TOP SECRET

[redacted]

29

SR/OCR

7 January 1963

[redacted]

THE STATE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AT THE NEW YEAR

Reference Title: ESAU XXI-63

[redacted]

DD/I Research Staff

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

THE STATE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AT THE NEW YEAR

This is a working paper, an early publication of our semi-annual report on the state of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The paper discusses developments since late August (the date of our last report).

We reaffirm in this paper our belief that, sooner or later, an open break between the Soviet and Chinese parties is probable; we make no estimate on the timing of the break.

The DD/I Research Staff would welcome comment on the paper, addressed to Harry Gelman, the principal analyst, or to the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Research Staff. All are at

THE STATE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AT THE NEW YEAR

SUMMARY

Beginning in late August, there was a visible increase in the rate of deterioration in the Sino-Soviet relationship, mainly as a result of Chinese initiatives. The Chinese began to allude to a break with Khrushchev as inevitable; moved against Soviet consulates and White Russian holders of Soviet passports in China; renewed lobbying among pro-Soviet parties in Western Europe; took further steps with their own supporters; renewed vigorous opposition to Moscow in the world front organizations; coordinated with Albania a public attack on Yugoslavia and Khrushchev's revisionist positions; convened a central committee plenum at which a decision to prepare for a break may have been taken; called home an unprecedented number of ambassadors for lengthy consultations; and resumed anti-Khrushchev discussions throughout China.

Through September and most of October, the Soviet party continued to show restraint. By the last week of October, the Soviet party felt obliged to strike back publicly, but Moscow apparently had not decided how hard a line to take toward the Chinese in the European party congresses in November. The Chinese helped them to decide, by attacking Khrushchev in strong terms for his backdown in Cuba and for his failure to support Peiping in its border war with India.

In the party congresses in November and early December, there was a striking escalation of the Soviet-organized attacks on the Chinese. By early December, Eastern and Western European Communist leaders (but not the Soviets) were vigorously attacking the Chinese party by name. The Chinese protested these attacks, placing the responsibility on (but not naming) the Soviet party and Khrushchev. A few days later, Khrushchev in a major speech denounced (without naming) those who had incited the Albanians and went on to speak with anger and contempt about a number of Chinese positions.

In a statement handed to the Czech congress and a subsequent editorial of 15 December, Peiping publicly defended itself, reminded its audience that Peiping had called for an international conference (the "only correct method of settling disputes"), and attacked Soviet positions (without naming the Soviet party or Khrushchev) in the strongest terms to date. The Chinese reaffirmed that they would not give in and that they were willing to accept a break.

The Soviet party has begun to reply by reprinting condemnations of the Chinese party (by name) by other parties. When this process has been completed, Moscow must decide whether to take the final step of attacking the Chinese party leadership by name in original Soviet comment.

We do not think that Khrushchev can yet make a strongly persuasive case for breaking with Peiping; it would be, at best, an on-balance case. But we think that sooner or later, Khrushchev will have taken all he can take from the Chinese and will decide to break. The decision would probably be defended in these terms: the dominant Chinese leaders cannot be overthrown or induced to change their policies; Peiping's supporters will not defect; there is less to lose from decisive action than from irresolution; and the best chance for reversing the unfavorable trend over the long term lies in breaking cleanly with the Chinese, henceforth attacking Peiping openly and employing against the Chinese all of the political and economic weapons at Moscow's command.

In sum, we continue to believe that an open break between the Soviet and Chinese parties, sooner or later, is probable; and that it is likely to come through a Soviet public attack on the Chinese party leadership. We are not attempting, however, to predict the timing of a break.

THE STATE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AT THE NEW YEAR

By the beginning of 1963, fourteen months after the 22nd CPSU Congress, relations between the Soviet and Chinese parties have degenerated to a point close to explicit public denunciation of each other's leaders--a step which would signal the rupture of interparty relations between Moscow and Peiping and begin to formalize the division of the world Communist movement into two organized camps.*

The Chinese party may have regarded this event as probable since the 22nd Congress, and perhaps as inevitable since late August 1962. The central aim of Chinese conduct toward Moscow since that time appears to have been to ensure that as large a portion of the world movement as possible places responsibility for the break when it comes upon the Soviet party and that as much of the Soviet majority in the movement as possible is persuaded at that time either to join the smaller Chinese camp or to weaken support for the CPSU.

In the face of more or less continuous violent attacks upon the Soviet position by the Chinese and their supporters since late August, the Soviet party until late October responded with comparative caution; there is some reason to suspect that this caution was motivated, among other things, by the Soviet party's concern over the solidarity of certain members of its own camp in the event of a break with Peiping, as well as by Soviet hopes to register gains in certain parties now leaning toward Peiping before an open break removed this opportunity. After the Chinese onslaught on Soviet policy toward Cuba and India, however, the Soviet position gradually hardened, and at four European party congresses throughout November and early December the CPSU organized a gradually ascending series of direct attacks on the Chinese party. The Chinese party, in turn, responded to this by publishing in quick succession a statement it had handed to the Czechoslovak party congress and a People's Daily

*The CEMA meeting of June 1962 began the process of formalizing the split in the bloc, as distinguished from the movement as a whole.

editorial, reaffirming Chinese defiance, surfacing much of the battle that had previously remained covert, calling upon the Communists of the world to "judge who is to blame" for the split which the CCP declares is now imminent, and avowing Chinese determination to convert Peiping's minority into a majority. These Chinese statements stop barely short of anathematizing Khrushchev and the CPSU leadership by name, and could be designed to provoke the CPSU into taking the initiative in (and the blame for) formalizing the split by publicly attacking Mao--whereupon the CCP would claim justification for responding in kind.

These recent events are best viewed against the background of Sino-Soviet relations earlier in the year, some details of which have only recently become available or been confirmed. It will be recalled* that, following the first cycle of Soviet-directed attacks on Albania and limited attacks on Communist China in the winter of 1961-1962, there was a period between late February and July 1962** in which the Soviet and Chinese parties sparred through an interchange of letters, each ostensibly addressed to the opposing party, but in reality written to appeal to the wider audience of the international Communist movement, to which versions of each letter were directed. While both sides professed an ardent desire for unity, each wanted it on his own terms, incompatible with those of the other: the CCP wanted an international conference of all the parties to be convened to mediate the Soviet-Albanian conflict impartially (i.e., to curtail the Soviet offensive against Albania), under the rule of unanimity (i.e., with a Chinese veto over all decisions); the CPSU would have none of this, wanted at the most a smaller, limited conference under majority rule to discuss not Albania but Chinese opposition to Soviet policies, and particularly wanted the Chinese to cease all such opposition. Through most of this period the two sides, each for its own reasons, were responsive to a North Vietnamese proposal in dampening

*See ESAU XX-62, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute (as of August 1962)."

**The last available letter during this period is a CPSU reply to the CCP dated 31 May 1962; there were probably others, as the Chinese party did not resume public attacks against the CPSU until August.

(although they did not halt) polemical public attacks upon each other, while simultaneously intensifying behind-the-scenes lobbying against the opponent throughout the world movement. In early June the USSR took a step toward the formal division of the bloc by admitting Mongolia to CEMA membership, while Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam remained outside with Albania. In early July--when Peiping seemed acutely aware of a need for the Sino-Soviet military alliance because of its fear of U.S. support for a Chinese Nationalist invasion--the CCP delegate to a Soviet-sponsored peace and disarmament congress in Moscow showed considerable restraint in presenting the Chinese viewpoint. A month later, however, at an anti-atomic bomb meeting in Tokyo, Chinese delegates privately complained bitterly at the degree to which they had had to subordinate their views at the Moscow meeting, and vowed that this would not happen again.

Thereupon, on 23 August, there began a renewed Chinese public campaign against Moscow which has continued to the present day. Speaking in Peiping on three successive anniversaries of bloc countries on 23 August, 1 September and 8 September, Foreign Minister Chen Yi inserted into his remarks statements implying that the CPSU had violated the norms of party behavior, had "replaced comrade-like discussions and consultations with mutual interference in internal affairs," and had indulged in "subversive activities." Simultaneously, the Albanians, who had apparently been under Chinese restraint, were now released to return to the attack upon Khrushchev; an Albanian politburo member did so in violent fashion on 24 August, the day after Chen Yi's first remarks.

Chen Yi's remarks about "subversion," and subsequent Chinese declarations that "subversion" would be repelled, suggested the possibility of a new and recent Soviet attempt to win over some members of the Chinese leadership. Peiping soon announced some personnel changes affecting military leaders, and the Chief of Staff called for further efforts by the armed forces "in defense /sic/ of the party central committee and Chairman Mao." In this connection, a Chinese official is reported to have said that there were indeed elements in the armed forces, notably the air force, which had favored reaching an accommodation with the USSR. In addition to the good possibility of fresh Soviet overtures to these and other elements, there were several reasons for a Chinese decision to resume the attack:

a) Negotiations over a conference had apparently broken down over the incompatible Soviet and Chinese views on its agenda and ground-rules. As was noted in DDI/RSM #1 of 1 October, this was indicated by Chen Yi's 1 September allusions to the "forcible imposition of views on others" and to the replacement of comrade-like discussions and consultations. The Chinese may well have concluded at about this time that they were never again going to obtain from the CPSU another such conference as the 1960 Moscow meeting, where they had been permitted before the eyes of the entire movement to defend their views, to defeat the Soviet party's efforts to impose its authority, and to force the inclusion of many Chinese positions in an equivocal published statement. The corollary, as Chen Yi indicated, was that the Soviet party henceforth would "replace" such conferences with new attempts at "forcible imposition" of its own views--particularly its views about CPSU authority in the world movement. An indication of such a Soviet intention was furnished publicly on 1 September in one of a series of Soviet broadcasts to Albania, which affirmed in the most vigorous terms since the preceding winter that the international Communist movement would "continue to deal hard blows" against "deviation and splitting." Moreover, by September it was probably becoming clear to the Chinese that an unprecedented juxtaposition of important European party congresses was being arranged for the five-week period extending from early November through the first week of December; the parties involved in this sequence eventually included three of the CPSU's firm Eastern European supporters (Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia) together with the largest and most revisionist Western European party (that of Italy). It must have seemed to Peiping that the uniquely close scheduling of so many congresses of the CCP's enemies was being stage-managed by the CPSU for some purpose inimical to the Chinese party. In short, Peiping now had to be prepared for the worst; and on 9 September for the first time since the 22nd CPSU Congress People's Daily carried an article attacking a 19th Century revisionist as a clear proxy for Khrushchev (a previous series of such articles had appeared only in the journal Red Flag). Moreover, in this article People's Daily for the first time alluded not to the possibility but to the inevitability of an eventual break with Khrushchev: it quoted Engels as declaring, with regard to the Bavarian revisionist Vollmar: "Whether today or later, it will be necessary to break with him."

b) Together with the apparent assessment by the Chinese that they were not going to be able to force the CPSU to agree to another conference on their terms, the probable Chinese suspicion that Moscow was preparing another move against their position later in the fall, and the growing Chinese conviction that a break with Khrushchev sooner or later was inevitable and had better be prepared for, there was a parallel factor impelling Peiping to resume the public assault on the CPSU: Moscow's further progress toward reconciliation with Yugoslavia. The dates of Brezhnev's late September visit to Belgrade were formally announced on 1 September, and by then it already seemed likely that Tito would visit the Soviet Union at the end of the year. Regardless of the degree of intimacy of Soviet-Yugoslav party relations resulting immediately from these visits, it must have seemed likely to Peiping that in the long run these relations would entail a further move toward the right on the part of the Soviet party and of all sections of the world movement susceptible to Moscow's influence. The Chinese probably regarded this prospect less as a danger to be averted (which they could not do in any case) than as one which created both an opportunity and obligation to attack the Soviet Union. In view of the relative restraint Peiping had exercised at the time of Gromyko's earlier visit to Belgrade in the spring, it probably seemed to the Chinese leaders that continued failure to attack this Soviet initiative would suggest weakness and would be dangerous to the Chinese position in the movement.

c) The Chinese were further impelled to attack by three more or less simultaneous developments in Sino-Soviet state relations, each of which prompted a formal Chinese government protest to Moscow. The first of these was the projected Soviet sale of MIGs to India, symbolizing as it did the entire course of Soviet policy toward the Sino-Indian conflict; Communist China is reported to have protested this deal to Moscow in September. The second was Soviet participation in discussions with the United States about an agreement to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapon ownership--such participation symbolizing the Soviet failure in recent years to assist China to acquire a nuclear capability. In a note of 4 September, Peiping is reported [redacted] to have vehemently protested alleged Soviet agreement "on behalf of the socialist bloc" to a proposal limiting dissemination of nuclear weapons. A third issue involved the Sino-Soviet border,

where incidents are reported to have occurred reminiscent of the one which took place in the summer of 1960 (and which evoked a Chinese government protest at that time). These new incidents are reported they are variously reported to have taken place in the late spring or summer of 1962. All the reports agree that the incidents involved certain of the minority peoples of Sinkiang; according to at one point an anti-Chinese demonstration took place during which the demonstrators made an effort to secure help from the Soviet consulate at Kuldja. It has been confirmed, in any case, that at some time during the spring or summer a substantial number of minority people fled across the border into Soviet Central Asia with the cooperation of Soviet authorities,* and that the Chinese government subsequently sent a formal and strongly worded protest to the Soviet Union. One report adds that it was being said locally in Sinkiang that "subversive activities by revisionists were to blame"--suggesting that this was at least part of the subversion to which Chen Yi and subsequent Chinese comment alluded. Other reports speak of a subsequent strengthening of Chinese border guard units along the Manchurian frontier; it is not unlikely that a similar reinforcement took place along the Sinkiang borders.

*In late May a U.S. Embassy official witnessed a program of Uzbek dancers in Tashkent in which Chinese Communist cadres and the PLA were ridiculed. At about the same time, and other Western diplomats were taken to the Sino-Soviet Central Asian border and told by Soviet officials of the contrast in conditions on the two sides of the border. On 15 June, a Soviet broadcast in Mandarin called pointed attention to the alleged success of Soviet policy in dealing with the Central Asian peoples of the USSR, emphasized that "people who oppressed people of other nationalities could not be called internationalist," and added:

> We demand that the Marxist-Leninist party in each socialist country deal properly with the problem of relations between the socialist countries in order to align the interests of nationalities in accordance with the common interests of the socialist camp.

With a multitude of reasons, then, for attacking, the Chinese in September began to move against the Soviets on a great many fronts simultaneously.

a) On 7 September, the Chinese reportedly threw a cordon of troops around the Soviet Consulate in Harbin, and are reported to have raided on the same day the quarters of the Association of Soviet Citizens in Harbin and other Manchurian cities. Subsequently, the departure from China of large numbers of White Russians (the great majority with Soviet passports) long resident in Manchuria was rapidly facilitated by the Chinese, suggesting a Chinese belief that the association and some of these Soviet citizens were used for espionage and subversive purposes by the USSR. Later in September, the two remaining Soviet consulates in China (Shanghai, and Harbin) were closed at the official request of the Chinese government.

b) On the interparty front, the Chinese apparently began to carry the struggle into the European stronghold of the CPSU; in early September they are said to have been showing documents (the contents of which are unknown) to representatives of the Dutch party, and presumably to other parties as well. Also in this period, the Chinese presumably completed negotiations with the Norwegian party for the lengthy visit which a delegation led by the chairman of that party, Emil Loevlien, paid to Peiping from mid-October to early December. Loevlien eventually had conversations with virtually all the top Chinese leaders, including Mao, and the Chinese bestowed considerable publicity upon the visit, suggesting they regarded it as something of a triumph for themselves. Simultaneously, the Chinese continued to maintain numerous contacts with and give strong propaganda support to those parties which in varying degrees supported them, particularly Albania, North Vietnam, Japan and Indonesia; a delegation from another supporter, the New Zealand party, was in Peiping during the Chinese central committee plenum in late September, after which the New Zealanders finally responded to a long-standing Albanian invitation to visit Tirana.

c) Simultaneously, in the second week of September the Chinese again began to oppose the Soviets vigorously at international front meetings. At a congress of the World Federation of Scientific Workers held in Moscow from 13-15 September, the Chinese delegate presented sharply polemical demands that the congress take a tougher stand "exposing U.S.

imperialism" and backing a more militant struggle for the national liberation movement. When Peiping's views were not accepted, the Chinese refused to take part in the voting--the first time they are known to have done this in an front organization meeting. On 21 September, Peiping compounded the injury by publishing these facts, which had been secret.

d) Meanwhile, the Chinese ambassador to Albania, who had been recalled home since the spring, publicly reappeared in Tirana on 17 September, and on that day the Chinese and Albanians began an obviously coordinated press attack on Tito, Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia, and Khrushchev's revisionist views generally, with the Chinese alluding to Khrushchev in thinly-veiled fashion and the Albanians using the same argumentation and naming Khrushchev. This attack was clearly timed for Brezhnev's 24 September arrival in Yugoslavia. On the same day that Brezhnev came to Belgrade, a plenum of the Chinese central committee was convened; and in the document eventually published by this plenum, as well as in Chinese statements for the 1 October National Day celebrations immediately thereafter, the Soviet Union was again implicity accused of subversive activities within the Chinese state and party, of great-nation chauvinism, and of vainly attempting to change the "correct" Chinese foreign policies through pressure.

e) Two weeks after this, on 13 October, the Albanian party organ Zeri i Popullit for the first time explicitly called for a split in the international movement, an open break, "however painful it may be," with Khrushchev and all who followed him. It is true that Tirana by this time surely was convinced that it was going to be pilloried again at the East European congresses in November, and would have had its own reasons for urging an extreme course upon Peiping. Nevertheless, the Albanians chose to make this public demand for the first time only after a Chinese Communist central committee plenum at which very important decisions were apparently taken; so Hoxha may have been following, as well as trying to influence, the trend of Chinese thinking. That the Chinese had reached some far-reaching decision was indicated by the fact that an unprecedented number of Chinese ambassadors were brought home for lengthy consultations shortly after the plenum, and by the fact that the North Korean regime soon did the same with its own ambassadors. Moreover, there is evidence to indicate that the Chinese party began to hold widespread anti-

Khrushchev discussion meetings with Chinese intellectuals (meetings such as those which had been conducted the previous winter and spring) well before the Cuban crisis arose. In short, the evidence suggests that the CCP plenum may have formally recognized the likelihood of a split with Khrushchev and may have approved measures to defend and advance Chinese interests in expectation of such a split. It is known that the Soviet party at some time thereafter--probably in late October or early November--was advising foreign Communists of its estimate that the Chinese party was now pressing for a clear line of demarcation between its friends and enemies in the Communist movement. Hoxha took a step in this direction in the course of a public attack on Khrushchev on 25 October, when for the first time he explicitly denounced the leaderships of the French and Italian parties. Similarly, Kim Il-sung in an address to the North Korean Assembly on 23 October aligned himself with Peiping more firmly than ever before by echoing the Chinese charges--clearly aimed at the Soviet party--of subversion, engineering of plots, double-dealing, and attempts to impose one's will in violation of the independence and equality of parties.

Throughout all this, in September and October, the Soviet party remained remarkably restrained. While continuing to maintain Soviet positions, to condemn "narrow nationalism," and to insist more firmly than ever that economic rather than political struggle is the ruling factor both in domestic and international affairs, Moscow nevertheless made no effort to match in its own propaganda the intensity of the Chinese and Albanian attack upon the CPSU. There were probably several reasons for this. First, Moscow knew, as Peiping and Tirana may not have known, that a grave confrontation with the United States over Cuba was possible at any moment, and was probably therefore reluctant to precipitate matters with the Chinese until the delicate task of emplacing the rockets in Cuba had been completed and the United States successfully faced down. For this reason, although the CPSU had long since decided to initiate a new offensive against the Albanians at the European party congresses in November in the glow of this Cuban victory (since the intention to launch such an attack seems the only reasonable explanation for the prior arrangement of this chain of congresses), nevertheless the Soviet party probably had not decided in advance how far and how directly to push this attack against the Chinese themselves. (In the event, the CPSU had to perform this operation against the background

of a defeat rather than a victory, and as will be seen, there appeared to be uncertainty in Moscow as to how far to proceed against the Chinese until the series of congresses was half completed.)

Moreover, the Soviet party had additional motives for restraint: it was probably worried about the continued loyalty of certain of the members of its own camp* in the event of a break with the CCP, and on the other hand it still had some hopes of reversing the tide in certain of the parties which had been leaning toward Peiping. It is known that the CPSU in this period felt that a final decision had not yet been made in North Vietnam, thought it still had a chance in the Indonesian party, and professed to believe that there might still be opportunities in one or more of the pro-Chinese group of Japan, North Korea, and New Zealand.**

By the last week of October, however, the CPSU had at last felt itself compelled to begin to strike back publicly. An unsigned editorial in the November issue of the Soviet-controlled international journal Problems of Peace and Socialism--signed to the press on 23 October--replied to the Zeri i Popullit article of 13 October, noting that the Albanians had "proposed to split the world Communist movement, to inflict a 'deadly blow' at the leadership of the CPSU, and at the price of 'any painful consequences' to 'put an end to the line' which the CPSU and the entire world Communist movement were following." The journal declared that in past struggles between the CPSU and its enemies the CPSU had always found the struggle facilitated when the enemy tore off his mask, that Hoxha and his group had now done this, and had thereby "facilitated the cause of the struggle against contemporary dogmatism." The article not only refused to concede that revisionism remained the main danger to the movement, but formally affirmed that in period such as the present "both

*For example, the Cuban, Norwegian, and Australian parties.

**With the possible exception of North Vietnam, these Soviet hopes seem unrealistic, not a good reason for refraining indefinitely from responding to the Chinese attack; nevertheless, they may have furnished a secondary reason for waiting.

revisionism and dogmatism are especially dangerous." It noted in cursory fashion that revisionists had been "ideologically overthrown" in the ranks of the Communist parties, and went on to emphasize at length that a similar pressing task now remained to be accomplished with respect to the dogmatists. The article concluded with the threat that "any attempt to split the workers movement, no matter from where it may come, will be beaten down by the revolutionary forces, like all those attempts which have gone before." Overall, the article confirmed that the Soviet party leadership by late October was resolved to renew the attack against the Albanians at the East European congresses the following month, but it did not indicate that the CPSU had yet decided what line to take toward the Chinese in these congresses.

The Problems of Peace and Socialism article was clearly written before the Cuban crisis began, although a parenthetical phrase was added at the last minute noting the announcement of an American blockade. The 22 October onset of this crisis, coming two days after the Chinese military offensive against India--and the Chinese political offensive against Khrushchev's policy toward Nehru--placed the CPSU temporarily on the defensive against the Chinese. On 25 October, Pravda momentarily abandoned the long-held Soviet neutral stance over the Sino-Indian border dispute to criticize the MacMahon line and support the Chinese terms for settlement. The Soviets have since privately termed this aberration an attempt to foster bloc unity in the face of the Cuban crisis, but it was more probably a temporizing concession offered to the Chinese in the hope of securing Chinese forbearance in the event a Soviet backdown on Cuba became necessary. The Chinese quickly spurned this gesture as grossly inadequate: on the one hand, a People's Daily editorial of 27 October made it plain that nothing would satisfy Peiping short of the total abandonment of Khrushchev's Indian policy and explicit condemnation of Nehru as an imperialist lackey; and on the other hand, after the Soviets did back down over Cuba the Chinese proceeded to pillory Khrushchev unmercifully as an appeaser.* Having lost considerable ground with India to no purpose, the USSR then began to edge back to

its previous neutral position; meanwhile, spokesmen for the CPSU camp were occupied with defending Khrushchev's Cuban retreat and condemning the Chinese attacks on it (indirectly) as irresponsible and adventuristic. It was on this note that the series of European party congresses began in November.

The most striking point about the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Italian and Czechoslovak party congresses held between 5 November and 8 December was the manner in which the attack on the Chinese position organized by the CPSU gradually escalated. Soviet conduct throughout suggests a shifting concensus of CPSU opinion about how far to go, as the Chinese reaction was appraised and debated in Moscow.

a) Thus at the Bulgarian congress, first secretary Zhivkov began on 5 November with an attack on the Albanians which did not name the Chinese. Suslov, the Soviet delegate, spoke the next day and named neither. The Chinese representative, Wu Hsiu-chuan, spoke on the 8th, furnished a strong implicit criticism of Soviet policies, insisted that revisionism remains the "main danger" for the Communist movement, and then criticized Zhivkov's attack on Albania as "repeating a vicious practice which destroys the international solidarity of the proletariat." During the next five days most of the foreign delegates who spoke joined the attack on the Albanians, and the Chinese delegate absented himself from the congress in implicit protest (as the CCP had previously done at the 22nd CPSU Congress); but very few of the foreign representatives chose (or, apparently, were urged) to attack the Chinese explicitly. On 14 November, Zhivkov closed the congress with a vigorous speech rebutting the Chinese arguments and again assailing Hoxha, but once more failing to name the Chinese party.

b) Next, on 18 November, Ponomarev, a CPSU central committee secretary and a specialist in liaison with other Communist parties, published an article in Pravda which evidently represented a compromise position within the Soviet leadership at that stage. Ponomarev strongly defended the whole range of Soviet policies against the "hysterical impulses" favored by the CPSU's opponents, and attacked the "nationalism" and dogmatism displayed by the Albanian leaders for their "slander" of the CPSU. However, Ponomarev not only failed to refer, even indirectly, to Chinese support for the Albanians; he also conceded points to the Chinese by admitting that revisionism

remained the main danger to the movement, by criticizing the program of the Yugoslav party, and by recognizing that the struggle against revisionism "remains an important task of Communists"--all assertions omitted or contradicted by the 23 October Problems of Peace and Socialism editorial. These slight modifications of the Soviet position apparently did not sit well with the Italian party, which has consistently attempted both to push CPSU policy to the right generally and to bring the quarrel with Peiping further into the open than Moscow was prepared to do at any given stage. On 19 November, the Italian party organ Unita, in reporting Ponomarev's article, declared that although the article was aimed against Albanian positions, "we cannot fail to reveal the preoccupation of the Soviet comrades with the positions taken by the leaders of the Chinese Communist party at the tribune of the 22nd Congress and finally during the Cuban crisis." (emphasis added)

c) Unita seemed to be lobbying for a more forceful CPSU stand at a time when a CPSU central committee plenum was about to convene. At any rate, a slight increase in pressure on the Chinese was shown in the conduct of the Hungarian party congress, which opened on 20 November, while the CPSU plenum was in session. First Secretary Kadar not only attacked Tirana in his opening speech, but added the gratuitous remark that "we condemn the dogmatist and sectarian trend... /as a/ current no less harmful than revisionism"--a position like that of the Problems of Peace and Socialism editorial and unlike that of Ponomarev. In contrast to Suslov at the Bulgarian congress, the Soviet delegate Kuusinen now proceeded to join in the attack on Albania; and after the Chinese delegate had repeated his Sofia performance (rebuking this "vicious practice" and subsequently absenting himself), Kadar closed the congress not only with a repetition of his stand on Albania but also by administering a gentle but explicit rebuke to the Chinese Communist party--the first time a bloc leader had named the Chinese in this way since the campaign in the weeks after the 22nd CPSU Congress.

d) There followed a pause of about a week, during which a further considerable evolution of Soviet policy seems to have taken place. The Italian party congress was held from 2-8 December, and the Czechoslovak congress from 4-8 December; and except for the fact that Togliatti took a more explicit line than Novotny toward Peiping initially, the two gatherings followed a new and very similar script. Togliatti on 2 December

and Novotny on 4 December each opened his congress by attacking the Albanians; but Togliatti went beyond this to indict the Chinese explicitly for their past defense of Albania, for the stand they had taken at the 1960 Moscow conference, for their prompting of Tirana to attack Khrushchev over Cuba, and (more mildly) for their policy toward India. Next, Kozlov in Rome and Brezhnev in Prague each vigorously condemned Hoxha, but failed to name the Chinese. The Chinese delegate in Prague on 5 December repeated his familar denunciation of this practice of "one-sided attacks," extending it now to recall that this practice "started a year ago and has since been repeated several times." The Chinese representative in Rome, meanwhile, had responded the day before by declaring that since the CCP had been attacked publicly, he was "compelled" to state frankly that the CCP did have differences with "certain" of the Italian comrades on such subjects as the theory of structural reform,* Yugoslav revisionism, the attack on the Albanians and others. Following this, Koucky and Pajetta --those members of the Secretariats of the Czechoslovak and Italian parties, respectively, charged with responsibility for liaison with foreign parties--each got up and delivered the major response to the Chinese on behalf of his party. Each attacked the Chinese directly, using violent language, and at length, with Pajetta professing particular indignation at the attempted Chinese "interference" in the Italian party. Next, most of the foreign delegates to the Italian and Czech congresses this time were given the signal to attack not only the Albanians, but also the Chinese for supporting Albania, and did so. Finally, Novotny and Togliatti each retorted to the

*This refers to the Italian CP variant of the familiar Soviet thesis that a peaceful transition to socialism may be prepared through the gradual accomplishment of "democratic" reforms in the structure of political, economic and social institutions through a combination of parliamentary struggle and struggle by the masses outside of parliament. The Chinese have been particularly exercised at the influence of this doctrine via the Italians on both the Japanese Socialist party and the former Kasuga faction of the Japanese Communist party, and they probably had this in mind when they brought up the question.

Chinese by name in his closing address. These attacks were published by Peiping in the People's Daily.

During the course of the Czechoslovak congress, before Novotny delivered his final speech on 8 December, the Chinese leadership evidently came to a further decision, and furnished its delegation in Prague a statement which was handed to Novotny on 8 December and read by him to the congress. The Chinese delegation, in this statement, professed to be shocked and surprised at the attacks made on the Albanians and Chinese at the congress; it warned that this practice "can only deepen differences and create splits;" it said that some parties "are going further along the road toward a split," that this practice "has already produced serious consequences and if continued, it is bound to produce even more serious consequences;" it placed responsibility on Khrushchev and the Soviet party (although not by name) to take the initiative to restore relations with Albania through "consultation," since the CPSU had made "the first attack;" it recalled that the Chinese and other parties had called for a meeting of all parties (a fact previously not acknowledged publicly); it declared that the purpose of such a meeting would be, first, to "clarify what is right from what is wrong" (i.e., to condemn the CPSU), second, to "strengthen unity", and third, to "stand together against the enemy;" and finally, it said that the CCP regarded itself as facing an "anti-China chorus coming from the side of imperialism, reaction and revisionism," and that the Chinese party had grown strong fighting such enemies and would continue to do so.

The existence of this document was not revealed by Czechoslovak or Soviet propaganda on 8 December, but it was disclosed and certain of its contents were summarized by Unita the next day; once again, the Italian party appeared to be taking the lead in bringing matters out into the open. On 10 December, Pravda published summaries of the concluding speeches of Togliatti and Novotny, including their anti-Chinese remarks; the existence of a Chinese statement was reported in a parenthetical remark, but the Chinese call for a meeting of the parties was not disclosed.

Instead, two days later, Khrushchev delivered a major address to the Supreme Soviet (in Tito's presence) in which he defended his actions in Cuba against the Chinese criticisms;

charged that certain "foul-mouthed scoundrels" had instigated Albania to attack the CPSU; and claimed that "certain dogmatists" had "slid down to Trotskyite positions" and were trying to drive the USSR and the bloc into world war because they had lost faith in the possibility of socialism winning without war. Khrushchev sarcastically referred directly to the Chinese failure to seize the colonial enclaves of Hong Kong and Macao and attacked the Chinese paper tiger thesis with the comment that the tiger has nuclear teeth. He made it plain that he deplored the Chinese attack in India, and noted sarcastically that some people would call the Chinese pullback there a retreat such as the one he was being charged with in Cuba. Khrushchev said the Yugoslavs had taken a correct position on Cuba, and that "the crisis over Cuba showed precisely that those were most dangerous who stood and stand on a position of dogmatism." He said that "leftwing opportunism" had now developed "beyond the infant stage," that it was being fed by nationalism, that it was now manifesting itself "in the actions of a party which is in power and from whose policy the destinies of nations to a great extent depend," and that this was "unbearable." From all this, he concluded that "leftwing opportunism" was now "no less dangerous than revisionism" (emphasis added)--signalling the triumph of the line taken by the November Problems of Peace and Socialism editorial over that voiced by Ponomarev on 18 November. Pravda duly ratified Khrushchev's new doctrinal formula in an editorial the next day, and it may now be expected to remain a feature of Soviet arguments against the Chinese.

It was then the Chinese turn to speak. Since the Soviet camp (or the disciplined portion of it) had declined to give publicity to the 8 December Chinese delegation statement, Peiping released that statement on 14 December.* On the next day, People's Daily followed this up by publishing an editorial

*Unlike the earlier CCP correspondence with other parties in which the CCP had defended its position and demanded a multiparty conference, this 8 December Chinese statement was not sent through covert party channels but was presented to be read to a large gathering at which nonbloc Communist newsmen were present; thus it was clearly intended to be made public, and indeed was phrased so as to appeal to a wide audience in the international movement.

which has brought the two opponents to the verge of an open split. This editorial defended the Chinese "paper tiger" thesis and insisted that it was "entirely a Marxist-Leninist concept." It defended the Chinese lines on India and Cuba and, without naming the CPSU or Khrushchev, suggested that he had been guilty both of the sin of adventurism for placing his missiles in Cuba (a course the Chinese would certainly have favored at the time if a pullback had not been part of the original plan) and the sin of capitulationism for taking them out. It again attacked the practice of "one-sided censure" of itself and the Albanian party, and cited the statement it had made on this point at the 22nd CPSU Congress. It denied that the Chinese party was guilty of nationalism, and suggested that it was the Soviet party and the USSR which was guilty of "big-nation chauvinism," since the Soviets "have insisted that everybody else follow their example and accused anyone of 'nationalism' who refused to obey their orders." It declared that it was "the Chinese Communists and all other true Communists" who were upholding the 1957 and 1960 Moscow statements, and not those others who were attacking the CCP as dogmatic. It warned publicly, as Teng Hsiao-ping had done in a speech at the 1960 Moscow Conference, that the Chinese party would never accept Soviet authority merely because the CPSU now had a "temporary majority," and indicated its willingness to accept or even to initiate a split, recalling that Lenin and the Bolsheviks, too, had been in the minority before breaking with the Second International.

Two weeks later, on 31 December, another People's Daily editorial continued the Chinese counterattack against the Soviet camp with a lengthy reply to Togliatti's criticisms of the CCP at the Italian party congress. In addition to asserting and defending once more the Chinese doctrines on war and revolution (repeating, among other things, that Cuba was a "Munich pure and simple," and insisting that the paper tiger thesis will always be valid "no matter what kind of teeth" imperialism may possess or acquire), this editorial furnished a detailed indictment of the Italian party's "structural reform" plan for peaceful transition to power, labelling this Soviet-approved line as not only revisionist but also as representative of "a new social-democratic trend within the international Communist movement."

The editorial said that the Italian party's congress had become "an outstanding part of the adverse current which has

recently emerged which is opposed to Marxism-Leninism," and that Marxism-Leninism is now "at a new and important historic juncture," in which the struggle between the "Marxist-Leninist trend" and the "anti-Marxist-Leninist revisionist trend" is being placed "on the Communist agenda in all countries in an acute form." (Emphasis added) While thus indicating Peiping's belief that a showdown between its own supporters and those of the CPSU will soon take place throughout the world, the editorial declared that Togliatti "and those comrades who share his views" are "increasingly departing from Marxism-Leninism". Although People's Daily expressed the pious hope that these comrades "will not plunge further," and repeated its call for a conference, it added what appeared to be another warning of Peiping's readiness to accept a split:

> However much they may have done for the workers movement in the past, no person, no political party, and no group can avoid becoming the servant of the bourgeoisie and being cast aside by the proletariat, once they depart from the road of Marxism-Leninism and step on and slide down the road of revisionism. (Emphasis added)

The Chinese delegation statement and the two People's Daily editorials of 15 and 31 December together constitute, as People's Daily said, a "challenge" to the opponents of the Chinese to go further if they dared. It has been reported, although firm confirmation is not yet available, that the Soviets responded by initiating jamming in the Moscow area (although not elsewhere) against Chinese Russian-language broadcasts of 15, 16, and 17 December; if true, this will have been the first such Soviet action against Peiping. This unfraternal Soviet gesture has been accompanied by what appears to be the beginning of a campaign in which other parties supporting the CPSU will pass resolutions condemning the Chinese explicitly, each to be printed in selective form in Pravda; the first such case occurred with Pravda's coverage of a French central committee resolution of this type on 17 December.*

*The French resolution as reported by Pravda said explicitly that dogmatism now "has become the main danger" for the world movement--going one step beyond even Khrushchev's formulation. On 19 December, Pravda carried excerpts from Thorez's speech criticizing the Chinese by name for continuing their "subversive activities" designed to split the movement.

After having exhausted the possibilities of this phase, the leadership of the CPSU will then be faced with the difficult decision of whether or not to accept the Chinese challenge--and accept with it the onus for the split--by publicly attacking the Chinese party and its leadership in original Soviet comment. The question of whether a greater loss to the CPSU would now be occasioned by breaking with the Chinese or by continuing to refrain from this step is probably being earnestly debated by the Soviet leaders right now, as well as by the Chinese leaders from their point of view.

The Soviet and Chinese leaders were debating that question a year ago too, and at that time, anticipating a steady increase in Soviet pressures on Peiping, we estimated (see ESAU-XVII, February 1962) that a break between the Soviet and Chinese parties in the period between autumn 1962 and mid-1963 was more likely than not, if there were no large new factor introduced such as a change in the leadership of either party. Looking at the state of the relationship again in August 1962, however, our February estimate seemed to have been too optimistic; it seemed to us (see ESAU-XX, August 1962) that, while the relationship had indeed continued to deteriorate, the pace of the deterioration was slow, probably too slow to bring a break by early 1963. It even seemed possible, judging from important indications and expressions of Soviet interest (in the first half of 1962) in just that question of a change in the Chinese leadership (bringing to power those wishing to reach an accomodation with Moscow), that Khrushchev had decided against initiating a break, at least until he had concluded that he had nothing to gain from maintaining his contacts with pro-Soviet forces in the Chinese leadership.

This same factor--of actual and potential pro-Soviet forces and Khrushchev's relations with them--may still be important. It seems clear enough from Chinese remarks about "subversion" and from personnel changes and related statements and reports, that the dominant Chinese leaders as late as autumn 1962 believed (as we did) that there was a threat to them from pro-Soviet forces,* but it is not known whether the USSR was directly involved with these elements and, if

*Chinese comment in October on the communique of the 10th plenum of the CCP central committee hinted (as the communique did) at a continuing threat of Soviet subversion "within the CCP."

so, whether Khrushchev has since concluded that he no longer has significant assets in the Chinese party with whom he ought to keep contact.

If Khrushchev has indeed come to this conclusion, then the main question for Soviet consideration must be the effect of a break on the position of the CPSU in the world Communist movement. We do not believe that the point here is, as is often said, that of whether the "unity" of the movement is to be sacrificed: while it is true that the loss of this concept is painful, as it is a part of the argument for the "inevitable" triumph of Communism, the loss has already occurred. The concept is used now as a rallying cry by both camps, with each calling for unity around itself, and is thus manifestly absurd as a description of the movement; as a practical matter, the concept is now chiefly useful to such parties as the North Vietnamese, who want to stay in the good graces of (and thus get aid from) both Moscow and Peiping.

The point, rather, as we think Moscow sees it, is that the Chinese are using their position within the movement to erode Soviet authority in other parties faster than the CPSU can shore up points of old erosion*--in other words that, as things are now, the Soviet party is playing a losing game. The question is thus framed, for Moscow, as that of what course would reverse this trend or at least slow the rate of loss.

As we have noted, an important factor restraining the CPSU from breaking with the CCP has been the Soviet hope of making headway in parties which have taken a nearly neutral position (such as the North Vietnamese party) or are leaning markedly to Peiping but are parties in which Moscow believes itself still to have important assets (such as the Indonesian party). Moscow has apparently feared that an open break with Peiping and the initiation of widespread purges among the parties of the Soviet camp, with the Chinese party openly proclaiming itself the leader of the orthodox revolutionary

*Thus the Cuban government newspaper Revolucion has demonstrated Castro's feelings by republishing the text of the 15 December People's Daily editorial.

camp, purporting to represent about half of the world's Communist party members, would cost Moscow some ground. That is, a break would push the on-balance supporters of Peiping into the position of clear supporters (the North Vietnamese would become more like the Indonesians), and would push the clear supporters into the position of strong supporters (the Indonesians would become more like the North Koreans), thus making the eventual recovery of Moscow's position that much more difficult. Further, in some parties leaning toward the CPSU in which the pro-Chinese minority is large (as in the Indian party), an open Sino-Soviet break would mean an important split in the local parties and a weakening of their positions, which the CPSU has been reluctant to see when the local party was itself important.*

On the other hand, by anathematizing the Chinese and adopting the Leninist policy of "better fewer, but better," the Soviet party would be in a better position than it is now to try to induce obedience among those parties in its own camp which have been lukewarm in their support or have even been flirting with the other side, and to insist on purges of open and covert friends of the Chinese from parties which up to now have apparently been unwilling to take this step (e.g., the Belgian, Swedish, Norwegian and Australian parties). As things are now, a lukewarm supporter of the Soviet party being pressed by Moscow can retort that there is obviously no urgency about declaring its strong support of Moscow and purging the pro-Chinese, as Moscow itself has not taken the situation seriously enough to break with the offender.

*We do not believe that the role Peiping can play in support of Soviet foreign policy would be an important restraining factor in a Soviet decision as to whether to break with Peiping: the Chinese are chiefly useful as a threat to be employed (in the Far East) in support of one or another Soviet initiative. But the usefulness of Peiping in this connection depends on the Chinese being disciplined partners. As things are now, Peiping's usefulness as a threat would seem at least balanced by the damage that Peiping does, as a member of the bloc, to a Soviet foreign policy nominally based on Khrushchev's theses of the non-inevitability of war, the need for "peaceful coexistence," and the increasing prospects for Communist accession to power by peaceful means; a break would absolve the USSR of responsibility for Peiping's ventures.

We do not think that Khrushchev can yet make a strongly persuasive case, on the basis of purely rational considerations, for breaking with Peiping. It would be, at best, an on-balance case. But we think that there is an emotional factor in Khrushchev's decisions, and that this factor, sooner or later, will help to tip the scales. In other words, Khrushchev will have taken all he can take from the Chinese, and will persuade the CPSU leadership to precipitate a break. The decision to break would probably be defended in terms something like this: the dominant Chinese leaders probably cannot be overthrown or induced by pro-Soviet forces to change their policies*; the CPSU cannot reasonably expect any defections from the ranks of Peiping's supporters; Moscow would have less to lose by acting decisively than by continuing to act irresolutely; or in positive terms, the Soviet party's best chance for reversing the unfavorable trend over the long term (recognizing the possibility of some additional early losses) would lie in breaking cleanly with the Chinese, henceforth attacking Peiping openly and employing against the Chinese all of the political and economic weapons at Moscow's command, while taking as much profit as possible from the concept of the "unity" of the Soviet camp--which would still be composed of the great majority of the 90 Communist parties.

In sum, we continue to believe that an open break between the Soviet and Chinese parties is probable; and that it is likely to come through a Soviet public attack on the Chinese party leadership, by name.** We are no longer attempting, however, to predict the timing of a break.

---

*The picture would be more complex if Mao were to die or retire in the near future. There might be at least a superficial improvement in Sino-Soviet relations as a result of conciliatory gestures from both sides, but it seems likely that the relationship would again deteriorate for much the same reasons as it has since 1956.

**It is of course possible that the Chinese party, concluding that it cannot force the Soviet party to take the initiative and bear the onus for a break, will itself make the break by publicly attacking the Soviet leadership by name. But we think that Moscow will pre-empt this conclusion by reaching its own conclusion to make the break.