

THIS FILE IS MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE DECLASSIFICATION EFFORTS AND RESEARCH OF:

THE BLACK VAULT

THE BLACK VAULT IS THE LARGEST ONLINE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT / GOVERNMENT RECORD CLEARING HOUSE IN THE WORLD. THE RESEARCH EFFORTS HERE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS THROUGHOUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AND ALL CAN BE DOWNLOADED BY VISITING:

[HTTP://WWW.BLACKVAULT.COM](http://www.blackvault.com)


YOU ARE ENCOURAGED TO FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO YOUR FRIENDS, BUT PLEASE KEEP THIS IDENTIFYING IMAGE AT THE TOP OF THE .PDF SO OTHERS CAN DOWNLOAD MORE!

9

2471

~~Secret~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAY 2007



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

*Soviet Expectations of
A European Security Conference
(Reference Title: ESAU LVII)*

~~Secret~~

October 1972
RSS No. 0060/72

WARNING

~~This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.~~

~~Classified by: 0156
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category: 5B(1),(2),(3)
Declassified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.~~

~~WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

~~SECRET~~

SOVIET EXPECTATIONS OF A
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR RECIPIENTS

The message of this memorandum is that the USSR has very definite objectives in mind concerning a European Security Conference (CSCE). These are not vague aspirations on Moscow's part, but tangible goals toward which the USSR is devoting considerable behind-the-scenes planning.

This memorandum highlights two aspects of Soviet thinking. One is the intent that CSCE establish permanent organizational machinery through which the USSR could become more directly involved in Western European affairs, economically and politically. This CSCE agenda item is second on the USSR's list only to a declaration of principles governing relations among European states.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The other point highlighted is that the Soviets are striving to accent the non-controversial at a CSCE -- not only with an eye to their future opportunities in Western Europe, but also with an eye to continuing internal Soviet and Eastern European misgivings about the risks of detente to Communist orthodoxy and control.


These ideas are examined within the broader framework of the USSR's interests in using a CSCE as a unique instrument for formalizing and nailing down post-war legalities in Eastern Europe, for creating a benign atmosphere which can enhance Moscow's role in Europe's future, and for quieting the European front in the interests of gaining greater flexibility with respect to China.

This memorandum includes information available through the end of September 1972. It has found general agreement within the Directorate of Intelligence and in the Office of National Estimates. Comments on this study are welcome, addressed to its author, Miss Diana Smith, of this Staff.

Hal Ford
Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



SOVIET EXPECTATIONS OF A
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

Contents

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION.	1
A. UNDERLYING SOVIET MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES.	4
China.	4
Legalizing Results of World War II	4
A More Flexible Policy for Europe.	6
Consolidating Detente Gains to Date.	8
Atmosphere for Future Soviet Involvement in Europe10
An Anti-American Element13
B. SPECIFIC RESULTS DESIRED BY THE USSR.15
Declaration of Principles.15
Freer Movement and the Inherent Risk of Detente.17
A Permanent Organization19
C. SOVIET VIEWS OF A CONFERENCE'S RELATION TO MBFR28
Internal Soviet Controversy Over European Force Reduction.28
Brezhnev's Position.33

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

SOVIET EXPECTATIONS OF A
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

INTRODUCTION

The idea of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has recurred so persistently in Soviet declarations, without much apparent movement toward realization, that it has frequently been suspected of having little more than propaganda intent. In fact, however, the amount and level of Soviet attention given a CSCE leave little doubt that Moscow is indeed serious and has some very definite goals in mind.

Brezhnev has cited the conference as a central feature of Soviet European policy in most major foreign policy statements that he has made since seriously turning his personal attention to foreign affairs in 1967.* The conference has been featured in semiannual Warsaw Pact Summit declarations since early 1969. In June 1971 the Soviets set up a 134-member Committee for European Security -- composed largely of front and propaganda specialists, to lobby in Western Europe for the conference;

**The Soviets had of course already been periodically advocating a European security conference for some time. The proposal goes back at least to 1954. The year 1967 simply marks the approximate beginning of the present phase of Soviet interest in the conference.*

-1-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

the Committee's membership and activities represent a large scale agitprop effort. This Soviet CSCE apparatus has been described by a sympathetic Western European as "fantastic." The source commented that he had previously believed the Soviets were serious about a CSCE, but had had no idea of the extent of people and money they were putting into the effort. The [redacted] to whom these comments were made had had more experience with Soviet activities and was less surprised, responding that these CSCE preparations reminded him of the scale of Soviet effort expended on Comintern causes in the 1930s.

Further, the CPSU Central Committee's International Department has devoted a high level of effort to lobbying for a CSCE. Heading the Soviet delegation to the October 1971 Brussels meeting of the all-European "Committee of Initiative To Organize a People's Congress of European Security" was V.S. Shaposhnikov, a Deputy Chief of the International Department. That same month a TASS correspondent newly assigned to Ethiopia even claimed that arranging a CSCE was "the most" important current Soviet foreign policy objective, and that every Soviet official in the world had been instructed to do what he could to promote this conference, including gathering any useful information on US and Canadian attitudes toward the conference.*

**Calling the CSCE "the most" important current Soviet foreign policy objective doubtless was something of an exaggeration on the TASS correspondent's part. Allowing for hyperbole in the claim, it nevertheless definitely suggests the conference had acquired a very high Soviet priority.*

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~



Since completing the prerequisite Berlin Agreement and German Treaties, the Soviet priority attached to CSCE has emerged more sharply: Soviet leaders put firm US commitment to a CSCE on the May 1972 Summit agenda; Foreign Minister Gromyko has since heightened emphasis on the conference in talks with Western European leaders, and made it a principal reason for his July 1972 visit to Belgium and the Netherlands.

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

A. UNDERLYING SOVIET MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES

China

One underlying Soviet motive for a CSCE, as for all aspects of the USSR's European policy, has to do certainly with the problem of China. Greater Soviet confidence concerning Europe would strengthen Moscow's hand in a variety of ways, ranging from the central matter of armed confrontation along the China front to that of the CPSU's position among world Communist parties. The Soviets of course are also highly sensitive to any suggestion that the Chinese contemplate active involvement in Western European affairs: the July 1972 visit to China of West German Christian Democratic opposition foreign affairs leader Schroeder caused an immediate airing in the Soviet press of suspicion of Chinese meddling in Western Europe (Chinese meddling in Eastern Europe is a fact), and the establishment of West German-Chinese diplomatic relations expected in October will be a severe test of Soviet balance. But while concern about China is significant in moving the USSR towards defusing problems in Europe, Soviet policy there has other primary roots.

Legalizing Results of World War II

First, the Soviets remain uncomfortable that the postwar European territorial situation has not been completely legitimized, regardless of the fact that power realities make any basic change in that situation highly unlikely. Thus one Soviet goal for the CSCE is that it serve as a kind of substitute for

-4-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

a formal peace treaty ending World War II. The degree of Soviet obsession with legal and institutional frameworks for de facto situations is often difficult for the outsider to appreciate. Nevertheless the Soviets evidently do feel a need for a general but formal Western agreement to the territorial status quo of postwar Eastern Europe, and especially the Oder Neisse boundary between Poland and Germany, and the existence of two Germanies.* Inviolability of existing frontiers has long been a staple of present Soviet leaders' public statements on European policy,** and this concept has been one of the two or three persistent ingredients in official and semi-official Soviet statements of issues for a CSCE. A July 1970 Novoye Vremya article on CSCE, for example, by one K. Lavrov, reportedly a pseudonym for a high Soviet official, strongly implied that CSCE declarations would be a substitute for a European peace treaty.

**The Soviets have already achieved the essential elements of this territorial recognition, of course, in the Berlin Agreement and the German treaties with the USSR and with Poland. What they want the CSCE to accomplish is a broadening of the legal framework of that recognition.*

***E.g., Brezhnev's report to the 23rd Party Congress in March 1966, Kosygin's report on foreign and domestic policy to the USSR Supreme Soviet on 3 August 1966, Shelepin's 29 October 1966 address at the Kirgiz SSR 40th anniversary celebrations, a Suslov address to workers in Helsinki on 2 November 1966, and Kirilenko's April 1967 Lenin birthday address.*

-5-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

A More Flexible Policy For Europe

The European territorial results of World War II have of course long been maintained in fact by the static confrontation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. But more recent Soviet interest in another kind of European territorial guarantee has grown out of a fundamental change in Soviet policy thinking about Europe. For since at least 1967 Soviet European policy has been groping toward some realignment from Cold War confrontation to a more flexible, involved, and competitive relationship with Western Europe.*

De Gaulle's bridge-building to the east in the mid-1960s gave the USSR a taste of a less embattled relationship with one European power. And as early as April 1967, Brezhnev himself took his first tentative steps toward what has since become the European detente policy now closely identified with him. The occasion at that time was the Soviet Party chief's first major foray into foreign policy, following two years of intensive domestic political infighting to assert his Party leadership and achieve initial consolidation of his power. At Karlovy Vary, speaking to a conference of European parties and workers' groups, Brezhnev endorsed the July 1966 Warsaw Pact Bucharest call for a conference to address problems of European security, with this comment:

**Something similar has of course happened in Soviet-American bilateral relations, although the specific policy content is different.*

-6-

~~SECRET~~

...the 'cold war,' and the confrontation of military blocs, and the atmosphere of military threats, seriously hamper the activity of revolutionary, democratic forces. In conditions of international tension in bourgeois countries the reactionary elements become active, the military raise their heads, antidemocratic tendencies and anticommunism are strengthened.

Overall evidence of Brezhnev's policy views and leadership style as of early 1967 make it unlikely that he had himself embraced, much less formulated, any grand design for a detente at this point. But he was allowing a characteristically cautious feeler in the direction of a less static and less reactionary kind of competition with the non-Communist world.

In 1968, Soviet control of Eastern Europe was threatened by the "Prague Spring," a situation from which they extricated themselves only by extreme measures. There was little real enthusiasm among Soviet leaders for the decision to invade Czechoslovakia; rather, it was a case of their reluctantly concluding that invasion had become the only recourse.* The necessity of invasion represented a Soviet policy failure, an admission that the Czech situation had got so far out of hand that essential Soviet controls could be salvaged only at great cost. It is probable that this reduction of policy options to the lesser of two evils increased some existing

*Some reports had Brezhnev himself, but only after much hesitation, casting the tie-breaking vote of the Politburo for invasion.

~~SECRET~~

pressure at middle levels of the Party and other parts of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus for more farsighted, initiatory foreign policy planning in general; it is additionally plausible that this pressure from experts coalesced at some points with 1969 criticism from Brezhnev's leadership colleagues of his "lack of dynamism," his "treading water" on policy issues, and other forms of alleged unimaginative consensus policy-making.

In any case, events of 1969 put a CSCE into motion. First, the Sino-Soviet border clashes in March provided additional incentive for putting Soviet European relations on a more stable basis. An opportunity developed in September, dramatically, with the election of the Brandt government in West Germany. For Brandt's Ostpolitik furnished the Soviets with a logical occasion to modify their tirades against German revanchism and militarism, and gave Moscow some hope that the perennial "German question" might indeed be solved by de facto acceptance of two Germanies. Formal consummation of such a desire, however, had to await the working out of several of the most vital European security problems via the Soviet-German and Polish-German treaties and the Berlin Agreement.*

Consolidating Detente Gains To Date

Once these three agreements were finally assured in May 1972, the Soviets promptly increased pressure for the long-delayed CSCE. In part the conference would

**The Soviets resisted acknowledging that convening of a CSCE depended on prior completion of these three German agreements, but in practice they reluctantly lived with the delay on CSCE.*

~~SECRET~~

represent to the Soviets a culmination of the important steps taken thus far in the German treaties, the Berlin Agreement, and the French treaty toward "normalization" in Europe, but CSCE would be more than just an ornamental crown. In Soviet thinking, a CSCE would provide formal European, American, and Canadian acquiescence in present de facto political systems as well as territorial boundaries in Europe. Even more important, it would create the appropriate political atmosphere for the next stage of active Soviet participation in the new Europe.*

**A noteworthy reflection of such Soviet thinking appears in a 4 July 1972 Izvestiya article by correspondent A. Ye. Bovin, a former Central Committee official who has long been associated with a pragmatic, even reformist, element of the Party foreign policy apparatus:*

The breakthrough of cooperation into Europe demands withdrawal from the circle of conventional bloc concepts. Europeans need a European Europe, and not an Atlantic one. Of course, such a Europe will not remove the contradictions between socialism and capitalism. But its foundations of security will not be a 'balance of fear' but a balance of interests and cooperation in the interests of peace. It will replace the bloc structure with an effective system of multilateral guarantees and pledges backed up by the appropriate institutional apparatus. It will combine growing mutual ties which are advantageous for all with full mutual respect for national individuality and for the independence of every European state.

~~SECRET~~

Atmosphere For Future Soviet Involvement in Europe

The Soviets anticipate that the conference would confirm the relatively relaxed Western European attitude toward the "cold war" memories and would increase American domestic pressure toward a military/political disengagement from Europe, leaving the Soviets a benign political climate favorable to maximum exploitation of Western weaknesses and differences in the tough bargaining to follow on such substantive matters as force reduction and trade agreements.

Regardless of whether the Soviets ultimately do follow through with a serious attempt at European force reductions, they clearly want the political benefits expected of a CSCE before they engage in detailed discussions on the substance of MBFR. The Soviet fudging in summer 1972 of their May commitment to begin CSCE and MBFR preparatory talks at approximately the same time, and the nature of their new September proposal on timing,* confirm that they hope to forestall the serious stages of MBFR negotiating until CSCE results are in hand.**

**Multilateral consultations on CSCE preparations would begin on 22 November 1972; preliminary consultations on procedure and organization related to reducing forces and armaments, first of all in central Europe, would begin in late January 1973; a CSCE would begin its work in late June 1973; a conference on the problems of reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe would start in September or October 1973.*

***Gromyko had said in Belgium in July 1972 that one role of a CSCE was to establish, through its declaration of principles, the "right atmosphere" for MBFR. A
(footnote continued on page 11)*

-10-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Moreover, the Soviets seem to envision CSCE as the prelude, not just to substantive MBFR negotiation, but to further progress on a full range of their goals in Europe: e.g., making it difficult or impossible for European countries to unite politically or economically; seeking to eliminate or at least sharply reduce American political, military, and economic influence in Europe; perpetuating the division of Germany; strengthening Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe; extending Soviet influence to the rest of Europe as well; and creating a situation in Europe which would allow the Soviets to bring more force to bear, should they choose, along the Sino-Soviet border. Essentially these motives were attributed to the Soviets by a Chinese diplomat in Europe, a perspective remarkably close to that of some Western analyses of Soviet intentions in Europe. Even if such motives represent maximum future aspirations, Soviet hopes doubtless contain such general thrust, and Soviet plans doubtless include sufficient flexibility to attempt to profit meanwhile from European developments less favorable to these goals.

The existing Western European economic arena, for example, involves both hazards and opportunities for Soviet trade and technological development. The Soviets

(footnote continued from page 10)
primary spokesman of the Washington Soviet Embassy on CSCE and MBFR, Oleg Sokolov, had said in April 1972 that a CSCE would bring about a climate in which force reduction issues would be more easily discussed. A few weeks later he stated that the Soviets opposed expanding CSCE discussions to include the military aspects of security, since political issues should be resolved before attempting issues of military security.

-11-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

have recently eased their long opposition to the Common Market (ECE), but only with evident misgivings, and they have yet to formulate a definitive Soviet policy toward ECE.

The high degree of ambivalence involved in the USSR's movement toward some very conditional tolerance of ECE was evident in the August 1972 Soviet reaction to impending links of two European neutrals with ECE. On 18 August the Soviets acknowledged Austria's proposed trade arrangement with the ECE, but also asked Austria to confirm its understanding of the obligations of a neutral state, and requested that the Austro-Soviet Commission on Economic and Scientific and Technical Cooperation redress any "unequal conditions" resulting from the ECE relationship. In the even more sensitive case of Finland, Soviet leaders apparently indicated grudging acceptance of a Finnish trade agreement with the ECE to President Kekkonen in August.*

That Soviet attitudes toward the Common Market remain in reluctant and defensive early stages of rethinking, and retain as well a strong anti-"Atlanticist" element, was especially evident in 24 and 25 August 1972 Pravda articles by commentator Viktor Mayevskiy:

* [redacted]
[redacted] Soviet leaders' "reluctant approval" included emphasis to Kekkonen that Finnish political ties to Western Europe not follow trade ties, that Finnish leaders should ensure growth in trade with the USSR comparable to growth in trade with Western Europe, and that Finland's foreign policy must not change.

-12-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Europe needs true security on an all European basis and... development of equal cooperation between countries. Naturally, all European economic cooperation in no way excludes regional cooperation. The 'Common Market' in Western Europe and CEMA in Eastern Europe are realities of our time. However, the far-reaching isolation of the 'Common Market' and attempts to prevent its members developing normal trade relations with the socialist countries, and particularly the important aspiration of certain circles to give this community the nature of a political or even military association have nothing in common with the officially proclaimed aims of regional economic cooperation.

An Anti-American Element

The USSR would undoubtedly welcome a reduction if not elimination of American influence in Western Europe. Soviet statements on European security are full of references to a "Europe for Europeans," and reminders that the USSR is, after all, a European country. French diplomats received the impression in the months following Brezhnev's October 1971 visit to France that the CPSU General Secretary entertained "unnatural" hopes of a monetary crisis which might lead to an irreparable breach among European states and the US. The French observed that Brezhnev was apparently struck with the idea that the European Community, which in his view had originated as a US scheme for developing Europe into a cohesive anti-Soviet instrument, had evolved instead into a force which could be used to work against US influence in Europe and internationally.

-13-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The Soviets presumably consider, however, that there are definite limits to their ability directly to influence American withdrawal from Europe, but that there are other political-psychological forces at work in Europe and within the US which will in themselves work to curtail American influence. Realistically, Soviet desire to participate more fully and continuously in European affairs doubtless involves a recognized interim need of being in a position to compete actively with whatever degree of American political, economic, and military influence remains in Europe.

-14-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

B. SPECIFIC RESULTS DESIRED BY THE USSR

Soviet conceptions of a CSCE's role in achieving their underlying policy objectives in Europe have taken concrete form in two primary measures on which the Soviets want agreement and action by CSCE participants. The first and most important of the two is a declaration of principles governing relations between states. A second important conference result desired by the Soviets is the establishment of some sort of permanent organizational mechanism to carry on CSCE work. In connection with this basic agenda, the Soviets have opposed any proposals likely to produce conference controversy and thus to spoil the atmosphere of at least outward pan-European harmony -- itself an underlying Soviet objective.

Declaration of Principles

The two basic elements which the Soviets want written into a CSCE declaration of principles are the renunciation of the use or threat of force in relations between states, and the inviolability of existing European frontiers. Discussing a proposed CSCE declaration of principles in June 1970, an authoritative article in the Soviet journal, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, stated that renunciation of the use of force involved more than the reiteration of UN Charter principles: that is, a CSCE treaty would affirm fundamental principles of peaceful coexistence, at a minimum the renunciation of war, in relations between European capitalist and socialist states; and recognition of states' territorial integrity and political independence would be organically inherent in this renunciation of force principle. This

-15-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

latter was specifically to involve "renunciation of intentions to recarve the map of Europe."*. Since the May 1972 US-Soviet Summit, a number of Soviet officials have suggested that something like its US-USSR Declaration of Principles, in the form of a multilateral treaty among CSCE participants, would be quite suitable for a CSCE.

Soviet concern that CSCE's first accomplishment be agreement to such a declaration of principles underlines the general Soviet penchant for insisting on a firm theoretical foundation before implementing specific policy measures. In the case of a CSCE declaration of principles, it has an important relation to Soviet domestic politics as well as the more obvious connection to Soviet interest in assuring a "legal" and atmospheric basis for extensive but ostensibly benign Soviet involvement in Europe. The renunciation of force and inviolability of existing borders formulations for a CSCE declaration of principles amount to a kind of definition for Europe of the Soviet concept of "peaceful coexistence," and for Soviets the declaration of principles would thus enunciate, in a doctrinal Marxist-Leninist sense, the ideological basis for a policy of detente in Europe. Once endorsed by the USSR as well as other CSCE participants, this kind of declaration of principles would make it much harder and riskier for Soviet hard-liners on foreign policy to snipe at future extensions of the European detente policy espoused by Brezhnev and his supporters.**

*N. Yuryev, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn No. 7, signed to the press 23 June 1970.

**The declaration of principles agreed to by the USSR and the US at the conclusion of the May 1972 Summit put a similar ideological leash on Soviet critics of various aspects of detente with the US, of course.

-16-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Freer Movement and the Inherent Risk of Detente

Apart from renunciation of force and inviolability of frontiers, and recent references to the US-USSR Declaration of Principles as a possible CSCE model, the Soviets have resisted going beyond generalized comments on the content of a CSCE declaration of principles, and usually have quickly changed the subject to procedures designed to ensure a relatively short and harmonious conference, capped (in recent scenarios) by the drama of a summit of European, US, Canadian, and Soviet leaders.

The Soviets have considered "controversial" any Western initiatives for an agenda item on "freer movement of peoples and ideas" in a CSCE declaration of principles. Some Soviet officials have hinted that something along these lines might be acceptable if it meant simply more officially-managed state-to-state exchanges, but anything smacking of uninhibited personal tourism or other contact has predictably set off strong defensive Soviet reactions. Earlier this year, Soviet diplomats countered the freer movement initiative by lobbying in Western capitals for some very general language on it to be included in CSCE proposals on cultural exchanges. A typical Soviet diplomatic comment was Washington diplomat Sokolov's demurral in mid-May 1972, that real debate on freer movement could lead to "damaging polemical exchanges" at a CSCE. Sokolov followed this observation with a realist-to-realist aside to his American diplomatic interlocutor that it would of course be unrealistic for Westerners to expect any far-reaching revision of Eastern European political and social systems.

Despite continuing reluctance among Western European countries to risk offending the Soviets at the outset of a CSCE by addressing the "freer movement" issue seriously, there emerged by early September general Western agreement to address the freer movement issue

-17-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

at CSCE in some direct fashion. US allies prefer some other terminology for "freer movement," in hopes of evoking a more forthcoming Soviet and Eastern European response.

One Soviet diplomat hinted in early September at possible flexibility in the Soviet position on freer movement, claiming that the USSR was not opposed on principle to its discussion but would not allow the West to use the topic as the basis of an intrusion into Soviet internal affairs. Given the typically broad and defensive Soviet concept of what constitutes its internal affairs, however, this diplomat's implied flexibility was probably more apparent than real. Indeed, N.M. Lunkov, the chief of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs department dealing with the UK, told British officials during the 15-20 September talks in London that Western proposals on freer movement amounted to an effort to interfere in the internal affairs of socialist countries. Lunkov stated that it would be a mistake to overload CSCE's agenda with subjects like freer movement, (or confidence-building measures relating to the behavior of armed forces in Europe), that are "too complicated." In general he stressed harmony and dignity as the desirable political atmosphere for a CSCE.

Soviet reaction to freedom of movement as Westerners understand the idea exposes, of course, the basic contradiction involved in all of Soviet detente foreign policy. The Soviets are presumably still prepared, as they demonstrated as recently as 1968, to take any steps necessary to ensure essential Party control within the USSR and in Eastern Europe, and to preserve Soviet influence in the latter as well. Indeed, disruption of internal stability and Soviet political and military control over all of Eastern Europe is the great risk the

-18-
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

USSR runs in any policy involving increased all-European contact, and Soviet ambivalence over the degree of risk present at any given time will doubtless continue to cause uneven progress in Soviet pursuit of the new pan-Europe. A frank CSCE debate on freer movement of people and ideas would confront the USSR with a double hazard. Such debate would pointedly remind Western participants of that which divides Eastern from Western Europe, and obscure that which unites all of Europe and constitutes the Soviet CSCE theme. Within the USSR and Eastern Europe, CSCE debate on freer movement would feed barely suppressed fears of detente's risky aspect -- the erosion of Communist party orthodoxy and control by Western influences.*

A Permanent Organization

Official Soviet references to the USSR's other main CSCE goal, a permanent organization to be formed by CSCE participants to continue the conference's work, have been vague, hinting that at most the Soviets envision a "consultative" body, which would nonetheless have "some executive authority."**

**Real freer movement of peoples would of course present the Soviet leaders with potential problems with their Warsaw Pact allies as well as with domestic hard-liners on ideological vigilance. For example, in March and April 1972 the Romanians and Hungarians indicated to Western contacts that they could agree to some freer movement in the Western sense, i.e., of individuals, so long as Western governments did not exploit it for subversive purposes.*

***This was the terminology used by Gromyko, for example, in a 29 June 1972 conversation with British Ambassador Killick.*

-19-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

Two "unofficial" glimpses of models of possible CSCE permanent institutional machinery have reached Western diplomatic circles indirectly, and provide some insights into what the Soviets may have in mind.

In February 1972 [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] of some views on possible permanent CSCE machinery put forth [REDACTED] by Nikolai Minchev, the chief of the Department of Political Research and Planning of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Minchev had suggested a regional organization, as provided for under Chapter 8 of the UN Charter, which would carry out "specifically European tasks independent of the UN." The Bulgarian diplomat had gone on to say that the organization should have "executive and control" functions to implement CSCE decisions. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] observed to his NATO colleagues that the Bulgarian idea sounded something like a Security Council of Europe, which, he added, was quite different from what NATO members had in mind.

There is of course plenty of precedent for Bulgarian floating of trial balloons for Soviet policy. The probability that this was the case with Minchev's model is increased by the existence of a Soviet "confidential working paper" describing possible CSCE permanent machinery, dated January 1971. This paper was leaked to members of several European delegations to the Geneva disarmament talks by a Soviet official at the talks who represented the paper as a "personal" effort which might be of general interest. The paper contains some comments on a CSCE itself, as a background to a description of possible permanent institutional machinery. It begins by assuming that:

-20-

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

- [REDACTED]
- If the Conference would succeed in evolving a system of interlocking measures for the maintenance of peace and security in Europe, coupled with a scheme for broad cooperation between the Governments of the States concerned, participating Governments would decide to set up permanent institutional machinery to operate the agreements reached on a continuing basis and thus "regularize" their cooperation.

 - The Conference would ratify a binding and legal treaty setting up the permanent organization, whose designation might be "The European Security Treaty Organization (ESTO)." The treaty would first set out the organization's "aims, purposes and principles," and then "define the system for the maintenance of peace and security by disarmament and related measures, renunciation of force, recognition of existing frontiers in Europe, provisions designed to forestall both political and economic misunderstandings"; and would provide "consultation and conciliation procedures for the peaceful settlement of any disputes that may arise." The treaty would further proclaim that "a visible security system must be organically linked with a system of cooperation between participating countries, irrespective of their economic and social systems, to ensure stable international relations..." Separate chapters of the treaty would thus set forth guidelines and "integrated bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental cooperation in economics and trade (including finance and investment); science and technology; culture and the protection of the human environment."

-21-

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- [REDACTED]
- The supreme organ of the permanent organization set up by the treaty would be an Assembly meeting annually, at the ministerial level, to "review the implementation of the Treaty in all domains." The Assembly would assess members for the permanent organization's expenses, using the UN formula.

 - An Executive Council, also at the ministerial level, would perform the Assembly's functions between Assembly sessions, meeting as often as required and at least quarterly. The Executive Council could deal with anything falling under the Treaty requiring prompt attention, but "... it would be understood that its main concern and preoccupation would be the observance of the system for the maintenance of peace and security."

 - The European Treaty Organization would be brought into relationship with the UN and its Security Council, and with other inter-governmental bodies as required. Both the Assembly and the Executive Council could set up subsidiary bodies and ad hoc working groups at expert level. "Normally, such groups, whose members would be kept to a minimum, would deal with technical matters in connection with the operation of the system of peace and security." (Comment: This kind of arrangement is presumably what has been meant by numerous Soviet official references, from Gromyko on down, to the possibility of a working commission set up by a CSCE becoming the forum for MBFR negotiations.) The "unofficial" January 1971 Soviet paper goes on to say, in connection with the permanent

-22-

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

organization's working commissions, that one might deal with the European Economic Community. Representatives of various other outside organizations, ranging from "sub-regional Treaty Organizations pending their discontinuance" (i.e., the Warsaw Pact and NATO), to CEMA and OECD, would also be invited to European Treaty Organization Assembly or Executive Council sessions.

- All Assembly and Executive Council decisions would be unanimous, excepting those on procedural matters which would use the UN's procedural voting formula. Whenever possible, however, consensus would be substituted for a formal vote on substantive matters.
- Finally, the European Security Organization would have a compact Secretariat, with its senior officials seconded from their national governments for five to ten years. A Secretary General, appointed for a non-renewable five-year term, would head the Secretariat.

While there is no present indication of how closely any Soviet permanent organization proposal at an actual CSCE might resemble this "unofficial" January 1971 model which is based so closely on the UN's organizational pattern, the January 1971 paper was undoubtedly intended as a Soviet trial balloon. Any permanent organization set up by a CSCE which even approached the dimensions of this model would, of course, involve the USSR permanently in virtually all European affairs.

- 23 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

Whatever precise form it may take, the USSR will almost certainly endorse some sort of permanent institutional machinery at a CSCE. The idea has been a persistent feature of Soviet comments on CSCE since Brezhnev advocated "some sort of permanently functioning mechanism for the practical elaboration and implementation of concerted measures" in his 12 June 1970 USSR Supreme Soviet election speech remarks on a CSCE. The 21 June 1970 Warsaw Pact declaration then promptly took up the call for a permanent organization to be established by a CSCE.

More recently, in June 1972, Gromyko argued strongly with [REDACTED] officials for CSCE permanent machinery. In August 1972 [REDACTED] reported that roving Soviet Ambassador Mendelevich had remarked [REDACTED] that the USSR attaches importance to the institutions or machinery to be created by a CSCE, since it "would trigger the Europeanization of Europe." [REDACTED] interpreted this to mean Soviet interest in diminishing US influence in Europe. Also in August, the [REDACTED] reported an East German view of a desirable CSCE agenda, which the East Germans had claimed was an agreed Warsaw Pact position and not simply their own: included in this agenda scheme was the establishment of a permanent organ which could plan future European security conferences and carry out the initial CSCE's mandates.

There is even a hint that the Soviets envision a post-CSCE European organization as a model for their proposed Asian Collective Security Pact. A Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs official recently questioned an [REDACTED] diplomat on the reasons for [REDACTED] lack of response to the Asian Security Pact idea. When the [REDACTED] responded by asking what specific national and regional relationships the USSR proposed, the Soviet suggested that the [REDACTED] would see next year,

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

from the organization which would be set up in Europe, what the USSR had in mind for Asia.

In the light of these persistent and strong expressions of Soviet interest in a CSCE permanent mechanism, Gromyko's efforts to play down Soviet advocacy in remarks to Belgian and Dutch officials during his July 1972 visits were almost certainly tactical. Gromyko carefully appeared not to be pressing for consideration of a permanent organization at a CSCE, and instead blandly allowed that the Soviets could accept an agenda item on it to please those Western countries that favored such a body.* Soviet policy planners presumably reason that widespread Western reservations about a permanent organization -- that it would abet Soviet intervention in European affairs -- might be lessened if the USSR could appear to be climbing on the bandwagon rather than leading it.**

Two European neutrals are reportedly preparing their own proposals on a permanent mechanism to present

**In the Hague he said a CSCE might possibly deal with the establishment of a permanent organ, in which, he avowed, the USSR has no special interest and about which it has an open mind.*

***OF US allies, the French have voiced the strongest reservations about the permanent mechanism aspect of CSCE, and its potential for increasing the difficulties of controlling Soviet involvement in Western Europe. It is possible that a cool French reaction to Gromyko's strong presentation to them in June was partly responsible for Gromyko's passive remarks on the subject the following month to the Belgians and Dutch.*

-25-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

to a CSCE. The Swiss intend to bring up a plan based on a distinction between disputes over interpretation of existing international law and treaties, which are susceptible to compulsory arbitration, and conflicts of a more political nature wherein one party demands change in an existing law or treaty, conflicts which are not suitable for compulsory arbitration. The Swiss advocate CSCE creation of a European arbitration tribunal to deal with the first category of disputes, and a European commission of inquiry, conciliation and mediation to attempt to resolve disputes in the second category. The Austrians are also reportedly considering a CSCE permanent mechanism proposal, one which would apparently involve a regional organization as provided for under the UN Charter. Sketchy available information on the Austrian draft indicates that it provides for an annual conference of this European regional organization at foreign minister level, preceded each year by a preparatory conference.

What little is known of the Austrian draft sounds rather close to available hints of Soviet ideas about CSCE permanent organizational machinery.* If the Austrians should in fact propose a UN type of European regional organization, the Soviets could endorse the plan, and simultaneously avoid some of the Western suspicion any proposal of their own would arouse.

In any case, the Soviets apparently accept the likelihood that some time would be required for realization of the full scope of the CSCE follow-on activities

**The Swiss have reported that the Soviets have thus far been noncommittal about the Swiss proposal. The Soviets have traditionally been cool, however, toward compulsory arbitration.*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

they seem to have as long term goal. [redacted]
[redacted] reporting of Brezhnev's remarks on European security, to the January 1972 Warsaw Pact meeting, included his position that it would be "advisable" for a CSCE to create some permanent group or secretariat as a central point through which ideas and exchange of information begun through a CSCE could be maintained in a continuing dialogue. Brezhnev suggested that a CSCE might initially found a European center for parliamentary cooperation, and he referred to a treaty of European political cooperation in terms only of a distant future target.

-27-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

C. SOVIET VIEWS OF A CONFERENCE'S RELATION TO MBFR

A European Security Conference probably comes as close to being non-controversial among Soviet leaders and officials as any plank in the detente platform can be. But this remains the case only to the extent that CSCE is kept pure of issues which raise the risky aspects of detente, such as freer movement of people and ideas, or the substance of European force reduction.*

Internal Soviet Controversy Over European Force Reduction

Soviet and Eastern European sensitivities to freer movement have already been discussed. European force reduction is apparently similarly controversial.

**Soviet internal sensitivities aside, there are some indications the Soviets have also had some difficulties with their allies over other potential CSCE agenda items as well, but have so far quashed them successfully. East German party chief Honecker was reported to have pushed hard for diplomatic recognition of East Germany as a CSCE agenda item during Brezhnev's late October 1971 visit to Pankow. An annoyed Brezhnev finally retorted that recognition would not solve all East Germany's problems. Furthermore, Brezhnev is said to have continued, if the European situation is normalized through a CSCE, recognition would follow naturally. Brezhnev told Honecker he was wrong to place recognition above the "major" issues of the conference.*

- 28 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Evidence of domestic Soviet criticism of MBFR is fragmentary, but it does suggest that there are some differences in the Soviet bureaucracy on whether, when, and how to proceed with negotiations on European force reductions. Some suggestive examples follow.

In late April 1971 Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs disarmament expert R.M. Timerbayev asked a US disarmament expert with whom he had long had a working relationship whether the US was really serious about MBFR. Timerbayev commented that there were grave doubts in Moscow "even among us" about US sincerity concerning arms control. The US official noted that Timerbayev has often made a point over the years of distinguishing Soviet disarmament professionals from harder line political, propaganda, and military circles.*

On 6 June 1971 the central organ of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, Red Star, noted in a commentary on a European Security Conference that the conference would create "necessary prerequisites" to such world problems as force reduction in central Europe. This was the first military comment on issues raised by Brezhnev's call for Western follow-through on European force reductions in a speech on 14 May 1971 in Tbilisi.

**At the time Timerbayev was a Deputy Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' International Organizations Department, which is the MFA component with primary responsibility for disarmament negotiations. Timerbayev was a delegate to SALT IV and V, and he has been a Soviet delegate to a number of Geneva disarmament conferences since the early 1960s.*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

In July 1971 a Polish delegate to disarmament talks in Geneva cautioned a US delegate against pushing too far or fast on MBFR issues in the early stages of their negotiation. It would be better to begin with general principles and token reductions, as "any effort to achieve something far-reaching too soon would strengthen the position of the conservatives in Moscow, Warsaw and elsewhere who do not desire progress on MBFR." He emphasized that this is a "very delicate question."

In August 1971 the Polish Ambassador with the Geneva delegation told a US delegate that the Polish Foreign Ministry had prepared an MBFR proposal and presented it to the Polish party leadership. When word of the proposal reached the Polish Ministry of Defense, it produced a strong negative reaction, and for the near future at least no agreed Polish position on MBFR seemed likely. The Polish Ambassador commented that he thought it a mistake for the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to have antagonized the military establishment this way, but he also recognized the validity of his MFA colleagues' argument that had they tried to coordinate their proposal in advance with the military, no proposal would ever have gotten to the top. He added that from conversations with Soviet colleagues he understood that a very similar event had occurred within the Moscow bureaucracy. The US delegate noted in reporting the conversation that the US delegation in Geneva had had indications that the Soviets were preparing an MBFR proposal, possibly for the 1971 UNGA session, but he had recently been told by a Soviet delegate that such a proposal now seemed unlikely.

In November 1971 the Soviet New Times correspondent in Bonn, Lev Bezymenskiy, an apparently well-connected and informed policy balloon floater on the German scene, told a [REDACTED] that Brezhnev was under

-30-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

pressure from some quarters of the Politburo and Central Committee to show results on Soviet CSCE efforts. The pressure, according to Bezymenskiy, came primarily from younger Central Committee members who felt that achievement of the current Five Year Plan objectives, including proposed consumer goods production increases, require military spending reduction. The correspondent went on to say that the Soviet military and some ambassadors to bloc countries oppose bloc to bloc troop reduction discussions. They believe bilateral discussions would allow the USSR to exploit the differing interests of the Western allies. Bezymenskiy said the debate over what form the force reduction talks should take was still in progress.*

Apparently it still is. Politburo alternate member and foreign affairs specialist Boris Ponomarev reportedly told British Labour Party shadow Foreign Secretary Callaghan during an August 1972 drinking session that the Politburo had not yet made any critical decisions on MBFR.

There would seem to be a number of reasons for apparent Soviet reluctance to begin serious negotiations on MBFR, at least before a successful CSCE has been staged. Among them are: insufficiently advanced and detailed

**Bezymenskiy's tale should of course be treated cautiously, because he was engaged in the Soviet effort to pressure the West Germans into rapid ratification of the Eastern treaties. Some truth may well be at the core of his comments, nevertheless. If so, it would, among other things, shed additional light on Soviet reluctance concerning MBFR explorations of a bloc-to-bloc character.*

-31-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Soviet preparations; French objections to MBFR; what probably appear to the Soviets to be excellent prospects for getting the cheap benefits of a CSCE in advance of embarking on the hazards of MBFR negotiations; reluctance to dim the limelight around their cherished CSCE; prospects for accumulating tactical advantages from unfolding NATO disarray on MBFR matters; a genuine aversion to anything smacking of "linkage," especially after their close call on the German treaties' ratification; and prospects that they can enjoy the opportunities afforded by US military and other withdrawal from Europe without MBFR bargaining.*

To this list this writer would add substantive and political disagreement, on both the wisdom and the content of MBFR, within factions of the Soviet bureaucracy affected. The evidence presented above of MBFR's controversial nature is admittedly fragmentary. But while present information does not allow analysis of the political influence, bureaucratic leverage, or probable tactics of MBFR opponents in the USSR, their existence at least is evident. And interest groups skeptical of MBFR would find a natural alliance on this issue with policy-level figures skeptical of detente in general.

Turning to the other end of the Soviet policy opinion spectrum, sentiment for curtailment of arms expenses is real enough among some Soviet leaders and some parts of Soviet and Eastern European officialdom, although it is scarcely universal or compelling. The amount of money European force reductions would save the Soviets is arguable (strategic arms limitation

**These reasons represent more or less the sum of views put forward by US observers.*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

agreements and foreign military aid cuts probably offer much more significant prospects for resource shifts from defense to other economic sectors), and European force reductions savings would obviously depend on specific agreements reached. Politically, however, resource reallocation could be held up in any case as a benefit of MBFR negotiations. So could an expected further improvement in European political atmospherics benefiting economic agreements and political influence favorable to Soviet interests.

Brezhnev's Position

Brezhnev's position on the European force reduction aspect of detente is not entirely clear. A [REDACTED] [REDACTED] reported that he complained to Tito during the two leaders' October 1971 discussions in Belgrade that Soviet expenditures for conventional and nuclear armaments, particularly missile systems, and for the support of North Vietnam and the Arab states, had reached intolerable proportions. This report should be treated with some caution, since Brezhnev could well have wished to try to disarm Tito with an impression of relative Soviet disillusionment with military outlays and military policy instruments. There is no available hard evidence on the degree of Brezhnev's own interest in MBFR. Nevertheless, some commitment to at least the serious exploration of MBFR feasibility and net benefits is a plausible extension of the European "peace program" with which Brezhnev is strongly and publicly associated. He also associated himself in March 1971 at the 24th CPSU Congress with increased consumer goods allocations, however limited or reversible these may turn out to be. Furthermore, Brezhnev did signal the first positive Soviet response to existing NATO proposals on European force reduction in a May 1971 speech in Tbilisi challenging the West to

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~


look into the details of reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe, notwithstanding an element of desire to deny the West all the political credit for supporting European force reduction which may also have motivated his remarks.

Whatever his real views may be on MBFR per se, Brezhnev now has the additional complication of some setbacks in other spheres this past summer. While poor weather's impact on harvests is just bad luck, Brezhnev is so closely identified with present agricultural policy that the political shadow of the misfortune falls partly on him. He is less out in front of his colleagues on Middle East policy, but his leadership inevitably suffers some tarnish from the Egyptian debacle in July. There is no present evidence that Brezhnev's personal political power has been undermined by summer events. But it would be more characteristic of Brezhnev's political style to avoid non-essential risks on controversial programs during a period of policy difficulties than to undertake a dramatic but hazardous policy initiative. Brezhnev probably does not see hard decisions on MBFR substance as necessary just now, and because they are controversial and risky he is likely to avoid more than the appearance of movement on MBFR until he has a CSCE success in hand as political insurance. By the same token, the CSCE that has always been a keystone of his European detente policy, supporting subsequent real political and economic gains in Western Europe, has assumed even more personal importance for Brezhnev.

-34-

~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~



~~Secret~~