the MI had
3 the authority to come in there, tell them who they needed to-- and at
4 that time the MPs were still escorting them, so they could say, we
5 need Prisoner Number 12345, we're going to take them to the
6 interrogation room and probably be out for an hour or two hours, or
7 we don't know how long They occasionally somebody from the ISG
8 would come by with somebody from MI to get a prisoner out to
9 interrogate them In most cases they didn't interrogate them there
10 on-site, they took them to the ISG facility. They signed a
11 handreceipt and----

12 Q ISG or the JIDC?

13 A The ISG The Iraqi Survey Group

14 Q Okay Were there other folks that were interrogating these
15 prisoners?

16 A OGA Other Government Agencies, they were a variety. CIA,
17 uh--Delta Force----

18 Q So it was a multitude of other folks that were accessing
19 Abu Ghraib, tier 1A----

20 A They could not access tier 1A without somebody from the MI
21 and it was usually--during the day it was usually Captain Wood and--
22 or somebody from the MI doing it

23 Q. But umm----

1 A But they weren't out there in the same force that they're
2 out there now. They weren't that organized They had a couple of
3 tents----

4 Q Was that before [REDACTED] or after [REDACTED]

5 A. That was before [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was out there the night
6 that the mortars killed those two MI soldiers

7 Q But when [REDACTED] showed up, to take responsibility for the
8 FOB, did that continue?

9 A Yes, and became it increased.

10 Q Okay Alright

11 A And-- and I really can't speak for how much took place over
12 at Vigilant because their interrogation booth was right there The
13 MI people would go into the compounds, take somebody out, take them--
14 we didn't-- the MPs didn't even have to get involved in the process

15 Q Did [REDACTED] inform you of this particular setting, or was--
16 did [REDACTED] understand that particular arrangement, or was that
17 arrangement between you and Colonel [REDACTED]

18 A I didn't have any arrangements with Colonel [REDACTED]

19 Q. How was that translated, in terms of who is going to take
20 control over what?

21 A We--Colonel [REDACTED], Major [REDACTED], Colonel [REDACTED]
22 Captain [REDACTED] and I sat down out at Abu Ghraib----

23 Q Without Colonel [REDACTED] just the MI?

1 A No, Colonel [REDACTED] Captain [REDACTED] Colonel [REDACTED], Major
2 [REDACTED] and myself----

3 Q When was that, do you know?----

4 A Uh--that was before he took uh--command of the FOB.

5 Q That was prior to----

6 A Much-- much before that. Because it was after--it was just
7 after General [REDACTED] left And I-- I it was my impression that
8 Colonel [REDACTED] got beat up pretty badly by General Miller, I mean in
9 terms of his criticism And-- and he was having a pretty difficult
10 time with General Fast So, I wanted to support him, we all did
11 And if made the interrogation operation go smoother, then it meant we
12 were going to be able to release prisoners faster and our population
13 would go down, so everybody felt the peace of the--derived some
14 benefit from it

15 Q Would it surprise you if I told you that that arrangement
16 never occurred?

17 A What arrangement never occurred?

18 Q The arrangement that the MI stipulated that they never had
19 control, absolute control, of that tier 1

20 A That's not true I mean, the MPs were, like I said, they
21 were guarding it, and the MI would come and say I need prisoner so-
22 and-so, and the MPs would go and get them and come back But they---

23 -

1 Q In your mind----

2 A Colonel [REDACTED] was in charge of that cell block, sir And
3 Colonel [REDACTED] worked for Colonel [REDACTED]

4 Q But, who replaced [REDACTED]

5 A Nobody did He-- I mean, you want my opinion? The timing
6 was very suspicious He was gone just or the leading edge of when
7 the investigation opened up.

8 Q Okay Alright So let me ask you again So the
9 responsibility for the actions of those soldiers, that were charged
10 by CID for mistreating those detainees should fall on the MI as
11 opposed to the MPs?

12 A The responsibility? No sir. I saw some of the pictures.
13 The--I think the MI gave the MPs the ideas. And I think----

14 Q So there's some complicity to that?

15 A Yes sir

16 Q You're suggesting that there is?

17 A ----And I think that it became sport And--and even saying
18 this makes me feel sick to my stomach, but, they were enjoying what
19 they were doing and the MPs who saw this opportunity-- seized the
20 opportunity I don't know if they shared the ideas with the MIs or
21 whatever they did, but there was definitely agreement, and-- then
22 some of the procedures they were following, they just elaborated on.
23 And-- and I would imagine and I don't know this to be fact, but would

1 imagine it went something like this-- in the DFAC or when they were
2 sitting around the Internet Café "Oh yeah, you should see what we
3 do to the prisoners sometime " "Can I come over and watch?" "Oh
4 yeah. How about Thursday " And because we had a clerk over there
5 who was thoroughly enjoying all of this sport, and the pictures
6 anyway, and she was the girlfriend of the guy who was one of the
7 kingpins in this We had a guy from the maintenance who must have
8 been one of the invited participants and-- these are bad people
9 That was the first time I knew that they would do such a thing as to
10 bring a dog handler in there to use for interrogation I had never
11 heard of such a thing and I certainly didn't authorize it And if I
12 had heard about it, I would have stopped it I don't believe we've
13 ever had a dog in the hard facility

14 Q Speaking of dogs Did you know that between the Army and
15 the Navy dog handlers that they were not placed in their one command
16 and control that they operated separately?

17 A That was at the direction of-- I don't want to put anybody
18 on the hook, but I believe it was CFLCC It's a-- it's a CENTCOM
19 asset

20 Q But, somebody requested for them.

21 A. We did But there were already two dogs there. The MI
22 either brought them from Anaconda or-- and they said they were
23 strictly for their operation

1 Q. Certainly, somebody requested for them At least the three
2 Navy dogs. That they would be placed under one command and control
3 and be utilized properly without proper authority for employment

4 A Yes, sir.

5 Q Did you check on them?

6 A. No sir, I didn't.

7 Q Okay Alright Given the circumstances then, do you
8 believe that perhaps proper supervision at night since these events
9 happened between the periods of 2200 and 0400 and who would you place
10 that supervision responsibility to?

11 A There is a and-- and it is precisely the reason that
12 Sergeant [REDACTED] is relieved from-- or suspended from his position
13 right now Because he was responsible He was the Sergeant of the
14 Guard, the NCOIC, whatever term they were using He was all of those
15 things And a platoon sergeant

16 Q Did you know what the Platoon Leader or the Company
17 Commander were doing?

18 A I do not And I talked to the Captain [REDACTED] myself. And
19 he said randomly he or the First Sergeant, or both of them would go
20 through all of the facilities

21 Q. During night or day?

22 A Nighttime, daytime, afternoon, lunchtime, feeding time.

1 Q Would you be surprised to hear that Captain [REDACTED]
2 priorities was not detain-- detention operations, it was improving
3 the facilities seventy percent of the time?

4 A I would be surprised to hear that, yes sir, because that's
5 not what he told me.

6 Q Alr..ght

7 A And I don't-- what would he be improving? The LSA?

8 Q I was just conveying to you what he put on his statement
9 and he conveyed to me

10 A Because the contract there was for Iraqi contractor work to
11 do the facility work, it was not for----

12 Q That was what he conveyed and umm--as far as he was
13 concerned, his chain of command knew of his priorities Thereby
14 depended and over-relied on personnel who had correctional facilities
15 experience Did he tell you that?

16 A He did not

17 Q Okay

18 A Him and the First Sergeant both talked about how they were
19 fully involved in the operation He didn't say anything about
20 seventy percent of his time doing facilities management

21 Q He put that on the Sworn Statement And that's exactly
22 what he intimated in the----

1 A Well, he's had enough time to figure out what the best
2 avenue approach is, I guess

3 Q Well, let me put it this way Knowing that the importance
4 of that particular facility, how often did you talk to the company
5 commanders?

6 A. I--

7 Q Did you senior rate all the company commanders?

8 A I did Uh-- I saw all the company commanders I-- I would
9 tell you that the-- unfortunately, that the largest gap of time uh--
10 between seeing a company commander and between seeing a company
11 commander and seeing him again was more than six weeks with Captain

12 [REDACTED]

13 Q Would it surprise for you to know that there's at least one
14 Company, the 320th as we speak today, or then at that time, that was
15 assigned to that Battalion, 320th, and up until I believe two weeks
16 ago was being utilized as a filler company?

17 A [Pause] Would it surprise me to know that?

18 Q That they were not employing him in his capability as a
19 cohesive company with his capability, but yet he's being used as the--
20 -you fill here, you fill there So, basically,----

21 A his company was spread out

22 Q Right And he doesn't have a function

1 A He-- if he's being used as filler, I mean, he's doing an MP
2 mission.

3 Q He's doing an MP mission that----

4 A The Company Commander doesn't have a----

5 Q ----the Company Commander is not responsible for any
6 specific mission because his Company was being utilized as a filler
7 company Individual----

8 A I would tell you----

9 Q ----fillers, not as a platoon, not as a squad, it was fill
10 this and fill that

11 A I will tell you, sir It doesn't surprise me. Uh--I
12 didn't know about it, but like I said, I saw all those company
13 commanders out there whenever I visited----

14 Q Sure, but nobody ever mentioned any problems of how things
15 are being----

16 A No, because the personnel numbers were so serious and Major
17 Sheridan was really making the best effort to get those internal
18 taskings reduced And it took a whole MP Company just to do the
19 taskings It got better when we got-- when the 82nd put a Company on
20 the same compound

21 Q How many Companies did the 320th have?

22 A. Umm--

23 Q. Six, seven, eight?

1 A. No, no. The 372nd, the 670th, the 186th, and some of them
2 were guard companies and some of them were combat support

3 Q You had the 229th 229th MP Company's also there It's an I
4 and R Company.

5 A. Some of them come up-- some of them came up because we were
6 getting ready to--some of the other companies to leave.

7 Q General Karpinski, what would you recommend for corrections
8 of detainee abuses?

9 A Sir, I--I actually started to make some of the-- I think--
10 I started to implement for the rotational forces coming in. I called
11 the Battalion Commanders that were coming in behind the rotational
12 brigades when I could get in touch with them at their mob station. I
13 told them that they needed to, ya know, get the people involved, to
14 give briefings to their soldiers before they deployed over here about
15 the potential for detainee abuse The indicators--the processes or
16 procedures to head off infractions, to continue to reinforce it
17 Umm--and I think that soldiers need to be reminded I-- I-- at the--
18 at the guard mount, at shift change, on duty You take an example of
19 an MP company like the 320th MP Company, which is out at Abu Ghraib.
20 They were down at Talil, they're a combat support company, but their
21 First Sergeant and the Company Commander were very much involved in
22 the Company and the operations Talked to soldiers all the time,
23 gathered them in small groups The First Sergeant was fully engaged.

1 Q. Is that Captain [REDACTED]

2 A. It is

3 Q. Would it surprise you that he was the one who is saying it
4 is not utilized as a Company up there today? That he is being used a
5 filler Company.

6 A. He's not being used as a filler Company, sir

7 Q. How do you know that?

8 A. Well, I know what they're doing. They were the-- they
9 were-- they're not doing a combat support MP mission, because that's
10 how they-- they weren't deployed to do that mission. They-- couple
11 of the teams, the driving teams were tasked to the TOC to do my PSD.
12 My two vehicles were from the 320th MP Company. He had some MP units
13 that were doing the escort missions down to CPA or down to Bucca if
14 we were transporting prisoners. He would-- so he's got a variety of
15 missions, but they're not filler personnel. He may have used some of
16 his MPs to do some of the force protection towers. But there isn't a
17 Company that's doing only force protection. I wish I had the luxury,
18 I'm sure the battalions do too.

19 Q. His comment to me was, when I asked him, "What specifically
20 is your mission set?" And-- then he mentioned something about I have
21 compounds boom, boom, boom, boom. I don't recall those compounds,
22 and I said, "So you're directly responsible for those compounds
23 then?" He said, "No, that's relegated to Headquarters and

1 Headquarters Company 220th MP Battalion. So what is your extent of
2 your responsibility?" I said, "I just provide personnel " So in
3 essence----

4 A Well that's not what his support form said, and that's not
5 how he was rated, and that was never my impression when we walked to
6 the different compounds that were under his control.

7 Q Well, the support form-- the support form doesn't really,
8 and you mentioned that that everybody should have-- could have
9 mistaken your support form for that of command philosophy?
10 Basically----

11 A Sir, I never focused on that.----

12 Q Well, I'm just making a comment to the comment you made

13 A Yes, sir But----

14 Q ----And so, basically, the Company Commander is given a
15 mission and the Company Commander felt that he's got a capability to
16 provide And the Company Commander felt that he's not-- his
17 capability's not being utilized Cause I asked him directly, "What
18 is your mission?" And his response to me was, "I'm a filler Company,
19 sir " Today, I said, "How long has it been going on?" He says,
20 "From the time I arrived until last week "

21 A Well, that's not true He was down at Talil, they didn't
22 have a vigorous mission down at Talil, they went out and did the same

1 thing. They did law enforcement, patrols, down to the prisons in
2 Najaf.

3 Q Do you know what the 229th MP Company's mission is?

4 A They're responsible for the URF and for the compounds at
5 Ganci

6 Q So, basically they're being utilized as a guard company?

7 A. They are. All of our MP units are being utilized as an
8 escort guard or guard company for this confinement mission

9 Q Would it surprise you that Captain Jones trained himself
10 and nobody ever validated him prior to deployment?

11 A That does not surprise me.

12 Q Did you know that he had prior experience as an MP, prior
13 to taking command of that Company from the Virginia Army National
14 Guard?

15 A I did not

16 Q Did you know that he had to provide support to the canine
17 unit, both Army and Navy, but he does not have command and control of
18 those canine units?

19 A That's with the HHC or with the Headquarters of the 320th?

20 Q Somehow, somebody's yet to find a house where those dogs
21 were That's what I mean It's knowing what each of those Companies
22 do, because it's their capability that you want to utilize. Okay,
23 what other recommendations would you make?

1 A I think that the-- the span of control covering the whole
2 country of Iraq is too big without the additional assets, either
3 aviation assets, or transportation assets, engineer General
4 Wodjakowski did tell me several times that they did not do a good job
5 of supporting us. We were running 15 civilian jails and 5 internment
6 facilities, and he said, "You're running three internment facilities,
7 how hard can that be?" He didn't know what we were doing

8 Q How often did-- you had the SUAs I guess in the separate
9 unit updates provided it depicted at least number of detain--
10 detention centers you were-- you were operating, number of Iraqi
11 prisons that you were overseeing or providing training for, number of
12 other things that you were missioned for, number of detainees that
13 were accounted for, based on the last report, and personnel situation
14 and your operational revenues to accomplish that mission Umm--when
15 those were posted, to include your maintenance capabilities, what was
16 the-- what was the percentage-- what would you-- what would you
17 consider as your C rating would be?

18 A Overall?

19 Q Overall

20 A C-3 at best

21 Q And that was amplified, you mentioned repeatedly to the
22 Battalion, to the CJTF-7?

1 A It was I-- I said to-- now when Colonel--General West
2 came in, he wasn't there originally, I don't remember who his
3 predecessor was who was the 4 But General West was-- and-- and
4 General Davis who was the Engineer Commander at the time, both of
5 them gave me tremendous support, but it was after we had found
6 another way, another mechanism to do it.

7 Q Sure. Which was network with your fellow general officers

8 A General

9 Q Networking with your fellow general officers, you know.
10 Was that helpful to you?

11 A They-- General West was very helpful. General Davis was
12 very helpful The CA guy who is General Kern, and said several times
13 "I don't know anything about detention operations, but, ya know, tell
14 me what else is going on " We couldn't get CA support We could not
15 get CA support I spent time with General little bit of time with
16 General Hahn and uh--and really the only time General Sanchez or even
17 General Wodjakowski spent any time or showed any interest in anything
18 I was doing was when there was a problem

19 Q. You--previously you appeared very critical of General
20 Sanchez or General Wodjakowski for their lack of concern or lack of
21 support on behalf of your mission and on behalf of your soldiers
22 Would you kind of draw conclusions as to why that is? Your
23 perception why that is?

1 A I think that General Sanchez is [pause] I think that his
2 ego will not allow him to accept a Reserve Brigade, a Reserve General
3 Officer and certainly not a female succeeding in a combat
4 environment. And I think he looked at the 800th MP Brigade as the
5 opportunity to find a scapegoat for anything that his active
6 component MI Brigade or his active component MP Brigade was failing
7 at. And if I was not capable, why didn't he tell me? Why didn't
8 somebody tell me sit down and let me give you some suggestions
9 because when DEPSECDEF Wolfowitz came into the theater, the first
10 time he came out to Baghdad Central he stayed an extra hour and
11 forty-five minutes because he was so proud of me and what the MPs
12 were doing. And he told General Sanchez that, and one night when he
13 got behind schedule on another visit, he asked specifically if he
14 could see General Karpinski before he left because he wanted to hear
15 how the prisons were coming. And on the headphones in the
16 helicopter, General Sanchez and General Fast, who was briefing him,
17 he said, "Am I going to have an opportunity to see General Karpinski?"
18 Because she always does a good job for me." And I thought at that
19 time, this is not a good thing. It is never good to be more popular
20 than your boss. If I was not doing my job, I wasn't aware of it.
21 And I'm sorry, but I took care of those soldiers, I took care of
22 those detainees. We provided support beyond what anybody expected to
23 the CPA to keep Ambassador Bremer out of trouble. Because when Major

1 [REDACTED] and Colonel [REDACTED] were trying to push all the jails off on us
2 in a briefing to General Sanchez, Major [REDACTED] said, "Well we don't
3 care if they're eating or not, sir, that's the Iraqi's
4 responsibility." And he corrected them And we made sure that they
5 were eating and that they did have water. They didn't Because in
6 spite of what General Sanchez was telling them, they were doing the
7 easy thing And I think General Sanchez has no use for Reserve
8 component or National Guard soldiers. And he has little use, would
9 not see it as time well spent, mentoring me How dare I succeed as a
10 female, as a Reservist, as an MP, in his combat environment? How
11 dare I And I became determined to show him that I would

12 Q Who would you pin the responsibility on the actions of
13 those individuals at Abu Ghraib?

14 A The MPs that were involved That's who I'd pin it on and
15 I'd pin it on [REDACTED], the Platoon Sergeant, and the First Sergeant,
16 Captain [REDACTED]

17 Q You wouldn't pin it on anybody else but them?

18 A. I would--it was Colonel [REDACTED] domain but it was
19 Colonel [REDACTED] FOB And he was the one who established the
20 limitation for those cell blocks He was the one, and Colonel [REDACTED]
21 was the one, whether he's here to say it or not, he was the one who
22 set the rules. Major [REDACTED] limited them and influenced them to
23 the extent he could by taking the MPs out of unhealthy and

1 inappropriate settings But they were still the guards in those cell
2 blocks. And they were still the ones who did those things that they
3 did to those detainees.

4 Q Do you think proper training, supervision, and effective
5 leadership, not just for that Battalion, but throughout the entire
6 Brigade would have sufficed, could have prevented it?

7 A No sir, no sir Because it's not typical.

8 Q Given the fact that that same Battalion was involved in the
9 Bucca incident back in May?

10 A Sir, I talked to-- was a different Company-- no that's not
11 an excuse, I talked to [REDACTED] and I talked to [REDACTED] and I
12 talked to them----

13 Q It's your Brigade ----

14 A Yes sir, yes sir ----I talked to them the next day when I
15 found out about it, when I was out there I talked to all the
16 Company Commanders and the First Sergeants. And-- and they asked
17 good questions And they raised the issues again about fair and
18 decent treatment and when were they going to see magistrates, and
19 when were they going to be able to give answers, and how can you say
20 dignity and respect and then not give them anything that they're--
21 even the basics that they're entitled to clean clothes, decent
22 food, bed or a mat to sleep on These are bad people and people who
23 were led by bad people in that situation But, once again, it was a

1 good MP, a good soldier who turned them in I talked to [REDACTED]
2 about the consistency in these events And that isn't something you
3 would put in an attribute column when you say, what did I do right or
4 what did I do wrong in this situation. "Did you exploit the
5 opportunity?" I asked him "Did you exploit the opportunity to talk
6 to soldiers if they were assigned to the Battalion and tell them,
7 'This is what happened at Bucca and this is not tolerated here '?"
8 And, no he didn't Did he use the lessons learned? No he didn't
9 Did he know how to do it? I don't even know if he did

10 Q You think possibly a command policy memo from you or
11 General Hill would have stipulated lessons learned at Bucca that it
12 not be repeated?

13 A I think that would have been extremely helpful The other-
14 - the other----

15 Q But none of those memos fell out and you didn't follow up
16 on that memo?

17 A No sir And when the incident down at Bucca was resolved,
18 we spent months working on it and-- and I don't wanna say me, because
19 I don't wanna-- I can't take credit for the hard work that was done
20 The 32, the CID investigations, the supervision of them at Bag-- at--
21 down at Arifjan. I think it was the first time they were effectively
22 supervised when Colonel [REDACTED] got them under control. But the
23 system failed us. And it was because the tenure had changed. And at

1 about the same time when those incidents were taking place out of
2 Baghdad Central, the decisions were made to give the guilty people at
3 Bucca plea bargains. So, the system communicated to the soldiers,
4 the worst that's gonna happen is, you're gonna go home.

5 Q. Where would you place them if they were not going to be
6 remanded to go home?

7 A It was supposed to go to a court martial, and it didn't
8 And suggestion by a Company Commander out there at Baghdad Central,
9 was that-- in front of everybody else, was that "Ma'am, everybody
10 knows the reason it didn't go to a court martial was because they
11 were protecting that Lieutenant Colonel who took a prisoner out to
12 the clearing barrel and cleared his weapon into the clearing barrel
13 right next to his head And they wanted to be able to forgive him "
14 So that was the change in attitude. And I said,----

15 Q Do you think that was associated in that?

16 A. Yes, sir He said it there in front of a group of people
17 and nobody turned around like they were shocked by this revelation
18 So I knew that that was what was permeating. What I told them during
19 that meeting was, "Look, let me tell you something, the UCMJ system
20 in my opinion is fair and impartial. And people who make decisions
21 to go to court martials or take other actions, do so with extensive
22 advice and study and everything else, whether you believe that or
23 not, okay." This took seven months to complete. But, let's talk

1 about results, okay? There were four cases One that was considered
2 a relatively weak case, was plea bargained out, and the individual
3 signed a statement saying that this was planned, it was orchestrated,
4 and there was definitely collusion or whatever that word is that they
5 use

6 Q But did you know that the events actually happened since
7 you were not there?

8 A Alright, well, I only know it from the Article 32 from
9 reviewing that case and then for recommending it go to court martial.
10 But I do know the results and I know why they--they gave that plea
11 bargain, or the plea package to the first individual. And that
12 individual signed statements saying this was planned, it was by
13 design, Master Sergeant [REDACTED] orchestrated the plan. She told us
14 exactly what to do, etc etc So, she gets an other than honorable
15 and goes home, yes And she understands her responsibility to come
16 back in case it goes to a court martial I said, "Do you realize
17 that if we went to a court martial on any one of those cases, any of
18 them if there were four or ten or twelve whatever the original number
19 was, the were all going to be tried individually because that's your
20 right under UCMJ And do you realize that if we went to a court
21 martial and the board said or the panel said, "Not guilty," those
22 individuals come back as MPs and maybe back to the same unit or the
23 same battalion And is that a factor, considering your options?

1 Absolutely And I got a lot of stares that time, because there's
2 another side to the story there, there's another perspective

3 Q. I don't think unless they get a bar to re-enlistment that
4 they'll ever make it back to wear the uniform.

5 A Well, they won't now because they are permanently barred
6 from coming back in They are reduced They are-- all of their
7 benefits and privileges from this deployment are suspended So, we
8 get what we want from that action And rather than take the risk-- I
9 mean, I-- I didn't like it at first, but I understood it, after
10 conversation with Captain [REDACTED] and Colonel [REDACTED] But, I wanted to
11 make sure that the leadership element out there at Baghdad Central
12 understood it because that seemed to be their concern that these guys
13 knew that all they would get would be a trip home

14 Q Well, put in that perspective, then General Karpinski, when
15 everything is put before the courts, and I have no reason why you
16 will not be placed before the military court system, and the
17 revelations of all these inhumane treatment of detainees You think
18 for one moment that those MPs that were accused of those allegations
19 were not made complicit of those-- the unit that they served under,
20 the battalion that they served under, the brigade that they served
21 under, that they will reveal all sorts of things that will put your
22 entire command under the microscope

23 A Absolutely

1 Q The fact of the matter is that that will be the second
2 incident to which the 800th MP Brigade would be associated with
3 potentially war crimes?

4 A Yes, sir

5 Q How would you deal with that?

6 A The same way I've dealt with other situations in this
7 Theater of Operation Tell the truth. And we were spread throughout
8 the theater of Iraq with a mission and the MPs have countless
9 examples of how well they performed and how professional they were
10 and are And do you get, out of 3,400 people; do you get some bad
11 MPs? Yes. And do some of them have a history of this in their
12 civilian job? Yes And does their civilian employer have a
13 responsibility to report these infractions to the military? No Now
14 were there mistakes made? Yes And are we taking actions to make
15 sure that they don't occur again? Yes Can we guarantee they won't?
16 No Because we've never forged this road before

17 Q Nobody has

18 A Yes, sir So we have to rely on values and those people
19 have none, at least if the pictures tell the story I don't care
20 what their specialty is, it's just more offensive because they're
21 MPs What they did was vulgar and abusive And I hope it-- it never
22 reaches the media's attention I can't-- I can't-- I didn't get a
23 vote. Nobody said, "Okay, you're taking over command of the 800th MP

1 Brigade now, and what happened before doesn't count " Because it
2 does And-- and all I can hope to do, is to make it better Not on
3 the run, not on the fly, but with conscientious-- conscientious
4 effort and-- and leadership I am a good leader And taking all of
5 this out of context, and using this example of what the 800th MP
6 Brigade is capable of doing, is what is typical, I say, of what
7 Sanchez is all about I told my soldiers this morning when they were
8 leaving, "You go home with your heads held high, because you did
9 everything and more that was asked of you, expected of you, and you
10 did it better than anybody else You're all heroes to me, so no
11 matter what is said, nobody can take it away from you " And I
12 believe it, and I want those 19- and 20- and 35-year old soldiers to
13 believe it, because it's true And Sanchez doesn't give a flip about
14 a soldier And I never said that before And he cares less about a
15 Reservist and a Guardsman

16 Q You think in your heart that that's true

17 A Yes, yes, sir I do

18 Q Did you spread any of these thoughts with any of your
19 civilians?

20 A Never. Because what I said to them was, "General Sanchez
21 has an enormous job He was a division commander before " I used
22 all the right expressions

23 Q Do you shift all this blame?

1 A No I'm not. I'm not shifting all of anything I'm taking
2 responsibility, but the situation accurately is a shared
3 responsibility And they failed us and trying to cover their
4 failures it's going to cost the 800th MP Brigade or me? Okay
5 Because it'll give me an opportunity to tell the truth I know what
6 they were doing and we kept finding a way to succeed So they'd give
7 us some more. When I took the-- when I briefed General Sanchez on
8 the condition of the civilian jails and why the progress was so slow
9 He turns on me, and he says, "What's wrong with you Karpinski, you
10 were briefing me just a month ago or five weeks ago that, you know,
11 they were going to be on track and we were going to have capacity for
12 3,100 by now " And I said, "Sir, because the construction is not
13 taking place And I've been to every one of the facilities and I see
14 no evidence of appropriate expenditure of funds, millions of
15 dollars " I said, "I'm not a contractor, but I know what \$25,000
16 worth of work should look like, and I know what \$2 million worth of
17 work should look like And there's no evidence of it anywhere."
18 "And what have you done?" "I went to the finance office at CPA I
19 looked for the IG's office at CPA I looked for the GAO office at
20 CPA I talked to finance officer at Arifjan at the 377th I talked
21 to Colonel [REDACTED] I talked to General Wodjakowski." "Well what
22 happened to the money?" I said, "I don't know, sir. It was a cash
23 operation and I suspect that the two subject matter experts borrowed

1 some of it permanently " "Are you suggesting that they
2 misappropriated funds?" "Yes sir, I am If the evidence of the
3 construction of the facilities is-- is what I have to go by, because
4 there is no GAO and there's no IG at CPA. And they wouldn't show me
5 the contracts that they let for all these places But I do know that
6 the only place where construction is taking place is at Abu Ghraib,
7 because my MPs are there They're not the contracting officer
8 representatives " And he turned to his SJA and said, "Since this has
9 been dumped in my lap, tell me the next step I take " He never came
10 back and asked for information He never came back and asked for the
11 information I had, or the evidence I had accumulated. Nobody ever
12 came back to me and said this is what took place As a matter of
13 fact, Colonel ██████ said to me, "You want to steer clear of the
14 issue " I'm not blaming General Sanchez or General Wodjakowski. I
15 just want them to take responsibility for what they didn't do. And I
16 don't ever expect a person like General Sanchez to change his
17 personality or his way of thinking or his way of succeeding or
18 anything else I have only ever asked for a fair chance And, no
19 sir, he did not give it me or anybody in the 800th MP Brigade.

20 Q Fair enough Do you have any closing comments you want to
21 make?

22 A No, sir

23 Q Thank you General Karpinski.

1 Witness was warned and excused.

2 [Session completed at 2035 15 February 2004]

On 9 February 2004, a team of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview: Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Ghraib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Ghraib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence.

The following persons were present:

MG Antonio M. Taguba, [REDACTED] DCG-CFLCC, Interviewer
COL [REDACTED], 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, Respondent
SSG [REDACTED], Jr., [REDACTED] 27D30, CFLCC - SJA, Recorder

This is the first interview of [REDACTED] on 9 FEB 04.
The interview is summarized as follows:

My name is COL [REDACTED]. I am currently assigned as the commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade.

The Brigade had a presence on Abu Ghraib on a permanent basis. In August or September for Operation Victory Bounty, a small element of interrogators was sent down there. In the middle of September, CJTF-7 decided to stand up a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center. The decision was made in November to move my TAC full time to Abu Ghraib by direction of the CG. The last week in November I was given direction to assume command of the Forward Operating Base in Abu Ghraib.

The initial presence during Operation Victory Bounty was a team of interrogators from the 519th MI Brigade. In the middle of September, we began the transition to the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center. It became a mixed group of soldiers from the 323rd, 325th, and the 519th MI Brigades to form tiger teams. In October we had tiger teams from Guantanamo Bay. Between October and November we received assistance from the 470th MI Battalion and the 500th MI Brigade.

Up until I assumed command the 800th MP Brigade had responsibilities for the FOB, exercised through the 320th MP Battalion. There were various leaders exercising responsibility for the FOB at different times including [REDACTED].

I directed that the 165th MI Battalion move down on December 2, to establish operations and take control. I relieved the commander of the 165th [REDACTED] about a week ago to redeploy to the central region. They did not provide any of the interrogator support. The 165th pulled guard, exercised direction over the FOB when I wasn't there and

provided me with advice and assistance on security. They had a section inside the area where I am currently at, but in terms of actual interrogation, they had nothing to do with it.

Prior to assumption of command as the FOB Commander, I did not specifically receive any instructions regarding my responsibilities. I had the policies and procedures that LTG Sanchez had signed, the Sand Book standards for quality of life and what had already been established by CJTF-7. I used those as my basic guide for exercising

I understood that overall, I was responsible for making sure that detention operations ran, but I acted under the assumption that my executive agent for detention operations was the 320th MP Battalion. I did not get involved in their SOP's or prison operations. I knew how many prisoners there were, if there were escape attempts or other problems that came up through the FOB. I understood that I had full responsibility of detention operations, but I used the 320th as my executive agent.

There were dual lines of command with regard to detention operations. The 320th MP Battalion would talk with me about things, I would ask questions and get answers. They were also getting guidance from the 800th MP Brigade with regard to detention operations for the CJTF. I was in charge of operations at BCCF but I did not have a broader perspective on things such as the transport of detainees. I had no visibility over the operation once they left the confines of the FOB, nor did I concern myself with it. Perhaps I should have.

I request a lawyer at this time.

The command relationship I had was TACON (tactical control). I could maneuver them on the battlefield but their organic units maintained the normal command relationship in terms of how they would operate and organize. I understood that I could take control with regard to positioning and activities that took place, but they still followed their command lines.

I think the units recognize my position as FOB Commander as being responsible for Force Protection. I relied on the 205th of my Brigade and the JIDC to operate the interrogations. I relied on the 320th MP Battalion to act as the warden for the facility and ensure that good MP and guard practice were conducted.

The MI units were within my command and control, they were assigned to me. They were under the 205th MI Brigade and the JIDC. The MP Battalion was TACON to me, they had their own operating procedures and the execution of policy differed.

There was not an established procedure as to how detention operations conducted by the MP's and interrogation operations being conducted by the MI units should interact. BG Miller suggested to me and I made the suggestion to BG Karpinski that the MP's be detached to MI to carry out detention operations. The assumption was that command

lines would be clearer and the MP operations would be easier to regulate. The suggestion was not carried out

LTG Sanchez gave me, in writing, a specific interrogation plan. We were under strict guidance. As late as 11 January, there was confusion in the MP ranks as to who was responsible for the guard mission. The TACON relationship was not clear. There were instances of confusion in the MP Battalion as to what my realm of control was; I had to reestablish my realm of control based on the TACON relationship. I had cognizance over the installation and all of its buildings. It was like being an ASG Commander and their relationships with tenant units on Abu Ghraib.

If detainee abuse was brought to my attention, action was taken. There were two instances when it was brought to my attention. For one of the interrogators we took UCMJ action. There was a second instance with an interrogator, I directed that she be suspended from further interrogations. [REDACTED] my deputy director at the time, can give the specifics. He handled it since it was a first time offense for the interrogator. I did not follow up specifically other than to verify that she was suspended and that [REDACTED] was working with her to ensure that it did not occur again. These were the only two instances that I knew about until CID brought me the disk. I told my soldiers to work with CID and if the soldiers were involved, then they needed to be punished with everyone else because that is the standard we've established at the FOB and within the JIDC.

If the interrogation plan falls within the outline set by LTG Sanchez then the O5 Deputy Director or myself approve the plans. Those interrogation plans include a sleep plan and medical standards. A physician and a psychiatrist are on hand to monitor what we are doing. In practice, the interrogation team then gives the interrogation plan directly to the MP guard that is going to work with MI when direct coordination is authorized. They would go down and work with the NCOIC in the cellblock to work out the specifics of implementation. Based on LTG Sanchez's outline, the approval came from me. Myself or a senior person in the JIDC signed off on the interrogation plan and took it down to work it with the MP's.

The execution of this type of operation with regard to interrogation plan dissemination is not codified in doctrine. Except for Guantanamo Bay, this sort of thing was a first.

Typically, the MP has a copy of the interrogation plan and a written note as to how to execute. There should also be files in the detainee files as to what is going on when an exception is needed. The interrogator uses these files to keep a record as to what has happened to the detainee. The doctor and psychiatrist also look at the files to see what the interrogation plan recommends, they have the final say as to what is implemented.

To my knowledge, instructions given to the MP's other than what I have mentioned, such as shackling, making detainees strip down or other measures to use on detainees before interrogations are not typically made unless there is some good reason. No one has reported anything back to me. There once was an incident where the detainees on Second

Tier 1A were naked. I told them to have the detainees put their clothes back on and that it was inappropriate. I also told them that if there was a good reason to do that, it should've been brought to my attention and should have gone through the CG. Things of that nature are inappropriate and not typically done.

My assumption was that the guard would supervise the plan and the detainees would be delivered at a specified point and time to the interrogator. For example, the interrogator would give the interrogation plan to the guard and the guard would implement that plan. Nobody came back to me saying that we had problems implementing the plan nor were there any questions about the plan. The only time that occurred were when the MP's came back to me saying that they saw some interrogators come down and they did inappropriate things to the detainees. I looked into it and I asked CID to come in and I suspended those interrogators from further operation. This was the first investigation that I directed on detainee abuse. In this case, there was nothing brought to my attention that there were problems in that regard.

I had mentioned to BG Karpinski and to the MP leadership that it would be cleaner if they detached a group of MP's to the JIDC so we could conduct that operation separately, we could run them through the necessary training. They told me they didn't have enough personnel for that, though they thought it was a good idea. I got feedback of that nature, though I don't remember the specific dates. Both my Deputy Commander and myself spoke to BG Karpinski about it. I made the assumption that they were competent to execute those plans, but I didn't follow up on it based on the fact that I got the positive feedback.

The point of the detachment and attachment of a group of MP's to me, to the JIDC was so there would be a clear line of command and control over the MP's dealing with the detainees housed in Tier 1A. I would have complete oversight of the operation, everyone would be working off of the same SOP's and the same lines of command. There wouldn't be a question about who to go to if you had a question. If they all worked for me, I would be able to get all of the feedback and make the appropriate corrections. On Sundays we have a meeting and all of the people at the JIDC stand up and they give an overview of how things are going. If the MP's were assigned to our unit they would be required to stand up at meetings and give briefings about what had been going on and any questions about procedures during interrogations that seemed inappropriate could be dealt with. I think it would've provided easier access to mitigate problems if they did exist. As I said, I am unaware of anytime where an interrogator said that there was a problem. I'm not saying it never happened, but nobody ever brought such an instance to my attention.

The feedback I received from BG Karpinski about an MP detachment was favorable, but they didn't have the personnel to do it. After we had talked about it, they withdrew the personnel who were escorting detainees back and forth to the prison. Normally, MP's escort detainees from their cells to the interrogation room and they provide security, but they didn't have enough personnel to do that. I had to come up with my own detachment and train them. There were specific rules and regulations that the detachment had to

follow with regard to that mission. This special detachment, made up of 96 H's, was used exclusively for the transporting of detainees.

My understanding about my duties with regard to detention operations came from the Deputy Commanding General. I needed to maintain awareness of what was going on with detention operations, but the execution of the operation was clearly in the MP realm. If I saw something that was being done wrong, I had the authority to correct them by changing the procedure and to ask for an explanation as to why a certain procedure was being performed.

The terms security detainees and security internees are interchangeable. I separate them from the term criminals, which are held and dealt with separately. A high value detainee is someone who is of particular interest to the CJTF. There are three categories of detainees: one, two, and three. Two and three are not of any particular interest, and category one consists of high value detainees. These three categories of detainees as well as security detainees are categorized by the command. The Geneva Convention provides for two types of detainees: Enemy POW's and civilian detainees. Both have specific, but different sets of rules and regulations that must be followed with regard to their internment. The reason we use the term security internee is to differentiate them from Enemy POW's who would require a separate facility and separate rules of treatment.

I was not aware that a copy of the Geneva Convention under AR190-8 must be posted in the facility in the language of the country to which the detainees are being held. The Geneva Convention was not specifically posted in any of the facilities where the detainees were being held. I maintained a copy in my office and on the facility, extracts based on the rules and regulations of interrogation were posted when you walk into the JIDC facility. The postings say that the Geneva Convention must be followed, what the CJTF approval is, and that detainees must be treated humanely. Each detainee, interrogator, and analyst goes through processing training. They sign a letter stating that they understand what they can and cannot do. Since I have been in command, the ICRC has come to our facility once and the lack of a regulatory posting of the Geneva Convention was not one of the findings that they briefed me on.

My interrogators are well advised about the Geneva Convention and about what they can and cannot do with regard to the treatment of detainees. I would go back to the certification process that we've implemented. The interrogators did not do anything wrong - it looks like I might have had an errant guy. If it came to my attention, I investigated. If it were inappropriate, I punished.

I would see [REDACTED] at weekly Mayor's meetings, from time to time I would attend his MP meetings. We interacted with his staff with regard to detainee numbers. We were working to finish the prisoner dining facility. My interaction was more so with his staff than with [REDACTED] himself. Availability was the reason that we had trouble meeting.

I spoke with BG Karpinski on two or three occasions. When we were first standing up the joint interrogation center is when I told him about the MP detachment plan.

When I assumed command I visited [REDACTED] once, after the shooting incident on Tier 1. We did not have a meeting after that visit.

The interrogation operation would be better served if we streamlined the split lines of responsibility. They came together a little after I took over the FOB, but it wasn't done. One commander still wasn't responsible for everything from the interrogation facility to the detention operations. All of the detention compounds and camps should fall under the area of responsibility of one commander. Also, the guard force needs to get to the same level of requirements, training and understanding of the Geneva Convention. If they do something outside of the standard, they know they do so at their own peril and they don't think it is acceptable behavior.

The person exercising command as the FOB prior to my arrival and relief of the 800th MP FOB was [REDACTED]. Once I arrived, I followed established CJTF policies. [REDACTED] was not present when the actual change of the FOB took place; [REDACTED] was the acting commander at that time. What brought this on was when BG Fast made a visit and saw that there was a lack of standards with regard to pieces of the FOB. [REDACTED] then called me to take over as the commander of the FOB.

The JIDC at Camp Cropper is not under our control, BG Dayton runs it.

The interrogation teams are predominantly MI. A company called Khaki also provides civilian interrogators. There are interpreters who are nationals from the Middle East that can get a secret clearance who are now U.S. citizens. Recently, we had British and Jordanian interrogators. The intent was that the interrogators wouldn't only be from the Army, but from all three of the other branches of the military. The interrogator slots should be predominately filled by the Joint Manning Document, augmented with twenty-five interrogators by the MI Brigade. We didn't have the personnel so I was required to get interrogators from different units, but the intent is that it comes off of a Joint Manning Document.

I have a briefing to give you that lists the detainee centers and statistics.

I have nothing else to add.

1 [REDACTED]s, U.S. Army, was interviewed on 12 February 2004,
2 as follows]

3 Q The purpose, [REDACTED] is just to re-interview
4 you and ask a couple of clarifying questions here and we'll
5 ensure that we gathered all the information that we require

6 A Yes, sir.

7 Q For the record, I acknowledge the copies of documents
8 that you provided yesterday that include your sworn statement,
9 of course, enclosures, briefs, things of that nature, as a
10 matter of record. Do you wish me to readdress the purpose of
11 the investigation?

12 A No, sir

13 Q Okay, all right, good Just a couple of questions,
14 are you familiar with the memorandum that was dated the 12th of
15 October, Subject. CJTF-7, Interrogation and Counter Resistance
16 Policy, unsigned, of course, but assuming it was assigned, from
17 the CG, CJTF-7, that was addressed to the C2, Combined Joint
18 Task Force 7, Baghdad, C3, Combined Joint Task Force 7, Baghdad,
19 and Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. And I now
20 show you this memorandum

21 A Yes, sir I am familiar with that document, yes, sir.

22 Q So you're familiar with that. And the directives
23 associated with this were then utilized to formulate rules of

1 engagement and policies that were later used at the FOB at Abu
2 Ghraib?

3 A Yes, sir, that is correct.

4 Q How else were those instructions and those directives
5 disseminated, and to whom did you disseminate them to?

6 A Sir, I gave--that memorandum was given to the
7 operations section. It was explained to the soldiers, and then
8 we used the system whereby that was approved by my JAG, which
9 during training, we gave a briefing which talked to those issues
10 as part of the training, which I put in the documents, the
11 allied documents that I gave you. And then each one of the
12 soldiers was required to sign the memorandum that said "these
13 are the things that you can and can't do with interrogations."

14 Q Were those just given to the interrogators, or were
15 any of these instructions given to the military policeman at
16 all?

17 A They were not given to the military policeman, sir.

18 Q Should they have been?

19 A In my view, yes, sir. And this gets to the issue that
20 I talked to you about during our last interview when I said I
21 think it would have been helpful if we had had one chain of
22 command with regards to both the military police and military

1 intelligence setup with regard to--the specific, those MPs
2 specifically supporting interrogations.

3 Q. When you say "interrogators," both military and
4 civilian contractors?

5 A. Civilian contractors and the analysts who supported
6 them, as well.

7 Q. Did you have an assumption or an understanding that
8 these instructions that culminated the interrogation rules of
9 engagement, that it was reasonably understood, the right and
10 left limits of the interrogators' authority?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Now, in that particular context, where the
13 interrogator provides a set of instructions to the military
14 policeman upon the detainee's return to custody from the
15 military policemen and returning them to either Ganci or
16 Vigliant or the hard site, was there a determination that those
17 instructions were to be executed by whom?

18 A. Well, sir, it was understood that the specifics of
19 management plans, let's say, for example, like sleep management
20 plan, would be executed by the MPs. And there was usually a
21 written document; I think I showed you an example of one in the
22 paperwork that said the person was to be woken up every X-amount
23 of hours.

1 Q. Okay, when those instructions were given, did you know
2 whether those instructions to the MP were given to the guard
3 themselves, or to the guard's supervisors or chain of command?

4 A Sir, they were probably given to whomever was in the
5 Sally port at the time that the interrogators went down to
6 coordinate that actions There was no formal system in place
7 that I'm aware of to--that would, for example, send it through--
8 guarantee that it was sent through the chain of command.

9 Q The rationale for my inquiry there was the prospect of
10 supervisor to an extent where the guard's supervisory chain
11 would understand the limits of those instructions, whether the
12 instructions were legal or whether the instructions were carried
13 to the letter In other words, if the instructor was given a
14 set of instructions that stipulated 4 hours of sleep over a 24-
15 hour period, then how would you know or how would the
16 interrogator know or how would the MP guard know that the
17 aggregate total of 4 hours were to be accomplished in a 24-hour
18 period, and in what segment or in what frequency?

19 A Sir, on the sheet of paper that they gave, the ones
20 that I saw and the one that I provided to you usually specify
21 that the person is to get an hours' worth of sleep during every
22 4 hours from this period Now, there would be no way for us to
23 actually monitor whether that happened I can tell you that on

1 a regular basis that when [REDACTED] was assigned down as my
2 Deputy, and I know that [REDACTED], who was in charge of the
3 interrogation and control element, a CW2 down there, would
4 routinely go down and work with the guards and their
5 supervisors, you know, talking through the implementing
6 instructions. However, you are correct. We had no formal
7 system in place to do that. There was an agreement at the
8 higher levels between me and the MP Brigade, the 320th
9 Battalion, that that would be done. But there was no formal
10 established procedure there, where I would hand that off, to
11 say, the company commander of the unit that was doing the
12 guardwork.

13 Q Given that then, why were these plans then formulated
14 and directed to the MP, was there any consideration given to the
15 detainees' physical, mental, physiological state?

16 A Yes, sir. From our perspective, when we do that, we
17 have our medical--we have a doctor assigned, I think he was just
18 called. But up until 24 or 48 hours ago, we had a psychiatrist
19 assigned. And that person would go in and, with the
20 interrogators, would review all those people under a management
21 plan and provide feedback as to whether they were being
22 medically and physically taken care of. Because of the JMD
23 fills and the lag times and that, I had to be honest that we

1 didn't get the doctor and we didn't get the psychiatrist until
2 after I had actually gone down as the FOB commander and moved my
3 TAC into the JDIC. So, that would not have happened until about
4 15 November. Up until that time, there was probably no good
5 methodology for monitoring the health and welfare of the
6 detainees. And that's one of the reasons that I pushed for that
7 and that we worked real hard in getting that fill, as we were
8 concerned about that.

9 Q I want to bring that up, Colonel [REDACTED] because in
10 the context of giving specific instructions from did the
11 interrogator, who we reasonably assume are competent, trained
12 individuals, to an MP that again, not assuming whether they're
13 compliant or were trained in the handling of detainees then that
14 would lead to a question of whether a set of instructions from
15 you would be carried out to the letter by the MP and predicated
16 on any misfortune that then resulted or that detainee. Would it
17 be kind of odd to you that somebody else is carrying the orders
18 that somewhat emanate what the interrogators that were directly
19 under your command?

20 A. Yes, sir. I mean, clearly, as I've articulated that
21 that was a--I think a concern in terms of the chain of events or
22 the structure of the JDIC. Your point is a valid one, which I
23 would have personally solved by having the MPs be part of the

1 structure We asked--I know that myself and my Deputy talked to
2 General Karpinski about that, about getting the Detachment that
3 provided guarding, especially over the hard cell, which is
4 really the area that we're most concerned about, under the
5 auspices of the Brigade and the JDIC so that we could ensure
6 that that was happening, because it was a loose area and we knew
7 that And so I would agree with your assessment, sir.

8 Q Did it occur, as well, in your discussions with
9 General Karpinski that there may be some MPs that may overextend
10 their authority in the execution of these----

11 A Sir, I never--the only reports that I ever got were on
12 my own people, and they were from the MPs. I had, perhaps,
13 improperly at this point, 20/20 hindsight being perfect, assumed
14 that they were competent regarding things that we were asking
15 them to do. As I worked my way back through that, I probably
16 should have asked more questions, admittedly.

17 Q In your infrequent contacts with [REDACTED]
18 was there any thought given to or even mentioned what this
19 particular memo covered interrogation and counter-resistance
20 policy? Did you ever ask or did you mention to him of his
21 unit's relations to this particular policy?

22 A Sir, I never discussed that policy with [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED]

1 Q But did you say, you mentioned this relative to his
2 gaining control of those MPs with General Karpinski.

3 A Yes, sir.

4 Q And she understood that?

5 A I don't know, sir I don't remember having
6 discussions specifically about that memorandum. I do know that
7 both myself and my Deputy Commander, [REDACTED] spoke
8 to her on several occasions about the possibility of having the
9 MPs come under our auspices for reasons--what I expressed, I
10 think, was just simply of training, of unity of command and ease
11 of operations to work that piece At one point, I actually
12 thought we were pretty close to doing it, but then, the MPs said
13 that they didn't have enough personnel. There were chronic
14 shortages and they were rotating people back in through the
15 system, so that the matter was subsequently dropped.

16 Q Who did you get that response from?

17 A From General Karpinski, sir, and from the MPs on the
18 ground

19 Q Did you take that as sort of a resistance to your
20 offer or to established policy, or did you take that as their
21 rationale of why they could not be included in your
22 recommendation to conduct an integrated training session with
23 regards to both interrogation and detention?

1 A Sir, I believe that the shortage of personnel that
2 they had was legitimate and that they were doing the best with
3 what they had.

4 Q Again, did you take it that everybody was short
5 personnel anyway?

6 A Yes, sir, I did.

7 Q Did you readdress that with her subsequent to that?

8 A Sir, we talked about it two or three times, myself and
9 the Deputy. I couldn't give you any specifics of when that
10 happened. I know that I spoke to her once when we were--I can't
11 remember, at least once, and I know that the Deputy brought it
12 up a couple of times at the weekly prison meetings that she
13 would attend down at CPA. And the response that we got was
14 shortage of personnel. And based on my own--I believe they were
15 telling the truth, and when I got down as the FOB Commander at
16 the end of November, there truly was a shortage of personnel,
17 which I attempted to address through putting together a request
18 for forces using civilian personnel that is currently pending
19 through the contracting process to try to help us with the guard
20 requirements because of their shortages.

21 Q Did you explain to the 320th, General Karpinski, or
22 any other tenant unit what TACON meant when you assumed command
23 of the forward operating base?

1 A. No, sir. When we got the order, and again, I put a
2 copy of that in the allied documents that I sent to you, and it
3 said for--that we're TACON for two tasks. One was the FOB force
4 protection, and the second was the detainee security, which I
5 assumed meant that we were to make sure that they had a place to
6 live, to protect them from mortar attacks in the same way that
7 we were to provide force protection. The TACON order, the other
8 way, was just for force protection purposes under the--when we
9 were under the 800th auspices prior to the 19th or the 21st, I
10 think, the order was written

1 Q The 19th But you understood that you were not TACON
12 to the 800th Did you understand that to be the case?

13 A No, sir I understood that we were TACON to the 800th
14 for purposes of force protection

15 Q Okay, that's how you understood the FRAG Order?

16 A Yes, sir

17 Q But the FRAG Order basically appointed you as the
18 205th Commander, to be the FOB Commander of the forward complex-
19 ---

20 A As of the 23d, yes, sir. And I guess--or on the 19th-
21 -I don't remember the exact date of the order, sir.

22 Q It's the 19th.

1 A On the 19th of November, up until the 19th of
2 November, we had been, the 205th JDIC had been TACON to the
3 800th MPs for purpose of force protection. On the----

4 Q Was there a FRAGO associated with that?

5 A Yes, sir, it was in the daily tactical update, and
6 I've provided a copy of that in the allied documents that I gave
7 you

8 Q All right, so there was a specific--prior to the 19th,
9 you had already been TACON to the 800th MP Brigade.

10 A Yes, sir, on the 800th--or excuse me, and I don't know
11 if I gave you a copy of that FRAGO, sir, but there was a daily
12 tactical update that established that relationship. On the
13 19th, I was appointed FOB commander and given TACON of the 320th
14 MP Battalion for purposes of force protection and detainee
15 security

16 Q Okay, I think the exact words were "detainee
17 operations" were the exact words of that FRAGO.

18 A My understanding, sir, could I see the documents,
19 please? I'm pretty sure it was "detainee security," sir.

20 Q Sure. [MAJ Taguba provides documents to ██████████]
21 Here is a copy of the...

22 A Yes, sir, "...are TACON to the 205th MI Brigade for
23 security of detainees and FOB protection."

1 Q Okay, and FOB protection, okay The security of
2 detainees, and it was never [inaudible]...

3 A Yes, sir.

4 Q And there's another version of this.

5 A Yes, sir.

6 Q There's another version of this that basically said,
7 ". . .are T4CON to the 205th for security, detainee--" sorry, "for
8 force protection and detainee operations." What it outlined for
9 you, security of detainees, how did that cross your mind? How
10 did you interpret that?

11 A To me, sir, I interpreted that to mean, basically
12 providing force protection for the detainees in the same manner
13 that I was providing it for other people on the base.

14 Q Was that relegated to anybody? For you to say, "I'm
15 providing security for the detainees in the context of force
16 protection for the entire forward operating base, the operations
17 there were separate and distinct from providing security.

18 A I don't know that they were separate and distinct, per
19 se, sir For example, part of that was providing a guard force,
20 someone making sure that the MPs had sufficient resources to
21 guard That's why I took a personal interest in this Eagle
22 contract, making sure that they are interested, that that type
23 of thing was taken care of But certainly, it was--I did not

1 think that I had the responsibility for detainee operations, at
2 large, for example, movement of detainees, tracking detainees,
3 providing legal services for detainees and working all that.
4 That stayed within the realm of the C3 and the Provost Marshal.
5 And I specifically had my staff check, because as this was being
6 developed, there were some discussions of detainee operations,
7 which is a much larger subset to which I said, "I don't have the
8 requisite knowledge and/or staff to be able to execute detainee
9 operations," in the broad sense of the word, sir.

10 Q But then, just for a matter of clarification here,
11 that during interrogation, during processes of conducting
12 interrogation sessions, did you understand that security of the
13 detainees also applied during that period of time?

14 A Yes, sir. What we did was we had retrained security
15 forces who were MI when they said that they could no longer
16 escort detainees. We got them trained up and we had a group
17 that were subject to the rules that I outlined to you, and they
18 escorted detainees back and forth. In all the instances, I
19 witnessed they were within the rules. I can't say 100 percent
20 that something didn't happen, but nothing was ever brought to my
21 attention. And, I have witnessed hundreds of cases of detainees
22 being escorted back and forth by these intelligence people that

1 I've designated, back from the various camps, and I never saw
2 anything that caused me to have suspicion.

3 Q Just another point of clarification, the security of
4 detainees during interrogation procedures are under your
5 purview

6 A Yes, sir.

7 Q But the security of detainees during detention
8 operations are under the purview of the MP unit that's
9 conducting detention operations.

10 A Yes, sir Sir, I rely on the MPs, for example, to
execute appropriate guarding procedures, whether it was on the
12 hard site, whether it was at Camp Ganca or Camp Vigilant. I
13 mean, they were the subject matter experts on that and I relied
14 on their expertise to do that. What I did do was ensure they
15 had guards available. We talked about the requirements, over
16 the things, at our weekly mayor's meetings. We would bring up
17 issues that they had with regard to those things, and I tried to
18 solve them as best I could

19 Q When did the handoff of sorts of responsibility
20 between security and detainees during interrogation processes
21 and the security of detainees during detention operations, what
22 is the handoff?

1 A Sir, the handoff is really the FRAGO from the 19th
2 that I just showed you that directed me to do that, gave me
3 TACON over that whole process.

4 Q Let me prepare a scenario for you. At the conclusion
5 of an interrogation, the typical scenario is that the detainee
6 is then remanded to the custody of the MP.

7 A Yes, sir

8 Q To return them to their cell at the hard site or at
9 Vigilant or Ganci, that at the conclusion of an interrogation
10 procedure, the detention procedure, the security of that
11 detainee is the responsibility of that interrogator.

12 A No, I mean, no, sir. The security of the detainee at
13 that point was the responsibility of the guard force.
14 Normally .

15 Q I'm just trying to understand----

16 A No, sir, I'm trying to make sure I explain this
17 correctly. If there were no shortages of personnel and a
18 military policeman, and this is by their own field manuals,
19 would escort the detainee from his prison site where he lived to
20 the interrogation booth and provide a force outside of the
21 interrogation booth to guard, to secure the site. On around the
22 last week in November, the MPs announced that they no longer had
23 the force structure to be able to do that. So what I did was, I

1 took some 96 Hotels, I believe they were, who were--who I could
2 move, and gave them training with the MPs on how to guard
3 people, to walk with people, and do that sort of thing, and
4 assigned them a detail of escorting detainees back and forth.
5 So, the way that the system worked after that time was that the
6 MI soldiers, who were specially trained, would go to the site
7 where the detainee lived. They would pick up the detainee and
8 transport that detainee to the interrogator, who would then
9 escort them. At times, the way that it normally worked itself
10 out over time was that the interrogator would go with the
11 special person who was supposed to be on guard and would assist
12 him as an assistant. And then the person who was trained to be
13 a guard would remain outside so that we had two people
14 controlling because I didn't have a lot of people who could do
15 this detail. An interrogator would assist the person designated
16 as a guard by going with him on the escort details and making
17 sure that they were----

18 Q So essentially, the interrogator has no security
19 responsibility for that detainee

20 A No, sir.

21 Q None at all, whatsoever.

22 A Doctrinally, they're not supposed to, and except in
23 the instances that I just outlined, where because of shortages

1 of personnel, they were then put in as assistants to do that.
2 Now, the reason that we did this with the MI people is because
3 interrogators for a period of time before we got the training of
4 these other guys correctly executed, they did, in fact, do
5 security, even though doctrinally, they should not have and they
6 were not trained to do it

7 Q So it depends on the situation and your guidance. I
8 mean, everybody is short people.

9 A Yes, sir

10 Q I mean, you're short people, but you're augmented by
11 contractors. They're short people, but they're not getting any
12 help. So I'm just trying to make a clear distinction of your
13 understanding when you say "security of detainees," outside that
14 governed by detention operations. But you also mention that the
15 interrogator has some semblance of security measures because in
16 the conduct of interrogation sessions, that typically there
17 three people inside that booth, the guard is outside.

18 A Yes, sir

19 Q Okay, I got it. Your interrogators, some are
20 civilians?

21 A Yes, sir

22 Q. And your translators are civilians, as well?

23 A Yes, sir.

1 Q And when you took over as the FOB, were the civilians,
2 their credentials checked by you or, that says they understand
3 their right and left limits authorized in terms of interrogation
4 practices?

5 A Sir, the civilian interrogators, yes. The
6 interpreters, I honestly couldn't say

7 Q I asked a couple of your civilian employees today, a
8 translator and an interrogator, whether they understood that
9 since they are employees of the United States Government in the
10 United States military forces, of their status under the Geneva
11 Convention should they be retained, detained, killed, wounded by
12 Anti-Coalition Forces And they stipulated that they didn't
13 exactly know what their status to be Were they given the
14 training that you know of that says, this guy is interrogating
15 Iraqi detainees, that conceivably, because of our combat
16 environment here, they could conceivably also be captured or
17 detained by Anti-Coalition Forces. Do you know if they were
18 given any instructions on the Geneva Convention?

19 A On their status, sir, or the detainees' status?

20 Q On their status and on their understanding of the
21 Geneva Convention as to relate to their job and as it relates to
22 the detainee, as it relates to their responsibility whereby they
23 should be aware of the basic fundamentals of the Geneva

1 Convention, that they could be charged as a war criminal if they
2 violate that?

3 A Sir, I did not have the program to do that. I don't
4 know whether----

5 Q Does your lawyer know that? Did he help you? That if
6 you have a civilian contractor conducting interrogation
7 operations, a collection of information, a collection of
8 intelligence, sensitive of this information might be of what
9 their status could be, that regardless of whether they're a
10 civilian or not, that they still could be culpable to violations
' of the Geneva Convention?

12 A Sir, I don't know that we ever told them that, per se.
13 I do believe that the civilian employees, at least the ones that
14 I worked with, were aware of the standards of conduct with
15 regard to detainees. I never personally told them nor did I
16 have any training program in place to provide the information
17 that you just gave them. They walked through the same training
18 program that the regular interrogators did that said "this is
19 the right and left limits for interrogations " They were
20 required to read, when General Sanchez published them and they
21 were published on the bulletin board as I showed you, the
22 dignity and respect memos. And those were the, I believe that
_3 they went through the same training and signed the same memos

1 that our interrogators did, which were in line with the Geneva
2 Convention. So with regards to that, I believe that they knew
3 the right and left limits of interrogations. But I certainly
4 never did brief them on their status with regard to the
5 specifics of their status with regard to being combatants, nor
6 did I tell them that they were subject to being held accountable
7 as war criminals if they violated that

8 Q Now, they're typically classified as noncombatants,
9 but they could be construed as collaborating with the military
10 forces in the performance of their duty to which they are
11 contracted for

12 A Yes, sir

13 Q Did you also know that, perhaps, at least that we know
14 of, that one of your translators does not even have a security
15 clearance that he is performing duties of collection and
16 gathering and interpretation of sensitive information?

17 A No, sir. When the interpreters came to us from a
18 Titar contract that was run out here at CJTF-7, my understanding
19 is that when we received those interpreters, they came with a
20 secret clearance.

21 Q Well, I advise you now that you're no longer the FOB
22 commander, that at least one of them is still pending a security
23 clearance. And I will advise you that that one particular

1 individual is working on a special project of a highly sensitive
2 nature whereby he's collecting intelligence information to which
3 he may not have access to. And I also mention that to the
4 interrogators. So I strongly recommend that if you have any of
5 those personnel, that I strongly recommend to you that you
6 change it. Because then you may be violating another set of
7 circumstances called the protection of security information, and
8 I don't know if you advised that to General [REDACTED] or not.

9 A I will certainly need to talk to her about that, sir,
10 because we, as I said, we relied on the personnel who came down
11 there were to have security clearances. The contracting officer
12 was here at the CJTF-7. And so when they were assigned to me, I
13 made the assumption that they did. None of the interpreters
14 ever came with their--I forget the form number, sir, their
15 security clearance form. But----

16 Q But they came with a packet. I assume they came with
17 some sort of a personnel packet introducing them as a matter of
18 record.

19 A Yes, sir.

20 Q What they were hired to do, who they were assigned to,
21 and some sort of a background check of some sort.

1 A. Yes, sir, and that would be monitored by the Titan
2 Corporation representative here, and I'll certainly look into
3 that when we break.

4 Q I strongly suggest you do that.

5 A Yes, sir

6 Q Interrogation sites

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q Where, to your understanding, are those authorized
9 sites to be?

10 A There are three general places, sir, that we allow
11 interrogations to be conducted at. There is the steel site,
12 which is over by Camp Vigilant areas, the site they call Site
13 Wood, which is over across the way from the hard site. And then
14 occasionally, they would do interrogations in the facility,
15 itself, in the hard site facility itself in the corner, in the
16 back. And then, from time to time, they would do it in a shower
17 area in the hard site.

18 Q In the hard site, those were the authorized sites that
19 you know of.

20 A Yes, sir.

21 Q Recall, if you can, at a time where the use of dogs
22 were utilized inside the hard site. And specifically, a
23 [REDACTED] who was a canine dog handler, who reportedly

1 made in his statement where he was instructed to go into the
2 hard site for the purpose of an interview. And he made a
3 comment and turned to you, since you just happened to be in the
4 proximity from where he was, proximity, of course, is the
5 vicinity of the hard site. When he got this set of instructions
6 from someone, he turned to you and he asked you, "Is it okay for
7 me to use the dogs in the hard site in the interview of
8 detainees?" Do you recall that?

9 A No, sir, I do not. I recall an instance where I spoke
10 to a dog handler. It was in the courtyard of Camp Vigilant
11 And we had a discussion about the dogs, and I said, I may have
12 said, "I don't recall," but we had a discussion and we talked a
13 little bit about dogs and that they could be used in
14 interrogations relative to this memorandum. But I don't recall
15 getting into any specifics of how or when. And I don't recall
16 ever that instance.

17 Q Authority to use dogs for interviews or interrogation?

18 A Well, sir, other than in the way that it's laid out in
19 the memorandum that you have right there, no, sir.

20 Q Do you know how many dogs, working military dogs are
21 in the FOB under the control of the MP unit?

22 A Sir, I believe that there were at one time, I think
23 there were five. There was three Navy working dogs and two Army

1 working dogs. The only discussion that I have ever had relative
2 to those dogs was on two occasions. One time, I talked to the
3 Navy head and talked to him about bomb sniffing and working with
4 the guards. And I did talk to some of my interrogation section
5 leaders about using dogs, and they were talking about how they
6 would set it up. And I said, "If you're going to use them in a
7 booth with interrogations as directed by the CG, they have to be
8 muzzleed. And those are the only--those are the only times that
9 I can recall discussing dogs

10 Q Are you aware that on or about the 24th of November at
11 the time of the riot at Ganai, and also subsequent to the
12 snooting that occurred in Tier One A, second floor, and when the
13 IRF was called to action and of course, associated to the IRF
14 was the five military working dogs, that a team of
15 interrogators, who we were told were civilians, wearing civilian
16 clothes, and also an interpreter, entered the cell of the
17 individual, the shooter, or someone associated with the shooter,
18 where dogs were called to either intimidate or cause fear or
19 stress on that particular detainee? Were you made aware of
20 that?

21 A No, sir. What I was aware of on that night was that,
22 and what I witnessed, was the use of dogs. I witnessed the use
23 of dogs as they were being used in a security role, not for

1 interrogations. As they were doing so, they were going in and
2 sniffing, looking for weapons and things like that in the cells.
3 And as they were shaking down some of the Iraqi police, I
4 witnessed dogs being used on the other side in a--they were not
5 muzzled, they were barking in an effort to control these
6 potential suspects as they were being inspected by military
7 police to make sure that they didn't have any weapons. The
8 specific event that you just described I was unaware of. I do
9 know that [REDACTED] along with several other people, I
10 don't know who they were, went into the cell, went after the
11 guy. As I understood, there were some civilian interpreters, as
12 well as some other guys, went into the cell. I became aware of
13 that during a different 15-6. And what my guidance was is that
14 that would be--only the IRF would go in and participate in such
15 actions and that that was inappropriate.

16 Q Did they make an identification of who the two
17 civilian interrogators were?

18 A Sir, the only--as I said, the details of this were
19 brought to my attention during the out brief with [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED] based on a 15-6, and he did not identify who those
21 people were. We both agreed that it would be more appropriate,
22 and I talked to the MPs about that, as well, that the IRF
23 respond to such things and that we not form our own. Although

1 they had good intelligence and good intentions, that they not
2 form their own formation and go in there and do that, but that
3 we use established procedures

4 Q The rationale was because the dog handler that was
5 involved in that particular incident did substantiate the fact
6 that the interpreter was there and did indicate the fact that
7 there were two civilian military interrogators in there, despite
8 the outcome of the 15-6. And if that would be the case and if
9 that was brought to your attention, did you subsequently go back
10 to your interrogators to remind them whether he was suspected,
11 alleged, substantiated or even perceived, that the use of
12 military dogs for interrogative purposes, not for searches are
13 to be in violation of this particular policy?

14 A I certainly would have, sir, had that been brought to
15 my attention. This is the first--as I said, the first heard
16 that there was an interrogation done with regard to that. And
17 that is a first heard for me.

18 Q Okay, fair enough. All right, the use of military
19 dogs, as you have stipulated, could be used for interrogation,
20 provided they're muzzled. They have to have a muzzle on during
21 interrogation.

22 A Yes, sir.

1 Q. If that would be the case then, why would you want to
2 use dogs for interrogative purposes? What's the purpose of the
3 military dog?

4 A Sir, the purpose of the dog would be, and again, it is
5 a--and I think that's one of the reasons that, as you look at
6 the dogs, that they're not used very much in interrogations.
7 And we discussed this on several occasions and the interpreters-
8 -or the interrogators have brought to my attention that, "Well,
9 it's not very intimidating if they're muzzled." And my response
10 to that was, "Well, then don't use them. Find another way." We
11 went in with the request. The paper came back saying they had
12 to be muzzled. That's the standard and that's the----

13 Q Who did request that to?

14 A It was on a list of--the draft prior to this, was a
15 list of numerous things that were on there, that we put on. I
16 couldn't recall the draft, sir. I think we ended up with about
17 A through F or S of things that we could do during the original
18 draft that we sent forth to the SJA. There was many more things
19 on that that we requested.

20 Q When you made that list, did your own SJA approve of
21 the list?

22 A Yes, sir.

1 Q And you understood that that was competent legal
2 advice?

3 A Yes, sir.

4 Q That it was not prohibited under the context of the
5 Geneva Convention?

6 A Yes, sir.

7 Q The use of force to coerce, to intimidate, to cause
8 fear, that sort of thing?

9 A Yes, sir.

10 Q And based on that remark, let me read to you now a
11 quote from the Geneva Convention It says "Prisoners of war to
12 which, also the category of civilian detainees and detainees,
13 are constantly to be protected, particularly against acts of
14 violence or intimidation and against insults and public
15 curiosity "

16 A Yes, sir.

17 Q Did that fall, did the use of dogs fall outside of
18 that particular statement, do you think?

19 A. Sir, I'll be honest, I never really--I did not
20 personally look at that with regard to the Geneva Convention.
21 It was a technique that I had discussed with General Miller when
22 he was here. In the execution of interrogations and the
23 interrogation business, in general, we are trying to get

1 information from people. We have to create an environment not
2 to permanently damage them or psychologically abuse them, but we
3 have to assert control and get detainees into a position where
4 they're willing to talk to us. That was a technique that was
5 addressed. We put it forth in a document.

6 Q What did General [REDACTED] with that technique?

7 A Sir, I honestly don't recall the specifics of what we
8 discussed. He said that they used military working dogs, and
9 that they were effective in setting the atmosphere for which,
10 you know, you could get information. Certainly using the dogs,
11 okay, in the booth with or without a muzzle, they would have
12 been leashed, and it would never be my intent that the dog be
13 allowed to bite or in any way touch a detainee or anybody else,
14 which is why the report that you just gave surprised me.

15 Q Were you aware of the use of two Army military working
16 dogs that were called in for a search, given that kind of
17 intent, not to be used for a search, but used for another
18 purpose, called "photo opportunity," which the two guards
19 perpetrated a situation where they took the detainee out of his
20 cell, stripped him of his clothing, cuffed him, made him lie on
21 the floor. And in that particular context, somehow both dogs
22 were released and attacked the detainee. Are you familiar with-
23 ---

1 A. No, sir, I am not.

2 Q And I make that remark only because the interrogation
3 rules of engagement typify or at least outline the use of the
4 presence of military dogs, must have the express approval, if
5 I'm not mistaken, of General Sanchez, for which I'll read to
6 you, "Presence of military working dogs require CG's approval."
7 It didn't say where It didn't say "muzzled." It just
8 basically said, "Presence of military working dogs...." Was
9 this then a revised interrogation rules of engagement after
10 January or is this the one that followed the same context of the
11 October 2003 memo? Do you recall?

12 A Sir, I don't recall I don't believe that this--this
13 was based on the memorandum I believe that we had the CG's
14 approval to use dogs as long as, based on this memorandum, as
15 long as they were muzzled And that is the instructions that I
16 gave to my people I don't necessarily--and this was with
17 regards, specifically, to interrogations and was not further
18 disseminated.

19 Q Because--look underneath here that basically
20 indicated--let me put my glasses on, it's in fine print, that
21 basically said, "The use of the techniques are subject to the
22 general safeguards as provided as well as specific guidance
23 implemented by the 205th MI Commander, FM 34-52, and Commanding

1 General CJTF-7" I believe that to be very directive, and you
2 had indicated that these rules of engagement were provided,
3 briefed, instructed, posted somewhere, where all members of your
4 interrogating team understood the intent with regards to this
5 rule.

6 A Yes, sir.

7 Q And you said that they signed a memo stipulating that.

8 A Yes, sir.

9 Q Do you think you may have a copy of, or file copies of
10 those interrogators signing, that they understood the provisions
11 of the interrogation rules of engagement?

12 A Sir, if they were available, they would be down in the
13 files at the Abu Ghraib I don't have anything personally with
14 me, no, sir.

15 Q Because those interrogators are still there, with the
16 exception of those that departed Is that correct?

17 A Yes, sir.

18 Q That's probably what we need to check on, to make sure
19 that there's a understanding That rationale that you had,
20 Colonel Pappas, the detainee abuses or the detainee
21 maltreatment, is not only prevalent--not prevalent, I should
22 say, could be caused under the detention operations, under the
23 direct purview of the MPs, but in the context of our interview

1 so far, we determined that interrogators are also susceptible to
2 causing an understanding on an environment to be interpreted as
3 detainee abuses if they're not clearly understood with regards
4 to the utilization of dogs or to the further explanation of what
5 an interrogation plan is supposed to indicate of whether it's
6 for isolation, segregation, sleep management plan, or any
7 deprivation of liberties.

8 A Yes, sir.

9 Q That is in fact, would be related to detainee abuses
10 that in some instances have been documented as allegedly what
11 happened Okay, do you have anything you want to add?

12 A No, sir

13 [Colonel Pappas was duly warned and departed the interview area.
14 The interview paused at 1714, 12 February 2004 and continued at
15 1724, 12 February 2004.]

16 Q ...that one of them included the use of military
17 working dogs, and that your SJA reviewed and approved of your
18 recommendation up through the chain.

19 A Yes, sir.

20 Q Again, please, could you tell me who you submitted
21 this request to, since you were still OPCON to the 800th MP at
22 that time?

1 A Sir, we were not OPCON to the 800th MP. We were to
2 TACON to the 800th----

3 Q I'm sorry, you were TACON, okay.

4 A ----for force protection, only. And so, I submitted
5 that directly through my SJA to [REDACTED], the CJTF-7 SJA.

6 Q And in their mind, those techniques were not approved
7 or approved?

8 A Sir, there were actually two memos that came out. The
9 one that you have a copy of is the one that I have a copy of
10 There was a previous one that had some additional techniques on
11 them that came down, that was later rescinded. And that
12 provided some additional techniques that were on there. It was
13 still going through the staffing process with Central Command,
14 and I think Central Command expressed some concerns about some
15 of the additional techniques. And it was a minute document that
16 you have a copy of, that I provided to you. And the thing that
17 I don't have a copy of is I sent a forwarding order to the JDIC
18 telling them to implement the instructions as of the 11 October
19 document that you have.

20 Q The approved----

21 A Yes, sir.

22 Q And those were given----

1 A Sir, I know that he has had some background in
2 criminal law, in terms of being a--prosecution. I don't know, I
3 think he had some administrative time, and I don't know his
4 background in OPLAW.

5 Q All right, that's fair. Is he still with you?

6 A Yes, sir.

7 Q Who drafted and approved the ROE subsequent, you
8 mentioned General Sanchez did that? You drafted it, you
9 submitted it, reviewed by [REDACTED] and subsequently
10 approved by General Sanchez?

11 A Sir, we worked the staff action together with the SJA
12 and submitted it to General Sanchez

13 Q Were there any other submissions or new techniques or
14 recommended techniques after the first one?

15 A Not that I'm aware of, sir

16 Q So no emails or anything of that nature, sir?

17 A Not that I'm aware of, sir

18 Q And again, were any of these approved techniques
19 approved interrogation rules of engagement? Was there any
20 attempt on one part to share that with the MP Battalion
21 Commander that was under your purview or given a copy of to
22 General Karpinski's staff?

1 A Sir, I did not give that to the MP Battalion on the
2 ground, I did not.

3 Q Should you have?

4 A I should have, yes, sir.

5 Q In 34-15--I'm sorry, in FM 34-52, is it doctrinal
6 there or anywhere found in there to utilize military dogs in
7 interrogation practices?

8 A Sir, I don't--I can't recall. I don't think so, but I
9 couldn't honestly say without having the manual in front of me.

10 Q I see, so what you're really going by is another idea
11 not necessarily contained doctrinally in 34-52 or anyplace else,
12 or----

13 A As I expressed, sir, that particular idea came from
14 Guantanamo Bay and my discussions during the General Miller
15 visit. For the most part, those techniques that you see on that
16 memo are all relative out of 34-52

17 Q All those except----

18 A I don't believe that military working dogs was in
19 there

20 Q You said you held prison meetings, how often did you
21 do that?

22 A Sir, we held mayor's meetings with all of the
23 component commanders on the base once a week.

1 Q Once a week?

2 A Yes, sir.

3 Q. So, all the commanders or their representatives were
4 there?

5 A Yes, sir.

6 Q Did you keep minutes of those meetings?

7 A No, sir. I'm sure that we can probably--well, I don't
8 want to say this. I did not keep minutes of those meetings,
9 sir. I might be able to go back and get you copies of the
10 briefings. I don't know how far they would go back.

11 Q Once again, further clarity, prior to you taking over
12 the Abu Ghraib FOB, you indicated that you had already been
13 TACON to the 800th MP Brigade

14 A Yes, sir.

15 Q When was that effective?

16 A Sir, I don't recall.

17 Q Give me a window, like May, June, July?

18 A Sir, it would have been sometime in the
19 September/October timeframe.

20 Q And you were again, your headquarters was not even
21 located Abu Ghraib.

22 A That is correct, sir.

1 Q And then, sometime around the 19th of November, you
2 received instructions whereby appointing you to be the Forward
3 Operating Base Commander of Abu Ghraib.

4 A Yes, sir

5 Q And you still remained TACON to the 800th MP?

6 A No, sir. At that point in time, the relationship was
7 changed and the 320th MP Battalion was made TACON to me for
8 force protection.

9 Q For force protection, but you no longer had command
10 relations with the 800th MP.

11 A Sir, the only relationship that I ever had with that--
12 mv unit assigned there, the JDIC, ever had with the 800th MP was
13 TACON for the purposes of force protection at Abu Ghraib.

14 Q I'm just trying to establish here some timelines.

15 A Yes, sir

16 Q You mentioned you were TACON to the 800th.

17 A My operation at Abu Ghraib, yes, sir.

18 Q But you were TACON before that to the 800th.

19 A The operation that I had at Abu Ghraib was TACON to
20 the 800th.

21 Q Okay, let me back up. Maybe I'm not phrasing the
22 question properly. Before Abu Ghraib, before 19 November, were
23 you TACON to the 800th MPs?

1 A The Brigade, at large, sir?

2 Q You, right.

3 A My understanding, no, sir.

4 Q Okay, so there was never any command relationship with
5 your Brigade to that of the 800th MP prior to the 19th of
6 November

7 A Sir, I would have to go back and look at the FRAGOs.
8 I understood that my forces that were assigned to Abu Ghraib----

9 Q No, to you. You, as the Commander of the 205th.

10 A No, no, sir. I was never personally under the 800th
11 MP Brigade.

12 Q None of your elements were ever associated prior to
13 the 19th, 19 November and previous, did you or any elements of
14 your Brigade, TACON, OPCON, attached, assigned to the 800th MP
15 Battalion.

16 A Those elements that were stationed on Abu Ghraib, and
17 there were elements of my unit stationed on Abu Ghraib from
18 approximately September on, various elements were TACON to the
19 800th MPs for purposes of the specific task of force protection.

20 Q Okay, and that included the 519th, the 165th, all
21 those folks.

22 A Yes, sir, the 165th would have fallen under---would
23 have been the 519th and those soldiers associated, it was a

1 myriad of people associated with the joint interrogation and
2 debriefing site.

3 Q. Okay. So on the 19th of November, you got a FRAGO
4 that appointed you Commander of Forward Operating Base Abu
5 Ghraib

6 A Yes, sir

7 Q For the purpose of security of detainees, as you
8 understand it, for the purpose of base operations.

9 A Force protection, yes, sir.

10 Q Did that include, did you understand under the content
11 of that FRAGO, that that included conducting improvements to the
12 quality of life there? Did you understand that to be anything
13 else beyond security of detainees and force protection?

14 A Well, I took on that role, sir. I mean, working with
15 everybody, we wanted to improve the quality of life as the
16 Commander of the FOB, although it was not a specified task in
17 the order. I worked with the 320th MP Battalion. I brought in
18 the 165th to help me with security. And we attempted to lay
19 down a plan that would increase the quality of life for soldiers
20 down there in terms of engineering support, and I did that with
21 the cognizance of the Deputy Commanding General, Major General
22 Wojdakowski.

1 Q What about the tactical late, namely Alpha, 1st of the
2 505th? What was your relationship with them?

3 A Sir, we did not have an official command relationship.
4 They occupied space I worked with their Battalion Commander in
5 coordinating the operations that were ongoing. I tried to
6 facilitate their operations, but I did not have a specific
7 command relationship with them. They remained under the direct
8 control of their Battalion Commander

9 Q Your understanding that those units in the FOB, your
10 perimeter, were TACON to you

11 A Sir, the 320th MP Battalion was TACON to me. The
12 251st RAIOC was actually attached to me and there was an order
13 specifying that on the 11th of January, I believe. And the
14 quartermaster unit, I mean, that was never specified in any
15 order, but they did what we asked them to do

16 Q Did [REDACTED] at any time, ask you for
17 clarification on what his TACON relationship was with you?

18 A No, sir, we never discussed that, no, sir.

19 Q Did you assume that he understood what TACON meant?

20 A Yes, sir.

21 Q Was there any specific instructions relative to TACON?

22 A No, sir.

1 Q What did you understand TACON of these elements to you
2 meant?

3 A Sir, that I would take responsibility for essentially
4 the security of the base. We published a base defense plan that
5 he would participate with us in developing the mayor's weekly
6 meetings that he did, developing projects and quality of life
7 enhancements for the soldier on the installation, and that they
8 would continue to, you know, if I could help him on something,
9 that they would do that, that they could come to me and I would
10 try to help them as best that I could

11 Q So you understood, based on your previous remark, that
12 he was TACON to you, that includes the security of detainees.

13 A Yes, sir

14 Q Less those that are clearly specified as detainee
15 operations

16 A Yes, sir.

17 Q That was his sole responsibility

18 A He was, to include General Wojdakowski, sir, they were
19 the warden of--the prison warden for the installation. So I----

20 Q That included the----

21 A It included Ganci, Vigilant, the hard site----

22 Q Okay

1 A It remained under their cognizance. They were
2 responsible for reporting through the national detainee
3 reporting system. They were responsible for providing guards.
4 They were responsible for transporting people. They were
5 responsible for care and feeding. If they asked me for some
6 help with that, I attempted to help them, running a contract.
7 They were running out of money. I went to the Carve and worked
8 with them on doing that. They talked to me about not having
9 sufficient guards to guard the facility. I worked a contract
10 with Eagle Contracting, sir, but that remained within their
11 purview. I just felt I was obligated to help them with that if
12 I could.

13 Q So in that regard then, what did you see as the
14 relations of your interrogating team for the purpose of
15 collecting information and intelligence relative to that of
16 detention operations.

17 A Sir, we were a supported unit.

18 Q To collect, so you don't see yourself both as a
19 supporting or a supported unit?

20 A Sir, you're asking what I thought the relationship
21 was? I believe that we were, with regard to interrogations,
22 that the interrogators were a supported unit. As I stated, when
23 they brought things to my attention that they needed help with,

1 I attempted to use my resources and my influence, what little I
2 had with the CJTF staff to help them get what they needed. When
3 they came and said they didn't have sufficient guard forces, one
4 of the reasons I brought in the 165th was that they manned all
5 the towers. I had some free people and so I was able to work
6 that with [REDACTED] to come in and pull security. When we
7 were able to free up some LRS teams to help with counter-mortar
8 and work, and it was just working with Alpha 1st of the 504th
9 So we tried our best to increase the force protection posture of
10 the installation. As you know, sir, we were short personnel,
11 and it was not a perfect or ideal situation we were working at
12 the very end, and I passed this on to Colonel [REDACTED] and General
13 [REDACTED], as well, trying to get some sort of counter-fire
14 capability out there from a force protection standpoint to help
15 us with the mortar problems

16 Q You mentioned that you at least made one attempt with
17 General Karpinski to recommend to her that the MPs be rolled up
18 in your operation.

19 A Yes, sir, just the MPs, cell block One A, and those
20 MPs that were, at that time, providing escort back and forth to
21 the detainees

1 Q And you didn't want to have anything to do with
2 interrogation or any of those detainees that were being
3 interviewed or interrogated at Gancl or Vigilant?

4 A Sir, I didn't want to control the guard forces, no,
5 sir. I didn't think it was--at Camp Gancl, sir, of course, most
6 of the detainees, all but a few hundred, are not of intelligence
7 value. And so, we would have no interest there. At Camp
8 Vigilant, in retrospect, as you asked that question, sir, I
9 never thought of it that way. It probably would have been
10 helpful to do that, but my intention was that those working in
11 cell block One A and the escorts going back and forth would be
12 the only ones that----

13 Q You wanted to limit it to that area.

14 A Yes, sir.

15 Q And of course, the response from General Karpinski was
16 basically, "No, because I'm short people, this and that."

17 A Yes, sir, and I know that--yes, sir, basically, "No,"
18 yes, sir

19 MG Taguba: Okay, well, that completes at least the
20 additional comments that we have.

21 [REDACTED] was duly warned, and the interview terminated at
22 1744, 12 February 2004.]

On 19 February 2004, a team of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Ghraib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Ghraib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence.

The following persons were present:

MG Antonio M. Taguba, [REDACTED], DCG-CFLCC, Interviewer

[REDACTED]
COL [REDACTED]

This is the second interview of [REDACTED] on 19 FEB 04.

The interview is summarized as follows:

I believed that I was responsible for the Force Protection of the facility. To include the detainees, the soldiers, and civilians who stayed and worked at the BCCF. The way that I interpreted the orders was that it would be a Force Protection mission and not detainee operations. I assumed that the 320th Military Police Battalion was responsible for the hard site facility, and I was free from any responsibility of detainee operations.

[REDACTED] was my deputy for interrogation operations. He was also responsible for the joint interrogation and retention-debriefing center.

I did request control of Tier 1a and 1b eventually. Tier 1a was done early on to provide segregation facilities for interrogation operations, the request for 1b came after the capture of Saddam Hussein when we had an increase in our mission to take care of those detainees captured surrounding HVD-1. When I did not make the request through BG Karpinski, we made it through the Iraqi Bureau of Prisons, my DCO did that directly with the Iraqis.

My understanding was that the hard site except for 1a and 1b was under the direction of the Iraqi Bureau of Prisons, it was not a coalition operation, the 320th MP's provided support of the Iraqi Bureau of Prisons. The prisoners in Blocks 2 thru 4 were not Geneva Conventions type detainees, they were common Iraqi criminals. Tier 1a and 1b was exclusively under U.S. military control up until sometime in December was used for interrogations. Tier 1b was a multi-purpose area until the Iraqi Bureau of Prisons gave us exclusive rights.

I understood that the MP guards that worked Tier 2 thru 4, and the MP guards that worked Tier 1a and 1b were from the same company. I didn't issue a formal request, I just spoke to BG Karpinski about a MP detachment to focus primarily on Tier 1a.

I may have made an incorrect assumption, but I interpreted that the mission was Force Protection, owning the ground per se, and not the requirement to do detainee operations. The reason I say this is because I did not have the expertise or the staff to accomplish such a mission.

TACON doctrinally means to me limited control over specified units for specified task. I set the priorities for specified task. With regards to other missions that they may have to perform it is the controlling unit. I came to the conclusion that it was a Force Protection type mission to make sure we did a better job of protecting the force and protecting the detainees. I knew that the MP's were having problems with the outside security of the facility. I didn't receive any clarifying guidance from the CJTF staff. The MP's continue to send reports of detainee counts and prison status and I never entered into that business. My focus was a new gate security plan, requesting for additional civilian support, and construction projects under a centralized authority.

I believed the MP's to be in control of Tier 1a and 1b.

[REDACTED] reads a section of the Camp Vigilant SOP of the 320th MP Battalion dtd 10 OCT 03.

It was common knowledge that [REDACTED] had access to Tier 1a and 1b of the hard site. I know that he was working with MP's, the only one MP I know for sure is [REDACTED]. I know that he and [REDACTED] would work with the MP's to make sure the conditions were being set for interrogations.

After the riot had been subsided, it had been 4 or 5 days after I had taken control of the FOB, and I was unfamiliar with all of the procedures. I had talked to the MP's about what had happened and asked [REDACTED] to make sure that we sent a good report to higher about the riot. That evening BG Karpinski called me and said, "Do you realize that there has been a shooting on Tier 1a?" I hadn't call that day to inform BG Karpinski of the riot, [REDACTED] told me that he reported it higher to his boss, and I left it at that.

I actually had been informed after the riot, and I told [REDACTED] that we needed to work on that. I had not put in place appropriate command and control measures to make sure that I was getting simultaneously reporting with those that was going to the MP Brigade. When BG Karpinski called she asked me did I know what had occurred, I said no ma'am I did not. I went to find out what happened, I got a hold of [REDACTED] and he explained the situation.

[REDACTED] was on the scene of the incident and he did not inform me about what had happened. He was also involved in searching the cell of the inmate who had the firearm.

hidden away. It is not common for MI personnel to be leading a search. It was common that [REDACTED] would conduct searches without notifying the MP chain of command or myself. In December and January I worked to have him reassigned to other duties. I was familiar that a certain number of Iraqi guards had assisted in the detainee obtaining the firearm. We talked to the Iraqi Bureau of Prisons and the CPA about what or plans were for questioning the Iraqi guards as they came through. My understanding was that the MP's provided the guard support and my interrogators work with them in the interviewing of the Iraqi guards.

[REDACTED] rating chain went through the C-2 element, I don't know who rates him, he is not assigned to my brigade. I assumed he was sent down from the C-2 to fill the deputy's position, or to assist with operations at Abu Graib, just as [REDACTED] is doing now. I think he was sent to fill the position of the deputy for the JDC, it's just that he worked in a separate chain of supervision than I was and he remained a part of the C-2's operational staff. The duties that I thought he was providing were to basically to be my assistant and to insure that interrogations were conducted properly. The operations center [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Rivas would have been under his direct supervision. [REDACTED] was assigned to my brigade, but she was transferred out.

As FOB Commander I did not confront [REDACTED] about the limits of his duties and responsibilities. [REDACTED] now works for C-2 on a special project.

After the riot we made a report to higher that explained the circumstances under which the events happened, I sent the report to higher headquarters. I also reported it through the chain of command. I didn't discuss the duties and responsibilities of [REDACTED] with BG Fast. I would say an accurate description of [REDACTED] is a loner who freeianges between MP and MI, and I must admit that I failed in not reigning him in.

The only background information on [REDACTED] is what he has told me. He said that he worked for the transportation security agency. He wore the MI branch insignia when he was with me. My understanding was that his specialty was a straight tactical intelligence, if had any other specialties I am unaware.

Towards the end of December I made my request that he be removed. I came to the conclusion that there was a little too much freelancing, and I found out from [REDACTED] after reviewing the 15-6 how problematic it was with what happened on the floor that night. After being walked through the proper procedures with [REDACTED], I realized that the IRF should have done the search. I should have known better, and I am the one to blame for that. I did not recommend any actions against [REDACTED]. By the time I went through the procedures with [REDACTED] was already gone. I didn't report it to BG Fast, but I should have.

I know of FM 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation, but I can't give you details of what the manual consists of. My unit conducts interrogations and I also have units that are associated with Intelligence Interrogation.

MG Taguba reads an excerpt from the JIF (Joint Interrogations and Debriefing Cell), Chapter 8

I was the Commander of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center

MG Tugaba reads from FM 101-5 on page F-2 on TACON

The only thing I can say is that I did not read that FM prior to the definition I related on what I understood TACON to be. When I took on the mission, the way that I understood it to be was security of detainees relative to Force Protection in the sense of I would take on that responsibility as I previously described. I briefed a mission analysis on the specified and applied task to my Deputy and my S-3 informally. I did not convey this mission analysis to my subordinate units.

I was explained that the partition on the bottom floor of Tier 1a was used to block the view of Iraqi guards coming in and out of the facility. There were 2 ways to get in and out of Tier 1a and 1b. Up until 24 NOV 03 the date of the incident, the backside had been guarded by the Iraqi prison guards.

On 25 DEC 03, helicopters flew over the Camps. I had received reports of a possible uprising in conjunction with the Christmas season, so we used it as a training opportunity and a demonstration to the guards and detainees that we had the ability to quickly reinforce if there was an uprising. I believe the 320th MP Battalion had knowledge of the demonstration but I did not inform them directly. I should have coordinated that with the QRF but I probably should have. BG Karpinski called me on the incident, and I also talked to my Battalion Commander, and it never happened again. I believe we did share the information with the MP's about the demonstration. I informed all the commanders a Base Defense Order that covered the Force Protection Posture for the day. I designed in my mind that it was a demonstration to prevent something from happening, I didn't have anything in my mind that it would be no more than a demonstration. It should have been a coordinated exercise.

The MG Taguba briefed [REDACTED] and then dismissed him.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form see AR 190 45 the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY Title 18 USC Section 301 Title 5 USC Section 2951 E.O. 9397 dated November 22 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified

ROUTINE USES Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval

DISCLOSURE Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1 LOCATION Victory Base, Iraq APO AE 09342	2 DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/02/11	3 TIME 1800	4 FILE NUMBER
5 LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6 SSN [REDACTED]	7 GRADE/STATUS COL/O 6	

8 ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HHD 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, APO AE 09096

9 [REDACTED] WANTS TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

I was interviewed by Major General Taguba, an AR 15-6 Investigating Officer from CFLCC, on 9 February 2004 concerning detainee operations at CJTF 7 and allegations of detainee abuse at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib. The purpose of this statement is to provide a written record of that conversation by highlighting and amplifying key areas of discussion including command and control, the nature of detainee operations, and the relationship between intelligence and military police at the FOB. As a caveat, the instances of detainee abuse under investigation occurred before I assumed command of the FOB. This statement must be understood from that perspective.

Command and Control at the FOB was a complex intermingling of four distinct essential tasks under the command of two separate brigades: the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade and the 800th Military Police Brigade. These essential tasks included: detention operations and monitoring; the conduct of operational and strategic interrogations of key coalition detainees; providing assistance to the Iraq Bureau of Prisons in establishing and running a maximum security prison; and enhancing force protection for the approximately 1000 service members and civilians assigned to Abu Ghraib. Detailed information about the forward operating base and its tenant units is provided in the attached briefing (enclosure 1). In light of mortar attacks where both soldiers and detainees were killed, the FOB had tactical control (TACON) of forces limited to two specified tasks: force protection and detainee security (enclosure 2). The 320th Military Police (MP) Battalion (Bn) was charged with executing detention operations at the FOB. This included assignment of detainees to internment camps, the establishment of standards for internment facilities, the training and regulation of guards, transportation of detainees throughout the theater, and the establishment of policy and procedure relative to resettlement operations. Likewise, they had the responsibility for reporting of detainees through the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) and the forward of Serious Incident Reports (SIR) concerning detainees. The CJTF-7 Staff Judge Advocate Magistrate's Cell was charged with developing systems to review the status of detainees, ensure they were given appropriate hearings, Article 78 appeals, and status reviews. The CJTF-7 SJA had the lead in facilitating visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) through the 205th MI Bde was charged with executing interrogations at the FOB. The Commander, CJTF-7 set forth the operating parameters of the JIDC (enclosure 3). Prioritization of interrogations was determined by the Interrogation Targeting Board and sent directly to the JIDC by 205th MI Bde.

In a very real sense, everyone working at Abu Ghraib is involved in "detainee operations." Abu Ghraib, also known by MPs as the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility (BCCF), currently holds over 6500 detainees. Over 5500 of these are in direct U.S. custody. Just over 1500 of these are of intelligence interest to the coalition. The FOB exists to house these detainees and facilitate interrogations. There are three basic components of "detainee operations" that include detention, interrogation, and release. Staff supervision of these functions is provided by the Provost Marshal, the C2 and the Staff Judge Advocate respectively. Unfortunately, this split responsibility for detainee operations increased the pressure at lower levels and blurred lines of responsibility. Although command of the FOB provided me knowledge of all aspects and limited input, as laid out in the discussion on command and control, policy and task execution was conducted along functional lines through functional commands. As a result, almost all of my experience in detainee operations comes from the interrogation perspective. The details of this perspective are provided below.

Policies and procedures established by the JIDC relative to detainee operations were enacted as the result of a visit by MG Geoffrey Miller, the commander of Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay. During his visit, General Miller focused on four key areas: intelligence integration, synchronization and fusion, analysis, interrogation, and detention operations. During his visit, he rendered a written report, which is provided in this statement (enclosure 4). I have also provided his in-brief (enclosure 5), his outline (enclosure 6), and a draft update for the Secretary of Defense (enclosure 7). The key findings of his visit were that the

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [REDACTED] PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

INITIAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND PAGE NUMBER

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT Victory Base, Iraq DATED 2004/02/11

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

interrogators and analysts, develop a set of rules and limitations to guide interrogations, and provide dedicated MPs to support of interrogations. As a result of his visit the task force formed a JIDC. The requirements for manning were laid out in a request for forces (RFF) and a joint manning document (JMD). All recommendations were implemented with the exception of dedicated MP support.

The basic rules for interrogation operations are contained in Army Regulation 34-52, *Interrogation Operations*. The standards for the conduct of interrogations are outlined in CJTF-7 CG Memorandum dated 5 October 2003, Subject *CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy* (refer to enclosure 3) that were staffed with United States Central Command. These rules provide the left and right limits for interrogators.

Despite the articulation of clear rules, there were two violations of these standards that were brought to my attention prior to my assumption of command of the FOB and the incident that precipitated this investigation. The first of these was reported to me by the MPs in early October. The incident involved two female detainees and three male interrogators. The three soldiers accused of detainee abuse were removed from their interrogation positions and I asked CID to investigate because of the potential explosive nature of the incident. The investigation was unable to show beyond a reasonable doubt that detainee abuse occurred. However, it did show that these interrogators failed to follow established procedures for interrogation, constituting dereliction of duty. Each of the three soldiers involved was given punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (enclosure 8). Punishment was imposed by me. The second instance involved a female interrogator. It was reported to me by the then JIDC Deputy Director, [REDACTED]. I cannot recall the specifics of this incident but the interrogator was removed from her position as an interrogator and remanded to [REDACTED] for additional training. Long after the fact, I was made aware of some additional allegations of abuse in an ICRC report (enclosure 9). These allegations track closely with some of the allegations brought to my attention by CID in January.

After the first allegations of abuse, the leadership at the JIDC decided to implement a more aggressive policy of ensuring that their personnel were aware of all the limitations surrounding interrogation operations. All soldiers who conduct interrogations are required to sign a memorandum that they understand the rules and agree to abide by them. A blank copy of the agreement is provided (enclosure 10). Additionally, prior to starting work at the interrogation facility each person assigned undergoes training familiarize them with the facility and operations at Abu Ghraib. This training is conducted by the section leader. A copy of the training slides is provided as well (enclosure 11). Finally, to have a reminder of the interrogation rules of engagement (IROE) as well as other important information the JIDC created a wall with a blow up of the IROE and applicable memorandums signed by LTG Sanchez. Every person entering the JIDC passes by these items as they enter and leave the JIDC facility. Pictures of the wall are provided (enclosure 12).

The complex and sometimes confusing command and control inherent in detainee operations makes the inter-relationships among organizations extremely important and contentious. Despite a genuine commitment on the part of seniors at brigade-level to make the relationship work, there were several areas of friction between 320th MP Bn and the JIDC. There were significant differences in standards between the two units in major areas, such as allowing local nationals to live in the billets, uniform standards, and the saluting policy.

In conclusion, in response to a request of the investigating officer I would make two recommendations as a result of my experience and the incidents that occurred. First, ensure that MPs supporting the interrogation mission are attached to the JIDC so they can be better sensitized to the rules of interrogations and provide additional value added to the interrogation process. Second, if the desire of the task force is to put detainee operations under the purview of one commander at Abu Ghraib, that commander must have training in detention operations, interrogation operations, and detainee release procedures. The command relationship between the FOB commander and subordinate units should be OPCON, the officer should not have additional command responsibilities and the level of responsibility probably necessitates a General Officer. NOTHING FOLLOWS //

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT Victory Base, Iraq DATED 2004/02/11

STATEMENT (Continued)
NOTHING FOLLOWS

[REDACTED]

AFFIDAVIT

[REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 3 I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me a person authorized by law to administer oaths this 11th day of FEBRUARY 2004

at BAGHDAD, IRAQ.
[REDACTED]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

10 USC 1044

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

DEPOSITION

1

2

3 At Camp Doha, Kuwait, on 10 February 2004:

4 COLONEL [REDACTED] U.S. Army, CFLCC Staff Judge Advocate
5 deposing.

6 MASTER SERGEANT [REDACTED] U.S. Army, CFLCC-SJA, Senior Court
7 Reporter, has been detailed reporter for this deposition and has been
8 previously sworn.

9 COLONEL [REDACTED] U.S. Army, was sworn, and testified as
10 follows:

11 Q Please state your name for the record

12 A My full name is [REDACTED] Social
13 Security Number [REDACTED]

14 Q What is your rank, branch of service and current duty
15 position?

16 A I am a colonel in the JAG Corps and I am currently assigned
17 to the CFLCC Staff Judge Advocate's office

18 Q And how long have you been deployed in this particular
19 assignment?

20 A I arrived in theater on March 18 of 2003, nearly a year
21 ago

22 Q And you are in the reserve component?

1 A That is correct I am Individual Mobilization Augmentee
2 assigned specifically to assist the Staff Judge Advocate with enemy
3 prisoner of war operations

4 Q. As you are aware, Major General Antonio Taguba has been
5 directed by the Commander, CFLCC to conduct an investigation into
6 certain aspects of the detainee operations at the Abu Ghraib prison
7 in Baghdad, alleged detainee abuses He's also been asked to look at
8 detainee escapes from that prison and also he's been asked to look at
9 the command climate and various other matters dealing with the 800th
10 MP Brigade Are you aware of that?

11 A I am

12 Q And have you previously spoken to Major General Taguba
13 regarding the investigation?

14 A Yes. I spoke to General Taguba two nights ago

15 Q I'm going to just ask you some generic questions about your
16 knowledge of the 800th MP Brigade and your knowledge of these
17 particular areas that Major General Taguba is investigating today.
18 First of all, give me a little bit of background about your
19 relationship with the 800th MP Brigade prior to this particular
20 operation

21 A In June of 1992 I was appointed as the Command Judge
22 Advocate for the 800th MP Brigade and in that capacity I served with
23 the Brigade for three and a half years, leaving the organization in

1 March of 1996 Many of the people who I came to work with during
2 this deployment were assigned to the Brigade back then in subordinate
3 positions to the ones they presently held. Notably, specifically,
4 Colonel [REDACTED] was the S-4 back then. There were others who were
5 assigned, [REDACTED] the current S-3, was company commander, things like
6 that

7 Q So, you are somewhat familiar with some of the individuals
8 assigned to the 800th MP Brigade?

9 A Yes

10 Q When you arrived at CFLCC in March of 2003, what were your
11 principle duties?

12 A I was assigned to prepare for enemy prisoner of war
13 operations both assisting the Staff Judge Advocate in rendering
14 advice to the command with regard to the implementation of the Geneva
15 Conventions, as well as the execution of Army Regulation 190-8
16 Specifically there were two matters that involved much of my time in
17 that preliminary period, one of which involved the purchase of
18 cigarettes using appropriated funds for the distribution, the free
19 distribution, to the prisoners of war, the other which involved
20 drafting an SOP with regard to the use of force by MP guards against
21 prisoners in custody at that time

22 Q And in the course of your duties, did I assign you to the
23 Camp Bucca Theater Internment Facility?

1 A Yes you did I was sent up to Camp Bucca initially on
2 April 9th. April 9th was the day that we officially took over the
3 operation of that facility that had previously been run by the
4 British under the name of Camp Freddy. Colonel [REDACTED] and I
5 accompanied Colonel [REDACTED] on a visit that day and it was
6 determined at that time that really to effectively do my job I needed
7 to be on site. And upon returning, we immediately planned for my
8 immediate forward deployment, if you will, to Camp Bucca, and I
9 arrived at Camp Bucca on a permanent basis on April 12th, which was a
10 Sunday

11 Q And what were your duties and responsibilities at Camp
12 Bucca?

13 A I was there to provide legal advice to the Camp Commandant
14 relative to the execution of his responsibilities under the Geneva
15 Convention as well as coordinate and operate the Article 5 tribunal
16 process with regard to all persons that we were holding at that time

17 Q And approximately at that time, how many detainees or
18 internees were held at Camp Bucca?

19 A. There were somewhere, probably about six thousand prisoners
20 in the Camp at that time

21 Q And the chain of command at that point for the 800th MP
22 Brigade was what exactly?

1 A The Brigade Commander was Brigadier General Paul Hill. His
2 Deputy Commander was Colonel [REDACTED], who was also functioning as the
3 Camp Commandant at Camp Bucca. There were numerous battalions
4 assigned to the 800th, I'm not privy to know all the numbers, but
5 there were three battalions assigned to Camp Bucca, or there were
6 two, when I arrived a third arrived right after I did, that would be
7 the 320th MP Battalion, the 724th MP Battalion, and the last arriving
8 battalion was the 530th

9 Q What was the responsibility of those MP battalions at Camp
10 Bucca? What were their primary duties?

11 A The primary duties were to guard and protect the prisoners
12 in their charge, mostly prisoners of war. Some of whom, however,
13 that may have been innocent civilians that got swept up in the
14 combat. It was our job, my job particularly, to sort through who
15 everybody was and determine the proper legal status of the
16 individuals in custody. It was the MP's job to secure and protect
17 the individuals.

18 Q. And how many, or how long did you serve at Camp Bucca?

19 A I was at Camp Bucca for two months.

20 Q And following your service at Camp Bucca, where did you go?

21 A I returned here to Camp Doha, where I was, where I worked
22 for about six weeks and at the end of July, I was again sent forward
23 to assist the 800th MP Brigade with the mission that was being

1 executed at Camp Cropper, which was a corps holding area that had
2 been established outside Baghdad International Airport The 115th MP
3 Battalion specifically had the mission at Camp Cropper, but they had
4 approximately twelve hundred persons in custody at that time at that
5 location

6 Q And what were your responsibilities at Camp Cropper?

7 A At Camp Cropper, the mission had changed slightly, with the
8 commencement of our occupation, if you will in May, we had started
9 performing law enforcement operations and many, many of the people at
10 Camp Cropper had been picked up for violating a criminal code of some
11 sort And it was my responsibility to go through the files of all
12 these individuals and make a determination as to the availability of
13 evidence, the appropriateness of the charge, whether or not there was
14 even a file and with an eye towards making a determination of who
15 might have been picked up for a minor charge, who might have been
16 locked up for an extended period of time and could, therefore,
17 otherwise be felt to have served their appropriate amount of time and
18 be released

19 Q And what MP unit was tasked with providing, or in charge of
20 detainee operations at Camp Cropper?

21 A At Camp Cropper the battalion on the ground was the 115th,
22 but they were also a subordinate organization to the 800th. In fact I
23 was requested, by name, by Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] the Command

1 Judge Advocate for the 800th MP Brigade to go and assist the mission
2 at Cropper

3 Q And following the mission at Cropper, where did you next
4 go?

5 A Following the mission at Cropper, I was assigned to CPA,
6 the Coalition Provisional Authority Office, in Baghdad, to work in
7 the Ministry of Justice, specifically working in areas involving the
8 prisons department and detainees

9 Q And who was your supervisor at the Ministry of Justice?

10 A Initially, the senior advisor was Major General Donald
11 Campbell, he left shortly after I arrived and the incoming senior
12 advisor was Colonel [REDACTED]

13 Q And what were your, in general, your responsibilities at
14 the CPA?

15 A My responsibilities were to liaise with the prisons
16 department and assist them any way I could with regard to the
17 standing up of prison operations, as the prisons operation was new to
18 the Ministry of Justice function in Iraqi government. Also to
19 prepare a list of detainees that we had in our custody in Arabic so
20 that it could be distributed and disseminated amongst the civilian
21 population to -- so that they would be able to know whether or not
22 that any loved ones that they were missing were in fact in custody
23 and not dead

1 Q In the course of your responsibilities did you have
2 occasion to visit intern or detention facilities throughout Iraq?

3 A Regularly That was a regular part of my duties I was
4 often called to Abu Ghraib, or had business at Abu Ghraib I also
5 went to the pre-trial detention facilities that had been established
6 at Rousafa, Al Salhiyah, Khadhamiyah, Al Kharkh, there were a number
7 of them we set up throughout Baghdad

8 Q And in the course of your duties, did you have occasion to
9 come into contact with various members of the 800th MP Brigade?

10 A Whenever I visited any of these facilities, they were all
11 initially being operated by MPs of one organization or another
12 subordinate to the 800th MP Brigade, in conjunction with, in the later
13 stages of this, more and more members of the Iraqi Correctional
14 Service

15 Q Would you say that you have an intimate knowledge of the
16 detention system as it operates in Iraq today?

17 A I probably have as good a knowledge of that system today as
18 anybody in the theater

19 Q If you could, let's go back to your relationship with the
20 800th MP Brigade when you first went up to Camp Bucca I wonder if
21 you could just describe, generally, your impressions from, say, May
22 of 2003 to the present regarding the command climate, the morale,
23 whatever, of the 800th MP Brigade?

1 A Well, morale at Bucca in the combat phases of the operation
2 was very high. These were all Reservists and they were all
3 performing their mobilization mission and so everybody was very, very
4 keen on doing the best job they could. They kept watching, and every
5 night at the staff meeting when I would report how many people we had
6 interviewed and gone through and authorized to release, they were
7 always very anxious to hear that I had authorized the release of a
8 very large number of people, because it meant, to their mind, when
9 they had nobody left in the wire, they got to go home. That was
10 mission complete for them. By the end of May, we had gotten numbers
11 of people that we were holding in custody down to only five hundred
12 people. Now we had processed in probably close to about ten
13 thousand, so the amount of people that we had processed and gotten
14 out through one form or another was substantial in a relatively short
15 period of time. At about that time, it was announced towards the end
16 of May that the 800th was going to be assigned a new mission, and that
17 was going to be to run the penal, prison system, in Iraq,
18 particularly in Baghdad. And overnight, there was a palpable drop in
19 morale. It was as if people had been told that they couldn't go
20 home, ever. And the only question that any soldier wanted to know,
21 and they would ask me because they figure that as a colonel, I would
22 have some information, was when were they going home. And I told
23 them, of course, that I had no information about that, but that I

1 thought it would be reasonable to expect they would probably be here
2 through Christmas. And I said that knowing - having some idea about
3 how many people were already in custody up at Camp Cropper and how
4 big the operation probably was going to be, and I just didn't think
5 that anything less than six months was going to be enough to stand up
6 a prison system that would enable the MPs to go home

7 Q Were the MPs at Bucca specifically trained in detention
8 internee operations?

9 A They were trained somewhat -- they were trained in their
10 functional MOS with regard to handling EPW. I don't know how much,
11 if any, training they had formally received with regard to the
12 difference between treating an EPW as with treating a criminal
13 detainee I suspect there was not a lot of training in that regard,
14 although a number of these individual soldiers in these battalions
15 were in their civilian occupations, corrections officers

16 Q Was the 320th MP Battalion and the 320th MP Company part of
17 that group that was at Camp Bucca?

18 A Yes The 320th MP Battalion is really just a Headquarters
19 Company There are no subordinate companies to it, other than the
20 Headquarters Company. But that was one of the first battalions on the
21 ground at Bucca

22 Q And do you know whether or not they are specifically
23 trained in -- or have any training with detainees versus EPWs?

1 A I have some knowledge. I can't really say that I'm fully
2 qualified to answer that question. But, in early June -- in late
3 June, I'm sorry, and early July I was tasked with assisting Major
4 [REDACTED] conducting an investigation - a criminal investigation
5 ancillary to certain charges that had been brought against several
6 soldiers at Camp Bucca for abusing EPW. In that mission, Major
7 [REDACTED] and I went to Camp Bucca and we wound up interviewing every
8 individual soldier assigned to the 320th MP Battalion. Ancillary to
9 my interviews with those individual soldiers, and I interviewed a
10 majority of the soldiers more so than Major [REDACTED] did because he was
11 there for one day and I was there for three, I would say I did ask
12 about the training they had received and in addition to whatever
13 training they had received in the past and or at their home station,
14 they did indicate that there were some -- some hands on training that
15 they did while they were waiting at Arifjan. It did not seem to be
16 much more than squad level training. Something that some of the NCOs
17 came -- put together to keep the soldiers busy while they were at
18 Arifjan. But it wasn't a more formal thing than that.

19 Q Now the 800th MP Brigade Commander, Brigadier General Hill,
20 was replaced by Brigadier General Karpinski in July of 2003?

21 A Right. I believe the change of command actually occurred
22 on June 30th.

1 Q. What's your impression, again, of the command climate of
2 the 800th MP Brigade from, say the date Brigadier General
3 Karpinski took over up until now?

4 A Not good My sense is that General Karpinski is not very
5 well liked by the members of her command. She has a mercurial
6 personality. Tends to fly off the handle very easily. Is demeaning
7 when she addresses subordinates She is, I don't think, an effective
8 commander in these circumstances

9 Q Is there a difference between General Karpinski and General
10 Hill that you could point to that would have affect on the command
11 climate or morale of the 800th?

12 A General Hill was really a soft spoken guy, he was very
13 tall, but he was very soft spoken and he had a way of relating to
14 soldiers that made you feel very good He was kind of a down home
15 kind of guy, and would talk to you, shake your hand and look you in
16 the eye and tell you you're doing a great job General Karpinski,
17 while she would try to do that, her manner was just-- it didn't suit
18 her Her manner was gruff, she tended to be loud I can't really
19 say that I ever saw her praise a soldier in my presence, although I
20 heard her often speaking very highly of the MPs that were working for
21 her I can't really say that I every saw her communicating that to
22 the actual soldiers -- you know, "You're doing a good job, keep it
23 up," that kind of stuff Where General Hill was always there.

1 Whenever he came up to Bucca he was with the troops, he was patting
2 them on the back, he was talking to them about what was going on.

3 Q Did you know, or do you know, Lieutenant Colonel

4

5 A I do

6 Q And how long have you known him?

7 A I met Colonel [REDACTED] in April, as he was the Commander
8 of the 320th MP Battalion

9 Q And did you have occasion to see him perform his duties as
10 a battalion commander from time to time?

11 A I did

12 Q How would you rate, evaluate, or give me your opinion on
13 Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] as a battalion commander?

14 A He was not particularly effective as a battalion commander.
15 I believe he is somewhat indecisive, and doesn't act with authority
16 when authority is required. He is also very soft spoken, a very
17 bright man. He seems to take it all in, but doesn't execute. There
18 were a couple of occasions I've had where I've spoken with him about
19 making suggestions on how to improve the operation both at Bucca and
20 also at Abu Ghraib and he would seem to be very receptive to my
21 suggestion, but then never act on what I had put forth.

22 Q Now you are aware of certain allegations of detainee abuse
23 that occurred at Abu Ghraib between October and say December of 2003?

1 A I am

2 Q When did you first become aware of those abuses?

3 A I was shown a serious incident report that had been
4 prepared and forwarded up through channels by [REDACTED] who is the
5 Chief of Operations for the Department of Prisons at CPA

6 Q And do you recall when that was?

7 A It was probably mid-January

8 Q On how many occasions had you personally visited Abu Ghraib
9 prison?

10 A Probably about ten

11 Q I wonder if you could generally give a layout as to who was
12 in charge of the prison as far as you could tell, who had control
13 over various detainee groups, things of that nature?

14 A When I first went out to Abu Ghraib the only U S military
15 presence there was the 320th MP Battalion

16 Q And when was that?

17 A That was in September The population there, the prison
18 population if you will, was split between those personnel who were
19 classified what we called an MI hold and those personnel that were in
20 custody because they were criminal detainees, either convicts or pre-
21 trial The criminals were held in the hard site prison facility
22 which is a -- was -- had been a prison under Saddam's regime. The MI
23 holds were held in two different tent camps, one known as Camp

1 Gantsy, one known as Camp Vigilant The distinction between Camp
2 Vigilant and Camp Ganci was that the folks in Camp Ganci were under
3 MI hold that we were not trying to actively exploit intelligence
4 from The folks in Camp Vigilant were the folks that we were still
5 actively looking at as potentially having intelligence information to
6 extract from them Over time, what ultimately happened was, the MI
7 community asked initially for permission to use cell block 1A on the
8 hard site to use to temporarily store, if you will, people they were
9 actively interrogating that day So they would take prisoners from
10 Camp Vigilant move them into cell block 1A and hold them there for a
11 number of days while they would intermittently over the course of
12 several hours take them in or out and interrogate them

13 Q Prior to that military police had exclusive control over
14 the hard site?

15 A That is correct

16 Q Who would have been the battalion commander and the company
17 commander who would have had that control?

18 A The -- Colonel [REDACTED] was the Battalion Commander
19 responsible for the operation at Abu Ghraib at that point in time
20 I'm not sure which particular MP Company in September had the
21 responsibility for actually working the hard site, but ultimately
22 that responsibility fell to Captain [REDACTED]

1 Q Approximately when did the MI community request, if you
2 know, that detainees be brought from Camp Vigilant to the hard site?

3 A I'm not really certain I believe it was sometime about
4 the end of September There was tremendous mission creep about that
5 whole operation Initially the cellblocks at Abu Ghraib are set up
6 in what is in the business known as a telephone pole arrangement.
7 Cellblock 1A has an upper and a lower and then across the hall is
8 cellblock 1B upper and lower Initially, the MI mission was only
9 cell block 1A lower, then they kind of spread out into cell block 1A
10 upper and then they shifted over across the hall to cellblock 1B
11 upper and then it got really -- it was clear that what was happening
12 was they just wanted to take over that whole first cellblock. And
13 that was ultimately the resolution The prisons department, if you
14 will, lost control and the MPs lost control of cell block 1 for
15 purposes of putting in criminal detainees Cellblock 1 became used
16 exclusively for persons under MI hold and they were held there At
17 the time that that happened, that final piece of excluding all
18 criminal detainees did not happen until December But it was a slow
19 progression from early October until the end of December. As MI kind
20 of just spread out and continued through that entire cellblock.

21 Q Who had the responsibility for the interrogation of
22 detainees?

1 A The interrogation of detainees was handled by the 205th MI
2 Brigade Ultimately, I believe by October as the MI mission at Abu
3 Ghraib grew, because what had happened was the MI community was not
4 sure where they wanted to set up their operation. By default, it
5 came to be that they accepted Abu Ghraib as being the place where
6 they were going to do their operation. So they were, if you will,
7 latecomers to the real estate Because of the significance, however,
8 of their operation, the FRAGO, CJTF-7 FRAGO was cut removing the
9 responsibility to manage the real estate from the MPs and made the
10 commander of the 205th MI Battalion, Colonel [REDACTED] the Commander of
11 Abu Ghraib, if you will It was officially -- shortly thereafter it
12 was designated an enduring base camp and it was nominated as a
13 forward operating base (FOB) So, Colonel [REDACTED] and the 205th ran the
14 interrogation operation and also the actual base camp

15 Q Approximately when was that FRAGO issued?

16 A Mid to late October, I would say

17 Q Do you recall a Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED]

18 A No

19 Q [REDACTED]

20 A No, I'm not familiar with that name

21 Q Okay. So, Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED], the Commander of the
22 205th MI ----

23 A He's a Colonel, full Colonel ----

1 Q ---- full Colonel, had command and control of the real
2 estate at Abu Ghraib, but within the hard site, the MPs would have
3 still been responsible for cellblocks 1A and 1B?

4 A That's correct The MPs never lost control of
5 guarding/protecting the prisoners in cellblock 1, both A and B It
6 was -- they were the custodians The MI folks would come in and
7 they'd say, "I'm here to take number 12345 for an interrogation "
8 They would go to cell 3, 1A upper, whatever, take the prisoner out,
9 put a hood on him, escort him to the interrogation chamber,
10 interrogate him for a couple hours, whatever, bring him back and
11 return him to his cell

12 Q Where, geographically was the -- were interrogations done,
13 versus 1A and 1B?

14 A I do not know where they were initially done, because I
15 believe it was done at a different location while they were
16 constructing it, but they built an interrogation booth, which was
17 outside the building So there was actually an escort required and
18 the MP, I'm sorry, the MI interrogators would provide the escort.
19 They would take the prisoner out of the cell, put a hood on him, walk
20 him downstairs, out the door, around the corner of the building,
21 around a walled-off area which enclosed Saddam's execution chamber
22 into the interrogation booth was built adjacent to this interior wall
23 where Saddam's execution chamber was on the other side of So it was

1 a short distance, it was maybe a walk of about a hundred and fifty
2 meters from the building itself

3 Q. Are you aware of any policies, regulations, whatever,
4 regarding the use of military police to set the condition for MI
5 interviews of detainees?

6 A No I'm not, no I'm not.

7 Q Did you, in any of your visits to Abu Ghraib ever see
8 detainees being abused, something that troubled you.

9 A Yes. On one of my last visits to the prison ----

10 Q When was that? ----

11 A ----It was in January some time I was walking down the
12 hall with some other people and I saw two Iraqi men who had been
13 striped to their shorts and they were standing facing either side of
14 a wall They had their backs to one another. It was--the hallway,
15 the central hallway in the telephone pole construction is actually
16 open, and by that I mean, it's not enclosed, it's kind of like a
17 lattice brick work, so it allows free passage of air And being
18 January, it was a little cold and the floor was wet because they had
19 just cleaned it, and typical in Iraq they don't mop it dry, they kind
20 of squeegee it and then let it evaporate Well the floor was still
21 wet----

22 Q Kind of like my shower

1 A. Right, right, just like the way they clean the bathrooms
2 These gentlemen were standing there barefoot on the cold, wet floor
3 and it must have been about 45 degrees in the area where they were
4 standing. And there were a bunch of Iraqi correction guards
5 standing--sitting around a heater, kind of supervising these guys,
6 and there was an MP sitting right there. I initially walked passed
7 and I said, "Wait a minute, something is wrong " So I went back to
8 the MP and--he was a corporal, and I said, "How long have these
9 prisoners been standing here?" And he said, "About ten minutes But
10 don't worry, the Iraqi guards are disciplining them, they'll be done
11 in a few minutes " I said, "Doesn't this strike you as being wrong?"
12 And he said, "Yeah, but it was the Iraqi guards who were doing this
13 to discipline the prisoners " I said, "That's not why you're here
14 You're here to show them the better way. You're not here just to be
15 witness to their abusive behavior toward prisoners, you're here to
16 make sure the abuses don't occur " I spoke to one of the Iraqi
17 guards and, you know, they assured me they would correct the
18 situation I went on with my business I just wondered if I hadn't
19 witnessed that, if I hadn't seen that, how long would that have gone
20 on?

21 Q Were you ever called upon in your position at the CPA, or
22 asked by anyone in the 800th MP Brigade to provide training in either

1 the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war,
2 or AR 190-8 or FM 27-10, anything like that?

3 A No Never

4 Q Did you ever have occasion to see or hear of something
5 called an interrogation ROE card?

6 A No I have not

7 Q Now you're aware of the seriousness of the--of some of
8 these alleged detainee abuses?

9 A Yes

10 Q Have you seen any of the pictures relative to those abuses?

11 A I have not But what I have seen, and it struck me as odd
12 at the time, although at the time I saw it I didn't recognize the
13 significance of it I was in cellblock 1, collecting the names of
14 the prisoners for the release of the -- for inclusion on the Arabic
15 name list and I had seen that the MPs had written in chalk on some of
16 the outside of the cell doors, kind of like nicknames for the
17 prisoners inside, so that they would know what to call them, because
18 they never really liked, I guess, using their Arabic names, not that
19 I think they ever really knew them, they knew more to call them by a
20 number, and one of the names that they had written on the door was
21 Ron Jeremy Now I know Ron Jeremy to be an actor who makes
22 pornographic movies and he is allegedly particularly well endowed for
23 a male, and so I understood, perhaps why the guards would have

1 referred to a particular prisoner in that manner. It didn't strike
2 me at that moment, but after hearing the allegations, I understood
3 very clearly why they perhaps used that nomenclature to describe that
4 particular prisoner

5 Q. At any time prior to January of 2004 when you said that you
6 received a--this SIR, had you been made aware of any allegations of
7 detainee abuse in Abu Ghraib prison?

8 A [Pause] No

9 Q But you were aware in fact you did participate in the, at
10 least preliminary investigation of the abuses that had occurred at
11 Camp Bucca at Umm Qasr?

12 A That's correct.

13 Q And those involved Master Sergeant [REDACTED] and a Sergeant
14 [REDACTED] Specialist [REDACTED]----

15 A ----Sergeant [REDACTED] Specialist [REDACTED] and there were
16 five other soldiers that were initially titled by CID

17 Q Did you have any opinion after doing your investigation
18 about that sort of misconduct? Did you think it was founded,
19 unfounded, what was your----

20 A I became convinced as a result of the investigation that
21 all the service members, to include the service members that weren't
22 charged, possible exception Specialist [REDACTED] Specialist [REDACTED] was
23 one of the nine individuals who was never charged, was offered

1 immunity in exchange for his cooperation in the prosecution of the
2 case We were able to determine from interviewing the MPs from the
3 223rd MP Company, who were onsite at the time, that Specialist [REDACTED]
4 had not at any time engaged in any inappropriate conduct. He had
5 remained on the bus and was helping, actually, to offload the
6 prisoners from the bus during the time the prisoners were being
7 abused, which is why we offered him immunity. But the remaining
8 eight soldiers I thought personally -- I became convinced that as a
9 prosecutor, the proper course of action would have been to charge all
10 eight of them A determination was made only to charge four of them
11 The charges that were initially preferred went to an Article 32
12 investigation and the Article 32 officer recommended increasing the
13 charges after the investigation And those charges were, in fact,
14 amended I think there were also other incidents that came to light
15 involving Sergeant [REDACTED] incidental to the investigation that we
16 had done There were apparently two other incidents that she had
17 been involved in regarding the questionable use of force prior to the
18 May 12th incident, which resulted in the court martial charges Both
19 of those investigations, or preliminary allegations, if you will,
20 were resolved in favor of Sergeant [REDACTED] giving every benefit of
21 the doubt to the soldier in the heat of combat, so to speak But
22 when the third incident came to light, and everyone started --
23 everyone who was aware of all the other incidents started scratching

1 their heads saying, "Gee, did we really make the right call?" One of
2 the incidents actually involved the shooting of a prisoner by another
3 soldier, but it was Sergeant [REDACTED] who had ordered the shooting.

4 Q Were you aware of, following the Bucca incident which I
5 believe occurred in May of 2003, of any attempts by the 320th MP
6 Battalion or the 800th MP Brigade to increase the level of training in
7 the appropriate treatment or conduct of detainees or internees?

8 A I don't know if it was in the 320th MP Battalion, but I do
9 know that we used to have a squad of MPs that were assigned to assist
10 us with the tribunal mission and after the 12th of May, I remember
11 having a conversation with an NCOIC of the squad that was working
12 with us that day, because the squads always seemed to rotate, and he
13 was saying how he couldn't touch the prisoners because they had just
14 had new instructions put out about what they could and could not do.
15 My recollection is that he was not a member of the 320th Battalion,
16 but was a member of one of the other battalions or one of the other
17 subordinate companies that might have just -- every battalion got the
18 word don't -- this is what you can do, this is what you can't do. So
19 somebody was putting the word out that was different than what it had
20 been. But, of course, the instruction was, in my opinion, overly
21 restrictive. It said they could not, under any circumstances, touch
22 a prisoner, which clearly is not what the law would require or

1 permit But that was what was being put out so that there would be
2 no further incidents about mishandling prisoners.

3 Q I want to return a little bit to the command and control
4 structure at Abu Ghraib and just ask you, did you ever have occasion
5 -- I realize you were only there approximately ten times -- did you
6 ever have occasion to see Brigadier General Karpinski there or
7 Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] there?

8 A I know I saw Colonel [REDACTED] there, I don't believe I
9 ever saw General Karpinski at Abu Ghraib

10 Q Again, can you just -- sort of -- in your own opinion, tell
11 me what you thought of the command structure and the way Abu Ghraib
12 was being monitored or run?

13 A I don't think it was being run very effectively. There was
14 a kind of a schism, if you will, that existed between the MI
15 community and the MPs that wasn't a whole lot of cooperation there.
16 Colonel [REDACTED] wasn't decisive with regard to recognizing the
17 situation and saying, "Hey listen, Colonel [REDACTED] we need to sit
18 down and we need to talk this out and make sure that we're on the
19 same sheet of music and working as a team to do everybody's mission
20 There were -- I know that there was a time, I believe back in
21 November where we had heard that Colonel [REDACTED] had been relieved
22 by General Karpinski It turned out that he wasn't actually
23 relieved, he was just sent down to Arifjan for a couple of weeks to

1 collect his thoughts, I guess, I'm not sure exactly what the purpose
2 of that was. But there was nothing done by the command, it was so
3 obvious to everybody that the sense and the feeling amongst the
4 soldiers was negative. They hated the job, they hated where they
5 were, they hated being here, they just wanted to go home. Nobody was
6 doing anything to relieve that negative morale. Nobody was trying
7 to, you know, bolster the troops and talk up the job and try to make
8 them laugh about their condition, and just build a sense of
9 camaraderie amongst the troops. There were people, when I was
10 interviewing everybody in the company, there were people who told me
11 that they felt marginalized and not even part of the company because
12 of the manner in which they had been deployed and they were just
13 looking to this whole thing to be over so they could go home.

14 Q But you said that Colonel Pappas had control of the basic,
15 I guess I'll call it compound at Abu Ghraib, I guess my question is,
16 and I'm having a hard time articulating it, but the average MP guard,
17 who did he answer to to Colonel Pappas, to Colonel [REDACTED] who
18 was able to come in and tell the average guard what, where and how to
19 do certain things with detainees?

20 A I think if you had asked the average MP in the hard site
21 prison what his chain of command was, Colonel [REDACTED] would never have
22 appeared in the answer. It would have been his Company Commander,
23 Captain [REDACTED] probably, then Colonel [REDACTED] then General

1 Karpinski The fact that Colonel ██████ was the FOB Commander never
2 really made it down ----

3 Q What does FOB mean?

4 A Forward Operating Base, the real estate, the base camp
5 The-- you know, they were a tenant organization, the MPs essentially
6 were a tenant organization, but I think they looked at the MI guys as
7 being the tenant in their building You know, there was no chain of
8 command, no command responsibility to the MI guys. Now, certainly as
9 a superior commissioned officer, even I could walk into that facility
10 and issue a directive to an MP and he would carry out what I asked
11 him to do, but it wasn't like I was ever in his chain of command. I
12 was closer to being in his chain of command because of my
13 responsibility with prisons than Colonel ██████ would be

14 Q Were you ever aware of, well let me ask you this, did you
15 ever see any SOPs in Abu Ghraib dealing with the treatment of
16 detainees?

17 A No I never did

18 Q Were you aware that an SOP existed either with the MI or
19 with the 320th MPs?

20 A I would have imagined that it existed I would have hoped
21 that it existed But I never saw it

1 Q Were you aware of the activities of, I call them for want
2 of a better phrase, other government agencies within Abu Ghraib
3 prison?

4 A Yes I was.

5 Q If you could, what were those agencies and what was their
6 purpose?

7 A. It's my understanding that other governmental agencies
8 refers to the Iraqi Security Group and possibly the Central
9 Intelligence Agency, that they have their own initiatives and their
10 own missions to execute which allows them -- or requires them, if you
11 will, to take persons into custody. These persons were often stored
12 in cellblock 1, however, never appeared on either the books of the MI
13 community or on the books of the MP community and at some point to
14 great diplomatic embarrassment to the United States. There was one
15 particular incident where they had picked up three Saudi nationals.
16 The Saudi government was requesting officially through diplomatic
17 channels for status of these three individuals and all we could say
18 was that we didn't have them because we had no idea where they were.
19 They weren't on any database, they weren't anywhere. It turns out
20 that they had been held at Abu Ghraib in cellblock 1 for seven weeks
21 and ultimately were released. We had a lot of egg on our face about
22 that because we not only responded to the Saudi government that we
23 didn't have them, but also to the ICRC, when in fact we did have

1 them When I visited Abu Ghraib in early January to do my rollup of
2 the Arabic name list, these individuals were described as ghosts
3 They were 11 prisoners in cellblock 1 at that time At that point
4 there were about 100 prisoners in cellblock 1, so approximately ten
5 percent of their population were described as these ghosts They
6 were folks that didn't appear on anybody's books, but we had the
7 body

8 Q Do you know whether or not, individuals whether they would
9 be MI or whatever other U S government agency may have been in the
10 Abu Ghraib prison would have ordered MPs to do certain things to
11 detainees?

12 A. [I am not -- I have no knowledge of that. I have never
13 been told that by an MP who said, "Hey, someone told me to do this,
14 that, the other thing." But based on my other experiences with OGA
15 throughout this war, I wouldn't be surprised if that was done.]

16 Q For the record, John, let's bracket the answer to this last
17 question and let's keep this -- say that this might be classified
18 until I get a reading from the C-2 folks, I have no idea what, I
19 think it is a reasonable question But what the classification of
20 that answer is, I don't know It is just his personal opinion, but
21 [The session recessed at 1405 10 February 2004.]
22 [The session resumed at 1420 10 February 2004]

1 Q One of the things that Major General Taguba is
2 investigating -- I just want to ask your comment on these Does the
3 training standards, employment command policies, internal procedures,
4 and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade? I wonder if you have any
5 sort of final comments on those subjects?

6 A I was never witness to any of the training that may have
7 been conducted I like to think it was conducted, just wasn't
8 necessarily in my lane, so to speak, and so I never had an
9 opportunity to witness it The command climate, as I indicated, I
10 think is poor I think the soldiers feel that, I won't say they have
11 been lied to but, they got the bad end of the stick, so to speak and
12 no one's doing anything to look out for them.

13 Q Did you -- what's your feeling about what Brigadier General
14 Karpinski did or did not do to improve the command climate within the
15 800th MP Brigade?

16 A I don't really think she did anything to improve the
17 command climate. She had to have been aware, I think everybody was
18 aware, as to how bad things were, particularly in the 320th The 320th
19 in addition to all of the other things and the disheartening that
20 occurred when they got the new mission, they were a fairly tight
21 group and when the squad got arrested for abusing the prisoners, they
22 immediately closed ranks and believed -- chose to believe that the
23 charges were not true

1 Q This was the squad down at Camp Bucca?

2 A That was the squad at Bucca But, that being said, and I
3 spoke to soldiers as recently as October about the charges and they
4 still did not believe that there was anything to them, and believed
5 that the soldiers were being railroaded by ineffective leadership is
6 what --the way most of them felt And it just was something that was
7 never addressed and or dealt with at the Brigade level

8 Q Okay Concerning the inquiry into the allegations of
9 detainee abuse, maltreatment at Abu Ghraib, did you have occasion to
10 see either the Company Commander, Captain [REDACTED], the Command Sergeant
11 Major or the Battalion Commander at Abu Ghraib?

12 A Yes, I saw Colonel [REDACTED] in the Battalion TOC on more
13 than one occasion and I actually saw Captain [REDACTED] we spoke at
14 length actually in the hard site facility, which is where I found him
15 when I was doing the -- my most recent scan for the Arabic names We
16 spoke for at least a half hour to forty-five minutes

17 Q How far was the Battalion TOC from the hard site?

18 A In a straight-line distance, it's probably about a hundred
19 yards But you'd have to actually walk around a wall, or actually
20 walk over it to get to an opening in the wall to get to the hard site
21 facility and then go through a gate

1 Q And do you have any personal knowledge of how often, I'll
2 call it cellblock or tier 1A or 1B were inspected by either Captain
3 Reese or Colonel [REDACTED]

4 A I do not have any knowledge of that

5 Q Based on your personal observation, what's your opinion of
6 Captain Reese as a commander?

7 A I have very limited information about that, but my
8 perception was that he was a good guy and had actually -- my
9 perception was, that his Company didn't have -- wasn't responsible
10 for that operation for a very long period of time, that they were
11 newly assigned to that operation and he actually had done some things
12 to improve the operation One of the things he did was he got the
13 prison guards to prepare their own list of all the names of the
14 prisoners in Arabic by cellblock that he would then post outside the
15 facility so family members could come and find out if their loved
16 ones were actually at Abu Ghraib Kind of a shorthand version what I
17 was doing for the theater, he was doing at Abu Ghraib And so I saw
18 him as someone who is demonstrating initiative to improve the
19 mission

20 Q Okay

21 A I also know that the folks with prisons, the civilian
22 subject-matter experts that had been brought in also thought highly
23 of him They thought he was reasonable and understood what his

1 mission was and was cooperative and working to accomplish the
2 mission

3 Q Again, were you ever made aware of the fact that MI or
4 other government agency personnel may or may not have been directing
5 MP guards to do certain things to detainees to make them more
6 cooperative or "set the conditions" for further interrogations

7 A I have no information about that

8 Q You were aware in your position with the Ministry of
9 Justice that there had been a number of escapes from Abu Ghraib and
10 other prisons?

11 A That's correct Well, I'm not aware that we ever actually
12 had an escape from Abu Ghraib I am aware that we had a number of
13 escapes from Bucca

14 Q Tell me about that, if you could, about the escapes and
15 your involvement, if anything, and what was done to try to stop that

16 A While I was at Bucca, and this, I guess in the May
17 timeframe, I recall there was an incident where three prisoners
18 escaped one night.

19 Q From Camp Bucca?

20 A From Camp Bucca Actually, there was an escape in April,
21 the first week we were there, there was an escape and it struck me
22 because the prisoner escaped right near -- at the point nearest where
23 we did the tribunal work, which was initially on the far side of the

1 holding area, very near the perimeter wire The prisoner was able to
2 throw a blanket over the compound wire, get over that wire, and then
3 was able, I think, to get underneath the perimeter wire that was
4 setup at the compound and escape out the side Then there was an
5 occasion where three prisoners escaped the same night, but that was
6 like I believe around the beginning of May And the only other
7 prisoner escape that I can recall at this time is one that happened
8 fairly recently and involved a prisoner who was detained at Bucca,
9 but was pending a charge of attempted murder of a coalition member
10 and was scheduled to appear before the Central Criminal Court of Iraq
11 and had been moved into a segregation compound pending his transfer
12 to Baghdad the next day and he dug his way out underneath the wire to
13 escape the night before his trial was scheduled to begin

14 Q Again, these were all escapes out of Bucca?

15 A That's correct

16 Q Do you know what was done to -- by the 800th MP command to
17 try to ensure that other detainees did not escape?

18 A After the first escape in April, I know that Colonel [REDACTED]
19 directed Colonel [REDACTED] -- Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED], who is the
20 Battalion Commander for the 530th MP Battalion to do an assessment of
21 the perimeter security of the Camp. And I believe certain changes
22 were made to improve the security to include putting additional light
23 sets and adjusting the guard rotations on the wire. After the escape

1 where three prisoners got out, I'm not sure if anything was done, I
2 believe they did an escape assessment, but I don't know that they did
3 anything beyond that and I don't know what, if anything, was done
4 after the most recent escape

5 Q Do you know whether or not the command did an internal 15-6
6 investigation regarding security or whatever?

7 A I don't believe a 15-6 was ever done on any of them. If it
8 was done, no one ever sought my advice with regard to the execution
9 of it, and I don't think -- I'm pretty sure I would have heard if
10 there was a 15-6 convened and I don't think there was one ever done
11 on any of the ones at Bucca

12 Q Let's talk about perhaps accountability lapses in the 800th
13 MP Brigade at the Abu Ghraib prison Were you aware of any instances
14 that were of concern regarding security, accountability, whatever, at
15 the prison?

16 A I believe, the only one that quickly comes to mind is an
17 incident where a gun was actually smuggled into the facility It was
18 smuggled in by an Iraqi correctional guard I don't know how he--
19 they got the gun to him, but he apparently threw it up to a prisoner
20 on the second floor of cellblock 1 He -- the prisoner used it to
21 actually shoot an MP, fortunately he was wearing an interceptor vest
22 and he was uninjured and returned fire with a shotgun and injured the
23 prisoner by shooting him in the leg. But there was -- I don't know

1 if there -- what the time period was between when the gun was
2 actually smuggled into the prison and when it was actually used I
3 believe that the prison protocol requires for regular shakedown
4 inspections in the cells for the prison -- for the guards actually go
5 into the cells and check for contraband and check to see if they're
6 not breaking down the walls to escape whatever. I don't know how
7 much time lapsed; I know there was an investigation done into that
8 shooting by the prisons department. And [REDACTED] the chief of
9 operations, went out there, interviewed some people, did his own
10 investigation and the conclusion was that the gun had been smuggled
11 in by one of our people, one of the ICS guards. Uh-- and----

12 Q You-- you say one of the ICS guards, this would have been
13 an Iraqi----

14 A an Iraqi Correctional Service guard----

15 Q ----national who was working for----

16 A the Department of Prisons

17 Q Okay, was that CPA--is that the CPA?

18 A That's right CPA, civilian government agency responsible
19 for running the prisons There is kind of a right seat ride
20 operation going on -- as we have more correction guards that are
21 being trained by the MPs, the MPs are stepping back I do know that
22 the particular weapon in question was brought up through cellblock 1,
23 which was not a cellblock that the Iraqi Correctional Service guards

1 managed, but this guard was on the outside of the actual hard site--
2 the facility and was able to throw the weapon up to the prisoner in
3 the second floor window

4 Q You're talking about a pistol?

5 A A pistol. Yes, I believe it was Chinese made.

6 Q And, what was the outcome of the investigation, do you
7 know?

8 A The outcome of the investigation was that the prison guard
9 was responsible for smuggling the gun into the prison. He remains at
10 large, there is a warrant outstanding for his arrest. The prisoner
11 himself had additional charges added to whatever it was that caused
12 him to be in our custody in the first instance. And that matter is
13 being -- they're preparing the appropriate documents to get it
14 referred to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq

15 Q Approximately when did this incident occur involving the
16 Iraqi correctional officer smuggling in a pistol? Do you remember
17 that?

18 A My recollection is that it was sometime in November --
19 just, I think judging from what else I was doing -- I was about to
20 start the field trips, I think, it was about the middle of November,
21 if I'm not mistaken.

22 Q Okay. Any other instances or accountability lapses
23 involving the 800th MP Brigade that you recall?

1 A. Well, it-- it--it hard to say whether or not you would
2 characterize this as a lapse, but in terms of being related to the
3 general area, the 800th MP Brigade has the responsibility to produce
4 in court security internees who were being produced for the Central
5 Criminal Court of Iraq The Central Criminal Court of Iraq is a
6 special forum that was created to deal with cases of national
7 interest A national determination was made by Headquarters, DA,
8 that criminal offenses committed by Iraqis against the coalition
9 would be referred to the CCC for prosecution. There has not been one
10 case referred to the CCC for prosecution where the 800th MP Brigade
11 has been successful in producing the defendant in court the very
12 first day the case was on in court It always required the case to
13 be adjourned because the defendant was not produced

14 Q How many cases are we talking about? Roughly

15 A About five or six at least that I can think of But not
16 one, every-- every one of the cases -- they're standing up the court,
17 they haven't had a whole lot of business, but on every occasion when
18 that case was scheduled to start the prisoner does not get produced.
19 Now on one of those occasions, it was because the prisoner had
20 escaped the night before, but short of that -- I mean they hadn't --
21 even if the case -- even if the prisoner had not escaped, they still
22 would not have produced him because he was still down at Bucca the
23 night before the case was scheduled to begin in Baghdad And I

1 would-- I had spent that night trying to coordinate a special air
2 mission to fly down to Bucca, pick up the prisoner and bring him back
3 to Baghdad so he would make the court case by the afternoon. But
4 they hadn't even coordinated the movement of the prisoner to get him
5 to Baghdad so that he would be ready to be produced in court the next
6 day.

7 Q. Is there anything you'd like to add to this statement?

8 A. The only thing that I want to be clear about, my
9 observations of Colonel [REDACTED] at Abu Ghraib. There were
10 occasions when I saw Colonel [REDACTED] in the hard site facility.
11 When we came to tour the facility with either senior officers or
12 other government officials, Colonel [REDACTED] would sometime
13 accompany us into the hard site, or meet up with us in the hard site
14 and we would tour the facility in his presence. But absent those
15 occasions when we were touring the facility, I can't say that I ever
16 just happened to be visiting the facility to take care of some other
17 business and saw Colonel [REDACTED] in the prison taking care of
18 whatever other business he had there at that time. So there were
19 occasions when I saw him there, it just didn't seem to be work
20 related.

21 Q. You're aware of the somewhat egregious nature of the abuse
22 of detainees?

23 A. Yes.

1 Q And you're aware that MPs took pictures of naked detainees
2 in a variety of sexual positions and you're aware of the graphic
3 nature of those photos?

4 A I've been advised of the graphic nature of the photos. I
5 haven't seen them but I've been told

6 Q. In light of the situation as you knew it in -- at the Abu
7 Ghraib prison, is it your opinion -- your personal opinion, that this
8 was sort of an aberration by a few bad MP guards and that perhaps
9 Captain [REDACTED] or Colonel [REDACTED] had no knowledge of what was
10 going on

11 A I have no doubt that both of them did not know what was
12 going on Whether or not a more involved leader could have prevented
13 it, will be a question that will remain unanswered throughout time.
14 I think it would have If there was more involved leadership, both
15 on the NCO side of the house and on the officer side of the house, I
16 would think that this would not have happened, because in my dealings
17 with these soldiers, they're not bad soldiers, they're really not. I
18 think they're bored, I think they're frustrated, I think they did
19 this out of lack of anything else to do that day It broke up their
20 monotony of their routine and leaders have the responsibility to find
21 constructive ways for soldiers to outlet their energy as opposed to
22 advocating that responsibility and letting the soldiers lapse into
23 whatever else they happen to be doing.

1 Q Okay. Please don't discuss your testimony with anybody
2 else. Thanks [REDACTED]

3 A No problem.

4 [The session closed at 1440 10 February 2004.]

On 14 February 2004, a team of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF) The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present

COL [REDACTED], MP, CFLCC – PMO, Interviewer
LTC [REDACTED], 705th MP Battalion, Interviewer
LTC [REDACTED], JA, CFLCC – SJA, Interviewer
LTC [REDACTED], 800th MP Brigade, Respondent

The interview is summarized as follows

My name is [REDACTED] I'm a Lieutenant Colonel with the 800th Military Police Brigade stationed at Unondale, Long Island I am the Executive Officer, and I also act as the Civil Affairs Officer for the 800th MP Brigade.

In October 2002, I was the Chief Observer Controller for the 800th. I knew the unit was going to be deployed, so I asked COL [REDACTED], he was the Deputy Brigade Commander, if he had any positions open, and he said the Civil Affairs position was open By December 15, 2002, I was transferred from the 2nd Signal, to the 800th MP Brigade. January 15, 2003 we were activated, and by January 29, 2003 I was here, and I've been here since.

After the war started, late March, we crossed the lines and went into Camp Bucca I was there until the end of July I was asked by General Hill, to come back and be the Executive Officer I stayed here for approximately 3 weeks, as the Executive Officer, because we were losing COL [REDACTED] He had 24 months on ground. We lost the Executive Officer for the same reason, and we lost several other officers, as well So, the units forward, with the Deputy coming out, were down to a Major, so I asked BG Karpinski if it was okay to come forward, because she would probably somebody there to help her.

During that interim, LTC [REDACTED] changed command, and she came in, as the Rear Executive Officer I had the forward position, as well as Civil Affairs So, we had no Deputy Commander, and we were missing a few other officers, as well.

BG Hill I never had much to do with, other than when I returned, here He's very closed mouth BG Karpinski is very intelligent I always got the feeling she was thinking a week ahead of me She seemed to have a good handle on what was going on. I learned a lot off of her I plan to stay with the unit I leave in October I'll be reaching age 60, by

that time. I have mandatory retirement, then Getting back to command leadership, BG Karpinski had regular meetings to clarify what she expected. She has no problem expressing her opinion, as to the way things should be accomplished. I'm very comfortable with her.

In my opinion, her primary interests were in the care, custody, and control of all the detainees. It was specified in her CCIR, her Rules of Engagement, which were pretty much made up by the S3 and LTC [REDACTED], the SJA. She was interested in our own troops, our own safety. I always got that same continuous opinion.

She was always on the move, going to Baghdad Central, going down to various jails. I tried to stay close, whereas she would take trips to Mosul, and Bucca. She would take care of that.

The soldiers involved in the Bucca incident were charged, and brought back to Arifjan. I was in the dark, until BG Diamond called me in the office, and wanted to know what was going on. When BG Karpinski took over, she asked that I keep track of the people for suicide, for contact with each other, and that I put them in meaningful jobs. CSM [REDACTED] took care of that, and I would check with him. When he left, I asked MSG [REDACTED], because he lived in the same barracks as some of them.

CSM [REDACTED] was very boisterous, physical, opinionated, and there was a point when I had to have a talk with him, as well. It encompassed what was perceived as sexual harassment. This was sometime back in July. BG Karpinski wanted me to keep a very close eye on him, but not to impede his position. CSM [REDACTED] informed me that he had seen some things that were inappropriate. I told CSM [REDACTED] that I think it would be a good idea for him to stick close to me. He didn't do that. I let the General know. There was an incident that was perceived as sexual harassment, whereas he touched a female on the shoulders, or something of that nature. I don't know if he said anything. That kicked off an investigation. As a result, he's been sent to the states.

BG Karpinski felt, in my opinion, that LTC [REDACTED] needed to relax a little bit. He was uptight, so she took him out for a couple of weeks. He got other jobs to do to assist us, and she put him back in place. I want to say that was October or November. In the interim it was pretty much MAJ [REDACTED] that ran the show.

Before the war started, I got the Free Iraqi Fighters, and held classes for the units. They could ask them any question they want, regarding the traditions, cultures, and what to expect from Iraqi soldiers. That was under BG Hill. When BG Karpinski took over, she emphasized training on the Rules of Engagement. The S3 emphasized that.

There was a constant need for replacements, which we never got. There was a constant need for interpreters, which we never got. Before the war started, we put in a request for 250 interpreters. We didn't have interpreters assigned until May, and that was at Camp Bucca. There was a constant need for attention on the supply side. I felt the Supply Officer did a pretty good job on it. It was very tough to deal with.

The main concern out of the S1 was the MDRS System, and accountability. That was another concern of the General; correct reporting, and accuracy on that. The awards and stuff? I think you got a problem there, in the respect that we lost three people out of the S1. One had to go REFRAD, back to the United States. He was very seriously ill. That was a First Lieutenant, excellent worker, 16 hours a day. Things started to slow down, but I think they did the best that they could. Now, up at Brigade you had MAJ [REDACTED]. He never had much help up there. He kind of depended on people back here, to cover that bridge.

BG Karpinski was Rater and Senior Rater, according to the rules. I was worried about that, because I felt she was inundated with OERs and stuff. I think she had 89 OERs, an exorbitant amount. So, I went to the S1, and asked, "How come?" He said, "They have to be rated by a General Officer." He showed to me in the book. I don't know what we can do to change that. If there was a way to do it, I assume the S1 would find that way. MAJ [REDACTED] is coming on the 15th, at 9 o'clock in the morning. He can answer that question for you.

We have a tactical SOP. It's probably going to be massively updated, after we get back. You try to update them, as you go along, but sometimes you're not able to do that. I think the SOP that we have is 2002.

Our mission is I/R, Internment/Resettlement. I am somewhat familiar with the Brigade's METL. I know that the Geneva Convention is constantly talked about. It's constantly being looked at, for a variety of reasons, for instance, cigarettes. An Iraqi without a cigarette, you got a problem. So, we were giving cigarettes to them, which was not required by the Geneva Convention, but that was a part of their comfort and welfare.

At the Brigade level it was constantly looked at, to decide what we could do better. The battalions sent up RFIs, and we answer their RFIs, all of them. The General goes down there, and answers their questions. I call down there on a regular basis. I would ask them, "Is there something I can get you? What is your biggest problem?"

The CCIR are the Commander's Critical Information Requirements. In general, it would be the care, custody, and control of internees, the immediate status reporting of persons that are injured, U.S. personnel, what affects her position, as far as attacks, and SIRs. A heart attack, an injury, anything that happens to the normal welfare of a prisoner is reported immediately through an SIR.

I'd be guessing, but I want to say there were 3 maybe 4 detainee deaths, including Bucca, that were the result of a soldier's action, that I can recall.

I was in the TOC, when MG [REDACTED] team came through last fall. The General took that over, along with the S3, and whoever else she needed to accommodate that mission. I understand that they were very pleased, at what they had to say. I believe the S3 has that report, because I've heard the S3, MAJ [REDACTED], refer to comments that were made by

MG [REDACTED] people. I don't recall a briefing chart, which specifically addressed the recommendations from MG [REDACTED] report

I wish I had the answer. Is it getting people in everyday, training them every single day, and beating them to death with the same information? As far as escapees, and deaths, and abuse, what is acceptable? Actually, none is acceptable. As far as killing somebody, I don't think anyone here really wants to pull that trigger. I know I don't, and I can't evaluate the person who did, unless I was there, and I saw exactly what went on. As far as abuse goes, it's absolutely unacceptable. When I heard what went on at Camp Bucca, I was appalled. It's not acceptable, and we've got to show that. If you can prove a point with somebody guilty of doing what those people did, you'll put the fear into everyone else, even if they got that little idea in the back of their head. And what I just heard happened at Baghdad Central .. I'm appalled. I can't believe that our people... I mean I have to, because it did occur. They have enough evidence to support that. What can we do to stop it? We need a constant check and balance system. I'm not allowed in the MI area. If I want to go over, and I say, "Hey, I'm LTC [REDACTED]. I'm the XO," I don't have free access, to check on my guards, or to just take a look. There has to be a supervisory presence. There has to be a fear, of what will happen to you, if you commit those offenses against people.

To my knowledge, I'm not authorized access to the hard site. We were upset. I caught a hold of something in the aftermath of this happening. We heard from the battalions that the MIs were escorting people in the nude. What are they doing in the nude to begin with? That's not humanitarian, unless they were on fire, or they had to take a shower, or something. That's not the way we treat people. I was a police officer for 35 years. I never even thought of doing something like that to people, and I've heard about abuse of prisoners, even as far as a policeman goes. I detest that, and I appall it. Our unit said, "Hey! You guys gonna do that stuff, we're gonna pull out our MPs, if that's the way you're going to treat people." And there have been some questions about how they're questioned. Now, would that have happened in our custody? I don't know. I would venture to say no.

To my knowledge, if I wanted access to Tiers 1A and B, I would need an escort. If I had a suspension, I want to go directly to the suspension. During unannounced checks, you discover many things.

I'm not aware of any training instituted, after the Bucca incident.

The panel stopped the interview, to consider LTC [REDACTED]'s statements.

Finished with their discussion, COL [REDACTED] gave LTC [REDACTED] questions, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45 the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate of identification to facilitate filing and
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1 LOCATION: Camp Doha
2 DATE: 2004 Feb 14
3. TIME: 1230
4 FILE NUMBER
6 LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
6 SSN
7 GRADE/STATUS: O-5 / Reserve
8 ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 800 MP Bde, Camp Cropper, Kuwait

9 I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH
[redacted] I do not recall the exact dates. Lt [redacted]
I was told gave incorrect information during
a brief to MG [redacted] @ Baghdad Central facility
BC Karpinski related to me that she told
LTC [redacted] (115 MP Bn Cdr) to stand in
as commander of the 320th MP Bn. while
LTC [redacted] has a break for a week or
few days. BC Karpinski felt I agreed that
LTC [redacted] was overwhelmed with being
the center focal point for BC of Major + 320th
Bn. Commander. No orders I aware of that were
written. LTC [redacted] returned as colr 8-10
days later & in my opinion, refreshed.

10 EXHIBIT
11 INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF

TAKEN AT

Camp Taha

DATED

14 Feb 04

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

nothing follows

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law administer oaths, 14 day of Feb, 2004 at Camp Taha Kuwait

[REDACTED]
VECC-SJA, CAMP Taha KUWAIT
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ARTICLE 366 (4) UCMJ
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

On 15 February 2004, LTC Gary Maddocks, 800th MP Brigade, returned for a follow-up interview

The following persons were present:

MG Antonio Taguba, Interviewer
LTC [REDACTED] Member
LTC [REDACTED], Respondent
MSG [REDACTED] is, Recorder

The interview is summarized as follows:

MG Taguba read the investigation purpose and reminded the respondent that the interview was being taped

I was a civil affairs officer when I first came to the Brigade and that was in December 2002. 2003 I was activated January 15th and I arrived here in country January 29th and I was a civil affairs officer. I went to Camp Bucca the end of March, and I came back sometime in July whereas General Hill had asked me to be his executive officer because the executive officer had to leave because of 24 months of active duty. Shortly after that, we lost a deputy brigade commander along with a couple of other officers that were coming up on 24 months duty here. From that point we changed command, General Karpinski, and the deputy was coming out of Camp Victory, Baghdad, and I suggested that I go forward as opposed to staying behind at Camp Arifjan. So, General Karpinski said she would think about it and about a week later, she agreed that I should go forward.

At the time, I was the XO. We also had another XO, LTC [REDACTED]. She was in the rear at Arifjan and I took the forward position. LTC [REDACTED] never gave me any detailed guidance related to my job, but what she would do would let me know what she wanted me to do. There was no deputy commander at the time, and still none.

General Karpinski went to CJTF-7 to get a colonel, but was refused and she had to hunt through the ones she had to find one that would volunteer and was a promotable LTC. That was LTC [REDACTED]. He came in around October and left first part of December.

My responsibilities as XO were to first find out what the general wanted me to do and I would work whatever from day to day: civil affairs, SITREPs, intelligence reports, communicating with the various battalions to assess their needs.

The staff needed very little supervision. We had staff call every day, whether the general was there or not. We stated our needs and problems and adjusted them from there. I ran the staff call if the general wasn't there.

My S-3 was the strongest staff element. I don't feel as though I have a weakest. I think the 1 is a very knowledgeable person.

Q Which one, [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] was in the NDRS down at Bucca. She was not the S-1, but assisted with the S-1 when we first got to Camp Bucca. MAJ [REDACTED] was at Arifjan.

I would describe the command climate at the brigade as having good continuity. I've been in other equal brigades and I've never seen fighting amongst each other like I have in other brigades. No vindictiveness, some disagreements, but there was very little supervision needed.

I had very little knowledge as the Brigade XO on cases of detainee abuses, maltreatment, U.S. Army officer misconducts, U.S. Army enlisted misconducts of that nature. It was mostly dealt directly with the Commanding General, General Karpinski. The S-1 would have some knowledge of it, I never saw any CID report or anything of that nature. Anything I got was secondhand information.

Those reports would be discussed from day to day with the staff as we could.

Q What was a day like for the brigade staff?

Usually by 0630 first thing I would do was check the SITREPs, intelligence, any problems that the units might have had, look for any SIRs. We usually knew about SIRs when they were coming in because they were serious and part of the CCIR. I'd go to the S-3 and he would brief his people on all the missions that were happening for that day and in the future and look up some past ones that never got completed. From there I'd contact the units or make staff visits. Try to make as much of the presence of the brigade as you can. The General may be gone to Bucca, Ashraf, Mosul, Tasarat, Rusafah, or even BCF. I'd try to stay close to the base of operations if she was away. I may go to BCF or downtown Baghdad.

I knew LTC [REDACTED] since he came into theater. I never had very much contact with him until I was the XO. I would talk with him at BCF and talk to others to see if they would have any other problems. I worked as a go-between with TITAN and tried to make sure that the interpreters were taken care of as well. I don't know Jerry through and through.

I never heard him brief, so I don't know his verbiage. He participated well and is easy to get along with. I felt as though he needed, as well as the officers needed a rest because when you talk to them, they look right through you.

I was aware that he was directed to take time off in October. There was a time I understand from General Karpinski that she had asked him to come in and work with the brigade. This was because he was briefing MG [REDACTED] on something and I understand the brief was not correct.

He also had two weeks leave and he was also trying to put together something that was bigger than his battalion, the entire facility. Now the colonel for the 205th took over as the Mayor Cell. That was just too much for one man to do and run his own battalion as well. I felt as though he was overwhelmed and he seemed to perk up after about five or six days and he went back to the battalion about ten days later. During the interim, LTC ██████████ was in the area and if his assistance was required, MAJ ██████████ the S-3, would go to him. MAJ ██████████ was very knowledgeable, intelligent man.

Do I think that's odd that if you need a rest for somebody else to take your place just for 8-10 days? No. The chain of command was ██████████. His XO was competent man who could run the job. Colonel ██████████ was in constant contact with his XO. I think he was there in the event they needed a colonel or lieutenant colonel or somebody to talk with to resolve anything.

General Karpinski told me that it was a temporary thing, that he needed a rest. We never discussed that perhaps LTC ██████████ should be replaced. Subsequently he took emergency leave.

We made up Rules of Engagement several times between the S-3 and the SJA. They put them up in cards in two or three different intervals. The latest one was a little green card with the Rules of Engagement on it that included the respect of prisoners as well. There were several things that was done with Rules of Engagement, to my knowledge they were passed down to the battalions and handed out. In fact I have one on me that I carry around.

I have never worked in I&R missions before this. The only experience I had was I was in the second simulation group out of Rhode Island and I was the chief observer/trainer during 2002 and I asked if they had any positions open and they said just civil affairs.

Most of the FRAGOs I've read, they would send them to me to see if we had anything to add or delete. As far as Field Manuals, we used 100-5 as a reference. We also used the prisoner's handbook for the brigade. We'd use an ARTEP to see what we're designed to do. 19-60 was the other one.

The Geneva Convention is emphasized before we come here, during ARTEPs, during simulation exercise, also at civil affairs I had brought in some FIF "Free Iraqi Fighters" and we go the battalions together at the fire station in Arifjan and we had a one-on-one with the Iraqis and our people as to what to expect, what are their traditions, that was a part of the training. And there was subsequent training as well.

During Gold Sword we posted the Geneva Convention and the provisions in general in both Arabic and English. That's true, none of that ever happened during the actual mission requirement here. It would ultimately be the battalion commander and me to oversee it. It was my failure on a staff visit, general, operations, battalion commander and those that were supposed to post it.

I do think if the troops understood the basic tenants of the Geneva Convention that none of these incidents would have happened. I further believe that if it was posted in Arabic for the detainees, posted in English for the guards, trained incessantly, emphasized increasingly in addition to the Rules of Engagement it could have prevented the abuses.

I am familiar with SGM [REDACTED] and the circumstances of his departure from command. SGM [REDACTED] was replaced as the interim. We talked constantly about things about the brigade. We live together, eat together, and work together. Any problems that I'm aware of I'm sure he's aware of. He's never kept out of the loop. He is closer than any other CSM on this base.

I would characterize the battalions as over-utilized. The 320th, the 744th didn't have much of a mission in Talil until now at the HVD. The 324th had a tough mission in Ashraf. The 530th relieved them. The 530th was at Camp Bucca with the 724th. I got a good taste of what it is like to be out in the desert that many days under that kind of temperature and I think they did exceptionally well for the time they were there and the means to secure the EPWs and detainees. I think they all just did the best they could. June last year they were thinking about going home and the officers urged them not to think about it because there was a pending mission that has never been done before, the mission of replacing Iraq and the prison system. We were always short staffed, working double shifts, extreme temperatures. I think they did the best they could.

They submitted requests for personnel for replacements and we never got any from the 377th. LTC [REDACTED] controlled those requests. My responsibility as the XO was to see that it was fulfilled. That was also done through LTC [REDACTED] Arifjan.

I never interfaced with Major General Wodjakowski at all. The only thing I had was the SUA briefs, the Separate Updates. And I also took the security detainee board as well.

I have some knowledge of what happened in Tier 1A, but it is all second hand or third hand. I was first informed around the beginning of January 2004. Colonel [REDACTED] came to myself and Colonel [REDACTED] and he indicated that someone had come to him indicating that there was abuse of prisoners that took place in 1A and B, which is MI territory. So I asked what the abuse was and he said someone took pictures and nude prisoners, a nude female. I asked what was going on and he said he couldn't see it, but that some MPs, maybe some of our people, were present. I suggested he tell this directly to the General, so we called her and she already knew about it.

Well, there was the 320th MPs there, but that was not an access for me or anybody else unannounced. That had been discussed prior to that. We were told by Maj [REDACTED] from the 320th, that we could not go there. MI controlled, not MP controlled. MPs were for the prisoners.

The Tier was controlled by the 372nd MP Company under the supervision of the 320th. When the detainees are taken out you have the MI interrogators who have access to tell the MP that they need to see a specific detainee, and they are signed out and escorted by

the MP to the interrogation booth and then back again. So, MPs had guard and access of that and they had control of the detainees feeding and housing. That's what I mean by control. What I meant to say is, that because you were told that you had no unscheduled access to that I made a comment that there were other people within that battalion, that company who took liberties of accessing that particular facility unauthorized.

The events leading to the riot on the 24th of November at Abu Ghraib, Camp Ganca. I read an SIR on it and that's all I had on it. I never went to the facility, but I believe the general went there.

The recommendations I would you make regarding the incident that happened at Tier 1A, would be as far as going into Tier 1A and 1B, a clear understanding of unannounced supervision with all. Like you said, the posting of the Geneva Convention, that would have probably had a bearing on it for someone to be looking constantly at it.

I came here only because I wanted to. I will retire at age 60 in October. I came here because I believe in what the President says and I believe in our way of life and that we can probably make a difference over here. I'm ashamed and appalled that things like that happen. Some of the things I take a look at is things that have to do with our MPs, like scores for coming in, MOS training, unit training, training prior to the war, Rules of Engagement, changing and constant emphasis, command posted emphasis, special posters about reporting abuse, ongoing battalion training, command and staff visits. There are all these things that are taking place and yet these things happen. Simulated exercise, the soldier's code, cards for Rules of Engagement, general orders, briefings by SOG. And we taught our people, yet a few shame us. I've put in 16-20 hours per day along with others and I'm very disturbed that all of this happened. It doesn't hurt or help me, but I'd like to leave with a good taste in my mouth. I'm sorry it happened.

On 14 February 2004, a panel of officers, lead by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF) The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present

MG Antonio M. Taguba, [REDACTED], DCG-CFLCC, **Interviewer**
COL [REDACTED], Lackland AFB, TX, **Member**
LTC [REDACTED], A, CFLCC - SJA, **Member**
SFC [REDACTED], U.S Army MP School, **Member**
MSG [REDACTED], CFLCC - SJA, **Recorder**
LTC [REDACTED], 800th MP Battalion, **Respondent**

The interview is summarized as follows

I'm [REDACTED], Lieutenant Colonel, [REDACTED], 800th Military Police Brigade, Staff Judge Advocate My effective date is 10 January 2003 I was with the unit 19 January We mobilized at Fort Dix We were there for approximately thirty days I have some Operational Law experience I did a lot of that with 8th Medical Brigade I have a heavy UCMJ background My secondary, so to speak, would be Operational Law The 724th was also at Dix the same time we were They got there a few days ahead of us, and left a few days ahead of us I believe the 310th MP Battalion, now at Camp Bucca, got there a shortly before we left

I have one JAG assigned, MAJ [REDACTED] We conducted training on Internment / Resettlement We met with the entire 724th staff, as well as the 310th staff, before we left Fort Dix, to talk about those issues, brief those issues We did it as a staff. I did it on UCMJ matters Other battalions received a full brief as they came in to Theater from the entire staff including an SJA BG [REDACTED] instructed me to individually brief each Battalion commander and to make myself available to each company commander, briefings were given on the UCMJ, Law of War and other Operational Law issues

We briefed the ROE, which changed four times over the course of the deployment Actually, it was more Rules for Use of Force that was briefed instead of ROE We had an ROE when we came in and we condensed it down to the size of a card for detainee operations that was briefed and given out down to the soldier level It was specifically for detainee operations and it fit on about a three by five card The first change to the card occurred in May when BG [REDACTED] wanted to issue a warning shot, we requested permission from CFLCC to do that CFLCC didn't think it was a good idea, but it was

acceptable if BG [REDACTED] wanted to do it. This warning shot was specifically for detention. This warning shot was for escapes, or rioting prisoners. BG [REDACTED] wanted to specifically allow it where as the original ROE didn't allow it. This change came after BG [REDACTED] direction, after the President declared an end to combat operations. General Karpinski changed it back to no warning shot when the move to Baghdad took place, which was meant to be consistent with the CJTF-7 Rules for Use of Force.

By the time of dissemination of the ROE's, beside myself and MAJ [REDACTED] there were two other JAG officers in the 381st and 494th PLD's Brigade liaison detachments that were assigned to us. Between the four of us, we would go out and brief the ROE to all of our units and disseminate the cards – they were also sent out to all of the commanders and told to disseminate to the lowest level through our S3 shop. A copy of the detention ROE should still be on my SIPR; I believe the S3 shop provided that with all of our other documents. The cards were definitely distributed, we had hundreds printed up just for distribution by the 13th PSYOPS, who were with the battalion assigned to us. They went home late August or early September, but they made up the ROE cards before they left.

The last iteration of the ROE was a change based on a change. The last ROE was dated 30, November, that was listed as ROE 4.1 because we went through a couple of drafts before we issued that. I saw the e-mail traffic. We also issued training next to that ROE and that was all done in December, end of January. I know for a fact that the Battalion received training on that to include the Battalion doing the Mec mission up in the North and the 310th in Bucca. We specifically sent the JAG officers to do that; I did some of them myself.

I never saw an interrogation ROE. That was an MI issue. We didn't do the interrogations. I'm not associated with what the MI interrogator should tell the guard when releasing the detainee to the custody of the guard. I don't believe that I should be

I knew that 13th PSYOPS had recorded dog barking playing on the outside of Bucca so they would think we had dogs when we didn't. At Abugared, I believe that we did make a request for a dog going through the S3 shop, but that wasn't staffed through my section. There were no requests made for dogs for either detention or interrogation through my section. I know that in Abugared that they had dogs there and they were looking for them for a while and when they got there they questioned kenneling. I received that information from regular shift updates. I was never consulted. I didn't see any need to become involved or informed on that issue. I was not aware that dogs were used for interrogation or for unlawful purposes.

I went to Bucca when it was still Camp Freddy under the British. I went once overnight and after that I would end up staying for two to three days at a time. I would average two to three days every couple of weeks while we were at Bucca, up until the end of June. I made one trip to Baghdad with BG Hill, actually Easter weekend I went up from Bucca to Lido to visit our unit there and then on to Baghdad. In early July we moved to Baghdad. The first week I was there, I made it a point to visit all of the prison facilities, which included Musafa, Tasfarat, Baghdad Central, Abu Ghraib. I made a day trip to

each of those as well as to Afalaya, which is a juvenile and women's facility. I got to Baghdad Central at least once every ten days or so. We would go to the other facilities less frequently.

The only Staff Judge Advocates I had assigned, as Brigade assets, were myself, MAJ Proietto, and the two JAGs from the BLDs, CPT [REDACTED], and 1LT [REDACTED]. The Battalions did not have Staff Judge Advocates on their TOE. There was a Staff Judge Advocate at Bucca, 1LT [REDACTED]. I requested additional Staff Judge Advocates from CJTF-7, starting in July. I got CPT [REDACTED], who left in August, and I got a CPT [REDACTED] but he was gone in September. I did a specific request, by name, of seven or nine individuals from the 7th LSO, which I was the Deputy Commander of, before I cross-leveled in the 800th. I believe COL [REDACTED] did a Request for Forces that was denied. There was more of a need in July. There were about a half dozen 15-6s from when 18th had Camp Cropper, based on shootings and riots, and they were clearing up that backlog. When that cleared up, there was a need for someone to help with the prison mission, at CTA, because we were taking that over. I sent CPT [REDACTED] to work at CTA.

We would average a 15-6 every couple of weeks for escapes, noting. There was a single escape in Talil. There were, I believe, two or three sets of escapes, one involving multiple prisoners from Bucca. There were also two recent escapes from Bucca on January 7th and 12th. There were two or three escapes from Baghdad Central. Then there was a shooting in November that involved the riot, and also the shooting of an MP. Fortunately, he was wearing his Interceptor Vest. We initiated a 15-6 on that, but shortly after we initiated it, CJTF-7 initiated their own 15-6, and had our Investigating Officer turn over everything he had to LTC [REDACTED] from the 220th, who was appointed as the Investigating Officer.

I interacted with COL [REDACTED] several times a week. There were some structured the Battalion Commanders. For instance, when there was a change in the ROE, we'd go there. I would receive regular email, or telephone contact from all Battalion Commanders, when they had questions on legal matters. I only interacted with BG Karpinski at the Brigade level.

BG Karpinski assumed command, I believe, on June 29th. In fact, I'm thinking it may have been BG Hill that made that other change for the warning shot, knowing we were coming up. The change was late June or early July. That would have been the second change to the ROE. The first one instituted the warning shot, and the second one took that away, again. For approval of the changes, we went through CFLCC. For the last change on 30 November, we went through CJTF-7, because we were making the change based on FRAGO 1150, which they had just issued. All iterations to the ROE, I staffed through the "3" shop, but BG [REDACTED], and later BG Karpinski were the ones that made the calls on it. They were only implemented, after approval by higher.

The subject of FRAGO 1150 was a more robust ROE for detainees. My understanding was LTG Sanchez was upset that soldiers were using non-lethal, when he felt lethal would be more appropriate. He wanted the ROE to clarify or emphasize that, if there was

a danger, soldiers could go immediately to a lethal use of force. That was right after the riots, in the latter part of November.

I believe all escapes were reported and investigated. I think the highest number at one time was seven. I know BG Karpinski took them quite seriously, which is why they initiated investigations. All the 15-6s I had were turned over with the document requests, early this week.

I know the CG got out regularly. She would usually take CSM [REDACTED] with her. CSM Clement was the Brigade Command Sergeant Major. He was relieved. He was relieved, after a 15-6, conducted by CFLCC, showed he made a false official statement to the investigating officer, and likely sexual misconduct. I gave a witness statement for it.

The "3" Shop went out regularly. MAJ [REDACTED] was the "3". Other members of the "3" Shop would also go out. In fact, we had a large cell at Camp Bucca, which consisted of MAJ [REDACTED], CPT [REDACTED], MAJ [REDACTED] who was the S2, and finished up as the Executive Officer for the 320th, and MAJ [REDACTED]. I had traveled with BG Karpinski. I went with BG [REDACTED] when he went. I mostly traveled on my own. CPT [REDACTED] when he became the acting "2" had an extended stay at the MEK compound. His enlisted soldiers were at Baghdad Central for an extended period. We had staff people going to Baghdad Central almost everyday. Usually, whenever I went, I went with a purpose. I'm not aware of what the staff sections were doing on their visits, but I know they were going regularly, and normally with a purpose.

We had a Staff Update, nightly. BG Karpinski was at more than half of those. For the last six weeks, they've been at 1700 in the General's office. She was always available to me, and had an open door.

There was a PAO Policy. I believe it was sent up through CFLCC. Early in the war the Press was trying to take photographs.

Sir, there were no posted policies. There were policies issued on treatment of detainees, but they weren't posted in the TOC. They were sent out to the Battalions, and they were to disseminate them down to the lowest level. There was a PAO policy that we sent up through CFLCC early in the war, that the press was trying to take photographs. It was not just the press, we had one general officer wanting to take photographs of POWs, we put out a policy that went through me and I helped draft it. The policy referenced the Geneva Convention stating that detainees will not be subject to humiliation and will not face a threat of retribution. We drafted the policy and it was approved by CFLCC.

The Geneva Convention was emphasized throughout our operations. Generally, I know what 190-8 is. I believe it requires the Geneva Convention is supposed to be posted in English, and the language used in the area. I remember it being posted at Camp Cropper. I did advise the Commanders that it was a requirement. I recall there being a problem, getting an Arabic translation, but that's no excuse, Sir.

I believe we felt I know that I felt that the Geneva Convention should be enforced throughout all the Camps I would say that Bucca, Baghdad Central, and Cropper got the most attention, because those were the Camps that the MPs were running, but I wouldn't say there was neglect of the other areas Until Cropper closed, it got most of the attention, and then it shifted Baghdad Central

I felt BG Karpinski was totally approachable for UCMJ matters She would listen to my advice, and in most cases she took my advice I believe she was approachable to the rest of the staff I'm not aware of her Command Philosophy

I don't believe I've ever seen the Interrogation ROE I know there was a disagreement between 320th and MI over the sleep patterns, keeping people awake, and things like that I heard MAJ [REDACTED] had some issues with the MI sending people back naked, and he said he wouldn't send MPs to pick them up anymore. I don't know if LTC [REDACTED] raised it I knew that MI did the interrogation, but I assumed this was done in their area It had not occurred to me that they would be returned to the MPs, with the expectation that the MPs would carry out what was on their list I did not have direct access to the MI interrogators We had a meeting with the MI, including COL Pappas The issue was not investigations

Outside what I've mentioned there were two incidents, from when the 18th had Cropper One involved a soldier urinating on a prisoner, and another involved two MPs from the 115th using excessive force on a prisoner, and inviting a third, unidentified person to come look There was another incident involving a soldier, who tried to mail back an M4 receiver group that had been seized from some Turkish Special Forces that were taken by us over the border That was the 443rd MP Company I was all day with that company drafting charges When the incidents occurred, they were under the 18th MP Brigade They did not come to light, until after the 800th took over The Battalion Commander, LTC [REDACTED] wanted to recommend a Special Court-Martial, initially BG Karpinski agreed I went through LTC [REDACTED] who was the 377th SJA, and LTC [REDACTED], who was the SJA (Rear) for CFLCC I asked their opinion, and they both indicated, based on the facts they had, they would recommend Field Grade Article 15s LTC [REDACTED] considered that, and decided to do a Field Grade Article 15 BG Karpinski did not want to use undue command influence She indicated that, if LTC [REDACTED] sent up charges, she would recommend a BCD Special Court Martial, but, if he decided to go with a Field Grade Article 15, she wouldn't pull it from him The incidents occurred late June, early July The CID Report did not come back 'til much later

During the course of negotiations, regarding the Bucca Case, I was asked to have BG Karpinski provide a memorandum, indicating whether LTC [REDACTED] had been relieved or suspended I believe it was based on LTC [REDACTED] coming in It was brought up as a motion for discovery that LTC [REDACTED] had been relieved or suspended from duty as the Battalion Commander of the 320th BG Karpinski said that, if they wanted the memorandum, it was fine She explained that she gave LTC [REDACTED] a rest, after they had a mortar attack involving some fatalities LTG Sanchez, I was actually there that

day, when he went out to Baghdad Central, and I understand that LTG Sanchez was not at all impressed with the force protection they had. BG Karpinski was there.

Anytime we had a meeting on operations, we emphasized compliance with the Geneva Convention to every Battalion coming in, or going to a new mission. One thing that never changed on the ROE was all persons are to be treated with dignity and respect.

From what I heard occurred, it's inexcusable. If true, the individuals involved should be punished to the fullest extent. I believe we acted in compliance, or tried to act in compliance with the Geneva Convention. BG Karpinski indicated she would not tolerate violations. I do not believe the Brigade got the support they needed to get from higher. I would hope there would be an investigation into the MI community, and their violations of the Geneva Convention. I would certainly hope, if deficiencies are noted, that there would be recommendations to make them far less likely to occur in the future.

The interview complete, MG Taguba reminds LTC [REDACTED] to not discuss or reveal the contents of the interview, and he is released.

On 14 February 2004, a panel of officers, at the direction of Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel was to assess the command climate and the command and supervisory presence of the 800th Military Police Brigade chain of command.

The following persons were present

COL [REDACTED], MP, CFLCC – PMO, Interviewer
LTC [REDACTED], 705th MP Battalion, Interviewer
MAJ [REDACTED], 265th Engineer Group, Interviewer
LTC [REDACTED], 165th MI Battalion, Respondent

The interview is summarized as follows

My name is LTC [REDACTED]. My current assignment is Commander, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion. My Battalion is currently located at Camp Doha, conducting re-deployment tasks in route to garrison, which is Darmstadt, Germany.

We were at Abu Gharib. I was responsible for augmenting the force protection, conducting reconnaissance and surveillance outside of the camp, and assisting COL Pappas with base operations. At the same time, we had a regular HUMINT mission, which was additional long-range surveillance, as well as tactical HUMINT teams, which were being deployed throughout Iraq, and we had the HUMINT Operations Cell, which did all the reporting for the general support task for HUMINT teams, none of which had anything to do with detention.

COL Pappas, at sometime in November, became the FOB Commander. At that point, we were still up at Bilad, and he called me and said, "I need some help with this, come on down," so I brought the Battalion down there on beginning the 28th of November.

COL [REDACTED] asks if LTC [REDACTED] is familiar with FRAGO 1108 published on the 19th of November, and LTC [REDACTED] responds, "I am not familiar with that FRAGO, Sir." COL [REDACTED] then reads PARA 3.C.8.A of FRAGO 1108.

"205 MI BRIGADE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, COMMANDER 205TH MI BRIGADE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BAGHDAD CENTRAL CONFINEMENT FACILITY (BCCF), AND IS APPOINTED THE FOB COMMANDER. UNITS CURRENTLY AT ABU GHARAYB BCCF ARE TACON

TO THE 205 MI BRIGADE FOR SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND FOB PROTECTION.”

COL [REDACTED] then continues the interview, and LTC [REDACTED] responds, as follows

Reading that, as it related to the 165th, at the time, it had no impact. That's why I wasn't familiar with it. I was at Bilad, and although I heard discussions on the phone that COL Pappas was going to become the FOB Commander it didn't affect us. He commands the 205th MI Brigade. 205th is V Corps' MI Brigade, and 165th is subordinate to 205th, so anything that affects COL Pappas is eventually going to affect us, but that, in and of itself, did not require the Battalion to move down there. He has other battalions. I don't have any interrogators. I don't have anything involved with interrogating detainees. So that's why, when that came out, it really didn't strike an interest, because I don't have any involvement with interrogations. When he called me and said, I need your help with force protection, and infrastructure improvement. I did the Army math, O6 - O5, and off we went.

The FOB Commanders in charge, and everybody had to follow. The 320th MP Battalion is headquartered there. LTC [REDACTED] was the Battalion Commander. I went down, and did my initial introductions, when I got there. I put out to the battalion, that we're going to use the Good Neighbor Policy. We don't want to go down there and make a bunch of changes, and have a lot of friction that would prevent infrastructure improvement. We need to work together. So, I went down there, and introduced myself to Jerry, and his first question was, "How many towers can you man on the perimeter?" and I said, "Well, I can man 3 of them right now. I'll take the northern half of the perimeter wall." The northern wall was down. You could actually walk out through there. There were some significant security issues. So, I took the northern part of the prison, and manned those towers immediately. I put dismounted patrols out there to make sure nothing comes through, during hours of limited visibility, and I put LRS teams out, along with A 1/504th, who was also working out there, as far as external security. Then, in a step beyond that, we built a Base Mayor's Cell. When you're an enduring base, there are certain things you have to do, that CFLCC puts out. None of that was happening. So, I said, "Jerry, I'ma start running with this, because COL Pappas is the FOB Commander, and he needs to have this done." I manned the towers, put out the R&S, built the mayor's cell, and I had 4 soldiers augment the Entry Control Point. Because the Entry Control Point is the most vulnerable point. It requires a great deal of resources to maintain the appropriate force protection posture, yet allow the visitation to go on.

To be perfectly candid, Sir, the 800th MP Brigade were out of site out of mind, except when an issue came up, and BG Karpinski would call COL Pappas. And they would be minor issues. Let me give you an example. We get there, and I brought 150 soldiers, and there was no place to live. I had the LRS guys in the shadows of one of the LSAs, with the 320th, and the guys were stacked, literally, cot-to-cot. There was an MWR Room, but nothing had been done to improve it, to make it an MWR Room. They had the frame of a pool table, but it wasn't put together or used, and there was a table with some

magazines on it. It was a big room, and my Company Commander said we need this room for the LRS guys, and they were like, no. LTC ██████████ said he'd look into it. Well, the next thing that happens is BG Karpinski calls COL Pappas, and asks, "Why are your guys taking the MWR Room away?" COL Pappas calls me, so I took him over there, and I showed him the MWR Room, which was a big concrete, unimproved structure, with the remnants of a pool table, and a wooden table with some magazines on it, and nothing else. I said, "This is the MWR Room that they're refusing to give up, meanwhile, I've got the LRS guys stacked on top of each other in the next room." He said, "I understand. I see the picture, but I don't know why a General Officer's getting involved with this." I didn't either. This was something that should have been handled by the First Sergeants or Platoon Sergeants.

I don't know this for a fact, but what I do know is the biggest roadblock to any type of relationship was LTC ██████████'s XO. His XO had a direct line to BG Karpinski. That's what tied his hands from my observations. Whatever he did, if his XO didn't like it, his XO would call BG Karpinski, and she would come down. MAJ ██████████ was his XO. The junior level MPs understood more people coming in meant they didn't have to man the towers. They were happy to see us, but MAJ ██████████, for some reason, he didn't like us. He was out there pointing his finger at my S4's chest saying, "You guys aren't moving in here." So, it went from my S4, to the Company Commander trying to talk to him. Then, my XO went down there. They said, "Hey, this guys getting animate over this room," so I went down there to look at it. It wasn't much to look at, but it would've been a good place to put my soldiers. We eventually took it.

I would say LTC ██████████ wasn't an effective commander. He's a little overweight. He had a speech impediment. He didn't communicate well, when he stood in front of soldiers, and there were a lot of things that weren't happening. There was discipline. There were no uniform standards. There was no saluting. I brought it up to COL Pappas. I said, "Sir, I recommend we institute saluting, right now. We got 6,000 detainees here. A lot of these detainees are former military. We know for a fact that these guys are passing notes to their loved ones, during visitation. Former military recognize a well-trained, highly disciplined unit. Soldiers saluting are an indicator of a well-trained highly disciplined unit. We want that message to get out." That took a lot to get the MPs to do that. We put the base defense plan in a very simple chart on one sheet of paper, and passed it out to the Platoon Sergeants, so the information could get down to the soldier level.

Another indicator was graffiti in all the latrines. It was rampant. So, I had my Sergeant Major go through with black spray paint, and spray it all out. I told them, hey, if you keep this up, we'd have latrine guards and inspect, until this goes away. It is getting better, but there were some challenges, initially.

There were some things they were resistant to, until the end, even when we left. Like I brought up civilian clothes. I told COL Pappas. I told LTC ██████████. I told LTC ██████████ – that's another guy that was involved in all of this. He was in charge of the

JDIC, before COL Pappas went down there. And that's why COL Pappas went down there. There were a lot of problems in the JDIC, as far as not producing Intel.

But, civilian clothes were an issue. There were civilian clothes all over the place. I said we can't have this. This place comes under attack all the time. Somebody running across the compound with an M16 in his hand, when we have 6,000 detainees, that person may be mistaken for an escaping prisoner, and he's liable to get shot. Therefore, I recommend we do not wear civilian clothes. It's too easy to stay in uniform. My guys stayed in uniform the whole time, but some of the MPs and interrogators were resistant to change.

LTC [REDACTED] was receptive. He'd say that does make sense, but push back would come from lower levels, and it would get around to BG Karpinski. So, BG Karpinski called COL Pappas.

There were a lot of positive things happening there. Some of the things I didn't weigh in on, like the base security net, because they were working good. If you go through my battalion, I'm sure there are things we could improve. But, it wasn't as effective as I've seen other units, Sir.

One time BG Karpinski came by on Christmas day, and we were getting ready to do a force capability demonstration. I was standing out there, and she came by and said hello. If I were the Brigade Commander, I would spend more time there. I just don't know what all her other requirements were.

I know COL Pappas had 7 battalions. He spent very little time with me, when I was up at Bilad, but I saw him everyday, when I moved to Abu Gharib.

I can't remember date, but the resident CID agent there stopped me, and he said, "I've got this CD, and it's got some pictures, that are fairly explicit. It looks like detainee abuse." I told him to go see COL Pappas, immediately. Tell COL Pappas what you have and give him your recommendation, as a CID agent, on the best way to proceed with this. I saw him later, and I asked if he saw COL Pappas, and he said he got it.

We get the annual training on Geneva Hague just like everybody else. We didn't do anything any additional to that, simply because we weren't going to have any interface with them.

LTC [REDACTED] is a good guy - nothing but good stuff coming from him. He'll do well there. Anything he touches will get better.

I went to the hard site in November, when COL Pappas had all of the Battalion Commanders come together for an OPD, and we did a walk through. That was the only time I was at the hard site. I didn't find anything remarkable.

One thing I did find weird was you have that big old CPA, and you have Iraqis in there guarding other Iraqis. I think that's going to be a problem in the future, especially, when they're talking about giving more of the LSA away. With the infrastructure centralized, Iraqis are going to have to leave their compound, and come across the Coalition area, to the power generation plant or to the water filtration plant, to see about that. All that's going to have to be controlled. It's going to take a company of guys just to watch all the Iraqis that are supposed to be there, not to mention the ones that are trying to come in the front gate. So, I think that's weird. I think that needs some more scrutiny.

And the other thing is we get mortared constantly, and the reason we can't fire back is because of where it's located. Abu Gharib is in an urban area. What you do, in my recommendation, is you pick up the Coalition's detainee operation, and you move it out in the desert. Then, you have mortar distance. That way the Iraqis can have the whole place, and you don't have any of these problems. The areas covered, but we still do not get counter-fire. The 504th goes out, the MP QRFs go out, I've sent LRS QRF out, but by the time we get there, they're gone.

Wrapping up their discussion, the panel gave LTC [REDACTED] a list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45, the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951, E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1 LOCATION Camp Doha, Kuwait	2 DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/02/15	3 TIME 0900	4 FILE NUMBER
5 LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6 SSN [REDACTED]	7 GRADE/STATUS 05/Active Army	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
165th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical Exploitation), Darmstadt, Germany APO AE 09175

9. I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

1 There were numerous leadership challenges at Abu Ghraib in the Fall of 2003. The one person that rose to all those challenges and led by example, setting standards, enforcing standards and demanding nothing short of military professional excellence was Colonel Tom Pappas. Shortly after he became the Forward Operating Base commander, he called me and directed my unit to move from Balad SE Airfield to Abu Ghraib. I arrived with my battalion ADVON on 28 November 2003.

2 Duties and responsibilities at Forward Operating Base - Abu Ghraib (FOB-AG) Duty title 165th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical Exploitation) Commander From unit arrival on 28 NOV 03 to unit departure on 4 FEB 04, responsible for

a Sustaining ongoing HUMINT operations at other locations (Long Range Surveillance at Al Asad and Tactical HUMINT Teams at Mosul, Tikrit, Ar Ramadi, and Fallujah)

b Sustaining ongoing HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) reporting

c Upon arrival at Abu Ghraib, responsible for

(1) Augmenting the Base Defense posture (immediately occupied towers 92A, 98, and 97) and provided four soldiers to augment the entry control point operation

(2) Increased Reconnaissance and Surveillance operations external to the base working counter-IED and counter-mortar missions with LRS teams in coordination with A Company, 1/504th Parachute Infantry Regiment

(3) Facilitated the FOB commander's execution of base operations by establishing a FOB Mayor Cell (Mayor, DPW, Contractor management), designating LSA mayors, and beginning weekly updates concerning infrastructure improvement. Updated the Base Master Plan and the Base Defense Plan.

(4) Improved the standard of soldier living conditions in LSA Mustang. Facilitated adjacent LSA (Shadow and Trailblazer) improvements.

d No soldier from the 165th MI Battalion had any interface with detainees. There are no interrogators in the 165th and we did not conduct or augment detainee security or interrogation operations. The only connection with the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) was that JIDC reports were sent electronically to the HOC (2 b above) which logged the reports, entered the information in a database, provided tailored electronic feedback to MSCs, then sent the report to higher (CJTF7).

3 To improve good order and discipline at FOB-AG, the 165th implemented several initiatives. Each initiative was staffed with all tenant units then briefed to the FOB Commander for approval prior to implementation.

a Revised the Base Defense Plan to establish easily understood standards so all tenant units could adhere (see attachment A). There were no common uniform or weapons posture standards. The chart outlined uniform and weapons status for varying levels of threat conditions. Initially, some company commanders in the 320th MP battalion questioned the policy of having to clear their weapons when not conducting detainee security duties. They stated they preferred leaving their weapons at Amber Status. They reluctantly complied with the standard.

10 EXHIBIT	11 INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
------------	--	-------------------

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF TAKEN AT Camp DohaDATED 2004/02/15

9 STATEMENT (Continued)




b. Recommended a salute policy Although I never saw a policy, upon arrival, FOB-AG was a no salute area The recommendation to institute a salute policy was based on the fact that the FOB contained several thousand Iraqi detainees and that many of these were former military. We knew the detainees communicated with friends and family members outside the camp (daily family visitation and illicit notes) We wanted the detainees to communicate that the soldiers working at Abu Ghraib were well trained and highly disciplined soldiers A well-trained and highly disciplined military unit is a hard target for the enemy Executing proper hand salutes is indicative of a disciplined professional military force According to COL Pappas, shortly after implementation, BG Karpinski called him and asked him to reconsider this policy in the detainee area COL Pappas discussed this with me and decided it was a good policy and continued to enforce same

c Recommended no civilian clothes Upon arrival, soldiers were wearing civilian clothes after duty hours within the FOB This recommendation was made in conjunction with the Base Defense Plan to mitigate the risk of fratricide in the event of detainee escape attempt or a perimeter attack that breached the wall A person in civilian clothes sprinting across the compound carrying a M16 could easily be suspected of being an armed escaping detainee or an attacking terrorist The MPs did not like this recommendation and wanted to keep the civilian clothes option available to their soldiers in the LSAs That option was included for the MPs in the Defense Plan The 165th soldiers remained in military uniform throughout our stay

d Leader presence at the Entry Control Point The Entry Control Point (ECP) is the most vulnerable point of FOB-AG The soldiers manning the ECP routinely search 800-1200 local nationals daily and inspect 300-500 vehicles The volume is so high because of inherent nature of detention facility operations - family member visits, lawyer visits, Iraqi Police reporting for work, and the constant drop off and pick-up of detainees by Major Subordinate Commands. Additionally, the prisoner kitchen was not operational for most of the time we were there so caterers routinely arrived with multiple vehicles carrying food for approximately 6000 detainees twice a day To exacerbate this further, numerous local national contractors were working a number of contracts for force protection and base infrastructure improvement so contractor vehicles and labor were constantly requiring base access On top of this, the ECP was subject to random drive by shootings by hostile elements, not to mention the constant threat of Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices Our plan here was simple, augment the MP ECP operation with additional soldiers, then personally go out there and spend time at the ECP every day We started out with four soldiers then increased our support to 8 soldiers daily

4. Interface with 800th MP BDE

a I said hello to BG Karpinski on 25 DEC 03 when she stopped by the FOB I never had an additional opportunity to speak with her, though I know she did visit the compound at least one other time during our time there

b Upon arrival at Abu Ghraib, MAJ  the 320th MP BN executive officer was reluctant to share living space in the 320th LSA (Shadow) My LRS soldiers were packed in to a part of a building in the northern portion of Shadow LSA The adjacent building had the bottom floor unoccupied because it had been designated a Morale, Welfare, and Recreation room for HHC, 320th MPs There had been little to no infrastructure improvement to the MWR space It was basically an empty room Despite LTC  saying we could occupy the space with the LRS soldiers, MAJ  insisted that we could not Within a day, BG Karpinski called COL Pappas and asked him why the 165th was trying to take over an "MWR room" I reengaged LTC Philabaum and we moved the soldiers in to the space No further interaction with the 800th BDE on this issue This is a trivial issue, but it speaks to how the 800th MP BDE chain of command operated The 320th MP BN commander made a decision (move LRS soldiers into MWR designated room), the 320th MP XO did not agree with the decision and reported situation to 800th MP BDE CDR, she then engaged the 205th MI BDE CDR on an issue easily resolved at platoon sergeant level

5 Counter Fire

a FOB-AG is routinely engaged by enemy mortar fire There was no friendly counter fire during the time we were there The primary reason stated by the 82nd unit representatives for a lack of counter fire is that the mortar points of origin (POO) determined by radar are routinely in populated areas The risk of collateral damage prevented friendly units (1AD or 82ABN) from returning fire

b 82nd maneuver elements frequently moved quickly to the points of origin shortly after attacks but never caught any culprits red handed LRS teams routinely conducted surveillance operations on previous POO but without success As of this writing, the attacks continue

6 Iraqi Detention operations I had no interface with the ongoing Iraqi detention operations other than my soldiers assisted entry control point operations where the Iraqi police entered and exited the FOB Additionally, I was privilege to some Coalition Provisional Authority planning initiatives (verbally from COL Pappas) that had the hard site LSAs within the FOB being turned over to the Iraqis for future Iraqi detention operations No further visibility on Iraqi detention operations

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT 

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

7 Recommendation I recommend we move the coalition detention facility operations to a remote location. This recommendation is based on the counter fire dilemma above and the fact that CPA planners have the hard sites within FOB-AG going back to the Iraqis. The base infrastructure (power, water, sanitation) is not designed to satisfy requirements of multiple isolated local national facilities within the compound. Currently Iraqis operate part of the hard site detention facility adjacent to the Vigilant Compound. The MPs have to watch the Iraqi police that are guarding Iraqis. The future plan has hard sites currently occupied as soldier LSAs to be turned over to Iraqis with the coalition forces occupying a modular (trailers) LSA that is currently under construction. The coalition forces will then be living in trailers and guarding/interrogating detainees that are housed in tents surrounded by concertina wire. The Iraqis will be guarding Iraqi prisoners at multiple hard sites within the compound, which will require more coalition soldiers to watch these additional Iraqi Police, and yet another major overhaul to the base infrastructure. Given this plan, the force protection challenges promise to be monumental. There will be no infrastructure benefits tying coalition forces to Abu Ghraib so lets move

Nothing Follows

AFFIDAVIT

[REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]

KINARA J. LAFAYETTE Co., GS
CFLCC AM Camp Doha

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 15th day of February 2004 at Camp Doha, Kuwait

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

The 16th Div (JA Pkt 10)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

FOB - ABU GHRAIB SECURITY POSTURE

AS OF 05 DEC 03

SECURITY POSTURE	THREAT	UNIFORM	WEAPON STATUS	TOWER STATUS	LSA /WORK AREAS STATUS	SOLDIER LSA POSTURE	QRF	BASE ENTRY
GREEN	ROUTINE REPORTING OR HARASSMENT	*DCU, WEAPON + AMMO, SOFT CAP COMPLETE ARMY PT	WPN WITH MAGAZINE ON PERSON	**PLANNED TOWERS MANNED	NO RESTRICTED ENTRY EXCEPT FOR NORMAL SOPs	DCUS, PT OR CIVILIAN CLOTHES (OFF DUTY & IN LSA ONLY)	MP QRF	LOCAL NATIONAL WORKERS ADMITTED
AMBER	BASE UNDER ATTACK OR ATTACK IMMINENT	ADD BALLISTIC HELMET & BODY ARMOR	LOADED MAGAZINE INSERTED INTO MAGAZINE WELL	ALL PERIMETER TOWERS MANNED	UNITS GAIN 100 % AND REPORT LSA ACCESS CONTROL	DCUS WEAPON WITH MAG IN WELL KEVLAR/IBA	LRS QRF ALERTED	NO LOCAL NATIONALS ADMITTED INMATE TRANSFER ONLY
RED	PERIMETER HAS BEEN BREACHED OR PRISON ESCAPE	ADD LBV + AMMO BASIC LOAD	WEAPON CHARGED, PLACED ON SAFE	INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TOWERS MANNED	LSAs LOCKED DOWN ENTRY/EXIT BLOCKED	DCUS WEAPON CHARGED ON SAFE KEVLAR/IBA/LCE BASIC LOAD	LRS/82 nd QRF ALERTED NOTIFY 82 nd FOR AIR QRF	ECPs CLOSED INMATE TRANSFER HALTED

*FROM 1700-0600 DAILY THE GREEN SECURITY POSTURE UNIFORM WILL INCLUDE IBA AND KEVLAR WHEN OUTSIDE OF LSA OR WORK AREA THE LSA IS DEFINED AS THE PERIMETER WALL OF EACH LSA OR WORK COMPOUND

**TOWER UNIFORM IS LBV, IBA, KEVLAR, WPN, AND MISSION ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT. SOLDIERS PERFORMING OTHER SECURITY MISSIONS WILL WEAR COMBAT GEAR AS REQUIRED

***KEVLAR WILL BE WORN AT ALL TIMES WHILE OPERATING A MILITARY VEHICLE

ANNEX A A

On 9 February 2004, a team of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present

COL [REDACTED], MP, CFCC – PMO, Interviewer
LTC [REDACTED] JA, CFLCC – SJA, Interviewer
LTC [REDACTED] 705th MP Battalion, Interviewer
LTC [REDACTED], 202nd MI Battalion, Respondent
SSG [REDACTED], 27D30, CFLCC – SJA, Recorder

The interview is summarized as follows

Sir, I'm Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED], Regular Army. I am Commander of 202nd Military Intelligence Battalion. I am currently based at Abu Gharib, Iraq. I assumed command of the 202nd on 6 July of 2003. On 3 February 2004, my transition of authority. I assumed my role at the BCCF from the Commander of the 165th MI, LTC [REDACTED]. He's in Kuwait, right now. When I took command of the battalion, it was in the process of re-deploying. I had a trail body still in Kuwait, and the main body was at Fort Gordon.

I am a force provider to the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, the area applicable to this investigation. My Alpha Company is an Interrogation Company. It provides Interrogators and Analyst to the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, otherwise known as the JIDC. I do not operate the JIDC. It is operated by the Deputy Director, LTC Sean Faust. Again, I provide forces. I sustain them – like a headquarters company does for them. The rest of my battalion provides tactical HUMINT Operations for the entire JTF, and provide the management of that. I have nine tactical HUMINT Teams that operate around Iraq, four mobile interrogation teams that operate around Iraq, and I'm in the process of bringing in two long-range surveillance units that will flush out the rest of my task force. I also have an MP platoon that pulls some of the perimeter security around the prison. COL [REDACTED] he's my boss. He transitioned authority on the 5th of February from COL Pappas. I provided him a document, to be published, which has been staffed with the tenant units, that lays out responsibilities at the base camp, because on the base camp, you have two primary battalions. You have an MI battalion, and an MP battalion, and then various other units.

Essentially, that document, which is for the FOB Commander to issue, charges the MP battalion with all detainee and confinement operations, and the JIDC Director is responsible for Interrogation Operations. I pick up the mayoral responsibilities. The FOB Commander, COL [REDACTED] is in charge of everything. He is in control of the entire facility. He's the commander of the 504th MI Bde.

Sir, I talk to LTC [REDACTED] who is the Battalion Commander for the MP Battalion, now I talk to him several times a day. The formal venue for that is the Force Protection meeting at 1600. It's held in his briefing room, and hosted by him. In the Base Defense Plan And Responsibilities Order, that we're asking COL [REDACTED] to re-publish, that's one of the requirements - for the MP's to host that meeting. Typical things discussed there are operations outside the wire, and threats to internal security. And, as you know, we have a very challenging situation, getting mortared, routinely, casualties. I've already lost equipment. I've lost a TPU that took a direct hit. That's a coordination meeting between the long-range surveillance assets that work outside the wire, the 82nd, who owns the dirt outside, the people that run the tower for external security, and I provide forces for that, my tactical HUMINT team that gathers intelligence from walk-in sources, as well as the entry control point, and the MP's run detainee ops, in terms of confinement operations, and they put out any information that's related to what happens, there. The MP's are also responsible for the internal reaction force and the QRF.

I am familiar with the Interrogation ROE. In fact, I carry a copy with me.

LTC [REDACTED] hands a document to COL [REDACTED].

It's the dumb version, a bulletized power point presentation. Having just gotten there, I've directed that all of my soldiers be re-trained on that by this Friday. The brigade is also wrestling with the problem of multiple units providing forces to the JIDC, and who's in charge of all these guys. What the brigade has now done is anybody in the 504th MI Bde, who works in the JIDC has been chopped to me. We did some mission analysis to show what types of things they should be attached - lodging, UCMJ, support, mail, all those types of issues. The brigade is in the process of cleaning that up. I've assumed responsibility for approximately 3 quarters of the people that are over there, now. Still, at my count, 46 individuals do not fall under the current standards.

Sir, if there was a significant event, it would be reported immediately to my TOC. We wouldn't wait for a meeting, and we would take immediate action, as required. Most of the SIGACTS that we've been dealing with numerous mortar attacks, stuff like that. We're still forming our task force, as well, and we're trying to get 2 more companies from the states. Additionally, I have an open door policy. And, of course, I have 3 staff meetings a week, Command and Staff. Information flows to me in all those ways. Plus, what I get from walking around talking to soldiers, daily. We're living in a third world prison, so I've spent a lot of time in the LSA, making sure the roofs don't leak; we get rid of mold. There's some third world latrines down there we're trying to seal up. I've spent a couple of hours a day at the JIDC, mostly talking to my guys who are in tactical HUMINT Ops.

Sir, I've heard rumors of events that have happened. I have not seen evidence. That's part of my motivation for re-iterating the training for the ROE and detainee ops. Soldiers in my unit have been deployed a lot, so they understand IROE. My concern is getting another 100 soldiers under me, who, perhaps, do not, so that's why I've directed this training to occur.

I'm performing a mission, here, that is not how my battalion is organized. I'm an EAC/CI HUMINT Battalion, called a collection and exploitation battalion. I've been re-organized to form a tactical exploitation battalion, a corps level mission, that's why I'm getting the LRS in, and that's why I'm reorganizing my counter-intelligence assets to do CI HUMINT. So, when you say, am I short, it's difficult to say exactly where. I believe this month I will report C2 or C3, which will largely be due to personnel. We are challenged. There's about a 20 personnel difference in MTOE authorization.

My unit was here from November '02, until 15 July 03. They weren't home long. There are issues, because of dep tempo. The command climate survey I conducted in September showed that 40% of the unit had low morale because of dep tempo, and we were one of the broken red line units, when the Secretary of Defense decided to establish red lines. We were one of the red lines that had to be waived by him, to come back so soon. The result of that was DEPORD came late. Stop Loss/Stop Move hit hard, and it was quite messy in December. We got our DEPORD on the 5th or 6th December, and we were deployed on the 7th of January.

It's not going to change. We're going to be here, we're going to do our mission; and we'll go home. I believe we need a force that can take control of external security, so we can focus on doing our jobs. I believe the MP's were responsible for the facility, and for some reason, they removed that from the MP's, and placed it on COL Pappas, the 205th MI Bde Commander. Shortly after that, COL Pappas decided to pull 165th MI Battalion from Balad, to help with that. Some of the complications are we have an ad hoc base staff. I've staffed a memo that COL [REDACTED] was from the JTF, trying to get a garrison staff, because, right now, we're taking that out of hide. MI and MP brigades lack some of the expertise that a combat arms unit would have, like engineers, preventive medicine and some other things. We have 2 major areas we have to fix – one of those is standing water and drainage at the camp, which could be breeding sites for insects, and we have a lot of rubble, which is difficult to move, because of hazardous waste, there. The removal of that rubble and debris, I believe, would remove breeding ground for rodents.

I have an MP platoon, which is OPCON'd to me, 3rd platoon of the 170th MP Company. When 165th MI moved, they had some of their LRS capabilities taken away from them, so they put in a Request for Forces, and received an MP platoon. They man 2 of the 4 security towers I'm responsible for. They also provide convoy security.

My troops were trained on Geneva Hague as part of SRP. The good news about being in my unit is we've done Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Brigade SJA is very versed in that, and the nuances in Intel oversight. She gave a special class for interrogators, which

focused on the aspects related to interrogating. Following the SRP, we had the DOD SJA come in and talk about interrogations in Afghanistan. That drove the point home that we have to do this right, because people will come back and ask questions. Also, one of my soldiers called into a radio talk show, and had been discussing ethics and all that. His concern was he wanted to do everything right. So, it was interesting to get feedback in that way, and to know that my soldiers have gotten the message.

If one of my soldiers were involved in an incident similar to what's rumored, I would notify my higher commander, and ask for someone outside the unit to conduct an investigation. I wouldn't want anyone to think we were trying to hide anything.

The panel stopped, to discuss LTC [REDACTED]'s statements.

Finished with their discussion, the panel gave LTC [REDACTED] a list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45 the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951 E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Camp Victory, Iraq	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004 02 04	3. TIME 1700	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS C5/RA	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CDR, 202 ME BN, APO AL 09342 [REDACTED] DOJ

9. I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH
 I AM THE COMMANDER OF 202 ME BATTALION. MY BATTALION ASSUMED ITS CIVIL MISSION AT ADH GHRAIB, IRAQ ON 3 FEB 04, HAVING COMPLETED A RELIEF IN PLACE (RIIP) WITH THE 165 ME BN. THE BASE CAMP COMMANDER IS THE CDR OF THE 30TH ME BRIGADE, COL FOSTER [REDACTED] COL [REDACTED] IS ALSO THE DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT INTERROGATION AND DEBRIEFING CENTER (JIDC). HIS DEPUTY DIR. DIRECTOR IS LTC [REDACTED] LTC FLORES IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATING THE JIDC I PERSONALLY PERFORM THE JIDC AND PERFORM THE OTHER MISSIONS MY BN IS TASKED WITH, INCLUDING TACTICAL HUMINT COLLECTION AND REPORTING AND PREPARING FOR LOW LEVEL SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS. THE 30TH MP BATTALION IS ALSO LOCATED IN ADH GHRAIB THEY ARE ENTIRELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL DETAINEE OPERATIONS I MEET DAILY WITH THE 30 MP BATTALION COMMANDER TO DISCUSS FACILITY PREPARATION OPERATIONS AND ISSUES RELATED TO THE FBI I WAS ASKED TO ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: // // // // //

Q: HOW LONG HAVE THE CURRENT INTERROGATION REG (I-REG) BEEN IN PLACE?
 A: I DON'T KNOW. I HAVE INQUIRED AT THE JIDC AND BEEN INFORMED THEY HAVE BEEN IN PLACE SINCE SEP OR OCT '03 //

Q: WHEN THE CG APPROVES A SPECIFIC INTERROGATION TECHNIQUE, HOW IS THAT COMMUNICATED TO THE MP, WHAT DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED, AND HOW IS IT MONITORED? //

A: THIS IS NOT MY SPECIFIC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY IT WOULD BE A POLICY ISSUE FOR THE JIDC DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR. I HAVE INQUIRED ABOUT THESE PROCEDURES AND UNDERSTAND THAT NO DETAINEES HAVE BEEN SUBJECTS TO SPECIAL TREATMENTS SINCE MY BATTALION'S ARRIVAL I UNDERSTAND THE JIDC IS PERFORMING AN JOB THAT COVERS THESE TOPICS FOR COL [REDACTED] REVIEW I ALSO UNDERSTAND BUT CANNOT PERSONALLY CONFIRM THAT THE MP ALWAYS REQUIRE A SIGNED MEMO FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT, AND THAT ALL INTERROGATION APPROACHES MUST BE LOGGED IN THE INTERROGATION PLAN AND THAT MEDICAL PERSONNEL AT THE JIDC ARE INVOLVED IN MONITORING DETAINEES UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, //


10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
-------------	---	-------------------


ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____ (29)
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF  TAKEN AT Camp Victory, 1st DATED 9 Feb 64

9 STATEMENT (Continued)



INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT 

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT CAMP VAN DYKE 12 DATED 9 Feb 04

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

[Large area with a large 'X' drawn across it, indicating the statement content is redacted.]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law administer oaths 11 day of Feb, 2004 at Abn-6424 J...

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES